TELOS

Number 56 Summer 1983

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INTRODUCTION

The discussion begun over a year ago (in *Telos* 51) concerning European peace movements has apparently raised a number of political and theoretical issues which have necessitated a new special section on the subject — notwithstanding the fact that additional contributions have appeared in almost every number of the journal since the outset of the debate. The main questions have to do with the collusion between a resurgent German nationalism and the peace movements, the Left's traditional misreadings of the character of the Soviet regime and its international role, the function of American missiles in Europe, etc. But beyond all this lurk more substantial issues concerning the meaning of Left politics in the 1980s. No longer related to a "revolutionary" proletariat, a robust anti-war movement or even the counter-culture of over a decade ago, Left politics in the United States has either become franchised to particular interest groups — women, gays, etc. — or increasingly ghettoized in the academy, where it thrives as the vocation of frustrated, politically impotent intellectuals. Yet, to the extent that theory cannot provide its own substance (however often it may try to do so, by engaging in meta-discourse), it needs an objective political referent. The current fad with communication and language, of course, provides what appears to be a suitable topic, but, on closer inspection, it turns out to be lacking. What is needed is a political *agency* which radical intellectuals would then theoretically articulate and represent. If "new social movements" did not exist, they would have to be invented.

Thus, hiding behind all this chatter about "new social movements" is the figure of the politically marginalized intellectual whose social function has been in crisis at least as long as Leninism or socialism. Notwithstanding the theoretical flimsiness of so much "new class" theory, its problematic is central and in need of considerable elaboration — much more so than new or reactionary social movements. At any rate, this debate is far from exhausted. In the next issue, its theoretical underpinnings will be more systematically discussed.

Much has been written about the New Right, but general evaluations of its economic policies have not been readily available. Shapiro and Kane here undertake to analyze theories of stagflation and the New Right's overall economic strategy. In a similar vein, Hearn examines the possibilities of corporatism in the United States, Luke discusses the impact of the informational revolution on ecology, and Habermas compares neoconservative cultural criticism in the United States with its West German counterpart.

The natural gas pipeline between Siberia and Western Europe may no longer be in the headlines. Still, the issue that it raises — increasing European reliance on the Soviet Union and, along with it, indirect support for the Soviet economy — has yet to be resolved. Nor has the pipeline's ecological cost been exhaustively treated. In this issue,Boris Komarov (a pseudonym for a high-ranking Soviet bureaucrat) traces out the devastating impact on Siberia that this project will have. He thus provides further evidence of the social irresponsibility of a 'really existing socialist society" that has managed to shield itself from all internal criticism.

In addition to a number of book reviews dealing with subjects ranging from Cambodia to Foucault to Adorno and Marcuse and Sullivan, this issue includes two interviews with Adorno never previously translated, as well as an analysis by Grady of the rise of child abuse as a social issue that provides cushy jobs for an army of well-paid "professionals."

Paul Piccone

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

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

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STAGFLATION AND THE NEW RIGHT

by Ian Shapiro and John Kane

The economic policies of the New Right in Britain and in the US rest on a novel analysis of the current stagflation and generate prescriptions counter to the Keynesian wisdom that has dominated economic policy making since the war. Despite differences between the fiscal and tariff policies of the Reagan and Thatcher administrations, and despite the fact the some of these policies were in fact begun by the previous Carter and Callaghan administrations, these two governments share enough common ground in economic, social and political philosophy, in the results they have tried to achieve and in the results they have in fact achieved (not the same thing) to be usefully considered together.

The main component of the stagflationary crisis to which the New Right has addressed itself has been the phenomenon of continuous inflation. Its leaders have offered a demand-pull analysis of inflation which is false and which, at any rate, they do not believe. The point of this demand-pull analysis, and of the prescriptions which it is supposed to entail, is to camouflage their real diagnosis and prescriptions which rest on a wage cost-push analysis of inflation that also happens to be false; but they do believe in it and this leads them to worsen the problems they claim to address. Contrary to their public claims, the New Right governments do not care at all about deficits or high interest rates; they have actively caused both to remain high in the belief that this will create a cash-flow crisis that will allow business to force labor to take cuts in wages; they are thus using the market to achieve the wage restraint that the incomes policies of the 1960's and 1970's notoriously did not achieve, to produce a kind of state-sponsored "Brazilian solution" — a low wage high technology economy which they believe to be essential if flagging corporate profits and international competitiveness are to be restored. Their supply-side rhetoric hides the simple deflation by which the New Right governments have knowingly caused the most serious depression since the 1930's to achieve these goals. While they have had some success with this "hidden agenda," in creating labor-shedding recessions and substantial decreases in the rate of incomes growth, this has not produced the economic recovery they anticipated, mainly because wage increases are not the principal cause of contemporary stagflation. The main causes are structural and the policies of the New Right have made them worse.

The History of Stagflation

Continuously rising prices, whether during periods of expansion or recession, is a relatively recent feature of capitalist economies. While there is some

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disagreement over when permanent inflation emerged,[1] it is clear that for most of the first half of the century prices tended to fluctuate fairly widely, rising and falling with the trade cycle. Since the war prices have climbed steadily and shown little or no inclination toward a general fall. A steady, permanent, inflation of between 2 and 5% has been a feature of all capitalist countries. This occasioned some concern, but insofar as mild inflation was held to encourage expansion it was not necessarily considered bad. One group of economists even christened this phenomenon "equilibrium inflation."[2]

Since the late 1960's, however, not only has there been a secular trend in rising prices, but the rate of increase has grown dramatically. This has been all the more disturbing since it has been combined with falling real growth rates (except for the short sharp boom of 1970-2) and rising unemployment. The typical stagflationary picture has emerged most dramatically in France, Italy, the US and the UK since the late 1960's. In West Germany there has been a looser approximation to this trend, although the recent increases in unemployment bring it closer into line with the typical pattern. In Japan, although the rate of growth has been in steady decline for much of the period and unemployment has risen in all years except three (1973, 1976 and 1979), remaining substantially higher throughout the period than during the 1950's and early 1960's, the behavior of prices has been erratic, so that while inflation has been continously present, there is no increasing trend in the *rate*. Despite these differences, there are obvious and remarkable similarities in the stagflation facing these countries since the 1960's. Similar accounts can be given of developments in Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Ireland and the Netherlands; and, to a lesser extent, Austria, Sweden and Norway.[3]

Inflation

The cause of price rises in any particular instance is complex and elusive, but the phenomenon of permanent inflation in prices generally has generated a search for more general explanations. It is clear that inflation, as Block puts it, has been "the characteristic problem of developed capitalist nations in the past fifteen years" and that the "inflationary dynamic is deeply rooted in the structure of contemporary capitalism."[4] Just what this dynamic is, and precisely what forms its rootedness takes, however, are issues which command much less agreement among either mainstream or critical writers. To begin with the latter, Block[5] blames permanent inflation on the very success of Keynesian techniques in preventing the "purification" of a major recession.

1. Ernest Mandel, *Late Capitalism* (London: Verso, 1975) pp. 412-3.
2. Dudley Jackson, Herbert Arthur Turner and Frank Wilkinson, *Do Trade Unions Cause Inflation?* (Cambridge, 1972).
3. Aggregate macro-economic statistics on unemployment are taken from *Yearbook of Labor Statistics* (various years) and *OECD Labor Force Statistics* (various years); and on growth and inflation from *International Financial Statistics* (various years), *OECD Main Economic Indicators* (various monthly reports) and *OECD Main Economic Indicators: Historical Statistics*.
4. Fred Block, *The Origins of International Economic Disorder: A Study of United States International Monetary Policy From World War II to the Present* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977) p. 204.
5. *Ibid*, pp. 204-5.

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For Mandel, in his early work, the growth of credit generally was seen as the main cause of permanent inflation — a view also argued for by Versluysen.[6] More recently,[7] Mandel has emphasized the role of deficit spending, at least in the inflation of the 1970's. Other Marxists and some "post-Keynesian" writers like Maier see inflation as the natural result of class conflict. Now that the post-war boom is over, labor and capital fight over a diminishing surplus and the ideology of "growth as a surrogate for redistribution"[8] is no longer viable for working class incorporation. Within mainstream economics, too, it is now common to observe that there are as many explanations as there are economists. On the demand-pull side the culprits are held to be government spending generally, deficit spending in particular and the growth of money — this last being the favorite of the supply side economists of the New Right. Common cost-push accounts include simple wage-cost-push explanations, accounts in terms of the "productivity growth slowdown," and, for example, the theory of so-called sellers' inflation. A number of writers have offered an alternative account of stagflation in terms of the concentration of capital and administered pricing. Finally, many have blamed, at least in part, a series of unfortunately timed "exogenous shocks," the most important being the cartelization of oil in the early 1970's and the Vietnam war.

Demand-and-pull explanations. Central to the new conservative economic orthodoxy is a diagnosis of inflation in terms of budget deficits and the growth of money. As Ronald Reagan stated confidently in his first presidential address on the economy, "We know now that inflation results from all that deficit spending. Government has only two ways of getting money other than by raising taxes...It can go into the money market and borrow...or it can print mon ey...Both methods are inflationary."[9] This view is endorsed by influential sectors of the academic economics profession,[10] the Washington and Whitehall establishments and the business community; so much so that the Reagan administration has often been criticized on Wall Street for abandoning the goal of a balanced budget.[11] Despite disingenuous rhetorical appeals for a

6. Ernest Mandel, *op. cit.*, pp. 408-37. Eugène L. Versluysen, *The Political Economy of International Finance* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981) pp. 229-45.

7. Ernest Mandel, *The Second Slump: A Marxist Analysis of the Recession of the Seventies* (London: Verso, 1980) pp. 90-95.

8. Charles S. Maier, "The Politics of Inflation in the Twentieth Century," in Fred Hirsch and John. H. Goldthorpe, *The Political Economy of Inflation* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1978) pp. 69-71.

9. Cited in David R. Cameron, "Taxes, Spending and Deficits: Does Government Cause Inflation?," Chapter 9, *The Politics and Sociology of Global Inflation*, (eds) Leon Lindberg and Charles Maier, (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, forthcoming) p. 1, (Page references are to the unpublished manuscript).

10. See, for example, James M. Buchanan and Richard E. Wagner, *Democracy in Deficit: The Political Legacy of Lord Keynes* (New York: Academic Press, 1977) where it is argued that the budget deficits "that emerged from the Keynesian revision of the fiscal constitution" are at the root of the current inflation and that "[e]mpirically, the deficit-inflation nexus is strong and widely acknowledged." Cited in David R. Cameron, *op. cit.*, p. 62.

11. In an article entitled "Reaganomics: Why isn't Wall Street Convinced?" *Challenge* (September/October 1981) pp. 43-8, Henry Kaufman argues that in order to forge "an effective national stabilization policy" the administration must "fight inflation head on" which entails "the need...for the government to achieve a balanced budget immediately."

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constitutional amendment to balance the budget, Reagan's massive military expenditures require the largest deficits in the history of the US — a fact that was bound eventually to bring him into conflict with those supporters who consistently believe in the deficit-inflation link. His somewhat incoherent turn, in August 1982, to a massive new $98 billion tax bill which hides unprecedented increases in indirect taxation behind such euphemisms as "revenue enhancement," has angered them even more, because their supply-side ideology dictates that only balance as a result of expenditure cuts, and not tax increases, will reduce inflation.

The belief that budget deficits are the root cause of inflation has also become widely inculcated into popular culture. Since the 1950's, the majority in the US has moved from seeing wage demands as the primary source of inflation to regarding government spending as the main culprit.[12] Along with and supportive of the budget deficit orthodoxy is the monetarist claim that the main *mechanism* by which general prices increase is the growth of money. Government prints money to fund deficits, but the net result of this is to drive up the general price level. It is this new conventional wisdom that informs the Reagan and Thatcher approaches to fiscal and monetary policy and legitimates their revival of the pre-Keynesian neo-classical orthodoxy of capitalism-with-the-gloves-off.

Budget deficits and inflation. Most economists would grant that budget deficits have an effect on aggregate demand but would be unable to find any causal link betwen deficits and inflation that did not operate through demand. Despite the consensus among elites and the changes in public opinion, there is little evidence that budget deficits cause inflation. Cameron has shown that whether one looks at the US economy historically, or compares the Western economies with one another, there is no systematic relation between either government spending or budget deficits and inflation.[13] His historical study of the US economy between 1947 and 1979 revealed no significant relation between the change in the rate of inflation and the level of or change in Federal spending. Turning to budget deficits in the US economy for the same years, he found a negligible relation between deficits and inflation, and observed that between 1975 and 1980, when the deficit was steadily falling, inflation accelerated to its highest levels.[14] Further, he noted that since the deficit argument requires that it is not *all* deficits that are inflationary, but only deficits that occur when the economy is operating at full capacity (that is, when the additional demand generated by the deficit can no longer induce an increase in supply, and asssuming also the role of imports to be zero), and since the

12. Cameron has documented this trend. In 1959 14% of the US public regarded government as the prime source of inflation, and by 1978 this figure was over 50%. Conversely those regarding labor as the prime source moved from 46% to 20% for the same years. Figures taken from Cameron *op. cit.*, pp. 44-6.

13. See *ibid.*, pp. 62-6ff. See also David R. Cameron, "Spesa publica, sviluppo e inflazione: un'analisi comparata," *Stato e Mercato*, No. 4 (April, 1982) pp. 129-65.

14. David R. Cameron, "Taxes, Spending and Deficits..." *op. cit.*, pp. 62-6.

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largest deficits occur when the economy is in recession (and therefore by definition operating below capacity) one should not expect inflation to be associated with large deficits. Recognizing this, he found that during the period 1965-9 when the policies of the Johnson administration to finance the Vietnam war *did* create large deficits when the economy was operating at near capacity, there is some evidence suggesting a relation between the deficit and inflation.[15] But this is the exception and not the rule. There is no evidence for a general relation between deficits and inflation, and there is certainly no demonstrable relation between the US inflation of the 1970's and Federal deficit spending. Cameron confirmed these findings by comparing the deficits and inflation rates of nine major OECD economies during the late 1970's, where he again found no systematic relation. Taking deficits as a percentage of GNP as his measure, he found that relatively high deficits can coexist with relatively low rates of inflation (as in West Germany and Japan) or high rates (as in the UK), and that relatively low deficits can be accompanied by high inflation rates (as in the US).[16] It seems beyond question, then, that despite its widespread respectability the view that inflation in general, or in the 1970's, is causally linked to deficit spending is a myth.

The Monetarist Thesis. No one doubts the role of money in aggregate demand. The monetarist debate centers on the question of a direct causal link between money supply and inflation, in addition to money's role as a determinant of aggregate demand. There is little evidence for such a link.[17] However, the monetarists' favorite equation MV equals PT is worth a closer look. Their quantity theory of money employs this truism to explain price inflation by claiming that an expansion of the money supply M, assuming long-term constant average velocity of circulation V, will cause a rise in the average price P provided the number of economic transactions T remains constant, falls or rises only slowly. This is a demand thesis: too much money chasing too few goods. Of course, if inflated aggregate demand produces increased production (as in a competitive market it should) and thus an increase in T, the result in the medium- or long-run should not be continuous price inflation, but stable prices at a new equilibrium, in which case an expanded money supply is merely financing a higher level of economic activity and not causing inflation. If production is blocked in some way then demand induced inflation *will* occur (as in Poland since the late 1970's where there was plenty of money and nothing to buy because production has stopped for social and political reasons), or in a market economy that is operating at capacity. Even in this latter case (assuming also full employment) if demand holds up we should expect increased production through technological innovation and higher productivity, although there would be some lag between demand and supply

15. *Ibid*, pp. 66-8.
16. *Ibid*, pp. 63-5.
17. See, for example, Arthur M. Okun and George L. Perry, (eds), *Brookings Papers on Economic Activity* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1978) pp. 45-6. The empirical difficulties in testing the monetarist are enormous. For an account of these see John S. Flemming, "The Economic Explanation of Inflation," in *The Political Economy of Inflation, op. cit.*, pp. 13-36.

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which would induce cyclical price fluctuations.

The monetarist explanation of continuous post-war Western inflation, then, is that government's failure to control the money supply, combined with "profligate" government spending, keeps aggregate demand constantly inflated above present ability of the economy to meet that demand with increased output. But this cannot explain why prices should continue to rise in periods when aggregate demand falls. In fact, the quantity theory of money in itself tells us nothing about inflation; for instance, price inflation could theoretically occur without a change in the money supply if the rate of increase in P is accompanied by a correspondingly proportional fall in T. On the other hand, price inflation may actually *cause* an expansion of the money supply, as consumers try to maintain living standards through increased borrowing while real incomes are stagnant or falling and firms, faced with rising costs, falling demand and uncertainty about the future, are forced to borrow more (even in terms of *real* interest rates — i.e., rates greater than the rate of inflation) simply to avoid bankruptcy rather than for productive investment. This presumes that P rises faster than T falls (otherwise M would remain constant), an empirical assumption but not an unreasonable one: an interesting feature of the British economy during 1981 was the way in which consumer spending remained bouyant despite a squeeze on real incomes. According to one ITEM report,[18] the high level of consumer expenditure was made possible by a fall in the savings ratio from 18.8% to 14% which was accounted for mostly by an increase in personal borrowing of over 4.3 billion Sterling. Thus, consumer demand held up while production and real incomes fell. In these circumstances the causal direction of the equation is not from left to right but right to left. Because prices refuse to fall, consumers are forced to borrow more to maintain living standards; at the same time companies faced with recession shed labor, cut production, run down stocks and increase their own short-term borrowing instead of cutting prices. The result is an increase in M which encourages increases neither in output nor in real income but goes directly to current consumption. An expanding money supply unmatched by economic growth may be, at least in part, a *response* to price inflation. This is in essence the view defended by such writers as Versluysen, who argues that money supply is "in every sense a *dependent* variable and...it is totally fallacious to attribute the *occurance* of booms to excessive monetary creation or that of slumps to excessive contraction."[19] Our discussion also underscores the point emphasized by Hickman, Keohane and others,[20] that to associate infla-

18. ITEM Forecast, reported in *The Guardian* (London & Manchester, January 4, 1982).

19. Eugène L. Versluysen, *op. cit.*, p. 241, Versluysen's italics. He goes on to point out that there is, anyhow, no one-to-one relationship between money supply and prices and that when prices fall during severe depressions, this is not because the money supply has contracted but because price cuts are resorted to by enterprises to liquidate stocks: "*Money demand* will tail off in recessions, and *money supply will follow* barring reflationary policies." *Ibid*, second italics added.

20. Bert G. Hickman, "Comment on Salant's 'International Transmission of Inflation' " in Lawrence B. Krause and Walter S. Salant, (eds), *Worldwide Inflation* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1977) p. 232; Robert Keohane, "The International Politics of Inflation" in Leon Lindberg and Charles S. Maier, *op. cit.*, manuscript pp. 7-19.

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tion with an increase in the money supply (assuming that this could be done) is not really to *explain* it, since the real question then becomes: what causes the money supply to increase?[21]

Cost-push explanations.

Demand-pull explanations, thus, fail to account for the permanent inflation of the post-war era. Prices would rise continuously on a competitive market only if demand was constantly sustained (for example, by government spending) at levels that always outstripped supply, for if demand fell so would prices. However, the tendency since the war has been continously rising prices even (though more slowly) in times of recession when demand falls and the economy is operating below capacity.[22] Many economists faced with this fact, have leapt on the alternative cost-push thesis, and since wages are usually the largest part of a firm's costs they are singled out as the main cause of inflation.

Wage-cost-push explanations. These are usually referred to as the "wage-price spiral."[23] Although to some extent these explanations were displaced by the supply-side revolution of the late 1970's, the failure of monetarist policies to reverse the economic decline has brought them back into vogue. In fact, as we will argue below, many of the demand-pull explanations subscribed to publicly by the New Right governments serve to camouflage a wage-cost-push analysis of inflation on which their deflationary policies really rest. We will differ from New Right critics who treat its proponents as lobotomous fools; rather we will suggest that the New Right policy makers are quite cynically aware that their policies cause declining real wages, stagnation, widespread bankruptcy and increasing concentration. They have created a depression for precisely these purposes, in the belief that only in this way can long run inflation be cured. Although political considerations prevent these policy makers from spelling out the impacts these policies are intended to have on wages and employment, other sectors of the economic establishment that are not similarly constrained have consistently blamed inflation on wage increases.[24] There is a certain chicken-and-egg quality to the picture behind this type of explanation of inflation: workers faced with rising prices and falling real incomes demand higher wages to compensate, thus raising the owner's costs — who then raises prices to maintain profitability and so on. The debate in this area centers around whether workers merely try to keep up with inflation, or cause it outright, or cause it by trying to keep up with it. There are several

21. If the money supply cannot be shown to have any causal impact on the general level of prices, it does not of course follow that controlling the money supply will not have some effect on inflation, if at considerable cost to the economy as a whole. This is an issue which we consider in more detail below.

22. See Howard J. Sherman, *Stagflation: A Radical Theory of Unemployment and Inflation* (New York: Harper and Row, 1976) pp. 164-5; Arthur Okun and George L. Perry, *op. cit.*, p. 1.

23. See Arthur Okun and George L. Perry, *op. cit.*, pp. 25-55.

24. A wage-cost-push theory of inflation has recently been propounded, for example, by Nobel prize-winning economist James E. Meade in the first of a two volume work on stagflation. James E. Meade, *Stagflation*, Vol. I: *Wage Fixing* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1982).

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studies providing strong evidence that the swing in wages follows the rise in prices and not the other way around.[25] There is also argument of formidable obviousness provided by Antonio Carlo. If wage increases are the root cause of inflation, one should expect that workers' failure to defend their wages would halt inflation. However, the history of capitalism is replete with counter-examples to this thesis. In Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy the destruction or prohibition of working class organizations and the consequent fall in wage levels did not prevent prices from rising. More striking is the case of Brazil where prices rose by hundreds of percentage points between 1963 and 1971, despite brutal control of workers after 1964. Analogous observations can be made for Chile, Argentina and Indonesia after their repsective anti-working class coups.[26] This is no less true of the metropolitan economies. In Britain, for example, the official retail price index rose by 12% in 1981 (nearly two points higher than the rate Thatcher inherited in May 1979),[27] despite an increase in unemployment from 5.4% in May 1979 to 11.5% in December 1981[28] and pay settlements averaging about half the rate of inflation so that real wages were actually falling.[29] There is scant evidence, then, that wage increases are the main cause of inflation.[30]

The 'post-Keynesian' theory of inflation. Another version of the cost-push argument is the so-called "post-Keynesian" theory of inflation. From this view, as Moore puts it, "the rate of inflation is determined primarily by the rate of increase of nominal money wages relative to labor productivity."[31] The post-Keynesians

25. See, for example, Andrew Gamble and Paul Walton, *Capitalism in Crisis: Inflation and the State* (London: MacMillan, 1976) pp. 8, 12-19; and Howard J. Sherman, *op. cit.*, pp. 60-64, 81-3.

26. Antonio Carlo, "Inflation," *Theory and Society* (Vol. 7, No. 3, May 1979) pp. 398-9.

27. *The Guardian* (London & Manchester, January 16, 1982).

28. *The New York Times* (January 10, 1982).

29. The Confederation of British Industry reported in January 1982 that pay settlements averaged between 5% and 7% for the round of bargaining in the fall of 1981. Reported in *ibid.* Large sectors of the workforce were, of course, forced to accept considerably lower settlements, such as British Leyland workers who took a 4% increase under threat of the company's closure.

30. A subtler version of the cost-push thesis is the theory of sellers' inflation which holds that the tendency of oligopolistic and monopolistic firms to earn high profits provides a target for union wage demands which are then replicated throughout the economy generating an upward wage-price spiral. It is further argued that firms in the more concentrated sector, secure in the knowledge that increases in costs generated by high wage settlements can be passed on in the form of higher prices, will resist wage demands less strenuously. Despite the intuitive plausibility of this, evidence from the US shows that while wages per man-hour have increased more rapidly in concentrated than in the competitive sectors productivity has also increased so that unit labor costs (wages per unit of output) have actually risen more slowly in the concentrated sector. J. Fred Weston and Steven Lustgarten, "Concentration and Wage-Price Change," cited in J. Fred Weston, *Mergers and Economic Efficiency*, Vol. II: *Industrial Concentration, Mergers and Growth* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, June 1981) p. 12. Thus the cost-push thesis cannot be salvaged in this form.

31. Basil J. Moore, "Monetary Factors," in Alfred Eichner, (ed), *A Guide to Post-Keynesian Economics* (New York: Sharpe, 1979) p. 131. Moore continues: "Over wide sectors of the economy, prices are largely cost-determined, based on a markup over unit labor costs...This markup...will be constant over time for the economy as a whole so long as the capital and labor shares of national income are constant, irrespective of the assumptions governing price-setting behavior." The post-Keynesian view is also adhered to by such writers as Charles S. Maier, *op. cit.*, and James

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link the emergence of permanent inflation to the slowdown in growth and productivity which has brought labor and capital into real distributive conflict over a surplus that is growing at a diminishing rate. Class conflict generates inflation as workers are granted nominal wage increases that cannot be made real because of the relative increase in costs. Inflation is simply the illusion that makes a zero-sum, or even a negative-sum, game seem positive. While distributional conflict can generate inflation (as it did for example in France during the mid-1970's), the post-Keynesian account runs into difficulties as an explanation of the systematic character of the inflation that has beset the capitalist world since the late 1960's. First, at least in the US, the "productivity growth slowdown" did not precede but followed the emergence of stagflation. Second, this view does not explain why inflation has remained a problem in economies such as Brazil's in the late 1960's and early 1970's, when growth and productivity were increasing. It seems more likely that the conflicts to which these writers are pointing as the causes of inflation are in fact symptoms of the stagflation which is induced by other causes.

Concentration and administered pricing.

If the "monopoly power of unions" seems implausible as a major cause of systemic inflation, we might turn to the "monopoly power of business." Sherman points out that the accelerating stagflationary trend since the 1950's coincides with the explosive increase in the concentration of capital since that time.[32] Although this is difficult to measure, the findings of a number of writers during the mid-1970's have recently been confirmed by an OECD study[33] which reviews the major empirical studies of concentration in the member countries to date. The growing concentration of capital has been a remarkable feature of all the metropolitan capitalist economies. In the UK the market share of the 100 largest manufacturing firms rose from 21% in 1948 to 38% in 1963, and 51% in 1970.[34] The same number's share of net manufacturing output rose from 30% in 1958 to 41% in 1972.[35] Few statistics are available for France, but a study by the Ministry for Industry on industrial concentration between 1970 and 1972 showed rising levels of concentration, particularly in the more capital intensive sectors which were already highly concentrated.[36]

This has also been of growing importance in the US since the 1950's. There had been earlier cycles of *horizontal* mergers (where a corporation absorbs its

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R. Kurth, "Economic Sectors and Inflationary Policies" in Leon Lindberg and Charles S. Maier, *op. cit.* although they are not avowedly post-Keynesians. See also Joan Robinson, "Solving the Stagflation Puzzle," *Challenge* (November/December 1979) p. 44, where it is argued that inflation is "a vertical movement of prices due to increasing rates of pay for the same activity."

32. Howard J. Sherman, *op. cit.*, pp. 160; 211-16.

33. *Concentration and Competition Policy*, Report of the Committee of Experts on Restrictive Business Practices (Paris: OECD, 1979).

34. Howard J. Sherman, *op. cit.*, Sherman's figures are taken from John Blair, (ed), *Roots of Inflation* (New York: Franklin, 1975).

35. *Concentration and Competition...op. cit.*, p. 82.

36. *Ibid*, pp. 108-9.

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competitors in the same industry) at the turn of the century, and *vertical* mergers (occurring between firms producing goods in sequence, as when a corporation absorbs its suppliers or absorbs the firms to which it sells output) during the 1920's. *Conglomerate* mergers occur between corporations in completely unconnected industries, usually within already concentrated sectors of the economy. Between 1950 and 1959 there was an average of 540 corporate mergers a year. Between 1960 and 1967 this figure rose to 1100. In 1968 there were 2655 mergers.[37] These mergers occurred, increasingly, between two giants in different industries. Between 1948 and 1953 conglomerate mergers accounted for 59% of the total. In 1968 conglomerate mergers accounted for 84% of all mergers. By 1969, a few giant corporations (1041, or just 0.07% of the total number of US corporations) held 55% of all assets ($1.218 trillion), while a large number of small corporations (890,000 or 58% of the total) held a miniscule 1% ($30 billion). Further, even among the top thousand, there is still greater concentration of capital within the top two or three hundred. This trend of increasing high level concentration continued throughout the 1970's. In 1977 the Federal Trade Commission report on mergers and acquisitions showed that recently conglomerate mergers have represented 80 to 90% of merger activity in the US. Analogous observations can be made for the UK, where proposed conglomerate mergers considered by the Mergers Panel rose from 7% of all mergers in 1965 to 32% in 1977.[38]

Returning to the US, data on aggregate concentration published by the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice reveals that between 1968 and 1974 concentration increased substantially throughout the economy, as well as in most sectors.[39] In West Germany, too, aggregate concentration has increased dramatically during the 1960's and 1970's. One study by Hochreiter found that the share of the top 100 industrial firms in total industrial turnover rose from 42.7% in 1968 to 45.4% in 1973; the top 50 firms rose from 33.6% to 38.3%; the top 20 from 22.5% to 24.8%, and the top 10 from 13.7% to 15.2%. According to the Monopolies Commission, the share held by the top 100 German firms in terms of sales in total turnover of the overall economy rose from 21.7% in 1972 to 24.4% in 1975.[40]

37. Howard J. Sherman, *op. cit.*, p. 138.

38. *Concentration and competition...op. cit.*, p. 170, n. 72.

39. For example, the percentage of total corporate assets accounted for by the 200 largest corporations increased from 34.3% to 36.9% from 1968 through 1974, while their percentage of revenues increased from 26.4% to 30.8%. In manufacturing, the percentage of assets attributable to the 200 largest manufacturing corporations increased from 57.2% to 60.5%, and their percentage of revenues from 47% to 55.2%. *Ibid*, pp. 81-2. High level conglomerate merging can be obscured by the fact that concentration can be increasing while the actual number of mergers declines. Thus between 1970 and 1981 the *numbers* of mergers fell from an average of over 5,000 a year to just under 2,000; but since the typical acquisition now often exceeds $1 billion and is vastly bigger than in the conglomerate era of the 1960's, the *dollar volume* involved in concentration has accelerated dramatically: it increased steadily from an average of about $15 billion a year in the early 1970's to an all time high of over $60 billion in 1981. *The New York Times* (January 10, 1982) section 3, p. 26.

40. *Concentration and Competition...op. cit.*, pp. 80-81.

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Little data on aggregate concentration is available for Italy and Japan.[41] For the entire EEC (excluding Britain) the share of the total output produced by the fifty largest firms was 35% in 1960, 35% in 1965, and 46% in 1970.[42] This trend also has increased during the 1970's.[43] The share of the four largest firms as a percentage of total employment rose from 11.5% to 12% between 1972 and 1973, and the total sales from 11.3% to 11.4%. For the same years the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (which expresses the sum of the squares of each firm size as a ratio of total industry size) rose from 9.8% to 10.1% for employment, and 8.9% to 9.2% for sales. While concentration in industry as a whole increased, concentration in large-scale industry increased even more rapidly.[44]

It seems unquestionable, then, that there is a persistent trend in increasing concentration since the 1950's both in the individual capitalist economies and in the EEC as a whole. Much of this is accounted for by horizontal and conglomerate mergers between major corporations, a fact that has caused growing concern among Western governments.[45] The significance of this enormous concentration of capital for an explanation of stagflation lies in the ability of the monopolistic-oligopolistic conglomerates to control prices by virtue of their control of markets. In the monopoly sector prices are no longer *determined* by the market but are, to use a term of Gardiner Means, *administered*. Means found that during the depression of 1929-32, while prices in the competitive sector fell by 60%, in the concentrated sector they fell by only 10%, and in the depression of 1937-8 the falls were 27% and 3% respectively. The conglomerates achieved these limited price falls only by reducing their production by large percentages, holding up profit per unit at the expense of production and employment. In the competitive sector, meanwhile, prices were forced down by the market causing increased demand and therefore a smaller drop in production.[46] Although the proliferation of conglomerate mergers since the 1960's makes this more difficult to measure, it can still be

41. In Japan, concentration measured in terms of the total corporate capital held by the 100 largest firms rose steadily from the end of WWII until the mid-1960's, from 30.4% in 1949; to 32.1% in 1953; to 35.4% in 1955; to 39.4% in 1963. Between 1963 and 1969, however, this measure declined to 33%, although it should be emphasized that this is still a remarkably high level of concentration, with 1.2% of the total number of corporations at the end of March 1969 accounting for one third of the total capital of all Japanese firms. Data for the subsequent years are not available. *Ibid*, pp. 81-2.

42. Howard J. Sherman, *op. cit.*, p. 212.

43. Whereas in 1972, 45 firms accounted for half of the sales of all big firms in the EEC, by 1973 this figure had dropped to 42, and similar changes occurred in total employment. The 50 largest firms increased their share in the total sales of large-scale industry from 53% in 1972 to 55% in 1973.

44. *Concentration and Competition...op. cit.*, pp. 88-9.

45. This is reflected by increased legislative activity designed to curb such consolidations. In 1970, for example, only Britain, the US, Canada and Japan had legislation controlling mergers and acquisitions. Since that time, however, Australia, France, West Germany, Ireland and New Zealand have adopted similar measures.

46. Gardner C. Means, "Simultaneous Inflation and Unemployment: A Challenge to Theory and Policy," *Challenge* (September/October 1975) pp. 6-20. See also Howard J. Sherman, *op. cit.*, pp. 163-6.

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done. Means showed, for example, that in the US between 1973 and 1974 prices in concentration dominated industries rose by more than four times as much as in competitive industries. In Japan the Fair Trade Commission analyzed the relationship between concentration ratio and price behavior in the 1971 and 1975 recessions, and, particularly in the second of these, found a strong relationship between the two.[47]

Despite this and other evidence (discussed below) it has been common for many establishment economists to deny the relationship between concentration and inflation. One influential study by Stigler & Kindahl,[48] made a straw-man out of the administered pricing thesis by classifying commodity prices according to whether or not, during a recession, they decreased, remained constant, or increased. They treat *all* price decreases as in conflict with the administered pricing thesis, which presumes that the argument is that the administered sector is perfectly administered. But obviously they should have looked at the *relative* behavior of prices in more and less concentrated sectors.[49] Another common strategy of argument against the administered pricing thesis is to deny that significant changes in concentration have in fact occurred.[50] It is possible to argue, as Franko and others have done, that when considered globally the Herfindahl indices for the production of commodities such as automobiles, pulp, some metals and petroleum have declined since the war.[51] However, great care is necessary in interpreting these global measures for four reasons. First, in all these industries (except zinc) the main fall in the index was between the end of the war and the early 1960's, before the conglomerate mergers of the past fifteen years.[52] Second, the Herfindahl index measures the sum of the squares of each firm size,

47. *Concentration and Competition...op. cit.*, pp. 88-9.

48. George Joseph Stigler and James K. Kindahl, *The Behavior of Industrial Prices* (New York: 1970).

49. Indeed Gardner C. Means has shown that Stigler and Kindahl's evidence can be used in support of his own argument once this is made clear. Gardner C. Means, "The Administered Price Thesis Reconfirmed," *American Economic Review* (June 1972) pp. 292-306.

50. Thus, for example, J. Fred Weston compared inflation rates for the US economy for the periods 1958-65 and 1965-77. He found, not surprisingly, that while the average annual rate of inflation in the wholesale price index was less than 0.5% in the first period, in the second this figure was greater than 8%. He then proceeded to claim that this demonstrates the falsity of the administered pricing argument on the ground that "the structure of the American economy did not change betwen the two periods. Neither the degree of industrial concentration nor the strength of labor unions was greatly altered." J. Fred Weston, *op. cit.*, pp. 12-13. This eminent economist offers no evidence of any kind in support of this contention however, and, as we have seen, the evidence concerning industrial concentration is decisively against him.

51. Lawrence G. Franko, "What has Become of the American Challenge?" *Challenge* (March/April 1980) pp. 49-52.

52. In the auto industry the index fell from just over .2 in 1955 to .1 in 1965 and fell only a further .01 between then and 1975. In the aluminum industry it moved from .17 in 1950 to .09 in 1965 and fell about .02 points thereafter. Figures for the pulp and paper industry for the same years were .25 in 1950, .13 in 1965 and .11 in 1975; in the copper industry .07, .035 and .025 for the same years, in the lead industry .13, .04 and .02, in the petroleum industry .18, .1 and 0.5 (and here concentration has been increasing since the late 1960's) and in the styrene monomer industry .32. .12 and .1. In all these cases (which are presented as examples of deconcentration in *ibid*) the vast majority of the fall occurred before 1965. The only exception is slab zinc where the index fell from .33 in 1950, to .2 in 1965 and .05 in 1975. All figures taken from *ibid*, p. 51.

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expressed as a ratio of the total firm size. This means that if production in a given industry is increasing more rapidly than concentration in that industry it is quite possible for the index to decline at the same time as concentration is occurring, provided the number of firms in the industry is permitted to vary. Third, the Herfindahl index measures concentration *by industry* but we have seen that the characteristic merger since the 1960's has been the conglomerate merger, that is between firms in *different industries*. Such mergers need not and in general will not be reflected in increases in the Herfindahl index for a given industry. Finally, to the limited extent that changes in these indices *do* reflect changes in the structure of global production since the war, they largely reflect the decline in the relative share of the US multinationals of new Third World proudction *vis-à-vis* West European and Japanese multinationals (except in the case of oil — see below). In no way do they reflect developments in the metropolitan capitalist national economies, where the growing monopoly sector now dominates and "exploits" the competitive sector.[53] Country by country studies of these economies showed even Herfindahl indices to be increasing.[54]

In this situation price has become the *independent* economic variable; instead of costs determining prices, prices now, to a large extent, determine costs. The price that a monopolist fixes on his product (in the interest of long-term profitability) becomes a cost to those who must buy his product whether or not they are in competitive or concentrated industries. This cost is passed on in higher prices for the latter's product, a price which is often amplified in the concentrated sector where there is no simple direct relation between rises in costs and price increases. Mockers notes that the inflationary nature of monpolistic competition excludes price reductions on principle; only increases in costs and not decreases (when productivity rises) are registered in prices, and even these missing reductions make a hidden, but important, contribution to the price spiral.[55]

A number of studies have attempted to look more closely at the relation between concentration and price behavior and performance generally, particularly in the UK. Shepherd, Phillips, Caves et. al. and Hart and Morgan all found the relation between concentration and profitability significant.[56] Cowling and Waterson demonstrated a strong relation between the change in

53. John Kenneth Galbraith, *Economics and the Public Purpose* (London, 1976); Antonio Carlo, *op. cit.*, p. 404.

54. Studies of concentration within the metropolitan capitalist economies are reviewed in the remainder of this section.

55. Cited in Antonio Carlo, *op. cit.*, p. 399.

56. William G. Shepherd, "Structure and Behavior in British Industries with US Comparisons," *Journal of Industrial Economics* (1972); Almarin Phillips, "An Econometric Study of Price-Fixing, Market Structure and Performance in British Industry in the early 1950's," in Almarin Phillips and Keith Cowling, (eds), *Market Structure and Corporate Behavior* (London: Grey-Mills, 1972), R.E. Caves, et. al., "Scale Economics in Statistical Analysis of Market Power," *Review of Economics and Statistics* (1975); Peter E. Hart and Eleanor Morgan, "Market Structure and Economic Performance in the United Kingdom," *Journal of Industrial Economics* (March 1977). The findings of most of these studies are summarized in *Concentration and Competition...op. cit.*, pp. 90-126.

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price/cost margins and concentration.[57] Other studies produced different results, but Gribbin has suggested a more complex relation between profitability and market structure. He found that there is unlikely to be a simple linear relation between concentration and profitability. Instead he produced results which suggest a negative relationship between profitability and concentration up to about a five-firm concentration ratio of 60% (i.e., where five firms account for 60% of the market in that industry) and thereafter the relation becomes positive. This implies that there is some threshold beyond which concentration becomes significant. It also suggests why linear regressions have produced conflicting results and confirms the findings of those who have tried step functions.[58] In the US as well, a number of studies have attempted to investigate this relation more closely, and although there, too, most studies use profits or price-cost margins, a few have used prices rather than costs as the measure of performance. This offsets the criticism sometimes made about concentration-profits findings that higher profits for larger firms merely reflect superior management, economies of scale, etc., and not monopoly power. In all four studies mentioned in the OECD report on concentration, a statistically strong association was found between price increases and concentration.[59]

Thus, although the exact relation between concentration and price behavior is more complex than early formulations of the administered pricing thesis suggested, they are unquestionably related. What has not been established with certainty is what the critical level of concentration is (if indeed there is one critical level for all industries) above which pricing ceases to be competitive, and whether concentration above or below this level significantly affects pricing behavior.[60] Although the relation between concentration and pricing does not appear to be linear and may vary across industries, it

57. Cited in *Concentration and Competition...op. cit.,* pp. 114-5.

58. *Ibid.*, p. 117.

59. Reuben Kessel, "A Study of the Effect of Competition in the Tax-exempt Bond Market," *Journal of Political Economy*, Vol. 79, No. 4 (July 1971) pp. 706-83; Donald D. Hester, "Customer Relationships and Terms of Loans," *Federal Board Special Studies,* Paper 102 (August 1977); Howard P. Marvel, "The Economics of Information and Retail Gasoline Price Behavior: An Empirical Analysis," *Journal of Politcal Economy*, Vol. 84, No. 5 (October 1976); "Competition and Price Levels in the Retail Gasoline Market," *Review of Economics and Statistics*, Vol. 60, No. 2 (May 1978); Joint Economic Committee, 95th Congress, first session, *The Profit and Price Performance of Leading Food Chains: 1970-4* (Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1977). The findings of most of these studies are summarized in *Concentration and Competition...op. cit.*, p. 169ff.

60. A number of studies, following Joe S. Bain, "Relation of Profit Rate to Industry Concentration," *Quarterly Journal of Economics* (August 1951) pp. 293-4, found that the critical level for an eight-firm concentration raio was 70% of the industry. Subsequent studies have produced better results with smaller firm-concentration ratios, such as Kwoka's report to the Federal Trade Commission, John E. Kwoka, Jr., *Market Shares, Concentration and Competition*, Staff Report to the Federal Trade Commission (Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, September 1978). which found that if two firms controlled about one third of the industry, price/cost margins were about 4% above competitive levels. This is confirmed by studies that have used more inclusive measures (i.e., 20- and 50-firm concentration ratios) which have produced poorer results, suggesting that the number of important firms in determining an industry's performance is quite small. *Concentration and Competition...op. cit.,* p. 118.

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has been demonstrated beyond question, despite measurement problems, that there has been a persistent and increasing trend of concentration in the metropolitan capitalist economies since the 1960's and that this is causally related to administered pricing. It has produced what even the OECD refers to as a "form of monopolistic exploitation."[61]

"Exogenous" inflationary shocks.
It is common to explain the inflation of the 1970's in terms of a series of contingently related exogenous events rather than features indigenous to the capitalist economies.[62] The two most important events are the cartelization of oil in the early 1970's and the policies of the Johnson administration in the 1960's.

The "cartelization" of oil. While the inflationary effects of OPEC price rises should not be downplayed, both their causes and their significance have been widely misinterpreted. In particular the role of OPEC has been exaggerated, thus perpetuating the myth that the Arabs are the principal villains in the oil price rises. This myth is likely to gain new credence in 1983 and 1984 as the major oil multinationals show substantial losses on 1980 and 1981 (exceptionally profitable years) and the companies blame this on the widening gap between OPEC's artifically sustained prices and falling world oil demand as a function of the 1982-3 recession.[63] It is therefore important to place these events in perspective by looking more closely at the relationship between OPEC and the oil companies, the mechanisms behind the price increases since the early 1970's and the effects of the recent oil glut on the OPEC economies themselves.

In the first place the stagflationary pattern had emerged in the metropolitan capitalist economies in the late 1960's, well before the first OPEC price rises in 1973. In fact these rises were a response to the erosion of OPEC oil revenues (which are in dollars) as a result of inflation. While the nominal price of Saudi Arabian crude, for example, remained almost unchanged between 1953 and 1972 (falling gradually until 1971 when it began to rise), the fact that inflation was eroding the value of the dollar meant that the real price was actually falling

61. *Ibid*, p. 117.

62. In 1977, for example, the authors of the McCracken report appointed by the OECD to study the causes of stagflation and recommend policies to deal with it, concluded that: "the most important feature was an unusual bunching of unfortunate events, unlikely to be repeated on the same scale, the impact of which was compounded by some avoidable errors in economic policy." Paul W. McCracken, et. al., *Towards Full Employment and Price Stability* (Paris: OECD, 1977) p. 103.

63. In April 1982, for example, Texaco — the first of the majors to report for the first quarter — announced a fall in earnings of 44.2% on 1981. John R. McKinley, chairman and chief executive officer, blamed the fall on the decline in world oil demand while Texaco "to maintain good relations with Saudi Arabia and other members of the Organization of Petrolium Exporting Countries has continued to buy at OPEC prices." *New York Times* (April 24, 1982) pp. 29, 35. For the first half of 1982 Exxon's profits were down 38% on the same period in 1981, Mobil's by 52%, Socal's by 54% and Texaco's by 45%. *The Economist* (August 21-7, 1982) p. 50. We argue below that there are good reasons to suppose that OPEC has been more seriously harmed than the oil majors by the 1982 glut, i.e., that their relative losses for 1982 will be greater than those of the oil majors.

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throughout the period. If the nominal price is deflated by the US GNP price deflator, which gives a rough indication of the "real" price, we find that it fell in every successive year between 1953 and 1970, by which time its price was 56.2% of the 1953 figure.[64] Turning to the second round of price increases in 1979-80, we find the same phenomenon in a milder form. The price fell by 1.6% in 1975, just managed to keep pace with inflation in 1976 and 1977, and fell by 4.5% in 1978, so that contrary to widespread belief, the 1978 price was some 3.32% below the 1974 price.[65] It is clear that the OPEC price rises of the 1970's have been to a considerable extent a defensive response to Western inflation which eroded the value of OPEC dollar income.

Second, while there has been much debate on whether OPEC is a cartel or an oligopoly,[66] there seem to be three good reasons for regarding it as neither. First, OPEC is not a cartel or an oligopoly in terms of market share. The 1973-4 price rises have led Western nations to reduce their Middle Eastern oil dependence by developing production elsewhere (mainly the North Sea and Mexico) and pouring resources into improving energy efficiency and alternative energy technologies. Unlike the world copper industry, for example, where four nations control more than 80% of all production, OPEC controlled at its height in 1974 only about 55% of global production, and its share has declined steadily since then-it fell from 55.2% of world production in 1974 to 47.9% in 1979.[67]

Nor is OPEC's internal structure that of a cartel or oligopoly. The manifest internal conflicts of interest and the special position of Saudi Arabia cause OPEC at best to approximate the so-called "leading firm oligopoly" model, with the Saudis — who produce over 40% of OPEC oil and account for 61% of OPEC's proven reserves[68] — dictating policy most of the time. But even this analogy is stretched because the Saudi economy is so firmly tied to the Western economies that their capacity to act in their own independent interests is severely limited. Further, their own internal financial needs — given their current $250 billion five year development plan (as compared with $18 billion for the 1970-75 plan and $170 billion for the 1975-80 plan)[69] also limits their capacity to adopt monopoly pricing tactics. As recent events have sharply

64. Prices for Saudi oil are computed from IMF *International Financial Statistics*, various years; US GNP price deflator taken from the *Economic Report of the President* (Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, February 1982) table B3. It should be emphasized that this is a rough indication only, because it is insensitive to variations in the relative values of different currencies in which some OPEC assets may be held or spent, against the dollar.

65. *Ibid.*

66. For a recent example of which see Steven E. Plaut, "OPEC is Not a Cartel," *Challenge*, (November/December 1981) pp. 18-24.

67. OAPEC: *Secretary General's Sixth Annual Report* (Kuwait, 1980) p. 40. Figures for the intervening years were as follows: 55.2% in 1974; 50.2% in 1975; 52.3% in 1976; 51.3% in 1977; 48.1% in 1978; and 47.9% in 1979. The coming to power of the Khomeini regime in Iran led to a reduction in supply of 4% in 1977-80, and the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war in 1980 led to a reduction of a further 6%. Henry S. Rowen and John P. Weyant, "Will Oil Prices Collapse?" *Challenge* (November/December 1981) p. 12.

68. Steven E. Plaut, *op. cit.*, p. 21.

69. "Saudi Arabia Survey," *The Economist* (February 13, 1982) p. 29.

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underlined, the decline in world oil demand in 1981-82, which is partly a response to the 1979-80 price increases and partly a function of global recession, led to cuts in OPEC production aimed at sustaining a price of at least $34 dollars a barrel. Production was cut by 40% to about 17 million barrels per day (mmbd) between early 1981 and March 1982, and some countries such as Kuwait have reduced output to less than half the levels of the early 1970's.[70] What is crucial, however, from the point of view of the world price is the behavior of the Saudis, and although they have made substantial production cuts (from 10.3 mmbd in November 1981 to about 7 mmbd by April 1982) Sheik Yamani has acknowledged that at most only another 1 mmbd could be cut if current budgetary needs are to be met.[71] As the credit squeeze produced by falling oil revenues tightens, the worst afflicted countries are likely to break from OPEC in one of two ways. Either they will continue to make radical production cutbacks, such as Nigeria, in an attempt to sustain prices, or desperate short-term currency needs will force them to undersell their partners, as is the case in Iran which was reported to be selling at $7 a barrel below the official OPEC price in March 1982.[72] By the opening of the Vienna OPEC summit in July 1982 Iran's open rejection of their March production quota of 1.2 mmbd (although they had in fact been almost doubling it for several months) precipitated threats from Venezuela and Libya to follow suit. Additionally Iran was trading crude in Rotterdam at $29.60 a barrel, as compared with the Saudi price of $31.80 and the official OPEC price $34. Thus OPEC's attempt to hold member countries to a 17.5 mmbd limit (which, it should be added, was their first ever attempt at a production ceiling) failed — production in mid-July was at least 18.5 mmbd — and their attempts to keep member countries to agreed prices and out of the spot market were no more successful.[73] This internal competition worsened in early 1983, and by mid-February a collapse of the $34 price seemed inevitable.

The fact that OPEC reached the limits of its capacity to manipulate supply to sustain price by early 1982 was indicated by the emergence of a new and entirely unpredicted phenomenon: large scale OPEC borrowing from international banks. OPEC Petrodollar net deposits (dollar deposits less borrowing and withdrawals) fell from $33.9 billion in 1980 to $4.6 billion for the first nine months of 1981, reversing the trends of the 1970's and creating the ironic situation where bankers and Western governments, accustomed to worrying about how OPEC surpluses are to be soaked up, found themselves worrying instead about how to do without them.[74] New OPEC borrowing almost doubled during the third quarter of 1981 to $2.4 billion from $1.3 billion in

70. At OPEC's summit meeting in Vienna in March 1982 it was agreed to reduce output to 18.5 mmbd, but it was widely known at that time that production was already substantially lower than this, as Saudi Arabia had just cut production by a further l mmbd. *The Economist* (March 20, 1982) p. 78.
71. Henry S. Rowen and John P. Weyant, *op. cit.*, p. 14.
72. *Ibid.*
73. *New York Times* for July 9 and July 10, 1982.
74. *The Wall Street Journal*, (February 19, 1982) p. 1.

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the second quarter, while OPEC countries withdrew some $700 million from Western bank accounts. Libya was forced to negotiate a $250 million loan late in 1981, while early in 1982 Venezuela was negotiating a $1 billion loan, and international bankers were correctly predicting that all but two or three OPEC countries would be forced to borrow before the year's end.[75] Thus, it is clear that OPEC's position in the world oil market and its internal structure limit its capacity to implement monopoly pricing.

A third reason why it is misleading to regard OPEC as a cartel or an oligopoly is that the monopoly power it *does* have in the world oil market is parasitic on the goodwill of the oil majors. As we saw earlier the price of Middle Eastern oil fell steadily between the mid-1950's and the early 1970's. In fact it was also seldom more than two thirds of the price of US produced oil for most of that period.[76] Despite this two earlier attempts by OPEC to raise prices via supply restrictions failed, as Blair has shown, because they did not have the support of the oil multinationals.[77] The latters' down-the-line controls of world marketing, other production sources and research and development make it impossible for the producer countries to act unilaterally, without the explicit consent and collusion of the multinationals. What happened after the late 1960's was that falling profitability meant that it became in the interest of the multinationals to support price increases by the producer countries. Net income as a proportion of sales for the Seven Sisters fell steadily between 1968 and 1972 from 10.15% to 6.9%.[78] It was this fall in profitability which provided the incentive for them to define their interests with OPEC's and support the price hikes. The same phenomenon was repeated for the second round of price rises in 1979-80. While the 1973 price rise restored profitability (measured as net income as a proportion of sales) to 9.42%, it fell to 6.3% in 1974, hovered around 4% for 1975-7 and fell to 3.9% in 1978, after which the price hikes began to restore it again to 5.92% in 1979 and 6.27% in 1980. Thus during the second round of price hikes it was again a relative decline in profitability that provided the impetus for the Seven Sisters to collude with OPEC and provide the decisive support necessary for the successful implementation of the price rises.

Not only is OPEC dependent on the active collusion of oil multinationals, but is relative strength *vis-à-vis* these companies in the world oil market has declined in recent years. This is partly due to increased energy diversification in the West in response to the first price rises; a decrease in oil dependence generally, which reduces the power of OPEC but not necessarily that of the oil multinationals who are diversifying their activities and becoming increasingly involved in other types of energy production. It is also partly due to OPEC's falling share of world oil production with the expansion of production in the

75. *Ibid.*
76. John Blair, *The Control of Oil* (New York: Vintage, 1976) p. 117.
77. *Ibid.*, pp. 98-120; 261-75.
78. The Seven Sisters, the seven largest oil multinationals, include Exxon, British Petroleum, Gulf, Shell, Socal (Chevron), Mobil & Texaco. These and the following statistics are calculated from earnings reported in *Moody's Industrial Manual* (various years).

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North Sea and Latin America (as well as increased production by Communist countries which decreases *their* dependence on OPEC oil and enables them to influence the world price on the spot market.) [79] Obviously a relative shift in production from the Middle East to the North Sea and Non-OPEC parts of Latin America harms OPEC; but it need have no impact on the multinationals which operate globally: on the contrary it increases their bargaining power relative to OPEC because they can threaten to move increasing amounts of the production side of their oil trade elsewhere. In the North Sea alone, where the Seven Sisters own almost 60% of the total oil reserves, oil production has increased fivefold since 1971 and doubled since 1976.[80] Some indication of the growing relative power of the oil multinationals can be gleaned by comparing the behavior of their profits with the oil revenues of the OPEC countries. While the 1973-4 price rises increased OPEC oil revenues by much more than the Seven Sisters' profits (OPEC oil revenues increased by 59.3% on the previous year in 1973 and 225.3% on the previous year in 1974 while the figures for the Seven Sisters' profits for the same years were 75.7% and 27.8% respectively), during the second round of price rises the converse was true. OPEC oil revenues increased by 48.1% in 1979 over 1978 and 39.9% in 1980 over 1979, but the comparable figures for the Seven Sisters' were 97.3% and 27% respectively which, taken together, constitute a Seven Sisters' increase of 150% on 1978, as compared with an OPEC increase of 107%.[81] It is thus evident that the relative gains made by the Seven Sisters during the second round of price increases were substantially greater than those made by OPEC. If the relative power of OPEC in the world oil industry has declined to the favor of the oil majors since the early 1970's, we should expect to find, when definitive statistics become available, that the relative losses in oil revenues by OPEC as a result of the 1982 glut are greater than those of the oil majors. This conclusion is already suggested currently by casual empiricism: despite the glut, the fall in spot market prices and the failure of OPEC prices to rise, there has been only a minimal fall in US pump prices — but the money must be going somewhere. Great skepticism is thus needed when interpreting complaints from oil companies that OPEC is the cause of their 1982 revenue losses. Probably the net loss will be much smaller than was being claimed in 1982, and much of the burden will be shouldered by OPEC — quite probably their loss will be the greater.

Another indication that the Seven Sisters have been principal beneficiaries of the 1970's price rises lies in their profitability relative to other corporate capital. As we saw, the profitability of the Seven Sisters fell during the early and mid 1970's, and even when it increased it never reached the high levels of the late 1960's. The oil multinationals have nonetheless fared considerably better

79. Between 1973 and 1979 the centrally planned economies increased their share of world crude oil production from 16.8% to 21.5%. *OAPEC Secretary General's Sixth Annual Report op. cit.*, p. 41.

80. *The Economist* Special Survey on Western Europe's oil and gas (June 12, 1982) pp. 4 & 8.

81. These statistics are computed from *International Financial Statistics* (various years) and *Moody's Industrial Manual* (various years).

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than other corporations in, for example, the US economy, where the recessions of the 1970's have eaten into sales and profits. In the early 1970's oil was far from the most profitable industry. In a comparison of the 1971 rates of return of the eight largest oil companies with those of the eight leaders in eighteen other major industries, the oil firms ranked only fifth.[82] If the Fortune 500 rankings of the 500 largest industrial corporations in terms of net income over the past 12 years are examined, one finds that between 1968 and 1973 five out of the top ten industrial corporations were oil companies (except in 1972 when only 4 were). This proportion increased after 1973, however, to six out of the top ten for 1974 through 1977, dropped back to five for 1978, and then rose dramatically to seven out of the top ten corporations for 1979 and 1980. Despite this substantial growth in relative profitability, the Reagan administration abandoned a pending anti-trust suit aimed at breaking up the largest oil companies in September 1981.[83] The trend of growing concentration within the US national oil industry, so dramatic since the 1960's, is therefore likely to be accelerated by the policies of the New Right.

Since 1972 the Seven Sisters' profits have behaved quite differently from industrial and financial profits generally. During the 1973-5 recession they actually increased during the first half of the recession *to levels higher than those profits at which the rest of the US economy was to peak between that and the next (1978-80) recession*. When they finally fell in the second half of the recession (although they fell further than profits generally) they only remained in recession very briefly: the percent change on the previous year was negative only for 1975. If we make the same comparison for the later 1970's the relatively strong position of the Seven Sisters is even more striking. The percent change on the previous year was at no time negative, and while corporate and financial profits fell as the economy moved into recession after 1978, the Seven Sisters' profits were soaring to unprecedented heights: in 1979 they increased by 97.3% on 1978, and in 1980 by 27% on 1979. This phenomenon seems to be repeating itself in the 1981-2 recession. Oil profits did not begin to decline until the last quarter of 1981 when they fell sharply, but were already recovering by the third quarter of 1982 despite the absence of any sign of recovery eleswhere in the industrial sectors of the metropolitan capitalist economies. Presently it is still too early to interpret the statistics definitively,[84] but it is clear that the oil industry is relatively free of the vicissitudes of the trade cycle (at least compared with other elements of capital). Their direct control of marketing, research and development, and their indirect control of production (given OPEC's parasitic dependence on them) enables them to sustain and even increase profits during recessions. This trend has become more pronounced since the mid-1970's.

82. Cited in John Blair, *op. cit.*, p. 316. Indeed one of the arguments used by the oil lobby against proposed regulation and anti-trust suits was that there were many more profitable industries than theirs.

83. *The New York Times* (January 10, 1982) section 3, p. 26.

84. Statistics employed in the preceding calculations are taken from *Moody's Industrial Manual* (various years) and the *Economic Report of the President 1982*, tables B-83 and B-84.

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Two implications are to be drawn here. First, it is not possible for a group of governments to act very effectively as a cartel in today's world, particularly if they are trading in a commodity like oil which requires their participation in world trade. Multilateral cartels could conceivably occur in closed trading blocs such as COMECON, but even in that case the experience of the past fifteen years in Poland, Rumania and the Soviet Union (not to mention recent developments in China) has shown decisively that national economies cannot any longer function independently of the international capitalist system. The imperatives of international competitiveness and the needs for Western capital and food imports have pulled them increasingly into the global system, no doubt to the detriment of large classes of the national populations. In the case of OPEC the bonds with the West are much stronger. They are tied into Western trade and financial institutions and are dependent above all on the oil multinationals. It follows that if we are to blame monopoly pricing activities in the oil industry for significantly contributing to the inflation of the 1970's we should look not primarily to OPEC but to the world petroleum industry itself. In 1976 Blair, who appropriately dubbed the relation between OPEC and the oil multinationals as a "bilateral symbiotic oligopoly,"[85] overturned the myth that the 1973-4 oil price rises were due to the "Arab embargo."[86] Furthermore, in 1975 the initiative for production cutbacks came from the oil multinationals not OPEC, as profits fell sharply and decisive action became necessary to restore them.[87] This supports our general finding that since the mid-1970's the oil companies have become the dominant partner in the symbiotic relation, a situation reflected in the fact that they did substantially better out of the second round of increases than OPEC. Thus, OPEC is one necessary component, but nothing remotely resembling a sufficient one, for the concentration that exists in the world oil industry. From this point of view the contribution of oil price rises to the inflation of the 1970's is simply another illustration of the truth of the administered pricing thesis.

Second, as we saw, in both rounds of price increases OPEC's policy was a defensive response to the erosion of oil prices by inflation. This does not mean, of course, that oil price increases do not cause further inflation, or that this inflation will not ultimately be harmful to the OPEC countries. The administered pricing thesis is not a conspiracy theory: multinational corporations (and in the case of the oil industry plus national governments) do not control the system as a whole but only their own operations. Their principal motivation, *pace* Galbraith,[88] is profit, and they pursue this with scant regard for the effects of their activities on the system as a whole, unless these

85. John Blair, *op. cit.*, p. 293.

86. Blair demonstrated that during the period of supposed embargo — the fourth quarter of 1973 — OPEC output was virtually the same as in the same period the following year, when both OPEC and the oil multinationals were worried about a potential surplus. In fact the oil embargo occasioned minor dislocations in supply *Ibid.*, p. 275. The price increased and remained high because of price increases agreed and administered by OPEC and the oil majors.

87. *Ibid.*, p. 276-93.

88. John Kenneth Galbraith, *Economics and the Public Purpose* (London, 1976).

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effects react back on their own operations. Even then their whole mode of existence and operation prevents their doing much about it, as is also effectively demonstrated in the OPEC case. The 1979 oil price rises were motivated by the erosion of real oil prices due to inflation, yet higher oil prices can only exacerbate this inflation. They also weaken the dollar by increasing the US trade deficit, further affecting their (largely dollar) income.

US Defense spending. There remains then consideration of the other-often proclaimed "exogenous" cause of the recent inflation: the policies of the Johnson administration during the Vietnam war. The general thrust of this argument is to place the blame for the modern inflation not on the deficit spending of Western governments generally, but specifically on the US's ability to remain in more or less permanent deficit because of dollar and political hegemony.[89] Although proponents of this argument focus on the Keynesian policies of the Johnson era, they are actually traceable to the Kennedy administration.[90] Kennedy spent heavily but was reluctant for political reasons to raise taxes and began to print money instead, legitimating it with his famous "full employment budget," a notion that requires government deficits whenever the economy is operating below capacity. It was this fiscal policy that Johnson took over as a means for financing his Great Society programs and his escalation of the Vietnam war without increasing taxation. Nixon, Ford and Carter all followed suit in varying degrees, printing money to cover the deficit. They were able to get away with this because of the special position of the dollar as the world's reserve currency. So long as Europeans were willing to exchange their hard currencies for dollars, the US was able to export its inflation, making Europe pay for its wars and social programs at the same time as it caused inflation within the Western European economies. The result was a flood of dollars in Europe which threatened the whole financial system, but this could only be kept going while other countries were willing to accept dollars and the dollar was tied to gold. The diminution of the US gold supply by 1971 and European anger at the dilution of their own currencies, forced Nixon into a choice of either stabilizing the dollar by reducing spending, or by devaluing — and of course he chose the latter. This stimulated exports, but did not help in the medium-run because the underlying cause was not touched: endemic inflation in the economy as the US continued huge balance-of-payments deficits (largely because of military spending abroad) which increased the Eurodollar flood and fueled worldwide inflation, notably in the price of raw materials. The solution of Nixon, Ford and Carter to these latter price rises

89. See, for example, David R. Cameron, "Taxes, Spending and deficits..." *op. cit.*, pp. 67-70; Robert Keohane, *op. cit.*, pp. 6-17; David P. Calleo, "Inflation and American Power," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 59, No. 4 (Spring 1981) pp. 781-812; and Ronald Steel, *The New Republic* (May 16, 1981).

90. Calleo points out that although US domestic inflation began to take off in 1965, well before Vietnam expenditures were to have a significant effect on the economy, the roots of Johnson's expensive military and social programs are clearly to be found in the Kennedy administration: in its rearmament, its reassertion of American leadership abroad and pursuit of neo-Keynesian employment policies at home. David P. Calleo, *op. cit.*, p. 782.

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was to print more paper dollars to pay for them.[91] If the dollar's central position in the international monetary system since the second world was permitted administrations after Kennedy to cause and export inflation in this way, it was continued long after it ceased to be of advantage to Europe, Japan and the Persian Gulf because of their dependence on the US for defense: American allies were forced to import inflation as one of the prices for US "protection." It may even be the case, as Steel has suggested, that the US overseas military presence is now so colossal that it cannot be paid for in any other way.[92]

This argument must be taken seriously as an important underlying cause of world inflation since the 1960's for three reasons. First, the budget deficit generated during the Johnson administration occurred when the economy was operating at near-full capacity, and for this reason alone there are theoretical reasons for expecting it to be inflationary. Second, the relative strength of the US economy and the special position of the dollar *do* place the US in unique position to export its inflation to the West European economies. Finally, US defense spending abroad *is* colossal, despite its being part of the Reaganomic creed to bemoan the supposed weakening of US military power and what is held to be the relative decline in military spending over the past several years. The *Economic Report of the President* for 1982, for example, asserts that a projected increase in military expenditure of 9% a year trhough 1987 will "be a sharp reversal of the trend of the last decade" when defense spending is implied to have been declining, but that it will "not even restore defense spending to its pre-Vietnam share of GNP."[93] Closer examination of the evidence, however, reveals this comaprison to be wildly misleading because of the rate at which GNP has increased for most of the post-war period. If we instead examine the changes in defense spending themselves we find first of all that (after inflation) since 1975 defense spending has been steadily increasing (except for a minimal fall of 0.5% in 1976) so that there is no declining "trend of the last decade." The increases begun by Nixon were continued by Ford and Carter and have been accelerated by Reagan so that by the end of 1982 the real dollar value of defense expenditure, after inflation, was equal that of 1968, the most expensive year of the Vietnam war. From 1983 onwards US military expenditure after inflation will reach historically unprecedented heights.[94]

To the extent to which the US military generated deficit spending in the early 1960's was an important underlying cause of world inflation, it is also worth emphasizing that this is likely to be repeated when the economy comes out of recession and begins to operate at capacity, assuming that the deficit will by then have been monetized. Even before the Pentagon announced in

91. After the oil price rises in 1973, for example, while Europe and Japan reduced oil usage, the US kept oil prices artifically low and refused conservation programs.

92. Ronald Steel, *op. cit.*

93. *Economic Report of the President 1982, op. cit.*, p. 85.

94. These and the following statistics are calculated from the *Statistical Abstract of the United States* (various years) and the *Economic Report of the President 1982* tables B-1, B-3 and pp. 85 and 115.

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early 1982 that it had undercosted a number of its major projects, the Reagan administration had planned to increase defense spending by 9% a year from 5.6% to 7.8% of GNP and from 25% to 37% of all Federal spending from 1981-1987.[95] Expressed in 1980 dollars and assuming, as the *Economic Report of the President* does, a real annual GNP growth rate of 3.2%, this means an increase from $156.9 billion in 1981 to $264 billion in 1987, or an increase of a staggering 68.3%.[96] Some comparative indication of the dimensions of this increase can be gleaned if we notice that, after inflation, the planned Reagan increase of $106.2 billion is almost 50% greater than the comparable real increase of $70.8 billion that occurred between 1959 and 1964 in the buildup for the Vietnam war. Given these plans, a projected cumulative Federal budget deficit at a minimum of $350 billion by 1984, Reagan's commitment to decreasing taxation and no prospect of a trade surplus in the foreseeable future, the phenomenon of Europe financing US defense spending through importing US inflation can only continue.

Unemployment

What remains to be examined is the flipside of the stagflationary coin: permanent and increasing unemployment. As we saw in the discussion of the history of stagflation, a secular trend of increasing unemployment has paralleled the genesis of permanent inflation, so that the so-called "tradeoff" between unemployment and inflation, immortalized in the Phillips curve,[97] can only be sustained via torturous arguments that the "natural" rate of unemployment has dramatically increased. Partly a response to the new conservative economic orthodoxies in some countries, the trend of increasing unemployment has taken on acute proportions in recent years, reaching postwar records throughout Europe and North America and approaching the levels of the great depression in most countries. In the US consecutive recessions in 1980 and 1981-2 drove unemployment to 10.8% (13 million) in 1982, with over a million workers unemployed in the construction industry alone. In every European country except France unemployment increased between 1980 and 1982 above the already high trend rates of the 1970's.[98] This growing unemployment together with low growth and continuous inflation flies in the face of conventional economic theory which predicts an inverse relation between unemployment and inflation. To explain this we must look more closely at the relationship between unemployment and busi-

95. *Ibid.*, pp. 85-6.

96. These projections do not take account of the small defense cuts insisted on by Congress in July 1982 and some further cosmetic cuts that will probably be negotiated in 1983. If these cuts are included in the medium-term projections our figure of $265 billion by 1987 is exaggerated by a little over $1 billion.

97. Alban W. Phillips, "The Relationship Between Unemployment and the Rate of Change in Money Wage Rates in the United Kindom 1961-1957," *Economica*, Vol. XV, NO. 100 (1958).

98. In October 1982 it was 12.6% in Canada, 7.2% in Germany, 11.1% in Italy, 12.8% in The UK, and 8.7% for the OECD as a whole. *OECD Main Economic Indicators*, December 1982, p. 16.

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ness cycles, and between unemployment and the economic functions of the state.

Business cycles and unemployment.

Theories of the business cycle are of three main types: (i) those that emphasize weak demand in the Keynesian tradition, or underconsumption in the Marxist tradition associated with Sweezy; (ii) those that emphasize secular trends of increasing capital intensity or, as Marxists such as Dobb, Yaffe and others have argued it, the rising organic composition of capital, and (iii) those, following Glyn and Sutcliffe, Boddy and Crotty and others, that emphasize increasing employment and wages in the upswing of the cycle and are thus led to a wage-push argument for a falling rate of profit, a concomitant fall in investment, and hence recession.[99] As Sherman has argued in relation to the Marxist versions of these arguments, they need not be incompatible with one another.[100]

It must be remembered that we are attempting to explain not cyclical changes in the rate of unemployemnt, but secular increases in that rate of recent years. First, the short-run version of the underconsumptionists' stagflation argument turns on the claim that workers have a higher marginal propensity to consume than do capitalists. It is then argued that increases in productivity during the expansionary phase lead to a falling share of wages in the national income and falling demand as a result. Investment drops off and recession follows. Whatever the merits of this as a short-run argument, it is clear that it provides theoretical reasons for expecting a long-run rise in unemployment to accompany concentration. In a concentrated economy the response to falling demand is to cut production while sustaining price. Unemployment thus rises in recession when monopoly production is cut, but since prices continue to rise the possibility of a demand-led return to full production is weakened or prohibited. The increasing capital-intensity which accompanies this process exacerbates it, producing recessions ever more frequently.

The second type of explanation concerns the rising organic composition of capital. From this point of view business cycles are simply labor-shedding devices. Profitability drops off at the end of the cyclical upswing, and can only be restored through reducing unit labor costs by an increase in labor produc tivity, which requires higher capital intensity. Labor is shed in the recession and less labor is taken on in the subsequent cyclical upswing. Cameron found

99. Paul Sweezy, *Theory of Capitalist Development* (New York: Monthly Review, 1958); Maurice H. Dobb, *Political Economy and Capitalism* (New York: International Publishers, 1946); David Yaffe, "The Crisis of Profitability," *New Left Review*, Vol. 80 (July/August, 1973); Andrew Glyn and Bob Sutcliffe, *British Capitalism: Workers and the Profit Squeeze* (London: Pelican, 1972); Raford Boddy and James Crotty, "Class Conflict and Macro Policy: The Political Business Cycle," *Review of Radical Political Economics* Vol. 7 (Spring 1975).

100. A comprehensive discussion of this question cannot be undertaken here; thus the reader is referred to Howard H. Sherman, "A Marxist Theory of the Business Cycle," *Review of Radical Political Economics*, Vol. 11, No. 1 (Spring 1979). For criticism of Sherman see Jöry Glombowski, "A Comment on Sherman's Cycle Model," *Review of Radical Political Economics,* Vol. 14, No. 1 (Spring 1982) pp. 42-9, and rebuttal by Sherman see "A Reply to Glombowski's Comment" in the same issue, pp. 50-3.

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that in the recessions of 1949, 1954, 1958, 1961, 1970, and 1975, the reduction in hours worked *exceeded* the reduction in output.[101] Furthermore, in the year following the trough of the recession the increase in hours worked lagged well behind the increase in output, so that recessions function to increase output per hour worked. In this way business is able to shed labor and increase efficiency at the same time as it holds down wages. It is only towards the end of the cyclical upswing that wages begin to rise, a fact that has been established by a number of the studies already mentioned. As Cameron points out, because employment increases more slowly than output and capacity utilization in the year following the recession, labor's bargaining power is weakened. The net effect is a sharp fall in unit labor costs and a consequent recovery of the rate of profit. Since the increasing capital-intensity of modern technological production is itself a secular development, the continuous creation of unemployment is its permanent by-product.

The wage-push argument for the declining profit rate is compatible with this labor shedding thesis: it deals with the other end of the cycle. What it in effect holds is that unit labor costs increase towards the end of the upswing, precipitating the decline in the rate of profit. Of course increasingly capital intensive production by competitors is only one among a number of possible causes of an increase in an employer's relative costs: strategically militant workers who can make effective wage claims or inflation in the price of raw materials can have the same result. So long as they increase unit labor costs they will have a negative effect on profits and generate an incentive to shed labor through recession.

The 'fiscal crisis' argument.

That these secular increases in unemployment have only occurred in recent years requires explanation. Carlo suggests that the foremost cause is the "failure of the state's balancing activity."[102] The unemployment created by new technology and monopoly underproduction since the War has been mopped up by the economic activities of the state: the building of roads and housing, investment in armaments, the expansion of services and its own bureaucracy, all of which provide employment. In this way the growth of the state is an adjunct to the concentration of capital. But the state now faces a fiscal crisis and is unable to raise sufficient revenue for the creation of the number of jobs required by unemployment.

Arguments about the fiscal crisis of the state have persisted since the publication of O'Connor's book by that name in 1973.[103] It is now fairly widely acknowledged, however, that if O'Connor gives a convincing account of why the growth of the monopolistic sector requires a continuous increase in government expenditure to absorb the unemployment that it creates, he does not establish that there are absolute limits to the taxable base of the economy

101. David R. Cameron "Economic Inequality in the United States," paper presented to the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association (Chicago, Illinois, April 1978).

102. Antonio Carlo, "Inflation" *op. cit.*, pp. 405-6.

103. James R. O'Connor, *The Fiscal Crisis of the State* (London: St. Martins, 1973).

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such that the state must eventually fail to do this.[104] This is because his thesis turns on the claim that the most rapidly expanding sector, in terms of employment, is the competitive sector, which in terms of providing and expanding taxable base for the increasing fiscal output of the state is, however, the most limited.

Despite the fact that O'Connor's thesis is not fully substantiated, it may still be sound, and Carlo suggests several reasons why. He points out that there are enormous difficulties in attempting to tax the monopolistic-oligopolistic sector. First, the very pricing mechanisms which produce administrative inflation also enable conglomerates to pass on tax increases to the consumer in the form of higher prices, and thereby effectively evade taxation. Second, the monopoly sector which ensures that the economy constantly demands state intervention also limits the amount of revenue available to the state to perform its function because monopoly capital is now multi-national. A great many of the transactions between capitalist countries are between subsidiaries of the same corporation (as many as 50% according to one study).[105] This means that through systems of transfer pricing they can ensure that they pay the bulk of their taxes in the countries with the lowest rates, thereby upsetting the fiscal policies of governments to the advantage of multinationals.[106] As McDermott has recently demonstrated in the US, corporate income tax as a percentage of all IRS tax collections has been in steady decline since WWII, falling from over 36% in 1944 to under 15.5% by 1979, in part as the result of changes in the tax law but in no small measure due to the globalization of capital.[107] Finally, as the monopolistic-oligopolistic sector is growing relative to the competitive sector it is simultaneously becoming more capital-intensive and less capable of generating the type of growth necessary to keep pace with employment.[108] If increasing automation generates stagnation in industrial employment, the need for jobs can only be met by broadening the tertiary sector, and if this sector becomes saturated an employment crisis is in the making. This is increasingly becoming the case in the Western economies, where it takes a GNP growth of nearly 10% to generate expanding employment markets, but where minimal falls in growth generate increasing unemployment. Automation is also growing in the tertiary sector as a function of computerization and centralization, further limiting its capacity to act as an employment sponge. Countries likes Italy and France have recognized this danger of cen-

104. See, for example, Hugh Mosely, "Monopoly Capital and the State: Some Reflections on O'Connor's *The Fiscal Crisis of the State," Review of Radical Political Economics,* Vol. 11, No. 4 (Spring 1979) pp. 52-61; Antonio Carlo, "Unemployment," *Telos,* No. 38 (Winter 1978/9) p. 12.

105. Ronald E. Muller, "Global Corporations and National Stabilization Policy," *Journal of Economic Issues*, Vol. IX (June 1977) pp. 183-4.

106. Antonio Carlo, "Unemployment" *op. cit.*, p. 13; Howard J. Sherman, *Stagflation...op. cit.,* p. 215.

107. John McDermott, "The Great Escape: The Secret History of the Deficit," *The Nation* (August 21-8, 1982).

108. As a poignant illustration of this Carlo points out that the monumental Japanese twenty year plan (1966-85) which assumed a nine-fold increase in GNP by 1985, projected an increase in employment of only 26%, which means an increase in the labor force of 1:35 in relation to GNP. Antonio Carlo, "Unemployment" *op. cit.*, p. 5.

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tralization and have passed laws, such as the Royer Law and the Italian Law 426 to slow down these developments.[109] Such solutions can only be stopgap measures, but the fact that they are attempted indicates the extent to which the private tertiary sector has become saturated. In this situation the state is forced to adopt policies aimed at creating employment.

Carlo concludes that the labor market has held in the past because the private tertiary and public sectors played a highly dynamic role. As these sectors become saturated, however, the employment outlook becomes increasingly bleak. While this argument has never been decisively tested empirically casual empiricism suggests that it merits serious consideration. An OECD development report on the industrial world published in July 1982 was predicting an unprecedented Europe-wide unemployment rate of 10.5% for 1983, the culmination of nine successive years of increasing unemployment. In the US (where the employment outlook has historically been better than in Western Europe) the figure was accelerating towards 11% in late 1982, with no prospect of a significant fall in the foreseeable future.[110] These aggregate statistics of course tell only a small part of the story. In many urban areas the figures are two or even three times the national rate and the social costs incalculable.

Stagflation and the New Right

It is worth emphasizing that under these circumstances there is extremely limited room for manoeuvre for any Western government. The social consensus in metropolitan capitalist countries, which both supports and is the product of post-war " managed capitalism," has been achieved by virtue of enormous economic growth that has provided ever higher standards of living for the great majority of people under conditions of full employment. If states have truly reached a limit to their capacities to perform their managing and balancing roles, then the strains on any government become critical and their options few. A government, such as the Mitterrand government, which goes it alone and tries to reflate its national economy through increased spending or looser monetary policies is most unlikely to succeed, since increased domestic demand, in the absence of quite radical protectionist measures, will pull in imports while exports are languishing, thus creating balance of payments difficulties and pressures on the local currency towards devaluation. Even if a concerted international effort at coordinated reflation were to succeed (which is unlikely), there seems little chance that growth could be sufficient to make any real dent in the long-term unemployment figures for the reasons just discussed. Thus, we cannot be surprised to discover that by mid-1982 the Mitterrand government had gone into retreat on many of its key policies. Faced in April with France's worst ever deficit in visible trade, an inflation rate of 14% and rising, and the fact that their reflationary policies were simply pulling in extra imports at a time when their trading partners were deflating — such as

109. *Ibid.*, pp. 10-11.
110. *The Guardian Weekly* (July 18, 1982) p. 15.

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automobiles from West Germany (which worsened the French-German trade deficit by 80% for the first quarter) and successive waves of speculation against the franc (that had washed away more than two thirds of France's hard currency reserves in less than a year) — the government was forced to give up its attempts at reflation. The public sector deficit was arbitrarily limited to 3% of GNP (less, it should be noted, than in Britain or the US), a four month freeze was imposed on wages and prices, and the franc was devalued by a further 5.75%.[111]

Another strategy a government may try, whether in association with or in preference to reflation, is to attack price rises by reducing costs either through increasing productivity or, more usually, through a prices and incomes policy. The latter will in practice be largely a wage-restraint policy since prices always prove difficult to control to any significant extent. The ideal is to improve profits and thus encourage employment-creating investment, either by reducing costs while prices rise or, if lower costs permit lower prices, by increasing competitiveness and expanding sales. The difficulties both in achieving a voluntary or statutory incomes policy and of obtaining any lasting benefit from it are well known. A workforce that submits to wage-restraint while prices continue to rise, even if more slowly, sees its real income eroded. When restraint is eventually lifted or the policy breaks down, there follows an explosive round of wage demands as workers try to recover lost ground and correct anomalies in pay differentials caused by the policy. If the increased profits made during the period of restraint have not led to any significant increase in investment, workers are likely to be even more intransigent in their demands. This is in fact what usually happens, since it is not solely or even most importantly the level of present profits that influences companies' investment strategies, but rather their perceptions of the longer-term economic outlooks, including likely future rates of inflation (since these will determine real rates of return on investment).

At any rate the governments of the main Western nations in the past few years have eschewed direct control of incomes and prices. The end of the post-war boom and the discrediting of the consensus politics founded on it has produced a resurgence of the Right and its electoral success in many countries (the notable exceptions being France and Greece; the latter, of course, is a very marginal economy). In Thatcher's Britain and Reagan's America a new analysis of the ills of the modern economy of modern states has been offered, and different (if archaic) solutions presented. The rhetoric has been radical, the ideas are a hodgepodge of pure monetarism and classical 19th century economic liberalism, with the emphasis on private enterprise and reduced government involvement in the economy. Misidentifying — perhaps disingenuously — the modern hyper-state as the enemy of modern capitalism rather than its effect and necessary concomitant, and blaming it for economic recession, the New Right has declared its aim to be to "let the people free;" that is to say "free" from governmental interference in the economy. Private

111. *The Economist* (July 19, 1982) pp. 14-5.

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enterprise is to be promoted through tax reductions, removal of governmental controls, cuts in government expenditure and, in Britain, denationalization, while at the same time financial discipline will be maintained through strict monetary measures. Rhetoric, as ever, is somewhat at odds with reality, and we should beware of the idea that the policies of the New Right mark in all areas fundamental and radical departures from the past. Thatcher's policies of public-spending cuts, published monetary targets and reductions in direct taxation were all inaugurated by the post-1976 Labour government. Nor has Tory success in carrying these policies through been noticeably greater than Labour's. The clearest shift has been one of emphasis rather than of substance, and the considerable continuity between the two regimes reflects the real and enduring constraints under which any government is forced to operate, and the limited scope for alternative policies to deal with them. Likewise in the US it was Carter, in 1979-80, who endorsed the Fed's tight money policy and its shift from interest rates to monetary aggregates as policy targets, recommended extensive cuts in social welfare spending in his revised budget proposals, and took an increasingly critical line on business regulation.[112]

The power of governments to affect the economy consists all too often in the power to make things worse. Thus the Thatcher-Howe government has presided over the most alarming decline and but for North Sea oil the picture might be even grimmer. Meanwhile, under Reagan's bluff tutelage the US giant has begun to resemble its dwarfish cousin across the Atlantic to a degree that a few years ago would have been inconceivable. Much of the blame for this sharp decline must be laid at the door of the high interest rates that have become a permanent feature of the new order on both sides of the Atlantic. In 1980 British corporate bank borrowing rose by 6 billion sterling, 70% of which was pre-empted by interest repayments to the self-same banks.[113] It is this massive squeeze on corporate cash flows which is behind the New Right's support of high interest rates. In their view, as ITEM forecasters have noted, if companies expect interest rates to remain high they will cut stocks, investment and employment. It will then be the concomitant fall in output, and not expectations that the government will hold down the money supply, that will slow the wage-price spiral. This is what is really behind the new monetarism, as the ITEM report concludes: "Once it is understood that simple deflation is being relied upon to redue inflation and the mysticism is stripped from government monetarism, the future of the UK economy depends on how quickly recession brings down wages and prices.[114] The reason for these unprecedentedly high rates, which have become real for the first time since the war, is mainly the reliance on monetary policy as the favored means of

112. See Thomas Ferguson and Joel Rogers, "The Reagan Victory: Corporate Coalitions in the 1980 Campaign," in Thomas Ferguson and Joel Rogers (eds) *The Hidden Election: Politics and Economics in the 1980 Presidential Campaign* (New York: Random House, 1981) pp. 3-64, esp. 26-40.

113. *The Guardian* (London & Manchester, August 4, 1981) p. 12.

114. *Ibid.*

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combating inflation. Leaving aside the large questions of, first, successful identification of what constitutes the total supply of money, and second, how or if it can be adequately controlled, the main problem with the use of high interest rates is that they do more to damage investment and production than to control inflation. The effect of making credit more expensive is to lower demand in the economy, striking particularly hard at companies' demand for capital investment. It is true that in Britain the Thatcher government also viewed strict monetarism as a better, purely "technical," alternative to a direct incomes policy in the attack on wage-cost inflation, the theory being that companies would be inhibited from borrowing to pay for wage increases and thus more resistant to wage demands. Wage settlements *were* moderate in 1981 and 1982 and average income just managed to keep pace with inflation (though this meant a fall in real incomes when other factors like taxation were taken into account). However, moderation was more likely a consequence of workers' fear of unemployment than of any stiffening of the spines of employers, though it is true that some managers successfully held the specter of closure and mass unemployment up as a means of frightening employees into settling for smaller increases.[115] By April 1982 over 62,000 companies had folded in the US, 55% more than for the same period in 1981 and almost as many as in the whole of 1978. The rate of business failures has increased from under 25 per 10,000 in 1978 to 30 per 10,000 in 1979, to 50 per 10,000 in 1980, to 60 per 10,000 in 1981, to over 90 per 10,000 for 1982. This last figure is the highest rate since 1932.[116] In Britain, apart from the high borrowing costs, high interest rates further worsened industry's problems in 1981 insofar as they were one of the main causes (along with possession of North Sea Oil) of the considerable over valuation of the pound for an extended period, thus diminishing Britain's already weak competitiveness internationally. Nor did high interest rates help the governments' own financial troubles much, for the resultant rise in unemployment increased expenditure on transfer payments and automatic Keynesian stabilizers, just when ways were desperately being sought to cut government spending and reduce the public sector borrowing requirement.

With respect to the attempts to control the budget deficit it must be noted that another Thatcherite policy operated in direct contradiction to this goal; this was the reduction in personal taxation for the value of "incentives" (though these reductions were somewhat countered by simultaneous rises in indirect taxation). The same set of contradictory policies has characterized Reaganomics. Within Reagan's team there has been a conflict of economic philosophies, with "supply-siders" on the one hand and proponents of a balanced budget and strict monetary control on the other. The theory of supply-side economics is that cutting taxes to encourage investment and removing government controls on business will lead to the miracle of

115. A most dramatic example of this was Michael Edwards defeat of the auto workers at British Leyland in November 1981.

116. *Time* Magazine (April 16, 1982) p. 48; *Newsweek* (April 26, 1982) p. 67.

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inflation-free growth. The case for arguing that cuts in personal tax will increase business investment incentive is, as Galbraith has pointed out,[117] highly dubious; the most likely result of the policy will be merely to increase aggregate demand at a time when monetary policy is pulling in the opposite direction. Apart from this inherent contradictoriness the effort to reduce the state's revenue from taxation at a time of fiscal crisis is, to say the least, counterproductive.

Meanwhile, and as usual during economic downturns, the concentrated sector becomes even more so, as conglomerate mergers and takeovers accelerate.[118] The concentration occurring in the industrial sector is likely to be paralleled and surpassed in the financial sector in the next year as the administration's plan to deregulate the banking industry aids the economic impetus towards mergers created by the recession. The counterpart in Britain has been Thatcher's selling-off of chunks of nationalized industry to the private sector, in the fond belief (against the evidence in Britain) that only there will wealth-creating enterprise be discovered.

The New Right's solution to the current economic ills is simple deflation, although this policy is shrouded in a mass of mumbo-jumbo about monetarism. It is anticipated that recession will force business to force labor to take the cuts in wages which will then provide the necessary breathing space for the investment "incentives" to take effect. Both Reagan and Thatcher have had some success with the first of these goals, namely causing recessions which depress wages and shed labor, although the concomitant revitalization of investment has failed to eventuate. In Britain this has been particularly acute. The corporate cash-flow crisis caused by high interest rates has forced unions to accept lower wage settlements, sometimes, as at Leyland, under threat of bankruptcy and unemployment if they fail to comply. Increases in average earnings in the private sector fell from 20% in 1980 to 13.7% in 1981.[119]

To the extent that there is an inevitable decline in progress in major sectors of the British and American industrial economies, there is a case to be made that the New Right's policies will only speed it up; a necessary condition for the restructuring of these industries. If the governments of the New Right are speeding up inevitable processes, at least in some industries, this does not solve the problem of future employment, nor will it ensure that when the

117. *The Observer* (London, August 2, 1981) p. 13.

118. Indeed 1981 saw the biggest takeover ever, as DuPont acquired the oil group Conoco for a record price of $7.5 billion. In another $6.2 billion deal, US Steel took over the Marathon Oil Co.

119. The substantial fall in earnings growth has resulted not only from falls in hours worked, but from deceleration in pay awards. Manufacturing led the way with wage-increases falling from just over 18% in 1979-80 to about 10% in 1981. *The Guardian* (London & Manchester, August 4, 1981) p. 12. Average earnings for the economy as a whole rose by 11.3% in 1981 (to November) and hence did not keep pace with either the 12% inflation rae or the 15.5% increase in the tax and price index (which measures the earnings increase required to maintain after-tax living standards). Furthermore the turn of the year saw a further moderation in pay settlements. The CBI reported on January 20, 1982 that pay settlements had declined from an average of 7.8% in August 1981 to 6.7% in November. *The Guardian* (London & Manchester, January 21, 1982).

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crunch comes they will not be forced for political reasons to step in and bale out lame ducks, and adopt reflationary policies, as the Heath government in Britain discovered in the early 1970's, and the Reagan administration was showing every sign of doing by early 1983. By agreeing to various indirect tax increases, a jobs creation bill, "contingency" increases in income tax after 1984 and considerable loosening of money control by the Fed, "Reaganomics" was showing many signs of collapsing back into orthodox Keynesian fiscal stimulus.

Conclusion

There is a theory according to which dieting can actually increase fatness. It holds that when slimmers go on crash diets to solve weight problems they lose not only fluid and fat but muscle tissue as well, so that when the diet ends they have less of the latter than when they began. Since it is only muscle tissue that burns calories, when they start eating again they burn less and put on proportionally more weight as fat, and their problems are worse than when they began. This is a close analogy to deflation as a cure to stagflation: government tries to take the flab (inflation) out of the economy by a monetarist diet, which affects not just inflation but industrial production, the muscle tissue. If a reflationary policy is tried after this the result is immediately to worsen the flab of inflation and balance of payments problems, because of the reduced productive sector. If deflation is not a viable cure for stagflation, none of the other going alternatives seems very promising either. The dilemma which stagflation presents to government is rather like that faced by a doctor with a patient who faces two serious ailments at once, where the treatment prescribed to cure either one necessarily worsens the other: if they try to solve the growth and employment problem by spending and printing money, as in Mitterrand's France, they exacerbate inflation and cause payments deficits; if they try to stop inflation by spending and money controls, they ruin production and employment. In periods of rapid economic growth it has been possible for governments to negotiate a corporatist consensus between labor and capital upon which a semi-permanent incomes policy could be built, and thus retain control of both wages and prices. But, as these periods become fewer and further between this option recedes: workers refuse negotiated settlements which reduce their real incomes and capital goes on an investment strike as firms see their profits diminishing and costs rising. Both are attempting to play a zero or even negative sum game by positive sum rules, and in this situation conflict becomes inevitable. It is this situation which has spawned the New Right on both sides of the Atlantic, and in conclusion we should like to make three points about the significance of this development and its implications.

First, the New Right does in one important sense constitute a radical break with the past. Although their policies are nowhere near a novel as they would like to have us believe, these policies rest on a rejection of the corporatist consensus of the Keynesian and New Deal eras. While it has historically been true that the negotiated consensus was most vulnerable to worker militancy, it is

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now being destroyed by capital and the state; a reassertion of capitalism-with-the-gloves-off which is being held up, particularly in the US, as inherently desirable rather than as a system which has unavoidable evit consequences.

Second, the ideology of the unrestricted free market upon which the legitimacy of the New Right has been staked is mystifying in a double sense. It is mystifying first in the traditional sense that it camouflages real social relations, but it is mystifying also because the reassertion of market laws in a highly concentrated economy is not leading to the type of competitive capitalism that its proponents say it will. Indeed it is facilitating still further concentration of economic power. The concentration of economic power has historically been paralleled and facilitated by a concentration of political power in the executive. As Polanyi pointed out long ago with respect to Britain, and as we now know from the example of Japanese industrialization, capitalist modernization requires a powerful and interventionist executive arm of the state.[120] In the US, as Wolfe[121] has recently argued, the historical accumulation of power in the presidency has been in part a function of its being the only center of authority which could press forward with economic modernization which involved the destruction of markets and concentration. The social basis of this, exemplified in F.D.R.'s presidency, consisted in a tacit bargain whereby the people were granted material well-being, protection from the harmful effects of modernization and security through superiority abroad, all of which was financed by massive economic growth. But as growth faltered, presidents could no longer offer the people material security against a malfunctioning economy or unquestioned national superiority in a hostile international environment. The Presidency thus began to lose power in Washington and prestige among the electorate during the early 1970's. The New Right's attack on consensus politics, its promise to provide "leadership" and "get things done" after a series of corrupt and or floundering incompetents may be seen as an attempt to reverse this trend. These authoritarian tendencies are compounded by the centralizing political impulses that generally accompany long periods of economic instability.

Our final point concerns the liberal opposition to the New Right which is emerging. Although the New Right has made a radical break with the consensus politics of the recent past, and although their remedies have worsened the ills they were (at least publicly) prescribed to cure, we have sought to emphasize throughout this essay that it is important not to misconstrue the New Right as an important causal determinant of the present crisis. "What went wrong" with Reagan's plan, as it is increasingly being claimed in the liberal establishment and press, is that he thought he could cut taxes, balance the budget and raise defense spending at the same time. No doubt this was an

120. Karl Polanyi, *The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of our Time* (New York: Rinehart & Co., Inc., 1944).

121. Alan Wolfe, "Presidential Power and the Crisis of Modernization," *Democracy* (April 1981) pp. 19-32.

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absurd supposition and certainly it has worsened the situation, but it is not really a causal determinant of the deepening crisis of American capitalism which, as we have seen, is related to long-term structural changes wrought by the progress of monopoly capitalism. Insofar as geopolitical realities force individual national governments to seek domestic solutions to what are basically global problems, we cannot be surprised when these solutions fail to relieve the symptoms of economic malfunction for which they are prescribed. As for their political consequences, the policies of the New Right are more frightening then those of their social-democratic predecessors; in the short term because of the misery they are creating among millions of workers, and in the longer term because they underscore the increasingly authoritarian social character of advanced monopoly capitalism.

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

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

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THE CORPORATIST MOOD IN THE UNITED STATES

by Frank Hearn

Until recently corporatist ideas have failed to generate interest in the U.S. A well-financed attempt to present corporatism as a perfectly American solution to economic and political instability was launched in the early 1930s.[1] Greeted with widespread indifference, the effort was short-lived. Contemporary accounts of corporatism generally pause to mention the U.S. only long enough to note that there, for a variety of historical, cultural, and political reasons, corporatist sentiments do not take root.[2] Implying a kind of American exceptionalism, the common argument is that, of all the advanced industrial countries, only the U.S. remains immune from the corporatist spirit.

This American exceptionalism, however, may be approaching an end. *Business Week, The New Republic*, and *Socialist Review*; Harvard's conservatives, Samuel Huntington, and Robert Reich; socialist union leader, William Winpisinger and Wall Street investment banker, Felix Rohatyn have all been hinting at corporatist solutions to America's decline. These embraces of the corporatist solution owe a great deal to the obsolescence of New Deal, Keynesian reform liberalism and to the failings of Reagan's contradictory supply-side/monetarist strategy. In this context, the corporatist solution increasingly appears not only feasible but also desirable.

Corporatist strategies now appearing in U.S. politics vary in emphasis and elaboration but none even come close to endorsing a full-blown set of corporatist political-economic arrangements such as presently exist in Norway and Austria. Rather, they propose partial corporatist political structures designed to co-exist with, not replace, conventional congressional, bureaucratic, and interest-group forms of representation and administration. The call is mostly for the creation of corporatist agencies limited to the formulation and implementation of economic policy.

Presently, support for a corporatist solution to America's decline is found most strongly among three important and increasingly influential groups: the neoconservatives, the liberal wing of the Democratic Party, and left advocates of reindustrialization. The following will examine corporatist solutions proposed by each group, and reassess corporatist prospects in the U.S.

The Corporatist Solution

Schmitter's conceptualization of corporatism informs much of this discussion. He defines corporatism as "a system of interest representation in which

1. See James Gilbert, *Designing The Industrial State* (Chicago: Quadrangle Press, 1972).
2. See, for instance, Alan Wolfe, *The Limits of Legitimacy* (New York: Free Press, 1977), pp. 337-341.

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the constituent units are organized into a limited number of singular, compulsory, noncompetitive, hierarchically ordered and functionally differentiated categories, recognized or licensed (if not created) by the state and granted a deliberate representational monopoly within their respective categories in exchange for observing certain controls on their selection of leaders and articulation of demands and supports."[3] Corporatist arrangements, Schmitter argues, can be either authoritarian or democratic. The former are forcibly imposed and maintained by the state and closely resemble fascist political structures. The corporatization of interest representation assumes democratic form when it results from more or less voluntary decisions and actions taken by key groups within the social division of labor in response to the gradual but steady decay of pluralist decision-making structures.

Schmitter's point is that there is an irreconciliable tension between pluralist political forms and the requirement of advanced capitalism for the formulation and implementation of policies necessary for the rationalization of the economy.[4] With the growing inability of parties and parliaments to fulfill their long-established functions, the already weak capacity of pluralism to produce consensus on any particular set of problems and related policy formulations is further diminished. Whether the ensuing problem is, as the neoconservatives argue, excessive democracy accompanied by an overload of demands or, as Suzanne Berger claims, a change in the character of the issues at stake, the conclusion is the same.[5]

Given the fiscal instability and loss of legitimation of pluralist structures in advanced capitalism, class, sectoral, and interest-group disputes come increasingly to the fore. Democratic corporatism emerges to counter these pressures in two ways: First, by manufacturing a spirit of consensus and mutual responsibility; secondly, by incorporating into the policy-making process the key groups and organizations so that the process is further depoliticized.

Corporatism has been invoked on several occasions. Two notable instances deserve mention. During the 1930s, corporatist ideology blossomed throughout Western Europe often with authoritarian implications. A century earlier, the corporatist ethos appeared in early sociology as a strategy for social reconstruction. Corporatism was anticipated, first, in St. Simon's and Comte's claim that managing social crisis in modern society requires the transferrence of governance to a scientific-industrial elite and, secondly, in Durkheim's similar but more developed argument that crisis in a complex

3. Philippe Schmitter, "Still the Century of Corporatism?," in P. Schmitter and G. Lehmbruch, eds., *Trends Toward Corporatist Intermediation* (Beverly Hills, Sage Publications, 1979), p. 13. See also Leo Panitch, "Recent Theorizations of Corporatism: Reflections on a Growth Industry", *British Journal of Sociology*, 31, 2, 1980, p. 173.

4. See Philippe Schmitter, "Interest Intermediation and Regime Governability in Contemporary Western Europe and North America", pp. 285-327 in S. Berger, editor, *Organizing Interests in Western Europe* (Cambridge: University Press, 1981).

5. Suzanne Berger, "Introduction", in Berger, *op. cit.*, p. 21.

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society would diminish with the establishment of occupational corporations, licensed and recognized by the state and substituted for geography as electoral units. In each case, corporatism was presented as an antidote to class conflict. Commitment to the national cause (emphasized in the 1930s) and submission to the objective requirements of social order (advocated by the early sociologists) would produce social harmony, moral discipline, restraint, mutual responsibility, and sacrifice necessary for the economic growth and prosperity to generate a more meaningful consensus.

The corporatist ethos is distinctive in its subordination of normative to pragmatic concerns. The consensus sought is nonideological and entails agreement not on "some normative conception of a good and just political order but [on pragmatic questions of] functional requirements, limits of tolerance, and economic mechanisms."[6] It is a consensus to defer to expertise, and in this regard it is in line with St. Simon's views. St. Simon's administrators, wrote Durkheim, "do not dictate orders, they only declare what conforms to the nature of things. The [scientists] show what the laws of social hygiene are: then, from among the measures they propose as a result of these laws, the industrials choose those which experience has proved most practicable. The first will say what is healthful and what is not, what is normal and abnormal; the second will execute. The one will teach what is true; the other will draw from these teachings the practical consequences they imply."[7] Politics is to become scientized, separated from normative questions, reduced through rational administration to an instrument of adaptation to reality.

Corporatism is often advocated in opposition to moral crisis. Always present, however, is the recognition that the erosion of civitas is rooted in a more fundamental structural crisis requiring a restructuring of the process of policy formation. The aim is to depoliticize this process by seeming to politicize it with the incorporation of key private organizations.

Corporatist political structures represent a rational (and rationalizing) response to the growing inability of the state to rest its legitimacy on the provision of material concessions to depoliticized segments of the population, and of parties and interest groups to channel the populace's demands. Corporatist structures are designed to meet these problems partly by strengthening existing organizations into viable instruments of political representation to be directly incorporated into the policy-making process (contingent upon their acceptance of general procedures and goals — especially support of capital accumulation). Democratic participation in this context proceeds "through the exercise of voting rights in relation to a corporation which represents [the various] interests in the formulation of state policy; the unit of representation is the corporation rather than the constituency organized on a territorial basis

6. Claus Offe, "The Attribution of Public Status to Interest Groups: Observations on the West German Case", in Berger, *op. cit.*, p. 132.

7. Emile Durkheim, *Socialism*, translated by C. Sattler (New York: Collier Books, 1962), p. 191.

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and citizens participate in their capacity as economic agents."[8] At the leadership level, various producer groups are integrated on the basis of a system of representation and direct cooperative interaction. This enhances mobilization and social control of the membership. Corporatist democracy, then, entails the institutionalization of functional groups in the formation of public policy in such a way that the linkage of each group to the state occurs through interaction with other groups.

As a consequence of incorporation, key functional organizations surrender their private character to become quasi-public agents responsible for legitimating and enforcing effected policy among their members. In this setting, participating groups do obtain a greater say in the making of policy at the price of enhancing state control over these groups and the policy-making process. Corporatist structures enable the state to delegate responsibility (and thereby lessen administrative overload) and to impose discipline.[9]

A good illustration of this is Keeler's study of the FNSEA, the only agricultural union recognized by the state during the Fifth French Republic. The FNSEA provided the state the services expected of a corporatist participant. It "served as a fixed channel of communication, as a bargaining agent that aggregates and moderates agricultural demands and mobilizes sectoral support for policies that it participates in formulating, and as a supplemental bureaucracy that assists in policy implementation."[10] At times, this official union had to act counter to the views of many of its members in meeting its obligations to the state. However, FNSEA's hegemony was bolstered by the support it received from the state in the form of privileged access to decision-making centers, devolved authority for the making of agricultural policy, monetary subsidies, and the repression of rival unions.[11]

Offe has clearly identified the depoliticizing effects of corporatist political structures: "First, the formal admission of corporate groups to the process of public policy formation favors the production of decisions that minimize the probability that social power will be used in order to obstruct or resist public policy . . . Secondly, to the extent that interest organizations do control the attitudes and behavior of their members . . . ,this organizational discipline can be used to prevent opposition from groups within the organization's membership. In this way the authority of the group's leadership is, so to speak, added to that of the state . . . Third, in case a policy meets or creates

8. Bob Jessop, "Capitalism and Democracy: The Best Possible Shell?", in G. Littlejohn, et. al., editors, *Power and the State* (New York: St. Martin's 1978), p. 48.

9. Offe, *op. cit.*, pp. 139-140, argues that the delegation of authority relates primarily to business organizations while discipline refers especially to working class organizations. This point is extensively developed in Claus Offe and Helmut Wiesenthal, "Two Logics of Collective Action," pp. 67-115 in M. Zeitlin, editor, *Political Power and Social Theory*, volume 1 (Greenwich: JAI Press, 1980).

10. John Keeler, "Corporatism and Official Union Hegemony: The Case of French Agricultural Syndicalism", in Berger, *op. cit.*, p. 187.

11. *Ibid.*, pp. 188-203. The Mitterrand government seems to be taking steps to reverse these corporatist developments. See Stanley Hoffman, "Year One," *The New York Review of Books*, August 12, 1982, pp. 37-43.

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conflict and opposition, in spite of these safety mechanisms, the government alone is not to blame: All the actors that have participated in the process of making the decision in question would be held responsible. This makes such opposition less likely than otherwise, for any 'relevant' opposing group would have to attack not only the government but also its own leadership."[12] This last point is crucial. Public policy in corporatist political structures is largely the responsibility of a functional elite generally operating in accordance with technocratic criteria and independently of public surveillance. Every effort is made to resolve issues in a nonpartisan, nonideological fashion. According to Kvavick, this situation offers the government a virtual guarantee of "little adverse reaction to legislation once effected; that reaction, if it comes, would be directed not toward the government, but at the participants — the interest groups and their representatives — who accept the legislation in behalf of the organization membership."[13]

In short, the active involvement in policy formation by the national representatives of functional groups reduces pressure on the state to intervene in the economy with a constant eye toward electoral success: it allows the state to act more in accord with what is objectively necessary for recapitalization and economic recovery. This is the core of the corporatist solution. Relieved both of complete decisional and implementational responsibility for such matters as social welfare and of inordinant fears of electoral backlash, the state is able to concentrate more fully on the "essential" concerns of economic revitalization and defense.[14] As it becomes clearer that the present crisis, like earlier ones, requires for its resolution a more active, rational and rationalizing state apparatus, the corporatist solution acquires greater appeal.

U.S. Corporatist Currents

As previously mentioned, corporatist solutions in the U.S. are articulated mostly by three otherwise disparate circles: neoconservatives, the liberal wing of the Democratic Party, and left advocates of reindustrialization.

Neoconservatism: Initially, advocates of capitalism argued that democracy and capitalism are wholly incompatible. Later, they reversed this argument to the effect that capitalism is a necessary condition of democracy. Today's neoconservatives synthesize both views: Unless checked, democracy will undermine the stability of capitalism and, in turn, threaten its own viability since stable capitalism is a prerequisite for democracy. The "crisis of democracy" thesis attributes many of the problems of advanced capitalist-democratic societies to a democratic distemper, an overload of democratic impulse, which has generated popular expectations impossible to meet. The use of democratic channels to expand the scope of governmental responsibility has lessened severely the government's ability to govern. Unable to meet excessive demands, government has lost much of its authority and this

12. Offe, *op. cit.*, p. 145.

13. Robert Kvavick, "Interest Groups in a 'Cooptive' Political System: The Case of Norway", in M. Heisler, editor, *Politics In Europe* (New York: McKay, 1974), p. 111.

14. See Schmitter, "Still the Century of Corporatism?", *op. cit.*, p. 35.

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hampers its ability to persuade or compel its citizens to bear the burdens necessary for economic revitalization.[15] The use or abuse of the democratic method to expand governmental activity, is a significant factor in the ungovernability of contemporary capitalism. These circumstances require both lower popular expectations and a stable depoliticization.

Steinfels has carefully identified the constitutive assumptions of this neoconservative treatment of democracy. First, "democracy is not a way of constituting or realizing government; it is a *check* on government." Secondly, "government means *management*, the successful accomplishment of technical tasks posed by the economic and industrial order. A well-governed order is an efficiently managed one." Finally, "government is (and should be) a largely independent managing force, . . . performing its work in a technically competent, professional manner."[16] In this view, democracy is a constraint on this independent, managerial governing body, and it retains positive value only so long as it does not interfere with its efficient operation. Given these assumptions, for Huntington the immediate task is to move "toward a democratic balance," to confront head on the "excess of democracy." Not only are there "potentially desirable limits to economic growth," Huntington has argued, "there are also potentially desirable limits to the indefinite extension of political democracy."[17] Democracy is proper and valuable to the extent that it is moderated. This requires some apathy on the part of segments of the electorate and the recognition that in many situations democratic claims should be overriden by "the claims of expertise, seniority, experience, and special talents."[18] This neoconservative conception of democracy is significant not so much in policy formation as in its contributions to an expanding ideological context whereby sound economic management is primary and that government is best whose economic intervention is designed to enhance not electoral popularity but capital accumulation.

On the surface, the neoconservative conception of democracy has much in common with Schumpeter's democratic elitism (and the so-called empirical democratic theory on which it rests).[19] Thus, both favor restricted participation in making key decisions and the translation of political into technical questions with the ensuing withdrawal of these matters from public discourse. Yet, there are substantial differences between the two. The elitist conception of democracy partly rests on the assumption that large segments of the citizenry are uninformed, intolerant, incapable of reasoned debate and compromise, i.e., bereft of the attitudes necessary for democratic participation. Consequently, the democratic system has a built-in susceptibility to dema-

15. See the arguments presented by Samuel Huntington, "The United States," in M. Crozier, S. Huntington, and J. Watanuki, editors, *The Crisis of Democracy* (New York: New York University Press, 1975) and Samuel Brittan, "The Economic Contradictions of Democracy", *British Journal of Political Science*, 5, 2, 1975.

16. Peter Steinfels, *The Neoconservatives* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1979), p. 268.

17. Huntington, *op. cit.*, p. 115.

18. *Ibid.*, p. 133.

19. Joseph Schumpeter, *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy* (New York: Harper and Row, 1942).

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gogic extremes. Mobilized around emotional appeals, the participation of those who are presently apathetic would constitute a real danger to the democratic system. Neoconservatism, on the other hand, does not fear the participation of demagoguery-induced extremists, but that too many people will become informed, involved, and insistent that larger areas of policy formation and decision-making be made subject to popular influence. What worries the neoconservatives is not that a Hitler or a Wallace will be elected, but that people will use democratic institutions to try to improve the quality of their lives, and, in so doing, make for unpredictability, disorder, and system overload

Another difference between the two is suggested by Habermas' distinction between decisionistic and technocratic models of the relation of technical knowledge to political practice. The elitist conception of democracy promotes a decisionistic model in the sense that, while the politician relies on the knowledge of experts in arriving at decisions, his exercise of power rests on a process of acclamation not justifiable in rational terms since it involves matters of will, value, and interest. In the technocratic model anticipated by neoconservatism, however, the goal is the rationalization of power, the transformation of political power into rational administration and the hinging of decisions of political elites directly to the objective necessity disclosed by technical expertise. In this context, according to Habermas, "The dependence of the professional on the politician appears to have reversed itself. The latter becomes the mere agent of a scientific intelligentsia, which, in concrete circumstances, elaborates the objective implications and requirements of available techniques and resources as well as a optimal strategies and rules of control . . . The politician would then be at best something of a stopgap in a still imperfect rationalization of power . . . the state appears no longer an apparatus for the forcible realization of interests that have no foundation in principle and can only be answered for decisionistically. It becomes instead the organ of a thoroughly rational administration."[20] Clearly, the rationalization of political power entailed by the technocratic model would come at the expense of democracy.

In a recent analysis of the implications of the Reagan Presidency, Wolin supports Habermas' argument that the capitalist state is shifting from a decisionistic to a technocratic form. Recognizing that the political economy of late capitalism requires a rationalizing state and an innovating economy, Wolin argues that in effect the major contribution of the Carter administration was "to discredit the idea of democracy . . . by teaching the citizens to distrust professions of democracy, and to associate democracy with incompetence, empty vision, and self-righteousness." Just as the populist Carter was ideal for discrediting the democratic beliefs and institutions that hamper the state's rationalizing tendencies, so is the conservative Reagan in a good position to orchestrate the weakening of those traditional values which frustrate

20. Jürgen Habermans, *Toward A Rational Society*, translated by J. Shapiro (Boston: Beacon Press, 1970), pp. 63-64.

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the economy's innovating dynamics. Minimally, these developments promise "a political economy in which the state will seek to ground its claims of legitimacy in the authority of technical and scientific knowledge rather than in democratic consent . . ."[21]

Like Habermas, Wolin takes the technocratic implications of the neoconservative conception of democracy to their extreme. Clearly, in this form, they are incompatible even with the narrowest view of democratic participation. In less extreme forms, however, the neoconservative concept of democracy does not imply the elimination of democracy but the establishment of a corporatist democracy. This is especially the case given the compatibility between corporatist political structures and the neoconservative conviction that the most urgent U.S. problem concerns the reindustrialization of the infrastructure rather than quality of life or relatively high levels of private consumption. According to Etzioni, "both projects cannot be advanced *on a high priority basis*, even under quite optimistic assumptions about GNP growth and the size of discretionary funds and the amount being used up by increased expenditures on health, education,and welfare . . . Hence, to accord quality of life coequal status with redevelopment implies, in effect, *an acceptance of underdevelopment*."[22] The neoconservatives' dilemma is how to generate accumulation needed to reindustrialize rapid and massive capital, while substantially reducing quality of life or social welfare measures. A government without authority, goes one of neoconservatism's major themes, is unable to impose necessary sacrifices on its people. Yet, for a long time, capitalist-democratic governments have rested their authority precisely on those measures which must now be reduced. Corporatist political structures seem to provide a solution.

A special issue of *Business Week* devoted to "The Reindustrialization of America" concludes with the observation that the effectiveness of any effort designed to reverse industrial decline ultimately depends on establishing a "new social contract," creating a "new sense of teamwork." Components of this proposed social contract include not simply "clear recognition of the new world economic realities . . . and indicative rather than specific planning" at the government level, but also "agreement among leadership groups, which, in turn, must voice the concerns of their constituents...At the center of the new consensus must stand the recognition that each social group will be measured by how it contributes to economic revitalization. Each group's income must be related firmly to its economic achievement."[23] Predicated on a consensus that the burdens of the necessary sacrifices are to be equitably shared, this coalition approach is presented as capable of overcoming the "short term thinking and political considerations" that currently dominate policy decisions. The central challenge, then, "is to develop a consensus-

21. Sheldon Wolin, "Reagan Country", *The New York Review of Books*, 27, 20, 1980, pp. 10-11.

22. Amatai Etzioni, "Social Progress vs. Economic Progress", *Social Policy*, March/April, 1980, 8.

23. *Business Week*, June 30, 1980, p. 86.

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forming framework under which government, business, labor, and other such major interest groups — without compromising their traditional roles — can agree on trade-offs that both strengthen the economy and, in the end, prove beneficial to all."

Corporatist democracy is clearly consistent with the "new social consensus" and its commitment to reindustrialization. Corporatist democracy entitles the dominant leadership groups to provide guidelines with reference to which state intervention in the economy takes place so long as, in Jessop's words, the participating groups accept "the legitimacy of the overall system in which they operate, i.e., [confine] themselves to an 'economic-corporate' role. [Accordingly, and especially in the context of reindustrialization,] such participation involves accepting the imperatives of capital accumulation and subordinating all policies to those imperatives."[24] Moreover, corporatist democracy would reduce the twin problems of governability in advanced capitalism by, first, facilitating a reduction of administrative overload and responsibility through a delegation of state power to the various functional groups and, secondly, weakening private sources of resistance to public policy. As a consequence, corporatist democratic institutions should prove capable of satisfying the neoconservative goals of lessening public consumption and promoting reindustrialization. Historically, one of the most important preconditions for the development of corporatism has been the state's commitment, forged in the face of growing working class militancy, to an incomes policy and expanded social welfare measures. The present situation, however, demands a reduction of the social wage — one which corporatism may be able to foster by replacing material concessions with greater participation in selected areas of policy formation. Since such participation would be confined to national leaders (committed to preestablished goals and to technical rules of decision-making as well as concerned primarily with means and the allocation of the burdens of sacrifice), it would further depoliticize and rationalize the state in the guise of expanded democracy.

The Trilateral Commission's report on "Industrial Policy And The International Economy" endorses a national industrial policy but emphasizes that such policy must be used to facilitate the proper functioning of the market, not to justify expanding government interventionism. "A sound industrial policy must recognize that the enterprise sector is the prime mover of the economy."[25] The report affirms the Japanese approach where "the government's policy [is] a catalyst for energetic private initiatives and entrepreneurship rather than the prime mover of the system."[26] The continuous

24. Jessop, *op. cit.*, p. 41.

25. John Pinder, Takashi Hosomi, and William Diebold, "Industrial Policy and The International Economy", in *Trilateral Commission Task Force Reports*: 15-19 (New York: New York University Press, 1981), p. 383. Also see William Tabb's "The Trilateral Impact of Domestic Economics" and "Social Democracy and Authoritarianism" and Holly Sklar's "Trilateralism and the Management of Contradictions" — all in H. Sklar, editor, *Trilateralism* (Boston: South End Press, 1980).

26. Pinder, *et. al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 331.

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"involvement of all relevant parties in the decision-making process and their thorough commitment to the resulting decisions" has become part of the everyday political-economic life of Japan, notes Ezra Vogel.[27] Within this framework of consensus, the Japanese government, through such agencies as the Ministry of International Trade and Industry, the Economic Planning Agency, and the Development Bank, plays a supportive but not directive role in the development of economic growth.

Clearly, in opposition to the market-based strategy of recapitalization advocated by the Reagan administration,the corporatist approach implicit in neoconservatism is consistent with the historical development of capitalist rationalization in its support of a rationalized state freed from the direct pressures of democratic input. While the national industrial policy promoted by liberal Democrats goes beyond the Japanese model by calling for directive and not merely supportive state action, it represents a position much closer to neoconservatism than does Reagan's anti-statist view.

Liberal Democrats: The effort to revitalize reform liberalism has at its core proposals for a national industrial policy to be formulated and implemented in a corporatist-like fashion. Given both the strong endorsement of most trade union leaders for the establishment of a tripartite National Reindustrialization Board or National Development Bank responsible for coordinating and funding industrial policy, and the growing appeal in Democratic circles of Rohatyn's and Reich's ideas, it seems likely that the alternative to Reaganomics will be generally consistent with the corporatist solution.[28]

These advocates of national industrial policy make several initial claims. Presently, the U.S. has an industrial policy but it is covert, incoherent, and haphazardly applied. This government intervention amounts to little more than old-fashioned protectionism designed to postpone the inevitable by sustaining obsolete and noncompetitive industries. By obstructing rational

27. Ezra Vogel, *Japan As Number 1* (New York: Harper and Row, 1980), p. 94.

28. The Democratic Party's position on this matter is outlined in "Rebuilding the Road to Opportunity — A Democratic Direction for the 1980's," a report issued by House Democrats in September, 1982. The Democrat inclination toward corporatist policies is discussed in Edward Cowan, "Diverse Factions of Democratic Party Seek Consensus on Economic Policy", *New York Times,* October 14, 1982, p. 30 and in Andrew J. Polsky, "Political Parties and the New Corporatism," *Democracy,* 2, 3, 1982, pp. 42-51. Growing trade union support for these policies is indicated in Sol Chaiken, president of the I.L.G.W.U., "Deindustrialization in America", *Foreign Affairs*, 60, 4, 1982, Lane Kirkland, president of the AFL-CIO, "An Alternative to Reagonomics", and William Winpisinger, president of the I.A.M.A.W., "Rebuilding America", both of which appear in *USA Today*, May, 1982, and in "Rebuilding American Industry", *Viewpoint*, Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO, Winter, 1981. These policies receive their clearest expression in Robert Reich and Ira Magaziner, *Minding America's Business* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and Jovanovich, 1982), Robert Reich, "Making Industrial Policy", *Foreign Affairs*, 60, 4, 1982, Ronald Mueller and David Moore, "America's Blind Spot: Industrial Policy", *Challenge,* January - February, 1982, Ronald Mueller, *Revitalizing America* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1980), and Felix Rohatyn, "America In The 1980's", *The Economist*, September 19, 1981, "The Coming Emergency and What Can Be Done About It", *New York Review of Books*, December 4, 1980, and "New York and the Nation", *New York Review of Books*, 28, 21-22, 1982. On the important differences between these corporatist Democrats and the 'neoliberal' or 'Atari' Democrats, see John Judis, "Neoliberals", *The Progressive*, October, 1982 and Michael Harrington, "A Path For America", *Dissent*, Fall, 1982, pp. 413-414.

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adjustment to the changing international economy, this policy merely exacerbates the problem. Yet, the fact remains that government intervention is indispensable to the vitality of any modern economy, and recovery requires more, not less — as long as the intervention is rational, discrete, and meant to bolster and not replace the marketplace. The goal is two-fold: to strengthen the private sector so that it becomes the basis of stable growth and to do so in such a way that all parts of society have access to the benefits afforded by growth. National industrial policy is presented as the necessary precondition for the achievement of this goal.

A rational industrial policy would have the government facilitate labor adjustment (by providing, for instance, retraining programs, transitional vouchers, inducements to industry to locate in depressed regions, and pressure on industry to offer advance notice of plant closings and layoffs), remedy market imperfections (through research and development and by nuturing key linkage industries), encourgage long-term productive investment (by acting as a source of venture capital, high-risk lending and investment, to small and medium-sized businesses), coordinate and centralize the making of economic policy.[29] For such policy to be workable, its formulation and implementation must be left to an autonomous, quasi-public, consensus-generating, tripartite body, nonpartisan in character and shielded from the pressures of political expediency.[30] Its task is to make strategically correct, not politically popular, choices and decisions. This broad-based, collaborative, consensus-seeking group of policy-makers would be charged with monitoring global and domestic economic changes, providing forecasts, information, and recommendations, and setting development goals and strategies. While this group normally would be empowered to dictate directly investment decisions, businesses would be under considerable pressure to create investment plans consistent with government policy. For the board would possess the authority to elicit concessions (in the form of agreements for, say, internal corporate reform and access to internal information as well altered investment plans) from businesses (and workers and regions) dependent on its recommendations.

Along these lines, Rohatyn proposes the establishment of a revamped Reconstruction Finance Corporation responsile for creating and monitoring national and regional industry policy. The R.F.C. would be financed from tax revenues and joined with an independent body (established by Congress and comprised of representatives of business, finance, and labor) which would allocate funds in the form of equity capital to industries and regions in accordance with the conception of public interest embedded in industrial policy. "In exchange for providing capital to industries that have a sound case for it, and the job security that would come with it, the relevant unions would be asked to make their contributions in the form of wage concessions and changes in work rules that would increase productivity. The lenders, the

29. See Magaziner and Reich, *op. cit.*, pp. 343 ff.
30. See Mueller and Moore, *op. cit.*, pp. 11-12 and Magaziner and Reich, *op. cit.*, p. 307.

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banks and insurance companies could be asked to convert some loans to preferred stock and to join with the RFC in committing additional capital . . . The RFC should have the right to insist on management changes in the board of directors . . . It should not become a permanent investor but should act as a revolving fund which can be used to help a given company (or industry) when necessary, and whose holdings can and should, be sold in the marketplace when it has done its job."[31] In the present age of austerity, government investment must be made contingent upon concessions from all segments of society; the sacrifices and burdens entailed by a rational program of economic recovery must be equitably distributed. In the long run, this will make for more fairness and greater wealth; in the short run, this requires that "freedom be abridged."[32]

Drawing from his experience as director of New York City's Municipal Assistance Corporation, Rohatyn gives forceful expression to the corporatist thrust of national and regional industrial policy. He promulgates the corporatist ethos of cooperation and sacrifice and in this context insists on the formation of tripartite decision-making groups. He actively encourages a state-directed strategy of economic recovery which revolves around the national coordination of wage-and-price and investment policy. He pleads for the setting aside of ideological and partisan differences: We have reached the time "when, on the national level, conservatives and liberals, Democrats and Republicans, will have to forget their ideologies, their theories, and their prejudices. They may have to join together just as New Yorkers did in 1975, and, with the cooperation of government, business, and labor, intervene vigorously where intervention may be required..."[33] Most significantly, he argues for the necessity of shielding the decision-making process from popular pressures: We need "courageous political leadership" and circumstances which permit leaders to make unpopular decisions without committing political suicide. Such courage and circumstances require the abridgement of certain democratic freedoms — just the kind of abridgement afforded by corporatist political structures.

The corporatism anticipated by advocates of national industrial policy differs in some important respects from that derived from neoconservatism. It draws more strongly from the Western European or social democratic tradition of industrial planning and thus gives greater weight to more active and more autonomous state guidance and calls for greater concessions and sacrifices on the part of the corporate sector. Where the neoconservative strategy argues that social progress must be postponed until economic progress is firmly reestablished, the liberal Democrat approach claims that social justice — initially with regard to a more equitable sharing of the burdens of austerity — is compatible with economic revitalization. In the final analysis, however, the two strategies remain quite similar. Each seeks to base economic recovery on a

31. Rohatyn, "Reconstructing America", *op. cit.*, p. 18.
32. Rohatyn, "America in the 1980's", *op. cit.*, p. 37.
33. Rohatyn, "New York and the Nation", *op. cit.*, p. 28.

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strengthened private sector. Despite the calls for tripartite representation on decision-making committees, each conveniently neglects the fact that national labor organizations do not represent the entire labor force. And each is designed to separate the making and implementation of industrial policy from democratic determination.

The Left Response: Generally, the left has been highly critical of and strongly opposed to corporatist proposals, finding in them an inherent bias in favor of the capitalist class. Behind the banner of national consensus, the corporatist strategy, it is said, is simply a way of incorporating in order to better control organized segments of the working class. Corporatist arrangements, according to this view, impose the severest restraints on labor, not capital, and the increase in relative autonomy these arrangements afford the state enable it to act more decisively to rationalize the economy. Capital is the primary beneficiary of the sacrifice, collaboration, and industrial peace brought by corporatist political structures.[34]

In the absence of any meaningful support for a socialist program, the U.S. left has begun to respond to the movement toward corporatist structures by arguing for a social democratic approach to the resolution of economic crisis. Like the corporatist strategy, Thomas Weisskopf writes, "the social-democratic strategy calls for a new institutional structure in which the state takes on a qualitatively enhanced role in planning a process of reindustrialization. But the social-democratic approach is distinct from the corporatist approach in that it seeks to maintain rather than cut back on the functions of the welfare state, in order not to impose a disproportionate burden on the weaker classes. But since something must give in a supply-constrained context, this concern for workers and the poor must be implemented at the expense of other classes, notably the capitalists themselves."[35] Grounded in a revitalized labor movement and a spate of community organizations, the movement for social democracy would be defined in part by its unyielding opposition to corporatist strategies. Social democracy will be offered as a workable alternative to corporatist democracy.

In their argument for rational reindustrialization, Dan Luria and Jack Russell also endorse the formulation of a social democratic strategy — but one which will work with and seek to influence emergent corporatist programs. Convinced that corporatist arrangements will be in place by the end of the decade, Luria and Russell see as the primary task of social democratic strategy the creation of local and democratic programs of economic development which would serve as a "training ground and power base from which

34. The left critique of corporatism is presented best by Offe and Weisenthal, *op. cit.*, and by Leo Panitch, "The Development of Corporatism in Liberal Democracies", *Comparative Political Studies*, 9, 1, 1977 and "Trade Unions and the Capitalist State", *New Left Review*, 125, January - February, 1981.

35. Thomas Weisskopf, "The Current Economic Crisis in Historical Perspective", *Socialist Review*, 57, 11, 3, 1981, p. 41. The same argument is made by Michael Harrington, *op. cit.*, and is implied in the program of democratic reindustrialization proposed by Barry Bluestone and Bennett Harrison, *The Deindustrialization of America* (New York: Basic Books, 1982).

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progressives can influence the evolution of national corporatist institutions . . . As corporatism emerges as the primary agenda of American capital, organizing in the 1980's must build movements that can form a progressive resistance to its unbargained position."[36] In effect, the goal is to figure out how to exert popular pressure and influence on a national development bank and tripartite decision-making bodies rather than to devise means to obstruct their development. Particularly in the presence of a center-left coalition, corporatism from above combined with social democracy from below may eventuate in policies which, while still assuring the domination of the interests of private capital, would reflect some real concern with public accounting principles and criteria of social as opposed to merely economic profitability.

Luria and Russell give due recognition to the corporatism implicit in their program, and this makes their view of social democracy more realistic than that proposed by Weisskopf, Harrington, and others. The social democratic proclivity toward corporatist programs has been well documented in recent years. Trade union and working class support for corporatist strategies appears strongest when social democratic parties are in office. Social democratic parties, Panitch writes, "Play a critical role in articulating . . . two arenas: they offer to win compensations for the working class in parliamentary institutions which dissociate state and class in representation/mediation, in exchange for compromises made by the working class in corporatist institutions where representation/mediation is explicitly class-based."[37] To the extent that this view is correct, and it appears to be so to a fairly large extent, social democracy is merely the long way to corporatism. It is in this respect that the Luria-Russell proposal is more realistic.[38]

Whether conceptualized as corporatism with a social democratic face or social democracy with a corporatist back, the corporatist-tinged proposals of the left do differ substantially from those offered by neoconservatives and from the liberal Democratic camp. Implying autonomous public investment agencies and not necessarily inconsistent with tripartite decision-making bodies, left proposals contrast with the other corporatist models in three important areas. First, they envision a much more active and extensive public control over investment decisions. Specific, as oppposed to mere indicative planning, would be required. Acting either as an independent investor or through its equity holdings in the private sector, public agencies would direc-

36. Dan Luria and Jack Russell, "Rebuilding Detroit: A Rational Reindustrialization Strategy", *Socialist Review*, 63-64, 1982, p. 165, p. 176.

37. Panitch, "Trade Unions and the Capitalist State", *op. cit.*, p. 41. On the social democratic inclination toward corporatism, see Schmitter, "Interest Intermediation and Regime Governability", *op. cit.*, and Harold Wilensky, "Leftism, Catholicism, and Democratic Corporatism: The Role of Political Parties in Recent Welfare State Developemnt", in P. Flora and A. Heidenheimer, editors, *The Development of Welfare States in Europe and America* (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1981).

38. Yet, in another regard, it is highly unrealistic in its assumption that the corporatist terrain enables something beyond class collaboration. Panitch, "Trade Unions and the Capitalist State", *op. cit.*, p. 28 and p. 42 offers a good critique of this aspect of the Luria and Russell position.

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tly influence an ever increasing share of investment funds. Clearly, the aim is to base economic recovery on a strengthened public sector, one capable of injecting into the decision-making process a guiding concern for social priorities ranging from workplace improvements to the provision of collective goods and services not readily produced by profit-seeking enterprises. Secondly, they reject the claim that the burdens of austerity ought to be borne equally by all segments of society. Instead, these proposals are aimed explicitly at improving the standard of living for working people. The elimination of tax loopholes and the introduction of a steeply progressive tax on corporate earnings and personal investment income would make available the funds necessary to begin to repair and enhance the social safety net.

Certainly, the left proposals are distinguished most by their intention to politicize the decision-making process. Where the other strategies view the depoliticization of the policy-making process as essential to economic recovery, the left approach calls for democratizing this process, particularly as it bears upon investment decisions. Thus, Zeitlin argues, to "insure that public investment steering is representative, accountable, and democratic, a radically new governmental form has to be established: an autonomous, democratically-constituted agency that would be the repository of sufficient public capital and credit, to guide the investment process in the public interest,"[39] Drawing funding from idle public funds, private union and state and local employee pension funds, and security deposits from corporations, the publicly elected governing body "would provide low-interest loans and credits as well as equity capital to firms which reinvested in new plant and equipment and expanded productive, healthful and job-creating employment or offset economic dislocations and met other *democratically designated* public priorities."[40] The aim is to place the making of decisive investment decisions on the political agenda and to do so in a way to limit the fundamental source of capitalists' power, the ability to withhold or withdraw investment funds.

To have any chance of success at all, the left strategy depends on a strongly revitalized labor movement and a nationally viable social democratic movement or party. In their absence, there is growing support on the left to enter into electoral politics with an eye toward forging a center-left coalition. The "center" in this equation is the liberal wing of the Democratic Party which would be the dominant partner in any such coalition. In these circumstances, it would be relatively easy to moderate social democratic themes — national planning, socialization of production, politicization of policy formation — so that they become generally consistent with the kind of national industrial policy programs advocated by Rohatyn and Reich. Were this to happen, left advocacy of social democracy would be translated into support for the corporatist solution.

39. Maurice Zeitlin, "Democratic Investment," *Democracy*, 2, 2, 1982, p. 74.

40. *Ibid*, p. 75. Some of the weaknesses of Zeitlin's proposal are pointed out by David Vogel, "On Democratic Investment," *Democracy*, 2, 3, 1982.

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Prospects For U.S. Corporatism

In one form or another, the corporatist mood is gaining ascendancy in the U.S., and for good reason. With the failure of the market-based strategy and the lack of popular support for social democracy and socialism, the corporatist solution increasingly presents itself as the only feasible alternative. Obviously, however, the corporatist solution requires for its implementation not only the proper mood or ideological context but certain major structural changes as well.

The institutionalization of federalism, comparatively strong anti-statist themes, and a labor movement committed to the apolitical tradition of collective bargaining combine with the inertia of the established arrangements to represent genuine obstacles in the way of corporatist structures. Though real, these obstacles are far from insurmountable. There are growing pressures on the state to assume a leading role in directing economic recovery by sharing policy making with representatives of key functional associations. Given these pressures, it should be relatively easy for the state to move toward corporatist political structures. By properly using incentives and by authoritatively attributing public status, resources, and powers to particular groups, the state should be in a position to influence how these groups define their interests and what organizational tactics and strategies they employ.[41] By rewarding and strengthening accomodating groups and depriving recalcitrant ones of access and influence, the state may very well be able to spark the organizational changes required for the fuller establishment of corporatist modes of intermediation. Should the initial movement toward corporatist programs be accompanied by a reversal of economic decline — and there are some reasons to believe that it would[42] — whatever inertia and resistance remains probably would quickly dissipate.

But is the state willing to lean in this direction? As Block and Skocpol have shown, state managers have an interest in expanding their autonomy, and this becomes all the stronger during periods of crisis.[43] In the present context, state managers can best increase their autonomy in and through corporatist political structures. As long as the economic crisis continues, and particularly if it worsens, Block observes, "the danger is acute that opportunistic state managers under pressure from subordinate groups, will attempt to resolve the economy's problems with dramatic increases in the state's role, including the imposition of controls over wages, prices, credit allocation, and investments."[44]

41. Berger, *op. cit.*, p. 15.

42. See Giovanni Arrighi, "A Crisis of Hegemony", in S. Amin, G. Arrighi, A.G. Frank, and I. Wallerstein, editors, *Dynamics of Global Crisis* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1982), pp. 98-108.

43. On the state managers' interest in expanding state autonomy, see Fred Block, "Beyond Relative Autonomy: State Managers As Historical Subjects", *The Socialist Register, 1980* (London: The Merlin Press, 1980) and Theda Skocpol, "Political Response to Capitalist Crisis", *Politics and Society*, 10, 2, 1980.

44. Block, *op. cit.*, p. 237.

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The point is that obstacles to the corporatist solution are no more serious than were those which initially impeded the construction of the New Deal/Keynesian positive state. The main difference between then and now, of course, is the presence of a powerful and authoritative state which has the wherewithal and capacity to weaken considerably the sources of opposition to its enhanced autonomy. In these circumstances, corporatist structures could be implemented at least as readily as was the New Deal state.

In conclusion, the corporatist solution, like the one based on New Deal politics and Keynesian economics, is not without contradiction and inherent tendencies toward instability.[45] Furthermore, the recent expansion of local and community-based grass roots politics and the even more recent refusal of steelworkers and others to continue concessions to management "for the good of all" may signal the beginning of a hard core of resistance to corporatist proposals. These observations, however, do not detract from the major point: The corporatist solution grows daily in appeal; it is workable and has more than a fair chance of successfully revitalizing the economy; and, of special importance, it is wholly consistent with the historical tendency of capitalism to overcome profound crises on the back of a more rationalized, less democratic, and more autonomous state apparatus. Although, unlike most Western European countries, the U.S. lacks the well-established functional peak associations necessary for corporatist politics, the state has both an interest in and the capacity to induce their development. If Lowi is even partially correct in his assessment that U.S. interest group liberalism, resting on a multitude of highly organized private associations with informal but well developed connections to the state, represents a latent corporatism, the task of calling forth representative functional organizations or peak associations is far from insurmountable.[46] Should the supply-side strategy, as many are increasingly coming to believe, prove incapable of either full implementation or stimulating economic recovery, dramatic movement in this direction, guided by the proposals of *Business Week*, Rohatyn, and the like, can be expected. Corporatist democratic institutions have the capacity to promote the rationalization of the economy while lessening public consumption and weakening democratic impulses, all in the name of the common good. Minimally, the prospects for corporatism in the U.S. are good.

45. The contradictory aspects of the corporatist solution are highlighted in the Offe and Schmitter contributions to the Berger volume and Panitch, "Trade Unions and the Capitalist State", *op. cit.*

46. Theodore Lowi, *The End of Liberalism* (New York: Norton, 1975).

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INFORMATIONALISM AND ECOLOGY

by Tim Luke

The disruption of the ecological balance sustaining human life has become one of the major products of advanced industrial society. Nature has been despoiled at the expense of all life for the benefit of a handful of recent generations who have been "fortunate" enough to enjoy the role of consumers in the 20th century.[1] This consumerist model thrives upon the wasteful production of private goods by destroying the collective resources of the natural habitat.

Having overloaded the ecological system of North America, American firms have shifted capital and jobs to other continents, forging a transnational industrial regime out of their untapped ecological potential. In turn, the character of American capital has shifted profoundly as its traditional *industrial* goods-producing activity has fallen behind *informational* knowledge-producing activities in economic and political importance. Ironically, however, the interests of American informational capital in this de-industrializing trend now parallel those of ecological activists, who seek to build new ecologically sound communities to coexist with Nature in diverse habitats without qualitatively lowering standards of living.

By elaborating the impact of this informational revolution on America's industrial economy, one can explore the possibilities for an ecological transformation emerging out of the contradictions between informational and industrial society. Already, some observers — like the "Atari Democrats" — see a post-industrial informationalized society as an environmentally sound economic order.[2] Still, their hi-tech solutions for the current industrial malaise, like the construction of massive solar collectors in earth orbit to generate electricity or the relocation of America's polluting industries abroad, must not be mistaken for an authentic ecological revolution. The ecological crisis is a global problem. It can only be aggravated by internationalizing industrial pollution or microwaving megawatts of electricity through the

1. For a further discussion in this vein, see Barry Commoner, *The Closing Circle: Man, Nature, and Technology* (New York, 1971); Barry Commoner, *The Poverty of Power* (New York, 1976); Rene Dumont, *Utopia or Else* (London, 1974); Ivan Illich, *Toward a History of Needs* (New York, 1978); and Harry Rothman, *A Murderous Providence: A Study of Pollution in Industrial Societies* (London, 1972). For a critique of consumerism, see Jean Baudrillard, *For a Critique of the Political Economy of the Sign* (St. Louis, 1981); Ivan Illich, *Energy and Equity* (New York, 1974); and, William Leiss, *The Limits of Satisfaction* (Toronto, 1976); and, Timothy W. Luke, "Regulating the Haven in a Heartless World: The State and Family Under Advanced Capitalism," *New Political Science*, Vol. 2, No. 3 (Fall, 1981), pp. 51-74.

2. See Lester C. Thurow, *The Zero-Sum Society* (New York, 1980) for the classic example of neo-liberal thought. Also see Barry Bluestone and Bennett Harrison, *The Deindustrialization of America* (New York, 1982); and Hazel Henderson, *The Politics of the Solar Age: Alternatives to Economics* (New York, 1981), for the neo-liberal program for a cybernetic "reindustrialization with a human face."

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planet's atmosphere. Instead, informational capital's program for cybernetically managing the earth's ecological collapse from space must be recognized as an environmental false promise that neither America's neoconservatives or neo-liberals can really fulfill.

The Crisis of Advanced Industrialism

The deep structural crises of advanced industrial capitalism, as it has developed in the U.S., extend beyond the current recession. Behind 11% unemployment and the $125 billion plus deficit of 1982, the entire American industrial complex has decayed to near collapse. In 1947, the U.S. produced 60% of all the world's steel. By 1975, U.S. production declined to 16% of world production and has dropped to near 12% in the early 1980s. Similarly, in 1959 American companies were the largest firms in 11 out of the 13 major industrial sectors, while U.S. interests controlled 111 out of the world's largest 156 companies in these 13 industrial sectors. By 1976, however, U.S. companies controlled only 7 of the 13 major industrial groups and 68 of the 156 biggest firms. Moreover, American technological primacy has declined significantly in all 13 groups save aerospace and electrical equipment.[3]

American industries after 1945 energized the world economy for over two decades as U.S. GNP consistently grew over 3% per year. Even in 1960, the U.S. dominated 25% of the world's manufacturing output, while American firms produced 95% of the consumer electronics, steel and automobiles sold in the home market. Yet, with market saturation and the energy crisis, American productivity decreased 1% per year from 1973 to 1978 and 2% in 1979. At the same time, American firms sold less than 50% of consumer electronics, 85% of steel and 80% of all automobiles in the U.S. market. From 1960 to 1981, America's piece of the world export pie has from declined 16 to 11%.[4]

These trends can be driven home by examining the keystone of American industrial primacy since the 1900s — the automobile industry. Automobile industries employ one out of every six U.S. workers and 26% of all retail sales are dependent upon automotive production. During the 1970s, however, American automobile firms lost control. In 1977, foreign imports comprised 18% of American auto sales. By 1982 Japanese imports alone held nearly 30% of the American market as all imports verged on gaining 40% of U.S. auto sales. Imports in 1982 were 70% of California auto sales, the major American

3. Richard J. Barnet, *The Lean Years: Politics in the Age of Scarcity* (New York, 1980), pp. 273 and 241. Also see "Steelyard Blues: New Structures in Steel," *NACLA Report on the Americas*, Vol. 13, No. 1 (January/February, 1979).

4. John Naisbitt, *Megatrends: Ten New Directions Transforming Our Lives* (New York, 1982), pp. 55-56. By the mid-1980s, Third World producers will account for 13% of all exported manufactured products and 64% of all Third World exports will be manufactured goods. In the mid-1970s, Third World countries exported only 9% of all world manufactured products and only 25% of their exports were manufactured goods. These newly industrialized countries have quadrupled their steel output since 1960 and will both produce and consume 25% of world steel production by 2000. In addition to steel, autos, shoes, textiles and electronic goods, the U.S. also now has lost its primacy in machine tools as it imports more foreign-made assemblies than it exports American-made units. See Barnet, *The Lean Years,* pp. 265, 274-275.

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market. In 1980, Japan surpassed the U.S. as the world's major automobile producer with 11 million vehicles — 40% greater than U.S. production. Japanese productivity also has grown to be three times greater than American productivity. American factories build a car in 31 hours to 11 hours in Japan for a comparable car. U.S. firms also largely have lost out in the new booming Third World automobile market, which will equal the American market at 15 million vehicles in 1990, to European and Japanese automobile companies.[5] With this industrial decay, unemployment rates in 1982 throughout the Midwestern industrial states hovered between 10 to 20%.

Much of America's unemployment problem, can be traced to this global reorganization of world industry and the emergence of a more service-oriented economy in the U.S. In the early 1950s, nearly 60% of America's workforce was employed in industrial occupations. By the early 1980s, however, only about 15% of America's workers out of a workforce of nearly 100 million were occupying traditional manufacturing jobs. Of the new jobs created in 1970s — 19 million in all — only 11% were in the goods-producing sector and only 5% were in traditional manufacturing industries. Nearly 90% — 17 million new jobs — were generated instead in the professions, service companies, government and informational firms.[6]

Public employment has increased tremendously with America's industrial stagnation. While one out of ten workers was a government employee in 1932, one of every six workers is employed directly in the U.S. at the federal, state or local level in 1980 — one of every ten works for Washington alone. With the collapse of America's basic industries and agricultural employment falling to only 3% in the 1970s, the public sector has become the employer of the last resort either directly in public agencies or indirectly through new government subsidies and protectionistic rules to support failing industrial enterprises. In addition to those directly employed by all levels of government, several million more work as private contractors, defense employees and outside consultants. Adding these workers together, nearly one of four workers is dependent on the public sector for employment.

Informationalization as Post-Industrialism

Despite this massive growth in state employment and private service industries, it is incorrect to identify "de-industrializing" or "post-industrial" America as essentially a service society. Merely because American workers no longer produce as many *goods*, it should not be assumed that only *services*, except for food services and the medical professions, therefore are necessarily growing in importance. Instead, American producers increasingly are

5. Naisbitt, *Megatrends*, p. 66; "Make Way for the New Japans," *Fortune*, Vol. 104, No. 3 (August 10, 1981), p. 176-184. Also see Emma Rothschild, *Paradise Lost: The Decline of the Auto-Industrial Age* (New York, 1973); and Barnet, *The Lean Years*, p. 244.

6. Naisbitt, *Megatrends*, p. 39; and, Barnet, *The Lean Years,* p. 273; and, David Birch, "Who Creates Jobs," *The Public Interest*, No. 65 (Fall, 1981), pp. 3-14.

7. See Daniel Bell, *The Coming of Post-Industrial Society* (New York, 1973), pp. 121-164; and, Daniel Bell, "The Social Framework of the Information Society," *The Microelectronics Revolution*, ed. Tom Forester (Oxford, 1980), pp. 500-549.

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engaged either directly in the production of *information* or indirectly in the informationalization of goods-production and services-provision.

Informationalization represents the new dominance of data-intensive techniques, cybernetic knowledge and electronic technologies as the strategic resource in corporate production. The invention, production, management and distribution of *information* — as words, numbers, images or audio — now overshadows the manufacture of goods or provision of services in the truly advanced capitalist economies. This qualitative shift in production towards *informational* productivity separates the U.S., Japan and West Germany from other advancing industrial systems in the USSR, Spain, Italy, Taiwan, Brazil or South Korea, which still measure their "advances" in terms of *industrial* activity. Informational society has been defined partially as the "service economy," the "technological society" or "post-industrialism."[8] Each of these incomplete notions, however, does not fully account for the transformations wrought by the informational revolution of American industrial society.

An entirely new social formation tied to the production, interpretation and distribution of information has emerged from within American industrial capitalism since the mid-1950s. These trends were launched in the 1920s and 1930s as the telecommunications and electric power grids were extended throughout the entire nation. The primary centers of informational activity accounted for 18% of national income in 1929 and 17% in 1948. In the 1950s, however, informational growth rapidly accelerated with widespread computerization. The annual growth rates in knowledge production in primary informational activities from 1949-1958 are astounding: 16.4% in research and development, 10.9% in telephone systems, 77.2% in television station revenues, 104.2% in electronic computers and 10.6% for total knowledge production.[9] These productivity advances were made possible by several technological and organizational breakthroughs. By 1954, for example, Texas Instruments had constructed the first silicon junction transitor for electronics applications, General Electric purchased the first UNIVAC computer used exclusively for business data processing, and IBM began to dominate computing markets with its mass-produced 701 systems.

In 1956, white-collar workers in technical, clerical and managerial positions outnumbered blue-collar industrial workers for the first time in

8. Daniel Bell observes, "A postindustrial society is based on services. What counts is not raw muscle power, or energy, but information." See Bell, *The Coming oe Post-Industrial Society*, pp. 126-127; Victor C. Ferkiss, *Technological Man* (New York, 1970); and, Alan Gartner and Frank Riessman, *The Service Society and the Consumer Vanguard* (New York, 1974). For further discussion, see Christopher Evans, *The Micro Millenium* (New York, 1979); Fritz Machlup, *The Production and Distribution of Knowledge in the United States* (Princeton, 1962), pp. 362-400. Also see J. Rose, *The Cybernetic Revolution* (London, 1974); Wickham Skinner and Kishore Chakraborty, *The Impact of New Technology: People and Organizations in Manufacturing and Allied Industries Work in America Institute Studies in Productivity: Highlights of the Literature*, No. 18 (Scarsdale, N.Y., 1982); and, Ronald Stamper, *Information in Business and Administrative Systems* (London, 1973).

9. Marc Uri Porat, *The Information Economy: Definition and Measurement,* Office of Telecommunication Special Publication 77-12 (Washington, 1977), Vol. 1, pp. 64-65.

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American history.[10] With the Sputnik challenge in 1957, an unprecedented mode of industrial production, based upon these white-collar workers generating data-intensive scientific knowledge and complex electronic technology, came together in American aerospace, defense, computer and electronics industries to produce wholly new genres of technological information. In 1959, the semiconductor integrated circuit was developed. By 1963, IBM introduced its first family of computers, the 360 line, with standardized programming, architecture and software — over 30,000 were sold in the 1960s to government, business and universities. AT & T, with NASA, launched the world's first communications satellite, TELSTAR, in 1962, which was the initial step towards a multimodal telecommunications network capable of receiving and transmitting video, audio and digital information in the 1970s. Finally, during the 1970s, Intel introduced in 1970 the 1103 Random Access Computer Memory Chip (RAM) and in 1974 the 8080 microprocessor chip, an improved model of its first four-bit 4004 microprocessing unit (MPU). By 1975, thirty years after ENIAC, the first electronic computer, over 200,000 large computers were in operation along with 750,000 microprocessor units worldwide.[11]

With these technological innovations, American industrial capitalism has been greatly augmented if not nearly displaced by American informational capitalism. Admittedly, most information production now derives from the programming and management needs of complex government or coprorate operations. Similarly, many informational jobs are undemanding, repetitive, low-paid and essentially uncreative. Nonetheless, job definitions, skills and duties increasingly have been defined in both the blue-collar and white-collar strata by their relation to informational activity. As the computer console has replaced the factory smokestack as the determinant sign of economic power, informationalization has reconstituted labor and management. By the late 1960s, the *primary information sector* of the economy — computer manufacturing, telecommunications, mass media, advertising, publishing, accounting, education, research and development as well as risk management in finance, banking and insurance — produced 25.1% of the national income. In turn, the *secondary information sector* — the work performed by information workers in government, goods-producing and service-producing firms for internal consumption — produced 21.1% of the national income. Already by the late sixties, prior to widespread computerization, data-intensification in manufacturing and microprocessing technology, informational activities alone produced 46% of America's national income and earned 53% of total national wages. By the mid-1970s, the primary information sector's overall share of national income production alone rose from 25% to 30%, while all information workers in both sectors surpassed non-information workers in

10. Bell, "Notes on the Post Industrial Society," *Public Interest*, No. 6 and 7 (Winter and Spring, 1967), pp. 24-35 and pp. 102-118.

11. Dirk Hanson, *The New Alchemists: Silicon Valley and the Microelectronics Revolution* (Boston, 1982), pp. 65, 82, 84, 97, 103-104, 120-128, 246.

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numbers.[12]

Of course, informational capital has not eliminated industrial or agricultural capital. Rather, it has begun to informationalize industrial production — using CAD/CAM, group technology and automated assembly — and agricultural production — using biotechnology, genetic engineering, computer assisted farm management — just as industrial capital industrialized agriculture in the early twentieth century. America's industrial and agricultural products remain vital to its present overall economic structures. Still, with the transnationalization of manufacturing and food cultivation in Second and Third World export platforms, the informationalized production of words, images, and numbers increasingly dominates the American workplace.

The collapse of America's industrial economy, however, will be followed by additional employment losses as the informationalization of economic life becomes more pervasive. Current projections hold that 40% of all economic productivity can be improved, in one way or another, by microprocessing technology. Data-intensive production could mean that at least 50% of current shopfloor workers will be replaced by highly skilled technicians and robots by 1990. With over 130,000 workers laid-off, General Motors began buying 14,000 industrial robots in March 1982. 40,000 to 50,000 jobs will be replaced once the robots are on line, which equals the Chrysler Corporation's total hourly U.S. labor force in 1982.[13]

Some of these displaced workers either will be retrained as informational workers to return to private sector jobs or will be absorbed into service occupations in public employment. Nevertheless, neither the private nor the public sector can entirely absorb the tremendous new displacement of labor promised by robotization and informationalization. Most of the displaced

12. See Marc Uri Porat, *The Information Economy: Definition and Measurement*, Vol. 1, and *The Information Economy: Sources and Methods for Measuring the Primary Information Sector*, Vol. 2 (Washington, 1977). See Vol. 1, pp. 65, 119-123.

13. John Stansell "The Social Impact of Microprocessors," *The New Scientist*, Vol. 8, No. 1124 (October 12, 1978), pp. 104-106. By 2000, nearly all industrial workers could be displaced by robotic units, while 50 to 75% of all industrial jobs could be lost in the process. By 1990, the U.S., which is lagging behind Japan and some EEC nations, could be producing 17,000 to 20,000 robots a year to augment a robotic base of 80,000 to 160,000 units. U.S. auto producers today already employ 1,000 complex robots to increase their productivity. The most sophisticated units cost $50,000 each; yet, they work two shifts a day for eight years in a normal workspan — or $5 per hour versus $15 per hour for human workers. Along with manufacturing, informational technology is predicted to displace 30% of the human workers in banking and insurance, 40% of all office workers and up to 50% of all middle level corporate and industrial management. Already, the relatively low capital intensitivity of office work — $2,000 to $6,000 per worker in 1980 — will rise to over $10,000 per workers by 1985 as informational capital displaces labor. The labor-displacing qualities of informational capital can be seen, for example, in New York Telephone's handling of 30% more calls in 1980 than 1969 with 15,000 less employees. "Info City," *New York* (February 9, 1981), p. 28; Skinner and Chakraborty, *New Technology: Manufacturing*, p. 2; *The New York Times*, September 3, 1981; Naisbitt, *Megatrends*, p. 74; Hanson, *New Alchemists*, p. 163; Wickham Skinner and Kishore Chakraborty, *The Impact of New Technology: People and Organization in Service Industries Work in American Institute Studies in Productivity: Highlights of the Literature*, No. 19 (Scarsdale, N.Y., 1982), p. 6; and, "Jobs: Putting America Back to Work," *Newsweek* (October 18, 1982), pp. 80-81.

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workers will not get jobs of equal status or pay as they fall into the high-turnover, low-wage niche of the labor markets. With informationalization, *hundreds* of *thousands* of stable, medium and high wage jobs will be lost forever, while only *thousands* of new high-wage professional jobs in the informational industries can be developed to replace them.[14]

Consequently, some corporate planners argue that the informationalizing economy and the contracting welfare state must develop a "third sector" (beyond the "private" and "public" sectors) or a "third system" (beyond the "market system" and "planning system") to accommodate the de-industrialized workforce of the coming decades.[15] Being unable to maintain the incomes of the unemployed and underemployed through either transfer payment schemes or full employment programs, the "technologically competent" elites now in control of the informationalizing industrial state and transnational firm are promoting a hybrid package of structural unemployment, volunteerism, soft energy paths, frugality, voluntary simplicity, decentralization and local actionism to meliorate the deteriorating situations of the "technologically obsolescent" and "technologically superfluous" classes.[16] Within this "third sector," Illich's notions of the "subsistent household," useful unemployment" and "vernacular economics" might come to prevail. Consumers will be encouraged to produce their own goods and services for their own frugal consumption as the larger informational economy discredits the ideas and infrastructure of mass consumerism on the lines of post WW II American suburbia.[17]

According to one corporate forecast, generated by the Values and Lifestyles program at SRI International in 1980, American consumers fall into three groups: *need-driven consumers* living at the poverty level and buying bare necessities are 11% of the adult population or 19 million persons; *outer-directed consumers* living affluent middle class lifestyles and buying the complete package of consumer society are 69% or 110 million persons in the total adult population; and, *inner-directed consumers* living "consciously" or "voluntarily" simple lives, or non-consumeristic lifestyles compared to outer-directed consumers, add up to 20% or 33 million persons in the total adult population.[18] Although the inner-directed consumers do not see their lifestyles as forming an austerity or downward mobility movement, its ultimate impact, in the con-

14. One labor analyst in New York noted in 1981, for example, as the Ford Mahwah auto plant closed in New Jersey with a loss of 6,000 jobs, that 6,000 new hotel rooms in New York would open in 1981. In-house projections suggest one domestic helper is needed for each room; thus 6,000 new jobs also were created in New York — at lower pay with less status for those displaced auto workers. See "Info City," *New York* (February 9, 1981), p. 29.

15. For a discussion of the "Third Sector," see Richard C. Carlson, Willis W. Harman and Peter Schwartz, SRI International, and Associates, *Energy Futures, Human Values and Lifestyles: A New Look at the Energy Crisis* (Boulder, Colo., 1982).

16. For a discussion of technology as the basis of class formation and conflict, see David Apter, "Ideology and Discontent," *Ideology and Discontent*, ed. David Apter (Glencoe, Ill., 1964), pp. 15-43.

17. These alternative social and eocnomic institutions are discussed more completely in Ivan Illich, *Toward a History of Needs* (New York, 1980); and, *Shadow Work* (Boston, 1981).

18. See *Leading Edge,* Vol. 1, No. 1 (Summer, 1980); and, Duane Elgin, *Voluntary Simplicity: Toward a Way of Life That Is Outwardly Simple, Inwardly Rich* (New York, 1981), pp. 129-130.

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text of the de-industrialization and ultra-informationalization of America's economy, is that of austerity. With scores of millions of outer-directed consumers losing their industrial or service jobs to informational technology, and only a few million jobs being created in the new informational sphere of production, it becomes imperative for the system's continual functioning to legitimate this new materially-deprived era as a "quality of life" revolution that is morally desirable.

Most consumers will not fall in the underclass of *need-driven consumption*. Yet, they can not hope to have in material wealth or symbolic fashions what *outer-directed consumption* has promised in America since industrialization in the 1890s. Corporate product demography already has targeted these trends. The high-volume, low-cost down-scale marketing of mass consumption of the 1950s and 1960s that always stressed *accessibility* slowly is giving way to the low-volume, high-cost upscale markets of elite consumers that primarily emphasize *exclusivity*. Outer-directed consumption will continue under informational capitalism, but it increasingly will center on smaller enclaves of elite consumers.

Hence, "voluntary simplicity," "frugality," "ecological lifestyles," "conspicuous conservation," "small is beautiful," "conserver society," or "simple living" are the new master codes of mass consumption in the age of informational capitalism, which produces less *goods* at higher costs for fewer people in specialized markets. Yet, image systems, value codes, knowledge bases, and information networks are readily produced under informational capitalism to ground an *inner-directed consumption* tied to innovative *information* packages of "post-affluence," such as personal fulfillment, physical fitness, self actualization or spiritual awakening.[19] Outer-directed consumerism provided expensive week-long vacations at Waikiki on a mass basis for conspicious consumption. The emerging inner-directed consumerism celebrates frugal ongoing "journeys of moral rebirth" performed at home on an individual basis for personal fulfillment. It is cheaper, saves energy, does not abuse the ecosphere, and the market is nowhere near saturation.

Transnational informationalizing capital wants to breakdown these consumeristic dependencies in the mass population on national industrial capital and the welfare state. Needing capital for informational development, informationalized firms do not want their backward industrial competitors to fritter away financial resources on consumer goods production — autos, housing, appliances, etc. — or the overextended welfare state to redistribute the social surplus — CETA workers, interstate highways, MX systems, etc.[20]

19. Se, for example one pollster's efforts to chart these changes in Daniel Yankelovich, *New Rules: Searching for Self-Fulfillment in a World Turned Upside Down* (New York, 1981). Likewise, a handbook for the "new rules" might be Warren Johnson, *Muddling Toward Frugality: A Blueprint for Survival in the 1980s* (Boulder, 1979).

20. See "The Reindustrialization of America: Special Issue," *Business Week*, (June, 1980), pp. 126-134 on the central importance of finding new pools of capital in wasteful government and consumer spending to meet the needs of "reindustrializing" America; and, Timothy W. Luke, "Rationalization Redux: From the New Deal to the New Beginning," *New Political Science*, Vol. 2, No. 4 (Spring, 1982), pp. 63-72.

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Informational capital instead seeks to displace industrial capital and government from financial markets. It, then, can invest available funds in the new producer goods of informational economies, soaking its fresh capital out of consumer production and the public sector. As a substitute for affordable, diverse consumer goods and dependable, substantive welfare payments, transnational informational firms are backing volunteerism, frugality, and spiritual reawakening to take up the slack during the informationalizing transition. Dirty, labor-mobilizing industry is moved abroad, leaving millions without jobs, incomes or purpose. Hence, the technologically competent classes in control of informational capital now urge the technologically obsolescent and superfluous strata to muddle towards frugality and voluntarily simplify their lives.

To restratify American society along the lines of technological competence, informational capital totally contradicts many of the egalitarian-democratic myths underpinning mass electoral politics. These political conflicts, moreover, have strongly influenced recent political events and movements. The contradictions between the "sunbelt and snowbelt" economies, the western "cowboy" and eastern "yankee" elites, workers in "sunrise" and "sunset" industries or the cultural styles of New Class "chablis-and-brie" groups versus blue-collar "pools-and-patios" strata all embody a vicious politics of redistribution within the informationalizing society. In turn, the frustrations of the technologically-obsolete working classes in America, who have lost immense purchasing power since 1967, increasingly support reactionary appeals from both Democrats and Republicans, which promise to restore America's greatness, economic prosperity and social consensus.[21] Advanced industrial America, cast along the lines of the U.S. from 1890 to 1950, however, is not fading away gracefully or easily. Similarly, the new informational society, which already has promoted massive unemployment, urban decay, social dislocation and international turmoil, hardly appears attractive or benevolent. These complex trends are misunderstood, fragmentary and disorganized. Yet, to the extent that the strategies for easing the informational transition are unrationalized, open-ended and disorderly, ecological activists might appropriate some of these new institutional, technological and cultural possibilities for the cause of ecological transformation.

Outlines for an Ecological Politics

Since the Industrial Revolution, technical advances have progressively robbed individuals and communities of their rights to self-definition, self-determination and self-direction. This process of rationalization without representation has engendered new modes of human and ecological domination in everyday life. The authority of technical experts and specialized

21. For a discussion of the "apple pie fascism" or "friendly fascism" that might emerge from these conflicts, see Paul Blumberg, *Inequality in an Age of Decline* (New York, 1980); Bertram Gross, *Friendly Fascism* (New York, 1980); and, Kevin Phillips, *Post-Conservative America* (New York, 1982).

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knowledge exerts itself through the material artifacts and organization processes of corporate culture, benefiting its anonymous controllers and designers in the technologically competent classes. It is this anonymous authoritarianism that needs to be attacked. Being grounded in a modern welfare state that tends toward total administration, any meaningful ecological critique must also recognize that transnational capital inescapably moderates, limits and defines its revolutionary thrusts.

Informationalization, particularly when mediated through microprocessing technology, has promoted its own version of an ecologically viable society. Informational developments have advanced the growth of exurban and rural communities by downsizing and automating industrial plants. New communications and cybernetics media keep these far-flung smaller factories under centralized management. The older industrial cities and regions, in turn, are decaying as they lose their population, industries, tax base and services to new informational communities and regions.

Microprocessing technology has been heralded as the true *avant garde* of a democratic decentralization of society. In 1975, a microprocessing chip cost $360; but, by 1980, the same chip cost $5, making computer processing capacity virtually free. Its co-inventor, Robert Noyce, predicted in 1973 that computerization after the microprocessor implies radical *decentralization* rather than the complete *centralization* characteristic of early mainframe systems. Microprocessing units are diffusing rapidly. Use estimates rose from under 1 million in 1975 to 60 million in 1980 (compared to 100 years to reach 440 million telephones) worldwide.[22] While the decentralizing potential of computerization is evident, it is not certain that it will become a reality.

The informational revolution will not guarantee necessarily a more democratic, small-scale, ecological society. Microprocessing units can be used equally well on a handful of massive orbital solar satellites or in millions of tiny rooftop solar panels to generate power. An ecologically sound politics must guide informational economies to technological options more suited to ecologically reasonable forms of production. Otherwise, the power centers of industrial capitalism will continue to divert informational development to reinforce their centralized transnational hierarchies.

The institutional basis for a deconstructionist ecology exists *in nuce* in certain tendencies of advanced corporate capitalism. Yet, it exists in fragments, unrealized possibilities, and unchosen options that need to be fully identified, correctly implemented and openly practiced to be realized. More specifically, an objective basis for ecological action might be found in six trends: new population patterns, the growth of single-issue political action groups centered on local or regional politics, the expansion of cooperative exchange and social services, the development of alternative communal

22. Hanson, *The New Alchemists*, p. 159; and, "Microcomputers Aim at Huge New Market," *Business Week*, (May 12, 1973), p. 180; and, "The Microprocessor/Microcomputer Industry," Industrial Analysis Service, Creative Strategies, Inc., San Jose, Calif., 1977. Quoted in Hanson, *The New Alchemists*, p. 144.

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institutions, the rise of an anti-corporate/anti-state underground economy, and a growing population of persons, perhaps as many as ten million, already practicing aspects of anti-consumerist ecological lifestyles.

One critical trend is the over-all return of population to the small cities and rural areas. From 1820 to 1970, large cities grew faster than small cities and country regions and by 1920 the U.S. was predominately urban. Yet, since the early 1970s, small towns and rural areas have grown faster than large cities. For every 100 people that moved into cities from 1970-1975, 131 people moved out. Over 42% of the population, or 95 million persons, now live in small towns, small cities and the country, which provides the solid possibility for developing a new exurban mode of existence as towns under 2,500 people are now the fastest growing form of settlement.[23]

These population movements reflect a developing interest in the pace, scenery and stability of rural living. Similarly, they accord with the population decentralization implicit in informationalization and de-industrialization. Along with this rapid growth in the rural population, many new jobs have moved into exurban regions as urban industrial jobs diminish in numbers. Over 700,000 new manufacturing jobs and 3,500,000 new informational and service slots were created in non-metropolitan areas from 1970 to 1978 alone.

With this growth in exurban communities, a new movement towards localism in economic activity, political decisions and social structures also has developed. State, county and local governments are being pressured to be more responsive, participatory and effective. Nearly 20 million citizens belong to single-issue or comprehensive action groups tied into local political concerns. Citizen action groups like ACORN (Arkansas Community Organizations for Reform Now), Virginia Action, CED (Campaign for Economic Democracy), Carolina Action, and the Illinois Public Action Committee have formed to put *local* economic, political and social issues on to the public agenda.[24] Much of this change has been manipulated from above to legitimize and rationalize the existing system of administration. Nonetheless, these new localist citizens movements also are providing the structural possibilities for realizing an ecologically sensible politics.

In the economic sphere, 70 million Americans participate in some kind of producer, credit or consumer co-ops. These aboveground alternative economic institutions also are augmented by a tremendous underground economy that amounts to hundreds of billions of dollars. Nearly 15% of the GNP probably turns over underground off the books. 4.5 million get all their income and 15 million more obtain part of their incomes off this non-corporate shadow economy. Similarly, over 32 million households engage in backyard or commons home gardening — a 100% increase since the 1950s —

23. Naisbitt, *Megatrends*, pp. 126-127; and, Sale, *Human Scale,* p. 44.

24. See Harry C. Boyte, *The Backyard Revolution* (Philadelphia, 1980), pp. 100-102. For a discussion of how such movements have been purposely stimulated to provide badly needed administrative rationality, also see my "Culture and Politics in the Age of Artificial Negativity, *Telos* 35 (Spring, 1978), pp. 55-72.

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and produce $13 billion in agricultural commodities.[25]

Apart from and completely outside of corporate capitalism and the welfare state, the self-production of goods and services has started in free schools, food co-ops, free clinics, women's groups, community media, credit unions, community daycare, neighborhood councils, flea markets, health foods, counterculture publishing, law clinics, cooperative housing, and localist politics. Single-issue action groups and citizens movements now have more contributing members (1.4 million to 520,000) and funds ($16.6 million to $13.6 million in 1976) than the two major political parties. Many of these groups and their members have been instrumentalized by mainstream politicians and public agencies. Still, they are only a tendential indication and a possible basis for moving towards ecologically sound institution-building on a local level. Likewise, 1977 and 1980 studies argue that 4 or 5 million people in the late 1970s, and nearly 10 million in the early 1980s, have withdrawn from consumer society to pursue "voluntary simplicity."[26] In other words, 5 to 6% of the U.S. adult population already may be working, in one way or another, towards some of the goals of an ecologically reasonable society.

If is technically possible, particularly with present-day informational technology, to design technical instruments that are simple, durable, useful and accessible to individual, household or community use.[27] Such tools, one disengaged from the constraints imposed by corporate control, can provide the inorganic energy and mechanical efficiency necessary for a humane standard of living. Virtually every tool possesses a self-subversive dimension that ecological activists can tap to serve the purpose of ecological development.

The alternative technology groups, which formed concretely as a movement only in the mid-1970s, already have developed into a considerable technical community and are promoting several viable technologies. Many access journals, like *RAIN, Appropriate Technology, Solar Energy, Appropriate Technology Quarterly*, and others, have a circulation of nearly a million and constitute both a developing technical discourse and public sphere for articulating ecologically sound alternatives. In addition to these journals and the publication of hundreds of related pamphlets and books, over 2,000 alternative technology groups have also formed to popularize these techniques. These alternative technologies have not yet transformed economic production in the U.S. Still, these advances provide a potential technological basis for living a labor-intensive, self-sufficient, ecologically-sound existence for millions of households.

An ecologically sound politics also necessitates a transition to a spatial-practical setting that ecologically fuses the rural and urban into a new mode of

25. Sale, *Human Scale,* pp. 45-46, 236. Also see *Co-ops, Communes and Collectives*, ed. John Case and Rosemary C. Taylor (New York, 1979).

26. Elgin, *Voluntary Simplicity*, p. 132; and, Milton Kotler, "Citizen Action: New Life for American Politics," *The Nation*, Vol. 223, No. 14 (October 30, 1976), pp. 429-431.

27. See *Appropriate Visions: Technology, The Environment and the Individual,* ed. Richard C. Dorf and Yvonne C. Hunter (San Francisco, 1978).

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existence.[28] This *deconcentration* of urban resources would bring "urban" commerce, art, society, letters into balance with "rural" crafts, culture, community, customs. The anthropocentrism of orthodox urban leftists and the nature chauvinism of traditional romantic rebellion, in turn, could be lessened in this new exurban culture, which would redefine the human-nature relation.

Orthodox leftists have wrongly confused large industrial cities with progressive social formations. Echoing Marx's diatribes against peasant and rural life, most leftist movements and thinkers hold that the modern model of industrial urbanism, such as twentieth century London, Paris, Berlin or New York, promises the most hospitable milieu for a socialist economy and society. In fact, such urban agglomerations probably can never become socialist, ecological or democratic.

Large American cities, which have developed with advanced industrialization, have expanded quantitatively with little qualitative improvement in cultural benefits, social services, public utilities or physical infrastructure. Rather, size itself imposes a cost on these collective goods, making them less accessible, enjoyable and useful as more people are concentrated around them. Yet, it would not be necessary to entirely relocate urban rhythms in the reconstitution of corporate society. Rather, transport, communications and land use could be reordered to reconnect the rural and urban through small-scale interdependent linkages. the benefits of rural and urban life can be unified to eliminate the personal costs imposed by rural isolation and urban giganticism.

These new institutions, in turn, would guarantee popular participation and operational accountability in the management of the localist economy and community. The *municipalization* of industry rather than the *nationalization* of industry emerges as the optimal mode for socializing the means of production in the ecological revolution to create a post-anthropocentric ethic of natural cooperation, close affinal association, and skilled craft practice of situating people in nature and by reintroducing Nature's needs to society.

Combining a participatory democracy with a communitarian ethos will demand tremendous exertions to assure that the obligations and benefits of producership are not unequally distributed. This issue crops up immediately in discussions of the ecological revolution. Ecological concerns are conventionally identified with elite, white-collar New Class groups, which are alleged to be inattentive to working class concerns or blue-collar constituencies. An ecologically viable organization, however, must go beyond these class-specific conventions by demanding a balance of manual and mental labor from all producers and an equitable sharing of resources within the networks of an ecological society. This change implies the adoption of a lifestyle grounded in "voluntary simplicity." This strategy, however, does not imply

28. See for a suggestive treatment of how to rebuild rural society, Wendell Barry, *The Unsettling of America: Culture and Agriculture* (New York, 1979); and, Murray Bookchin, *The Limits of the City* (New York, 1973).

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an uncritically embraced austerity, which mystifies the falling rate of material satisfaction in informationalizing American society. Instead, it suggests the self-definition and self-realization of needs independent of corporate capital's "coercive complexity."

Preserving Ecological Possibilities

In the last analysis, the political goals of an ecological revolution and the structural directions intrinsic to the trends of the informational revolution only coincidently complement each other. One must not presume that the ecologically minded new citizens movements or the rise of localism are simply stalking horses for transnational capital. These ideas and the new institutions grounded on them can continually be reappropriated and redeployed to serve progressive ends and preserve emancipatory possibilities.

In the short run, corporate capital and the welfare state might stimulate the advent of free schools, neighborhood councils, backyard gardening or frugality philosophies to compensate for the withering away of public goods and consumer commodities as capital flows into informationalizing firms, as jobs are exported abroad, and as consumer markets shift into specialized upscale boutiques. Yet, in the long run, these alternative institutions and techniques hold the potential for developing a more rational, equal, and participatory society through self-reliance and communal interaction. Thus, in the intermediate run, ecological activists must nurture the emancipatory potential of corporate capital's "third sector," "new volunteerism," or "voluntary simplicity." Ecological political action represents an emancipatory dimension: an oppositional possibility within the informationalizing corporate order that can be organized to reorder everyday life.

Such activism delimits the class conflict of informational societies as consumer and client groups struggle locally to gain greater collective control and individual benefit from the informationalized means of production controlled by corporate producers and professional providers. By refusing to accept the corporate and professional administration of informational capital, consumers and clients can organize to reappropriate their alienated energies and skills communally from the technologically competent classes, overcoming their technological obsolescence in a more universal ecological competence.

Informational capital and ecological activists both seek to dismantle rapidly advanced industrial society in order to create a less centralized, hierarchical and environmentally destructive economy in the U.S. Still, informational capital stops at the limits imposed by capitalist exchange as it merely seeks to reconstruct industrialized manufacturing and agriculture along informational lines, making them more data-intensive, robotized, numerically-controlled and downsized. It does not, however, end the domination of man and nature. Instead, informationalized technology promises to extend and elaborate that domination. Individuals are to be reduced

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to word processors, number crunchers and image consumers in their cyberneticized frugal households, while Nature is bioengineered or genetically technologized to unfold along corporate-planned lines of evolution. The politics of informationalization, now forming inchoately as neo-liberalism, or "Atari Democracy," must not be mistaken for a progressive new wave of the future.

On the contrary, the ecological revolution must push beyond these limits to resist the on-going domination of man and nature and by challenging both industrial and informational capital. Ecological activists must demystify, repossess and decode the material packages and behavioral scripts being produced by informational capital to advance emancipatory interests of average producers and consumers in everyday life.[29] The struggle centers on the different meanings being reassigned to acts and artifacts in industrial life by informational capitalism. One syntax of signification points towards an official informational pragmatics in labor and leisure that would revitalize the reification of labor in the production and consumption of information. On the other hand, a more subversive ecological pragmatics derived from localist vernaculars can empower producers and consumers with their own meanings for informationalizing development, which could turn labor and leisure into emancipatory modes of ecologically sound living.

29. See Jacques Donzelot, *The Policing of Families* (New York, 1979); Stuart and Elizabeth Ewen, *Channels of Mass Desire* (New York, 1982); Ivan Illich, *Disabling Professions* (Boston 1978); and, Christopher Lasch, *The Culture of Narcissism* (New York, 1979), for an introduction to this process of critically identifying emancipatory possibilities.

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

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NEOCONSERVATIVE CULTURE CRITICISM IN THE UNITED STATES AND WEST GERMANY: AN INTELLECTUAL MOVEMENT IN TWO POLITICAL CULTURES*

by Jürgen Habermas

It is an accomplishment of the neoconservatives in the United States that a conservative government is able to rely on theoretical perspectives and not merely on pragmatic considerations and the general climate. That explains the interest of the European conservative parties in this intellectual movement: an example is the conference sponsored by the Konrad Adenauer Foundation in September of 1981, which brought together German and American neoconservatives.[1]

In the USA as in the Federal Republic, neoconservatism is a matter of loose groupings of intellectuals with common orientations. The neoconservatives in both countries share a collection of critical positions and conceptions which resulted from similar disappointments. Since the middle of the sixties, these social scientists and philosophers confronted economic, political and intellectual developments which did not conform to their rather affirmative image of western industrial societies. In this sense, neoconservatism emerges from a response to a disappointment. Nevertheless, the profiles of neoconservative thought in the USA and the Federal Republic differ as much as do the theories and diagnoses with which these intelletuals, in both countries, commenced during the fifties.

I

The theoretically productive center of American neoconservatism is composed of well-known, scholarly recognized sociologists such as Daniel Bell, Peter Berger, Nathan Glazer, Seymour Martin Lipset, Robert Nisbet and Edward Shils. They make no secret of their Leftist and liberal pasts. During the fifties many belonged to the strictly anticommunist circle around the American Committee for Cultural Freedom, took part in related congresses and published in the journal *Encounter*, the English counterpart to *Preuves* and

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* An earlier version of this article has appeared in German in *Praxis*, Vol. 2, No. 4 (January, 1983), pp. 339-358. Translated by Russell A. Berman.

1. H. Rühle *et al.*, editors, *Der Neokonservatismus in den Vereinigten Staaten* (St. Augustin, 1982).

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Monat. Given this political background, the intellectual continuity of the American neoconservatives becomes evident. They continue to maintain two important positions advocated during the fifties: on the one hand, anticommunism, understood in terms of the concept of totalitarianism, and on the other, antipopulism, based on the theory of democratic power elites. Neither theory was uncontroversial in the social sciences of the fifties, but both were widely accepted. The theory of totalitarianism highlighted the negative traits of the enemy's political system by emphasizing the similarities between fascist and communist one-party systems; with the other theory, intellectuals explained the advantages of their own political system by claiming that the representative character of the constitutional state with a balance of powers guaranteed both the pluralism of social interests as well as the optimal selection of the leadership cadre. This was the common denominator of liberal social theories in which the understanding of modernization processes implied that the industrially most advanced society, i.e., the United States, was exemplary.

This normative distinction of the status quo could not, of course, withstand the realities of the sixties and seventies. Hence the self-understanding of Irving Kristol who sees himself as "a liberal disillusioned by reality." Peter Glotz paraphrased this definition: "Neoconservatism is the net into which the liberal can fall when he begins to fear his own liberalism." What frightened the liberals?

The social and economic changes that brought about the end of the New Deal era and destroyed the old New Deal coalition (in part through upward mobility) cannot be treated here. The changes in foreign policy were more tangible; the neoconservatives reacted to the defeat in Vietnam and Kissinger's détente policies with the feeling that America's resistance to world communism was being crippled by a sort of moral disarmament. As little as the international developments fit into the anticommunist project, the domestic mobilization which gripped society in the wake of the civil rights movement, the student protests, the New Left, the women's movement and the escapist counter-cultures did not correspond to the wholesome world of a non-ideological power elite.

In addition, the thematization of poverty in the middle of the sixties fractured the rather harmonious picture of the affluent society. The undesired byproducts of the social programs implemented bureaucratically under Johnson soon began to appear. Where these programs nevertheless functioned well, they displeased the neoconservatives even more, since they endangered the formal principle of equal opportunity via the improvement of the collective chances of ethnic minorities and women.

The formerly liberal neoconservatives are concerned with the alleged loss of authority of the central institutions, especially the political system. This phenomenon is presented suggestively with key terms like ungovernability, decline of credibility, the loss of legitimacy, etc. The explanation begins with an "inflation" of expectations and claims, heightened by the competing

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political parties, the mass media and pluralist interests. This pressure of popular expectations "explodes" in a drastic expansion of state activities. The steering instruments of the administration are consequently overburdened. This overburdening, in turn, leads to a loss of legitimacy especially when the possibilities of state activity are limited by preparliamentary power blocks and when the citizens blame the government for tangible economic losses. This is increasingly dangerous, the more the loyalty of the population depends on material compensations.

Interestingly the beginning and end of this spiral are marked by cultural resources: the so-called *inflation of expectations* and *the lack of a willingness to acclaim and obey*, which is based on tradition and is immune to variations in (state) services. This point was formulated by Peter Steinfels in his 1979 book *The Neo-Conservatives*: "The current crisis is above all a cultural crisis...The problem is that our convictions are full of holes, our morals and our manners corrupt."[2]

Certain therapeutic proposals result from this analysis. The state bureaucracies need relief: hence those problems, which burden the governmental budget, are to be returned from the state to the market. Because simultaneously investment activity is supposed to be heightened, the reduction of the volume of tasks must lead to a restriction of public social services and consumptive spending in general. At this point, support for a monetarist and supply-side economic policy, designed to stimulate investment activity through tax reductions, merges easily into the neoconservative vision. The more the state retreats from the economic process, the better it can escape the legitimation demands, which arise from its general responsibility for the burdens resulting from a crisis ridden accumulation process.

Other proposals aim directly at the suspected causes. The neoconservatives recommend a stronger decoupling of the executive from the broad political will formation and even a moderation of those democratic principles which "excessively" heighten the level of legitimation. Behind the "utopian" exaggeration of the democratic level of justification, behind the "luxuriating" expectations-pressure, which is passed onto the state through decision-making channels open at the base, certain cultural orientations are operating. The overstimulation of these cultural resources must ultimately be blamed on an enemy — the "new class" of intellectuals. They release, be it through negligence or design, the explosive contents of cultural modernity; they are the advocates of a "adversary culture," i.e., adversary, as it seems, from the perspective of the functional exigencies of state and economy. Thus the intellectuals become the most visible target of neoconservative criticism: "The new class and its hostile culture must be tamed or forced out of all sensitive areas."[4] (Steinfels)

2. P. Steinfels, *The Neo-Conservatives* (New York, 1979), p. 55.
3. P. Graf Kielmannsegg, *Demokratieprinzip und Regierbarkeit* (Stuttgart, 1977), p. 122.
4. P. Steinfels, *The Neo-Conservatives*, p. 65.

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I do not want to present an extensive critique of the research on ungovernability. The theoretical weakness of these analyses is based on their confusion of cause and effect, as Joachim Heidorn has correctly shown.[5] A crisis which arises in the economy and the state is presented as a "spiritual-moral" crisis — also presented, by the way, in this manner by the leader of the opposition (Helmut) Kohl in the Bundestag debates of September 9, 1982. More interesting than this argument however is the fundamental cultural theory, especially the interpretation of the cultural crisis which Daniel Bell first presented in 1976 in his book *The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism.*

II

Bell starts from Max Weber's claim that by destroying the Protestant ethic, capitalist development undermines the motivational prerequisities for its own continuity. Bell explains the self-destructive pattern of this development in terms of a split between culture and society. He analyzes the tension between a *modern* society, unfolding in terms of economic and administrative rationality, and a *modernist* culture, which contributes to the destruction of the moral bases of rationalized society. In both cases modernity depends on the process of secularization; but what is good for *secularized* society, i.e., capitalist modernization, is catastrophic for culture, since a culture rendered *profane* evokes subversive attitudes; in any case, it contrasts with the willingness, anchored in religion, to achieve and obey, on which an efficient economy and a rational state administration functionally depend.

The affirmative stance toward *social* modernity and the denigration of *cultural* modernity are typical for the evaluative schema implicit in *all* neoconservative diagnoses of the contemporary situation. But Bell has a complex mind and is a good social theorist — in his analysis of the causes of the cultural crisis he does not proceed at all in a neoconservative manner.

The concept of the new class, which according to neoconservative tenets allegedly establishes the predominance of the principle of unlimited self-fulfillment, is rejected by Bell as confused. The so-called new class is composed of individuals who carry the "logic of modernism" to its conclusion in their radical life style but who exercise no significant power. The development of capitalism is determined by very different factors: military needs, technical innovations, social upheavals and so forth. In addition to these structural transformations, a new hedonism has spread, which is modelled after examples from aesthetic modernity. According to Bell in a 1979 essay, only "the machine of modern capitalism assimilated and commercialized these (counter-cultural) life styles. Without this hedonism stimulated by mass consumption, the consumer goods industry would collapse. The cultural contradiction of capitalism ultimately amounts to the following: once capitalism lost its original legitimations, it adopted the legitimations of a formerly

5. J. Heidorn, *Legitimität und Regierbarkeit* (Bd., 1982), p. 249.
6. D. Bell, *The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism* (New York, 1976).

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antibourgeois culture in order to maintain the stability of its own economic institutions."[7]

In this essay, Bell is not at all guilty of the usual confusion of cause and effect. He does not explain the split between culture and society with the claim that the crisis of authority can be simply ascribed to a culture whose advocates exacerbate the hostility toward the conventions and virtues of the rationalized everyday life of economy and administration. Nevertheless his analysis of modernism is somewhat distorted.

On the one hand, Bell fully comprehends the development of modern art and literature since the middle of the nineteenth century as the unfolding of a consistent pattern, which is specific, in Marx Weber's terms, for the "sphere of aesthetic value." The avant-garde artist gives authentic expression to experiences, which he makes via a decentered subjectivity freed from the pressures and exigencies of everyday knowledge and practice. The specificity of the aesthetic appears on the condition of avoiding the everyday structures of time and space, of the break with the conventions of perception and goal-oriented activity, and it is revealed in the dialectic of revelation and shock, which breaks down taboos and purposefully wounds moral sentiment.

On the other hand, Bell is less interested in the new sensibilities and experiential gains of aesthetic modernity; he stares at the subversive power of a consciousness which rejects the normalization achievements of the tradition. Bell does not see that the aestheticist neutralization of the good, the useful and the true — the aesthetic rebellion against all norms — is only the result of a radical differentiation and specification of this value sphere; the avant-garde cleanses, so to speak, aesthetic experience from contamination from different values spheres. The sociologist's attention is directed solely toward the disturbingly anarchistic life-styles which are spreading everywhere and in which the new mode of experience becomes the center of a subjectivist life-form concentrated on self-experience and self-realization. Therefore the central claim coincides fully with the neoconservative line of argument: that the bohemian life-styles with their hedonistic and unlimitedly subjective value orientations are spreading and eroding the discipline of bourgeois everyday life.

On closer examination, the complaint about the anomic effects of avantgardist art can only refer to the surrealist *program* of an unmediated transformation of art into life. These attempts at a false supersession of art failed long ago. If one examines empirical research into changing values in western societies, one observes something very different in terms of new attitudes and the shift of the whole spectrum of values — especially in the younger generation.

The "materialist" needs for security and subsistence are receding behind "postmaterialist" needs.[8] This label covers a variety of issues: an interest in an

7. D. Bell, "The New Class: A Muddled Concept," in *The Winding Passage* (Cambridge, 1980), pp. 163ff.

8. H. Klages and P. Kmiecak, eds., *Wertwandel und gesellschaftlicher Wandel* (Frankfurt, 1979), pp. 179-365.

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expanded space for self-realization and self-experience, an increased sensitivity for the need to protect natural and historical environments, as well as a heightened sense for vulnerable, interpersonal relations. Certainly Daniel Bell could link these *expressive* attitudes to the dimension of aesthetic experience. However in the postmaterialist scale of values, one also finds orientations characteristic of *moral* sensibility — for example, the interest in the protection and extensive use of civil rights and democratic self-determination are *two equal*, mutually complementary components, which are *equally rooted* in cultural modernity. Bell does not see the implications of the fact that modern culture is no less characterized by the universalization of law and morality than by the autonomization of art.

Bell himself uses these moral ideas at the end of his book where he claims that the economic contradictions of capitalism, evident in the governmental budgets, can only be solved with the help of a renewed social contract. He is not satisfied with the neoconservative demand to limit democracy in order to meet the imperatives of an economic growth based on an unchanged incentive mechanism. As a consistent liberal, rather, he considers a consensual *concept of equality* necessary, "which gives all persons a sense of fairness and inclusion in the society and which promotes a situation where, within the relevant spheres, people become more equal so that they can be treated equally."[9] On this basis, the historically established terms, under which the social product is achieved, distributed and used, would have to be negotiated anew.

III

The social questions of the eighties, for which no one can offer a simple solution, might be discussed on that sort of basis. However in the Federal Republic, those neoconservatives who, like Richard Löwenthal and Kurt Sontheimer, could be regarded as the intellectual counterparts to their American colleagues do not set the tone. Rhetoric and a politics of ideas determine the controversy in Germany more strongly than does social scientific analysis. In addition to a few historians, the spokesmen are largely philosophers. In the wake of neoconservative positions, sociologists are declaring themselves "antisociologists" — a very German phenomenon.

Yet the differences in the styles of thought and discussion depend less on the initial disciplines than on the lines of tradition in the two political cultures. The philosophical proponents of German neoconservatism — and I will restrict my discussion to this clearly defined central group — did not identify with social modernity via the concepts of an unambiguous liberal theory which subsequently gave way to disappointment. The theories with which they *commenced* had rather a young conservative tone and thereby a specifically German background. They relied on a generation of teachers who had inherited the young conservatism of the Weimar period. After 1945 these figures reconciled themselves with civilizational progress but maintained the cultural criticism. This compromise, the half-hearted acceptance of moderni-

9. D. Bell, *Cultural Contradictions*, p. 282.

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ty, separates the Germans from the Americans, the formerly young conservative from the formerly liberal neo-conservatives.

For authors like Joachim Ritter, Ernst Forsthoff and Arnold Gehlen, the compromise meant that they only conditionally accepted social modernity, refusing to affirm cultural modernity. In his equally fascinating and influential interpretation of Hegel's political writings, *Joachim Ritter* described the modern "bourgeois society" which emerged from the French Revolution as the locus of both emancipation and estrangement. The devaluation of the traditional world, the estrangement from the historically transmitted life order, is seen on the one hand positively as the form in which the *citizens* (*Bürger*) of the modern world achieve and maintain their subjective freedom. On the other hand, modern economic society reduces *human beings* (*Menschen*) to the status of agents of production and consumption. Because of its tendency to reduce *persons* to their structure of needs, encompassing socialization which negates its own historical conditions would also destroy the achievements of subjective freedom. In the context of estrangement, freedom can be guaranteed against the danger of total socialization, if the devalued powers of tradition "as powers of personal life, subjectivity and provenance" still maintain the strength to compensate for the unavoidable abstractions of bourgeois society. Therefore in order to stabilize social modernity, a renewal of its own historical substance is necessary, in other words: a desperate, because paradoxical, effort of an historical enlightened traditionalism.

Conservative constitutional theory attempts to find a different solution with the help of Carl Schmitt's concept of sovereignty. In the early fifties a discussion arose over the constitutional significance of the social-state clause in the West German constitution. *Ernst Forsthoff* put forward the position then that the norms which established the constitutional-state character of the Federal Republic had to maintain absolute priority over the social-state clause, understood merely as a political recommendation. The historico-philosophical content of this legal-dogmatic controversy[10] only becomes evident, if one recalls the premise which is reminiscent of Ritter's interpretation of Hegel: that the society which represents the substrate of welfare-state mass democracy cannot achieve stability immanently and requires compensations. For Forsthoff, however, this social dynamic cannot be retarded by the counterforce of a rhetorically invoked tradition but only by the sovereign state. The constitutional state still has, as its substantial center, sovereign power, and this state can develop the power necessary to stabilize social modernity only if, in extreme cases, it is immune to arguments presented in the name of social interests. The guardians of the commonwealth must have the political power, *not* to argue but instead to decide. In this view, social modernity ceases to be a danger only for a state power whose sovereignty is not threatened by moral disarmament. In later works, Forsthoff opened up to technocratic conceptions.[11]

10. E. Forsthoff, ed., *Rechsstaatlichkeit und Sozialstaatlichkeit* (Darmstadt, 1968).
11. E. Forsthoff, *Der Staat in der Industriegesellschaft* (Munich, 1971).

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Arnold Gehlen follows this third line of argumentation. His important anthropology from the early fifties emphasizes the extreme plasticity and vulnerability of the human nature which is not fixed by instincts and therefore depends on the regulating force of archaic-natural institutions.[12] From this perspective, the dismantling of sacred institutions, the loss of authority by the church, the military and the state as well as the erosion of the latter's sovereign substance appear as signs of a pathological development. This explains the harsh cultural criticism which Gehlen initially articulated after the war.[13] Every step toward emancipation robs the individual of automatic regulations, abandons him without protection to his desultory motivations, strains him with excessive demands for decisions and renders him increasingly unfree, the more the ideals of self-determination and self-realization are extended.

The tenor of the argument changes in the course of the fifties when Gehlen adopted a technocratic thesis which allowed him to view modern society in a new light. According to this idea, economy and state administration, technology and science coalesce in the iron cage of modernity and become a self regulating system of laws which are apparently subject to no influences and which can substitute the dismantled institutions. The anthropologically soothing tendency to unburden the individual (*Entlastungstendenz*) can continue on the level of this system and its *Sachgesetzlichkeiten* because time has run out for cultural modernity: the premises of the enlightenment, so Gehlen argues, are dead, and only its consequences continue. A traditionalist revival of former powers nn longer provides the prescription for the deactivation of modern ideas; the key term is rather "crystallization." Gehlen calls modern culture "crystallized" because "the fundamental contents and all the immanent possibilities have been exhausted."[14]

IV

Given this background, it becomes clear that the changed scene of the sixties — the revival of a militant social criticism and a broadly mobilized enlightenment tradition, an anti-authoritarian movement, a new outbreak of the avant-garde in the arts and an aesthetically inspired counterculture — revived everything which the conservative theoreticians had considered dead. Theoreticians like Ritter, Forsthoff and Gehlen had only recently reconciled themselves with social modernity on the assumption of an immobilized cultural modernity. While American liberals were forced to search for new arguments for an unforeseen situation, the philosophers among the German neoconservatives were faced with a relatively easy task. The argumentative arsenals of their teachers supplied the necessary ammunition: whatever contradicted their *theory* was to be combatted in *practice* as the machinations of a

12. A. Gehlen, *Der Mensch* (Berlin, 1940).

13. A. Gehlen, *Urmensch und Spätkultur* (Frankfurt, Bonn, 1956), and by the same author, *Die Seele in technischen Zeitalter* (Hamburg, 1957).

14. A. Gehlen, "Über kulturelle Kristallisation," in his *Studien zur Anthropologie und Soziologie* (Neuwied, 1963), p. 321.

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domestic enemy. They needed only to name the agents who were responsible for the disagreeable phenomena, which seemed to shake the foundations of the compromise, and who had unleashed a cultural revolution. This turn to practical polemics explains why the German neoconservatives could tread the beaten path and were not compelled to offer much new. A new element however, is the type of professor who courageously takes his stand in the semantic front of the civil war.

The neoconservative doctrine which during the seventies filtered through the press into the everyday politics of the Federal Republic is based on a simple pattern. The modern world appears as the world of technical progress and capitalist growth; all social dynamic, which is ultimately based on private investments, is modern and desirable; the motivational resources on which this dynamic thrives are in need of protection. Danger lies in cultural transformations, motivational and attitudinal changes and shifts in patterns of values and identities, which are attributed to the entry of cultural innovations into more or less traditional forms of life. Therefore the legacy of tradition has to be preserved as far as possible.

The therapeutic suggestions which in recent years in Germany have penetrated into everyday politics can be derived from three elements: 1) All phenomena which do not correspond to a compensatorily immobilized modernity are personalized and moralized, i.e., blamed on Left intellectuals, who allegedly are carrying on a cultural revolution in order to insure their own authority, the "priestly rule of a new class." 2) The explosive contents of cultural modernity, which nourish this cultural revolution, must be deactivated, hopefully by declaring them passé. We have actually reached the safe shores of post-history, the post-enlightenment or post-modernism. Only the slowpokes still caught up in the dogmatic slumber of a "humanitarianism" have not yet recognized the new situation. 3) The socially undesirable by-products of an economic growth lacking political direction are transposed to the level of a "spiritual-moral crisis"[15] and need the compensation of a straight-forward common sense, historical consciousness and religion. I want to comment on these three recommendations separately.

1) The *critique of intellectuals*, to which Arnold Gehlen devoted the work of his last decade and which Helmut Schlesky expanded into a theory of the new class, draws on three sources.[16] First, it mobilizes the clichés which have accumulated during the "history of an insult" since the days of the campaign against the Jewish captain Alfred Dreyfus (1894). Dietz Bering traced this history, and his study provides a lexicon of aggressive and coded terms, such as: abstract, abstruse, agitator, decadent, formalist, free-floating, critical, mechanistic, opportunistic, radical, racially-foreign, revolutionary, cutting, arrogant, soulless, self-glorious, substanceless, degenerate, unworldly, rootless, immoral, cynical.[17] Once one has glanced through this register of nearly

15. See the speech by Kohl in the West German Bundestag on Sept. 9, 1982.

16. A. Gehlen, *Moral und Hypermoral* (Frankfurt, 1969), and the articles in *Einblicke* (Frankfurt, 1978), pp. 253-530.

17. D. Bering, *Die Intellektuellen* (Stuttgart, 1978).

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one thousand terms, the new critique of intellectuals turns out to be less than novel.

In addition, the allegation of an intellectual theocracy is based on certain trends; for example, in postindustrial societies the proportion of academic occupations grows, and the significance of the scientific and educational systems generally increase. Among the intellectual professions, Schelsky of course points especially to teachers and publicists, ministers and social workers, humanists and philosophers and stylizes them as an exploitative class of mediators of meaning (Sinnvermittler) — while others do the real work. Richard Löwenthal provides a convincing critique of the false conclusions implict in this extraordinary concept of the new class: "The first false equation is between a social sector and a class. The second false equation is between influence and power. The third false equation is between eschatological hopes, implying necessarily a short-term outbreak of chiliastic faith, and a long-term religion capable of culturally forming everyday social life."[18]

The last element is the relationship of intellectuals to the crisis of the educational system. The educational reforms, necessitated by sociostructural changes but long postponed in the Federal Republic, did indeed take place in a period during which educational policy was influenced by liberal and moderately Leftist goals. And it was in fact the reformist practice itself which led to the recognition of the dangers of legal regulation and bureaucratization as well as the dangers of a scientificization of pedagogy. But the neoconservatives misrepresent these unintended consequences as cultural revolutionary intentions, and they were able to use these consequences, which met with general disapproval, as an excuse to mobilize middle-class ressentiment, because anti-intellectual agitation provided the missing link needed to suggest the fatal nexus of social criticism, educational reform and Left-wing terrorism.[19] Subsequent biographical analyses of terroristic careers have dissolved this fantasy into thin air.[20]

2) The thesis of an exhaustion of cultural modernity refers to all three components: technically successful sciences, avant-garde art and universalist morality as conceptualized by Rousseau and Kant.

As far as science is concerned, the message is simple. If scientific progress has become "uninteresting for a politics of ideas," if the solution of scientific problems no longer touches our life problems,[21] then the encapsulated expert cultures have little more to offer everyday life — except technical innovations, and socio-technical recommendations. An ability to orient practice is ascribed only to historical sciences, where narrative means reactualize

18. K. Löwenthal, *Gesellschaftswandel und Kulturkritik* (Ffm., 1979), p. 38.

19. G. Rohrmoser, "Idologische Ursachen des Terrorismus," 1, *Ideologien und Strategien* (Köln, 1981) pp. 273 ff.

20. H. Jäger, G. Schmidtchen, L. Süllwold, "Analysen zum Terrorismus," 2, *Lebenslaufanalysen* (Köln, 1981).

21. H. Lübbe, "Wissenschaft nach der Aufklärung," in his *Philosophie nach der Aufklärung* (Düsseldorf, 1980), pp. 45ff.

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traditions and guarantee continuities. Hence the revaluation of narrative procedures in the humanities as well as the distrust of history as a social science and a devaluation of sociology — this would never have occurred to the American neoconservatives, since their spokesmen are nearly exclusively sociologists.

In addition, the thesis of a post-enlightenment is anything but convincing. Certainly, the empirical sciences provide no substitute for metaphysical and religious world views. Yet the wide distribution of popular scientific literature proves that cosmological findings regarding the origin and development of the universe, biochemical discoveries about the mechanisms of heredity, and especially anthropological and etholgical insights into the natural history of human behavior and the evolution of our species, psychological findings on the development of intelligence in children, the development of moral consciousness, affects, and motivations, the psychology of mental illness and social scientific insights into the origin and unfolding of modern societies — all this still touches the self-understanding of contemporary subjects. These findings also change the standards of discussion for life problems, for which the empirical sciences themselves have no ready answers.

It is of course important to exercise caution by treating hypothetical, i.e., provisional knowledge, carefully; a healthy dose of skepticism is also called for regarding the extent and efficiency of sciences which depend on a hermeneutic access to their object-domain; and the concern is certainly legitimate that the life-world autonomy of everyday practice needs to be protected from the unmediated, professionally largely unregulated interventions of experts — in the family and at school no less than in the gray zone of often questionable psychological services and therapies.

With reference to the *fine arts*, Gehlen claimed as late as 1960 that the avant-garde had lost its contagiousness — we, so he thought, have learned to live *beside* today's art. Looking back over the past two decades, Hans Sedlmayer comes to different conclusions. He is convinced that "aesthetic anarchism (is) much more dangerous than political (anarchism)."[22] Sedlmayer sees "a black line" linking the early romanticism of Jena with contemporary avant-garde art via Baudelaire and surrealism. He conjures up the dangers of an artistic practice which begins by abstracting from all extra-aesthetic orders and which banishes from art justice and truth as well as beauty in order to break the borders of the aesthetic work and become subversively active in the everyday bourgeois world. The uniformity of modern architecture appears simply as the other side of anarchism in painting, music and literature: "The rejection of art, logic, ethics, shame; the church, the state, the family; the classical European tradition and all religion — has penetrated newspapers and journals, film and television, theater and happenings and the practice of life." Of course it is not the complaint which is neoconservative, but the reaction to it — the

22. H. Sedlmayr, "Ästhetischer Anarchismus in Romantik und Moderne," in *Scheidewege*, 8, 1978, p. 195.

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programmatic dismissal of cultural modernity and the proclamation of the "postmodern." This expression implies the claim that avant-garde art, having exhausted its creativity, has reached its end and is trapped revolving in unproductive circles.

"Postmodern" is also the key term in a debate in recent years in the field of architecture. One might concede that contemporary post-avant-garde art, which has given up the surrealist dreams, does not emit any clear signals. But where are the works which might fill the negative slogan of "postmodernism" with a positive content?

From a neoconservative standpoint, it is not only necessary to deny the sensitivization potential in contemporary art and to downplay the enlightenment potential of the sciences; it is above all the explosive force of the *universalistic principles* of *morality* which must be deactivated. A morality is universalistic if it only permits norms of which all those concerned could approve on the basis of full consideration and without duress. No one will object to that — the basic rights and the principles of our constitutions are norms which we may assume everyone could affirm. I do not want to treat the problems which result when such abstract principles are applied to concrete life situations. Only *one* aspect of the relationship of morality and ethical life is of interest, for it especially arouses the suspicion of the conservatives. A universalistic moral naturally recognizes no limits; it even subjects political action to moral scrutiny. In contrast, the neoconservatives desire to minimize the burden of moral justification incumbent on the political system.

Following Hobbes and Carl Schmitt, some proceed from the claim that the state must legitimize itself above all by accomplishing its central task of guaranteeing the peace, i.e., the defense against foreign and domestic enemies. Hence the priority of the problem of internal security and especially the stylization of a purported competition between demands of the legal state and of democracy. Others proceed from the technocracy thesis that the state must act primarily as an arbitrator guaranteeing an appropriate separation of jurisdictions so that the relevant laws of the functionally specific sectors can operate "independent of the general political will formation."[23] Hence the preference for depoliticized steering institutions (like the *Bundesbank*) and especially the stylization of a purported competition between the principle of a balance of powers, on the one hand, and democracy, on the other. In both cases, the arguments point to a separation of the administration from the democratic discussion of sociopolitical goals and social justice.

The relevance of these considerations is obvious in a situation in which the central issue is the degree of social injustice we are prepared to accept, given the fiscal crisis of the state, in order to reinstigate an economic growth, the propelling mechanism of which remains unchanged. This capitalist propelling mechanism requires, for example, that the distribution of jobs be

23. H. Schlesky, *Systemüberwindung, Demokratisierung, Gewaltungteilung* (München, 1978), p. 58.

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regulated solely by the job market, even if the reserve army of the unemployed continues to grow.

3) The programmatic dismissal of cultural modernity should make room for a *healthy sense of tradition*. As soon as cultural modernity closes all the gates open to everyday practice and the expert cultures are also sufficiently sequestered, the *preserving powers* of common sense, historical consciousness and religion come into their own. However the birth pains of the post-enlightenment call for the mid-wifery of neoconservatism. It concentrates on a "courage to educate," i.e., an educational policy which tailors elementary education to basic skills and secondary virtues (industriousness, discipline and cleanliness). Simultaneously it emphasizes a "courage for the past" in schools, the family and the state. The neoconservatives see their role, on the one hand, in the mobilization of pasts which can be accepted approvingly and, on the other, in the neutralization of these pasts, which would only provoke criticism and rejection. Walter Benjamin called the "empathy with the victor" one of the signs of historicism. When, in the spirit of Benjamin, Gustav Heinemann called for the adoption of the perspective of the defeated, the unsuccessful rebels and revolutionaries, he had to put up with the rejoinder (from Hermann Lübbe) that this orientation toward the ideals of his own past was merely a "fixation of immaturity."[24] In this context, one also finds the attempts to interpret the National Socialist period so artificially that any reference to fascism can be denounced as a symptom of a "universal domination of sophistry."[25]

Of course the simple truths of common sense and historical continuities cannot alone carry the burden of the envisioned spiritual-moral regeneration. The appeal to the cohesive powers of religion is most important. In fact the enlightenment was incapable of fulfilling or ending the need for comfort. It also never answered the central question: whether, after the collapse of the religious world views, additional elements beyond the profane principles of a universalist ethic of responsibility could be salvaged — and this implies: appropriated with good reason, based on insight.

With this question, we are of course still in the realm of modernity, including modern theology. It leads away from a traditionalist revival of religious consciousness, and it compels us to understand the whole spectrum of movements and impulses which, for example, are filling contemporary church conclaves in Germany. Even religious fundamentalism thrives on very heterogeneous sources; meanwhile the non-fundamentalist currents release exactly those forces of problematicization, which the neoconservatives want to impede, as can be seen in the religiously motivated sections of the peace movement. It is precisely here that Schelsky's sense-mediators are congregating along with Lübbe's ideological guides, horizon-openers, experts on goal-eflection and pathfinders.

While Daniel Bell unbiasedly analyzed the different orientations of new

24. H. Lübbe, *Zwischen Trend und Tradition* (Zürich, 1981), p. 17.
25. G. Rohrmoser, *Zäsur* (Stuttgart, 1980), p. 27.

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congregational and communitarian religiosity inside and outside the churches,[26] the German neoconservatives are often concerned only with one issue: the powers of social cohesion implicit in an inherited belief which they understand solely as a substantial tradition unburdened by any demands of proof. Lübbe considers this functionalist interpretation of religion as a "practice of overcoming contingencies" advantageous precisely because it ignores the aspect of the legitimacy of religious belief.

However, traditions cannot be revived simply by demonstrating their beneficial effects. The retreat into functionalism does not solve the quandry in which every mere traditionalism has been entangled since the historical enlightenment. Horkheimer pointed this out in 1946: "Precisely the fact that tradition must be invoked today shows that it has lost its power."[27]

I do not want to be misunderstood: the non-renewable resources of our natural environment and the symbolic structures of our life world — both the historically developed and the specifically modern life-forms — need protection. But they can be protected only if we know *what* is threatening the life-world. The neoconservatives confuse cause and effect. In the place of the economic and administrative imperatives, the so-called objective exigencies, which monetarize and bureaucratize growing dimensions of life and increasingly transform relationships into commodities and objects of administration — in the place of these real sources of social crisis, they focus on the specter of an expansive and subversive culture. This false analysis explains why the neoconservatives, when they have the choice, do not regard the life-world, including the family, as so sacred as they otherwise claim — for example, in the case of the Christian Democratic media policy.

V

The political culture of the Federal Republic would be worse today if it had not adopted impulses from American political culture during the first post-war decades. The Federal Republic opened itself for the first time to the West without reservations, we adopted the political theory of the enlightenment, we grasped the pluralism which, first carried by religious sects, molded the political mentality, and we became acquainted with the radical democratic spirit of the American pragmatism of Peirce, Mead and Dewey. The German neoconservatives are turning away from these traditions and drawing on other sources. They are reaching back to a German constitutionalism, which reduces democracy to little more than the rule of law, to a Lutheran state ecclesiasticism rooted in a pessimistic anthropology, and to the motifs of a young conservatism, whose heirs could only achieve a half-hearted compromise with modernity. Bismarck broke the back of political liberalism in Germany. It is no historical accident that the domestic political shift to neoconservatism was brought about by the national-liberal wing of the FDP. For German political culture, this change threatens to close a fatally vicious

26. D. Bell, "The Return of the Sacred," in *The Winding Passage*, pp. 324 ff.
27. M. Horkheimer, *Kritik der instrumentellen Vernunft* (Frankfurt, 1974), p. 41.

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circle. The rejection of cultural modernity and the admiration for capitalist modernization will corroborate a general antimodernism ready to throw out the baby with the bathwater. If modernity had nothing to offer beside the praises of neoconservative apologetics, one could understand why parts of today's intellectual youth are returning (via Derrida and Heidegger) to Nietzsche, searching for salvation in the portentious moods of the cultic rejuvenation of a young conservatism not yet distorted by compromise.

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ECOLOGY AND ETHICS OF THE GAS PIPELINE DEAL

by Boris Komarov*

From the ecological viewpoint the sale of Soviet gas to Western Europe looks safe enough....at first glance. Natural gas is perhaps the energy source least of all harmful to the environment. But a lot depends on the conditions under which the gas is extracted and transported. Gas will be coming to Western Europe — to France, West Germany, Italy and other countries — from Western Siberia, a region with two distinguishing characteristics: 1) It lies in the permafrost zone, where natural ecosystems are exceptionally easy to destroy. 2) It lies in the zone of the Soviet socialist economic system.

Western Siberia now supplies roughly half of the gas and oil in the USSR. The Soviet Union's energy sufficiency up to the year 2,000 largely depends on resources located in the frost-bound Siberian earth. The USSR's ability to export gas and oil depends on these same resources, and it is not surprising that the government is prepared to exsract them at all costs. The situation is such that environmental protection in gas-and oil-producing regions is naturally relegated to the background. West European credits and Western technology play a very important role in the opening up of gas and oil deposits and the building of pipelines: the role of catalyst and accelerator of all technological processes. Thus, like it or not, the West is beginning to participate in the "Bolshevik transformation of the area" — in this case, Western Siberia.

Oil and gas are found in an area of Western Siberia comprosing 1.5 million square kilometers, between the Urals and the Yenisei River. This is equal to all of Western Europe between Warsaw and Paris or between Antwerp and Florence. More than half of this territory (over 850,000 square kilometers) is swamps and lakes. Even minimal human interference with nature, such as reindeer pasturing, leads to reduction of the forest floor and the growth of swamps. Once destroyed, permafrost forests cannot be renewed, so that, from the developmental viewpoint, huge expanses of Siberia turn out to be a fiction. This landscape has been damaged much more by the construction of roads and gas pipelines than has Central Europe by centuries of exploitation.

By 1982 more than 50,000 gas and oil wells had been drilled in Western Siberia, and the number grows by five or six thousand a year. Over 25,000 kilometers of main and auxiliary pipelines have been laid, and each year another 3,000 are added. Thousands of kilometers of roads of various kinds have been built, thousands of settlements erected. Meanwhile the entire protected area amounts to .6% of the territory of Western Siberia (compare to Alaska's 13%). Half of all the animal species in the USSR Red Book are Siberian. A small proportion of the country's population lives in Siberia, but animals there are as threatened as in thickly-populated areas.

The main means of transportation for geologists and workers in the oil fields is the caterpillar Landrover, and this detail plays a tragic role in the fate of northern ecosystems. Flying over the northern part of Western Siberia, one sees hundreds of square kilometers literally cut up by straight lines, the landrover tracks. Water collects in the ruts and they become gullies which grow fifteen to twenty meters in the warm season.

* This article was originally published in *Posev*, No. 12 (1982). Translated by Jean Alexander.

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In the early fifties, Stalin ordered a railroad to be laid down in these parts. Forest was cut down on both sides of the embankment, subsurface ice began to melt, and gullies and lakes were formed which swallowed up the embankments, the rails, and even station buildings. Hundreds of thousands of prisoners perished while building the railroad.[1] Of course, their graves have not been preserved, and the only noticeable result of Stalin's idiotic undertaking are the approximately one thousand square kilometers destroyed forever.

Modern engineers have learned how to deal with permafrost, how to keep structures such as roads and pipelines in working condition. But all their efforts are aimed at protecting the structures from the elements, not at protecting the environment from technology.

All roads in Western Siberia are still built on log foundations. For this purpose (and for housing construction) 380-450 cubic kilometers of forest and undergrowth are cut down each year. It would be possible to simplify Western Siberian transport problems by using a synthetic, seamless material instead of logs. Soviet army engineers possess vast quantities of such material, enough for the immediate construction of thousands of kilometers of road, but the state construction sector receives only a few thousand meters a year! The military industry long ago became familiar with environmentally harmless air-cushion vehicles, but here too the non-military ministries receive such vehicles by the piece! "Soft" caterpillar Landrovers, which have been devised and even produced, have one serious shortcoming, their slowness. To use them for freight would mean risking failure to fulfill delivery plans which, needless to say, in no way accommodate the interests of nature preservation.

An oil pipe burst in June 1979 on the Ob River bottom. Divers arrived after two days. After another four days, a technical explanation was found. It turned out that there were no stop mechanisms in the pipes on the river banks. For some reason they had been placed several kilometers from the bank. And into the Ob had flowed the oil from six kilometers of pipeline. The leak was stopped twelve days after the accident.

All that the environmental protection agency protecting the Ob basin can say is what it is unable to do. They do not know how to collect gas spilled into the swamps, because they have no mobile pumps, no emulgents, no detergents. And even when these are available, the existing types are insufficient. Burning is the only available means of combatting oil spills. Of course, if oil mixed with ice and snow catches fire.... Burning of oil on land, like burning of gas in the event of a burst pipe, leads to the thawing out of the soil and the creation of ravines for hundreds of meters from the line. At a meeting of specialists at Pushchino near Moscow in 1980, O. Trunova announced that of the 300 different bacteria she studied, not one could function at water temperatures below 5 degrees Celsius.

The objective cause of accidents is the enormous number of rivers and streams intersecting gas and oil pipelines. At South Urengoya, 99 rivers intersect a hundred kilometers of gas pipeline! The Ob basin once had the richest supply of fish in the world. Now, according to L.V. Mikhailov of the Sibniirybproyekt Institute, there are some hundred lakes in Western Siberia where the most primitive plants cannot survive. Grown fish can live a fairly long time in water with small csoncentrations of hydrocarbons, but at spawning season the harmful substances which have accumulated in the liver break into the bloodstream, and the fish dies, without spawning.

1. This is the sadly well-known Salekhard-Igarka "Dead Road," described by A. Solzhenitsyn in *The Gulag Archipelago* (Part 3, chapter 22). See also Pobozhy's article "The Dead Road," published during the Thaw in *Novy Mir*, No. 8, 1964.

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V. A. Komchenko, head of the Surgutsky hydrochemical laboratory, and G. I. Rudzevich, chief inspector of water preservation in the Tiumen district, maintain that accidents occur not so much for objective reasons (pipe corrosion, excess pressure) but because of mismanagement and disregard for preservation. For example, 150,000 tons of oil is used for boring wells each year. Instead of oil, a special liquid could be used, which is environmentally harmless. Only small amounts would be needed. But this liquid would be an extra load for the drillers, and why should they have to take it with them? They are paid only for meters drilled, so nothing else is taken into account. Oil pollution destroys the plant cover. And without forest, or at least a "blanket" of shrubs and mosses, thousands of square kilometers of land will turn into swamps and dead lakes.

Soviet scientists have sufficient data on all that is taking place in Siberia, but only rarely do they succeed in getting their views into print. The leading expert in the study of permafrost, P. F. Shvetsov, says that immediate action is necessary to avert the transformation of the tundra into North Arctic Ocean bottom. This is a matter of thousands of square kilometers. And Chersky also warns of the danger of caterpillar transport destroying a significant portion of tundra and transforming it into wasteland and ocean bottom.

In 1980 Yuri Isakov prepared (at Gosplan's request) a map showing conditions of ecological balance throughout the country. On that map almost all of Western Siberia is colored red, indicating the impossibility of restoring an ecological balance. Pipeline routes from Siberia to Europe are also red. High-level bureaucrats at Gosplan studied the map....and made no changes in the policy of "energy at all costs."

That same year N. P. Federenko published an article in which for the first time he expressed doubts as to the correctness of ecological policy in the country as a whole. "The root of the evil lies in the inability to comprehend the long-term laws of economics. Nature-preserving measures, like renewal of basic capital, hold back growth for a time, but then the country can make a spurt forward. The fact that we have two thousand organizations working on environmental problems is small consolation. Out of a thousand mice you cannot make one horse. A mouse-drawn carriage cannot carry the load of environmental protection. Countries that do not see to the reconstruction of their basic ecological capital will be left behind in economic growth." Nevertheless, Federenko and his colleagues realize that the present government, i.e., the present party elite, is incapable of "seeing to the reconstruction of basic ecological capital." They would be happy to get out from under their immediate problems.

One of those pressing immediate problems is precisely that of the construction of the Urenga-West Europe gas pipeline, and if the West Europeans require environmental safeguards, the Communist Party of the USSR will probably have to comply. The question is: who in Western Europe will require this, and what can be demanded of the Kremlin leadership? It is possible for the West to make demands. It would not even be necessary to alter the whole gas pipeline deal, but only to alter the conditions of credit depending on fulfillment or nonfulfillment of various conditions. It would also be possible to monitor the effectiveness of preservation measures; several yearly visits by European scientists would suffice. Visual observation is one of the basic scientific methods of evaluating the condition of the environment. Admission to "closed establishments and institutes" would not be necessary. Trips through pipeline routes and oil extraction sites would be enough.

But why should West Europeans be concerned about the environment of another country? Do they not have problems enough of their own? Nevertheless, there are

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several reasons for uneasiness in Europe. The first of them has to do with global ecology. A citizen of ancient Rome who bought goat cheese from Asia Minor could eat it with an absolutely clear conscience. He had no way of knowing that in doing so he was indirectly financing the slow destruction of forests in Greece and Turkey. Only after many centuries did scholars explain that "goats had consumed the forests of Asia Minor and Greece." The Roman citizen did not understand, but citizens of modern Rome, Munich and Paris know that barbaric economic methods take their toll not only on the economy, but also on the climate of entire countries. Western Siberia is much farther from Europe than Greece, but the processes taking place there are ten, if not a hundred, times more dramatic than the ecological changes that occured in Greece and Asia Minor. The increased percentage of surface water and the poisoning of enormous rivers will inevitably lead to serious climactic displacement throughout the Eurasian continent. According to K. K. Markov, even small changes in average annual temperature (on the order of .3 degrees Celsius) are enough to set off a new ice age. No climatologist is in a position to predict when or how climactic change associated with the Western Siberian environment will begin. But no one can afford simply to ignore what is taking place in Siberia. Unrestricted atmospheric pollution in England and Germany hit the Scandinavians most severely, in the form of "acid" rain. Nobody warned the Europeans about "acid" rain in advance, which means that nobody wittingly took part in the financing of projects threatening the stability of atmospheric processes. In the case of Western Siberia, the Europeans are in effect consciously ignoring the ecological-climactic danger in pursuit of cheap Soviet gas.

The next reason is legal. The "transformation" of nature in Western Siberia is unprecedented in scale. Soviet legal experts, for example, I. Karpets, Vice-President of the "International Union of Democratic Advocates," are constantly stressing that the UN regards ecocide — i.e., the real or potential destruction of nature over a broad territory — an international crime. The very concept of international crime, coming from Soviet legal experts, applies by definition only to Western countries and their allies. But why could not Western lawyers use UN documents to clarify the true state of things regarding environmental protection in Siberia?

The third and final reason is completely idealistic. Europeans ought to speak out against the destruction of Western Siberia simply because they can, whereas Soviet society (scientists, writers and ordinary concerned people) is gagged. A significant number of Soviet people still believe (falsely, perhaps) that there are more decent people in Western Europe, with its long democratic tradition, where there never was a Bolshevik revolution or a Stalinist terror, than there are in, say, the USSR. And a decent person will certainly protest if he sees someone else robbed and injured and deprived of the possibility of protesting and speaking of his own misfortunes.

But do West Europeans resemble this image? Europeans cannot claim, "We did not know what was going on in Western Siberia." They know. They know as much as they want to know. About the prison-camp labor constructing the pipeline, and about the ruined lakes and rivers. Whether they act, is a question of will, not information.

Many years ago the Presidium of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR was supposed to approve (on government orders) a huge cellulose project which was known to be dangerous to Lake Baikal. Academician Federenko did not attend the meeting — he suddenly checked into a hospital. Now he says, "I was not one of those who destroyed Baikal. I was in the hospital." Will West Europeans say "We protest" to those who are ruining Western Siberia today for their own political advantage? Or have they all gone off to pacifist demonstrations against American missiles?

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ADORNO'S RADICALISM: TWO INTERVIEWS FROM THE SIXTIES

by Russell A. Berman

While the recent conservative turn in West German politics immediately suggests a continental version of the victories of Thatcher in England and Reagan in the United States, the specific political and cultural context warrants closer scrutiny. The arithmetic of parliamentary procedure in the *Bundestag* has tended to obscure the real constellation of power: throughout the seventies, the Social Democratic ascendancy relied on the now defunct coalition with the small Liberal party which alone made it possible to outmaneuver the numerically superior Christian Democrats. Nevertheless on a fundamental level, Conservatism remained a strong force within national politics, exercising its influence directly via various governmental agencies in the legislature and the judiciary and indirectly through the increasingly conservative character of the SPD-FDP coalition itself during the Schmidt administration. The subsequent disaffection of the SPD's own left wing, particularly around bitterly embattled issues such as *Berufsverbot*, the anti-terrorism laws and NATO armament policy, occasionally even threatened to bring down the government. Yet, it was ultimately not a break of party loyalty on the left but the Liberals' defection on the right which undermined the coalition and made Helmut Kohl the first Conservative chancellor since the sixties. More importantly, however, soon after the initial establishment of the social-liberal coalition government, a cultural milieu began to emerge in which hopes for social reform appeared increasingly illusory: the political consequences of that cultural shift, thematized during the mid-seventies as the *Tendenzwende*, were finally realized in the fall of 1982.

Undoubtedly the various wings of the traditional left contributed, albeit inadvertently, to the genesis of this cultural shift. The orthodox Marxism-Leninism which attracted those members of the old New Left who chose to spend the early seventies organized in a plethora of tiny parties was fundamentally incapable of addressing the new social issues; precisely the questions which it assiduously ignored — ecology and feminism — formed a cultural complex which became politicized outside of the left — or even in opposition to it. Meanwhile established Social Democracy's attempts to carry through reform solely via bureaucratic legality implied a basic unwillingness to mobilize a public culture committed to emancipatory change. In a more general sense, the statism of the traditional left, i.e., the understanding (shared both by Marxist-Leninists and Social Democrats) of the state or the party as the key agent of social progress, led to an anti-cultural bias and to the current situation in which a conservative hegemonic bloc is emerging as the central feature of West German political and cultural life. Utopian visions of a return to pre-industrial artisanry shift attention away from the reality of working class issues and potentially provide an alibi for unemployment in the ongoing economic crisis. An ecological idealism nurtures romantic images of a healthy nature and a hostility to urban life. A discourse of authenticity privileges interiority over politics and transforms anti-Americanism into nationalist programs for reunification hardly impalatable to the traditional conservative opposition to détente.[1] There are certainly deep contradictions and

1. Cf. the discussion in the recent issues of *Telos*, especially my "Opposition to Rearmament and West German Culture," *Telos* 51 (Spring 1982), pp. 141-148; Seyla Benhabib, "The West German Peace Movement and its Critics," *ibid.*, pp. 148-158; my reply, "The Peace Movements and its Critics' Critics," *Telos* 52 (Summer 1982), pp. 99-107.

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oppositions within the new cultural bloc — just as there are always differences between a political leadership and the mass following mobilized by ideology — but the novelty of this cultural bloc is equally certain, especially if it is held up against the previous period of West German history.

Nature, nation and emotional subjectivity: these central terms of the milieu out of which the current conservative resurgence developed represent the antitheses to the intellectual and cultural renaissance of the sixties which once successfully challenged the earlier conservative hegemony of the Adenauer era. Against the so-called repression of the past, serious attempts were made to come to grips with the experience of National Socialism and its consequences for West Germany. Against the cultural conservatism which envisioned a truncated bourgeois traditionalism as the sole alternative to fascism misunderstood as a plebeian phenomenon, the modernism of the Weimar Republic was reappropriated as the cipher for a confluence of democratic politics and avant-garde art. And against the social psychology of *Wirtschaftswunder* consumerism, analyzed by the Mitscherlichs as an "inability to mourn" and marvellously scrutinized by Günter Grass in the onion cellar chapter of *The Tin Drum*, the possibility of a collective political practice took shape in the anti-authoritarian phase of the student movement.[2] A full account of the dynamics and eventual decline of this progressive cultural hegemony would obviously demand a much more elaborate exposition than can be offered in the present context. Suffice it to note that the new conservative perspective distorts and denounces it with the same categories with which regressive thought has repeatedly opposed enlightenment: as excessively rational, critical and theoretical.

Despite the considerable attention devoted to the history of the Frankfurt School during the past decade, the specific character of its participation in West German culture has yet to be investigated thoroughly. A good deal is known about the intellectual profile of critical theory, much less however about its concrete relationship to the student movement and ultimately very little about its role in the establishment of an anti-conservative milieu during the sixties. In general, the judgment generated within the student movement while it was breaking away from its teachers Horkheimer and Adorno and moving toward a more orthodox Marxism (mediated by the positions of Brecht and the later Benjamin) has gained currency: that the Frankfurt School propagated a pessimistic resignation that prohibited political practice and privileged an ivory-tower quietism. This antagonistic evaluation seemed to be confirmed even by readings of key texts such as *The Dialectic of the Enlightenment*, which apparently described a seamless universe of domination where all the traditional agencies of emancipatory change — reason, science, democracy — turned into their opposites. That the Frankfurt School was fundamentally skeptical about the likelihood of imminent revolutionary change, that it could not offer the activists of the sixties a practical political agenda and that indeed its inability to recognize the important shifts in the character of Western societies revealed the historically determined limits of its central tenets — none of this can be contested. Nevertheless an examination of its participation in post-war German intellectual life may well lead to a more differentiated understanding. For example, despite Adorno's frequently restated hostility to the mechanisms of the culture industry, many of his important essays of the fifties and sixties were conceived precisely as radio talks. This historical fact implies that even within the context of the "administered society" a certain amount of public cultural engagement appeared possible. Furthermore, in autobiographical statements, both Adorno and

2. Cf. Alexander and Margarete Mitscherlich, *The Inability to Mourn* (New York, 1975); Günter Grass, *The Tin Drum* (New York, 1962), pp. 519-535.

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Horkheimer repeatedly underscored that they decided to return to Germany after the war in order to contribute to social change more effectively than they considered possible in the United States.[3]

The following two interviews with Adorno from 1965 and 1969 will help locate critical theory within the transformations of West German culture. Many of the central motifs of the intellectual tradition appear: the description of the bourgeois family and the associated psychological structures, the contrast between the deception of the culture industry and the rigorous forms of the authentic work of art, the attacks on positivist science, vitalism and orthodox Marxism. In addition, the emphasis in the earlier interview on the historicity of thought complements the later discussion of individual autonomy, and this juxtaposition typifies Adorno's wavering between Hegelian and Kantian perspectives: the philosophical configuration emerges as the result of the attempt to preserve social criticism without claiming the absolute knowledge of the totality and to preserve the ideal of the autonomous individual without falling into solipsism. Nevertheless, Adorno treats all of these issues in greater detail and with greater rigor elsewhere. The importance of these interviews lies less in their thematic contents than in the organization of the various themes into a constellation within the cultural-political context of the late sixties. For example, Adorno's defense of aesthetic progress turns out to be part of an opposition to both commercialized popular culture and officially sanctioned anti-modernism; these dimensions were subsequently overshadowed by the emphasis on the antagonism toward the political aesthetics of Lukacs and Brecht which cast Adorno in the role of an anti-political aesthete.

A second example: Adorno's discussion of education intervened in the highly political debates on educational policy. The main thrust of his contribution is directed against the elitism of the Conservatives' track system and, by extension, against the injustices of traditional privilege. Simultaneously, however, a second front is opened up against the bureaucratic reformist model of a one-track structure by elaborating a radical notion of an "education for contradiction and resistance" as the basis for any long-term opposition to heteronomy. Thirdly, a sort of metaphysical geopolitics tends to appear when the United States, Germany and the Soviet Union are all described as hostile to individual autonomy but each in the terms of its own ideology: positivism, existentialism and dialectical materialism respectively. Each of these, in turn, corresponds to isolated moments which, however, Adorno insists on linking in a dynamic model of consciousness: idiosyncrasy, experience and thought. Positivism turns the first into the passive observation of "almighty facticity," existentialism privatizes the second as interiority, diamat distorts the third as purportedly objective theory. This sort of philosophical tripartition of the world is nothing new in German intellectual history. However, the specificity of Adorno's radicalism becomes clear once his version is contrasted with competing accounts. Thomas Mann's initial support for the Weimar republic, for example, was based on an opposition to the excessive individuality of the West and the excessive collectivity of the East; Germany thus became the privileged *locus* of the synthesis, "the German Republic."[4] Of course, later Mann grew rather skeptical about the legitimacy of this logic and provided a splendid parody in the Winfried passage of *Doctor Faustus*.[5] More recently (and with a relatively desiccated metaphysics), tendencies within the West German peace movement similarly display hostility toward Western and Eastern models and idealize national identity as an

3. For example, see Max Horkheimer, *Verwaltete Welt* (Zürich, 1970), p. 40.
4. Thomas Mann, "The German Republic," in *Order of the Day* (New York, 1942), pp. 3-45.
5. Thomas Mann, *Doctor Faustus* (New York, 1971), pp. 115-126.

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alternative to superpower predominance. Nowhere does one find Adorno putting forward a privileging of a national or a specifically German model in the manner of either traditional conservatism or contemporary neutralism. On the contrary, writing within a particular tradition, he remains critical of all systems of heteronomy by constantly re-elaborating the contemporary obstacles to emancipation. His fundamental partisanship for progress and against reaction, for autonomy and against domination pervade these interviews and constitute the historical contribution of the Frankfurt School to West German culture in a period which has itself now become fully, if not irretrievably, part of the historical past.

ON THE HISTORICAL ADEQUACY OF CONSCIOUSNESS*

by Theodor W. Adorno and Peter von Haselberg

VON HASELBERG: In what sense can we speak of adequate consciousness? Adequate, that is, in relation to the time in which we live. Indeed, to what degree can we define or discuss consciousness apart from empirical subjects — regardless of whether we have naive subjects in mind or subjects as formulated by philosophy?

ADORNO: There is something which might be called a historical drive within the movement of things. For their part, even subjects are conditioned by this historical drive and a true cognition of the situation depends on a proper consideration of this conditioning. This formulation is a bit of a generalization, and we should have to engage in extremely extensive epistemological considerations — in which we cannot possibly involve ourselves here — to make a truly concrete statement. But I think that we ought to concern ourselves here less with the question of adequacy — the adequacy, that is, of consciousness in regard to its object — than with the problem the initiators of this discussion had in mind: the question, namely, of the *historical* adequacy of consciousness. This adequacy of consciousness is by no means restricted to academic knowledge; it is expressed with equal force in art, which is after all also a form of consciousness and at the same time, we might say, a configuration of cognition — or even of truth — in the face of which the question of adequacy can also be asked. I should like to take the liberty of reformulating the question somewhat and say that we are concerned here with the problem of advanced consciousness. I might further say — and I ask that you not ask me to offer evidence for each individual point right now — that the adequate consciousness of an epoch is that consciousness which is most advanced at any given time. I should like to suggest that we discuss what we have in mind in speaking of such a consciousness, what its characteristics are, and that we offer a somewhat more precise picture of it.

VON HASELBERG: Agreed, for as soon as we start talking about adequate consciousness, the suspicion arises that we might have in mind a prescription for an adequate disposition toward reality, according to which something of a healthy reaction would be experienced by every individual as a result of our conversation. That we have nothing of this sort in mind is clearly beyond doubt. When you say "progressive consciousness," this obviously is to be understood in the sense that the growing differentiation of phenomena and of the totality of production — and, above all, this includes

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intellectual work — no longer can be reduced to any simple formula, but rather that everything progressive is always an experiment, conducted at a particular point of present-day reality and within a certain artistic endeavor — and this is the topic to which we shall now restrict ourselves. The question resulting from this consideration is: who is in a position to define when such a consciousness is progressive?

ADORNO: To begin with, I should like to refer to a thesis of Rimbaud's which is now almost a hundred years old. The statement is: "Il faut être absolument moderne" and it represents a demand which was most certainly not restricted only to art, but extended to all of cognition. It is as if this demand — present already, for example, in the idea of the "nouveau," of the new, in Baudelaire — had become the only obligatory imperative of the intellectual disposition following the disintegration of the objective intellectual cosmos and of the great philosophical systems. My feeling is that there is no really responsible intellectual who withdraws from this imperative and when many people emphasize that they are independent of vogues and do not follow the currents of the time, or when others in the very face of the modern speak of "decadent art" with a gesture dictated by sadistic stupidity, one feels that behind such emotions, involving the regression to such categories of nature as resound in the concept of decadence, a bad conscience is at play — that is to say, people in truth know very well how important it is to be modern in an extremely serious and obligatory sense, i.e., to stand their ground even in conscious awareness of that developing dynamic, once characteristic of liberated bourgeois society, and to give expression to this dynamic in everything that one does and thinks.

VON HASELBERG: But just a word of warning against an underestimation of those reactionary forces (I'll use just this one word for the sake of a rather crude summary) which despite it all represent a social force and, to be sure, not just a simple force, but one rather which assumes very definite functions within society. Such reactionary forces can at times gain the upper hand; we are both old enough to have had a profound experience of this over a number of years. In such cases the protest against those who speak about "decadence" is forced into the background. For the sake of their own existence, people cannot protest aloud, and in such moments the question becomes acute as to how these tendencies can be described in more than simply a pejorative manner in order to recognize them as historical factors. I should like to bring up an example which is not quite current, or rather only theoretically current. Mannerist painting, held in contempt for centuries, has been enjoying a renaissance and a friendly reception in the last 15 years precisely because, viewed by many generations in all innocence as a kind of post-Renaissance decadence, it is now seen as a vehicle which can tell us more about the epochs from the counter-reformation down to the Enlightenment and the 19th century than the art which was formerly regarded as official. How are such judgments expressing periodic taste to be integrated into the concept of progressive consciousness?

ADORNO: To give a truly responsible answer to this question, extensive considerations would be necessary which we can expect neither from our listeners nor from ourselves at this moment. I must restrict myself to a few suggestions and theses as an answer. The concept of the most progressive — or of the most progressive consciousness at a given time — must include the entire problem of the concept of progress itself, as Horkheimer and I attempted to develop in the *Dialectic of the Enlightenment*. But against this problem of progress — that is to say, that progress does not come about with one-dimensional regularity, but that it experiences regressions of great magnitude and further, by means of correspondences, the return of things past — the antidote of

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timelessness is helpless against this problem, for every idea of a so-called timeless classical art, independent of change, is susceptible to the effects of time to an exceptionally high degree and — precisely because of its supposed agelessness — destined to grow old. The task which you have just sketched would thus involve the inclusion of the problematic nature of progress itself in any consideration of progress; in this way we would further promote the concept of progress without sacrifice of its own progress in the process. This is a very difficult matter. When one lives in times which experience so much regression in so many ways as is the case today, thought — advanced thought — cannot simply cancel out this regression and act as though it does not exist. One can resist this regression only by accepting it into one's own disposition so that one understands it and thus progresses beyond it. For example, it is possible that one, as a thinker, is forced to repeat arguments present long ago — I experienced this in one particular case — simply because the subject in question — in this case it was sexual taboos — repeats itself, because, for example, a certain type of journalist still produces today the same moralizing phrases which were taken to task by Karl Kraus 60 years ago. In such cases — precisely because one wants to change that which is bad — one cannot avoid self-regression and the repetition of things that were said before. However, one is forced to recognize that it is old and often repeated and therefore contaminated by regression; this recognition must be integrated into consciousness. In this process one realizes that old untruths are entrenched precisely in the ever-constant and in that which — despite its objective untruth — returns again and again. If such repetitions are reflected upon from this perspective, they will not only be repetitions, but will at the same time throw light on the historical process which in a certain sense is no process at all, but rather merely the bad return of the same. In that case, a consciousness which repeats would no longer be a retarded consciousness. I don't know whether this is in any way something of an answer to your question.

VON HASELBERG: I think you have understood quite correctly that which I — seemingly an advocate of reaction — have brought up for discussion. It is no longer possible for us, as in the days of Auguste Comte, to speak confidently of progress which blazes its way and thus quickly disposes of all obstacles that it encounters.

ADORNO: In these matters, however, even Comte himself manifests a contradictory position; he was equally concerned with the problems of order — that is, of constants — and of progress. In truth, his sympathy was more on the side of order than of progress.

VON HASELBERG: Right, but his position was to endorse an optimism of convenience which, precisely as an optimism of convenience, was of greater effect than his contradictory reservations. I mean, we have come to realize that not only do retarding forces play a greater role than they did in the 19th century, but that there is further a certain demand for repetition within these arguments and within the resistance or return of atavisms or barbarisms which must today be considered much more seriously. One cannot counter you — as though you were mouthing platitudes — with the same old argument; after all, I know what my response would be. Furthermore, the constellation in which such things appear changes continually. When, for example, proto-fascist movements crop up today, we can be sure that they will not do so in the form of Guenther's racial theories. However, a certain technique will have to develop and this, to be sure, will be an increasingly more conscious technique in the response to such regression asnd I believe that this can mean "progressive consciousness." In this context, this would mean by and large a greater cognizance of the historical process within a datable historical epoch in terms of its regressions and its repetitions.

ADORNO: If today such a fascist movement again seeks an ideology and this ideology,

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in turn, is marked by those signs of incorrectness and weakness which we are able to observe in such cases, one obviously would not be able to counter it simply with the same old categories (for example: that history is determined not by natural forces, but rather by social momentum), but rather one would have to say that one is confronted by the ghost of a ghost, by the shade-like return of something which had already lost its substance at its first appearance, and in this derivative actually-no-longer-believing-in-themselves of such ideologies one would be much more able to find a point of attack than in the arguments once brought forth against them, all of which today have grown just a trifle harmless.

VON HASELBERG: Thus, in this context, consciousness means experience — and precisely experience of the ineffectiveness of mere argumentation.

ADORNO: Consciousness always means experience — the ability, that is, to have experiences even in the consciousness of scars. That's right...

VON HASELBERG: That is to say that mere argumentation, that the superiority of greater consciousness is in itself of little importance, but rather that in this concept of consciousness — and precisely of the more progressive consciousness — a great deal must be integrated regarding methods of conduct and, under certain conditions, of praxis as well.

ADORNO: In this matter I share your opinion fully. I should like to say that in discussing the concept of progressive consciousness we are not talking about something exclusively temporal, that is, something which is up to date, otherwise we would end up with an artistic consciousness for which the Beatles — simply because they are the big hit today — would be more modern than the most progressive, new art. But the decision regarding what is progressive lies really in the logic of that which develops within time. For the logic of objects has a temporal nucleus; it develops within time and the progressive consciousness is a consciousness mediated through time — you expressed that very nicely with the concept of experience. This deserves further reflection. Such reflection calls for the furtherance of thought instead of the mere reproduction of that which is. Of the possibilities which exist for such thought — i.e., the possibilities of a truly progressive consciousness — I should like to mention at least two, which interlock. One is innervation, the nerval reactions of the artist, that which, that is, ought to be the reaction of the theoretician — at any rate, of the philosophic theoretician — nerval reactions to that for which the time has come. Progressivity can be experienced only through one's idiosyncrasies, through idiosyncratic disinclination regarding words...regarding things.

VON HASELBERG: Might I interrupt? This strikes me as a concept very much in need of further comment. Idiosyncrasy is an irrational concept, both in the sense in which the word is used today and in the sense in which attempts have always been made to use it. Precisely in our present day, idiosyncrasy has again become highly virulent toward a form of "decadent art" and this "decadent art" — we of the older generation are of one mind here — is that of the Beatles. And now I must ask you: in discussing the Beatles, how can we justify using an argument which is allegedly illegitimate in the face of the art denounced by the Nazis? They appealed to a healthy sensibility in the same way that *we* talk about idiosyncrasies in cases where our consciousness — viewed by us to a certain degree as an absolute — prohibits us from occupying ourselves with regressive tendencies, barbarism, or with other expressions which appear to us all too much as the perversions of a consumer public whose behavior can be viewed only as hostile to culture.

ADORNO: I think there is a very precise answer to your question. What can be said

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against the Beatles is not so much idiosyncratic; it is simply that what is offered by these people — in fact, everything with which we are inundated by the culture industry and manipulative mass culture — is in terms of its own objective configuration something which has fallen behind. One can show that the expressive means employed and conserved here are in reality the deteriorated expressive means of the tradition, which exceed in no way the established boundaries and which in terms of the expression which they assume they have and which cause the fascinated listeners to affirm that it is indeed a matter of fascination they no longer have — something which can be seen objectively in the exhaustion of all these very elements. And if you will permit me just one more word about what I mean by idiosyncrasy: this finds perhaps its most precise formulation in one of the late hymns of Hölderlin, who hardly runs any risk of being taken for a representative of irrationalism through such idiosyncrasies. Hölderlin said: "This, however, is no longer possible." Whoever does not have this historical tact which allows him to feel what is and what is not possible has lost touch with truth itself, and I would say that it is part of the misery of contemporary philosophy that it lacks this tact. To be sure, an irrational impulse is involved here as well when, in reading a certain type of prose, one's hair does not stand on end because of unctious, reactionary and covert turns of phrase — and that, if you wish, is irrational. However, whoever lacks this manner of irrational reaction is also bereft of progressive consciousness. Part of progressive consciousness, however — and here I would agree with you — is the ability and the energy to raise these idiosyncratic or blind reactions to the level of consciousness and, indeed, even to refine them as theory. This is what I meant with the second element. I would say that progressive consciousness is a consciousness able to sublimate idiosyncratic reactions and experiences into theory. Thus, I am speaking of idiosyncrasy in a way totally removed from the disreputable sense of the word against which you have quite rightly spoken.

VON HASELBERG: Idiosyncrasy, that is, not as a direct, natural or philological reaction to something, but rather as the product of willful experience within which certain regressions and certain phenomena, the aggressive nature of which is all too clear, are revealed as dangerous and regressive. At this point, however, your concept of idiosyncrasy in the Hölderlin quotation surely converges with objectivity.

ADORNO: That was my intention.

VON HASELBERG: For in the Hölderlin poem — insofar as I am able to remember — "This, however, is no longer possible" does not in any way mean that it is convention which makes this impossible.

ADORNO: No. But rather that it is no longer possible in terms of the truth of the matter.

VON HASELBERG: More than that, it can be understood almost in the sense of a timepiece which no longer functions. It is part of the "captive horses" which appear there and "this now without movement" is meant in the poem...

ADORNO: No, I think this particular line simply means "ça ne va plus" — "it can no longer be done," it is no longer possible.

VON HASELBERG: Then progressive consciousness cannot simply mean a continuing presence of the concept of immediate consciousness — that is, to put it in somewhat common terms, of all that which is simultaneously conscious in our mind, but an idiosyncrasy in your sense means a type of experiential security which must not always and continually rely upon critical reflection, but rather becomes so essential in a time of massively expanded perception — a security of subjective reaction, which for its part can only exist properly when it is truly the result of thought.

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ADORNO: Just today I spoke — or rather wrote — in a totally different context in this regard that adequate expression of a matter does not involve an elimination of subjectivity, but rather that the matter itself can be brought to language only through the most extreme refinement and exertion of subjectivity. To this, I would add that this process equally demands the work and exertion of the concept in order to get beyond blind idiosyncrasy and for thought to catch up with experience, simply because thought itself is an element of experience. Experience without thought is as far removed from true experience as is experience without idiosyncrasy. There remains one point which I would like to mention briefly. The concept of progressive consciousness grows suspicious because it sounds vain; it always looks as if one were attempting to reverse the most progressive consciousness for oneself. Even Hegel reacted vehemently against this. I recall that Mannheim used this Hegelian position against me in a conversation years ago; his position was that a subjective feeling, a subjective experience — no matter how advanced — when far ahead of the possibility of its realization or merely ahead of the possibility of its reception, is no longer in harmony with the gravity of reality and that it is, consequently, not to be regarded as progressive, but only as impotent...
VON HASELBERG: ...and only richly intellectual...
ADORNO: ...a richly intellectual aperçu, an impotent, helpless feeling.
VON HASELBERG: That is, that the spirit ought to orient itself according to reality and allow itself no leaps or jumps.
ADORNO: Today I would no longer view this argument so lightly. I would now say that a thought which is worth anything at all must absorb the weight of reality and not simply flee from it. Otherwise, we end up with that which Kafka called "the empty, happy journey." There is a difference, however, between integrating this power of the existent into thought and merely capitulating before it. I might refer here to a sentence from my *Minima Moralia*, the content of which is that one must place the motives of reaction in the service of their opposite. The thought which does not project far beyond the respective situation and the respective consensus, but merely reproduces that which is, is sterile and not progressive. In this sense, however, I would say that positivism as a reactive form is by and large a reactionary intellectual disposition.
VON HASELBERG: Yes, especially because submitting oneself to the entire gravity of being — this is the principle of positivism — denies in a definitely apodictic manner the legitimacy of experimental thought...
ADORNO: ... and would further attempt to eliminate the impulse of play from thought,
VON HASELBERG: ...and the impulse of wit at the same time.
ADORNO: ... that is to say, it would like to forbid the spirit every aperçu.
VON HASELBERG: Whatever has not been concretized previously and whatever is not of sufficient gravity would have to be removed from the path of progress.
ADORNO: Yes. I think that even this Hegelian demand has its position of historical value — that is to say, it too is transitory. In view of the open possibilities today, a restriction to that which could be realized here and now in terms of the immediately existent has become an impediment and sabotage to thought. I remember that Georg Lukacs told me once in a heated discussion in his and my youth that the Communist Party, with which he was having trouble at the moment, was correct in its position toward him; in terms of objective insight, of course, he was right, but according to the current state of total consciousness, the Party and its truth were of a higher order and it was up to him to submit himself to it. Well, I think in the meantime the world has seen where this type of submission has led and what has become of the party for whose sake it was undertaken.

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VON HASELBERG: A frightening secondary meaning of progressive consciousness, a "progressive stage" thereof, comes to light there.
ADORNO: *D'accord.* I would even say that the thought which does not shoot subjectively into an open and unsecured realm beyond objectivity is no longer progressive, now that objectivity — the very essence of whatever is the case — has become a fetter upon the potential lying in this objectivity, close enough to touch.

EDUCATION FOR AUTONOMY*

by Theodor Adorno and Hellmut Becker

ADORNO: The requirement of autonomy or independent thinking seems self-evident in a democracy. To clarify this claim, I would like to refer to the beginning of Kant's short treatise, *A Response to the Question: What Is Enlightenment?* There he defines tutelage — and thus also implicitly its opposite, autonomy — as self-incurred when its causes are not a lack of understanding but a lack of the resolve and courage to use one's understanding without the guidance of another. "Enlightenment is humanity's emergence from self-incurred tutelage." I believe this forthright program of Kant's is extraordinarily relevant today. Democracy, embodied in the institution of representative elections, depends on the moral development of each individual. If the result is not to be regression, then society presupposes each individual's ability and courage to use his own reason. If this aim is lost sight of, then all talk of Kant's greatness is merely idle lip service, just as when someone points out the statue of the Grand Prince-Elector in the *Siegesallee* in Berlin. If the concept of a German intellectual tradition is to be taken seriously at all, then tendencies of this kind must first be rigorously opposed.
BECKER: It seems to me that up until now our entire educational system in West Germany has not been oriented toward the ideal of independent thinking. If you take the simple case of our three-track educational system, schools for the so-called highly talented, schools for the moderately talented, and many schools for the so-called untalented students — then the school system itself demonstrates a certain primary unfreedom. I believe that we do not do justice to the whole question of autonomy and independence unless we first surmount through enlightenment the false concept of "talent," which defines our educational system. We recently published a volume of reports by the German Educational Council called *Talent and Learning* in which we tried, on the basis of 14 reports from psychiatrists and sociologists, to make it clear that talent is not something given in advance, but depends on the challenge to which the individual is exposed in order to develop. This means that "talent" is something that can be learned. In this light, the possibility of stimulating in each person "learning through motivation" becomes a special form of developing intellectual autonomy.

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Of course, this requires a school system that does not perpetuate class-specific inequalities, but instead, through a dissolution of class-specific barriers at the early childhood stage, makes the development of autonomy possible in practice through learning motivation based on an extremely differentiated program. In other words, this means developing intellectual autonomy not through a single-curriculum school, but by abolishing the traditional three-track system and by establishing a highly differentiated educational program at all levels. Only in this way can individual autonomy be developed. This is a process that becomes all the more important when the individual must maintain independence in a world that increasingly seems to determine him through external mechanisms of control.

ADORNO: I would like to support what you have been saying from a completely different angle. Actually, the significance of our conversation lies in the fact that we touch upon the same questions from different fields of experience and view the results as an experiment, as it were. The impact of my own efforts (if one can speak of an impact at all) has in truth nothing to do with individual talent, intelligence, or similar categories. Rather, it has to do with the fact that, through a fortunate series of events over which I had no control, in my own education I was not subjected to scientific mechanisms of control, as is otherwise so often the case. Thus, I have always dared to think "risky" thoughts — which most people are otherwise cured of at a very early stage, when they obtain the level of what is called assistant professor — in this tremendously powerful mechanism of control known as the university. It turns out that knowledge itself is rendered so sterile and impotent by these mechanisms of control that it then needs what it itself despises in order to survive. If this view is correct, then this fetishization of talent (which is, of course, still very closely linked to the old romantic cult of genius) should be abolished. This standpoint also coincided with the psychodynamic finding that talent is not at all a natural disposition (although perhaps a natural residue would have to be conceded; one should not be puritanical about this), but that in terms of the ability to express oneself linguistically, etc., talent is in a large measure a function of social conditions. Thus, even the conditions for independent thinking on which a free society depends are determined by the unfreedom of society.

BECKER: At this point I would prefer to refrain from reviewing all the related arguments. However, it should be noted, for example, that everything Basil Bernstein has discovered about linguistic development in the small lower-class child, and which Oevermann then developed further in Germany, very clearly shows that conditions for life-long lack of autonomy can be established at the very beginning of socialization. Incidentally, I listened with amusement to your autobiographical remarks, for perhaps it is no accident that today we are both scholars, albeit atypical ones, and for this reason alone we are capable of discussing the concept of independent thinking.

ADORNO: Yes, if we really concentrate on the pedagogical process the strange thing about the problem of intellectual autonomy is that even in pedagogical literature — and this is something truly frightening and very German — one does not at all find that decisive partisanship for "education for autonomy."

With some friendly help I recently scanned educational literature on the problem of intellectual autonomy. Instead of autonomy, one finds an existentially tinged concept of authority, of allegiance, or other horrors; concepts that sabotage the concept of autonomy and thereby not only implicitly but quite openly work against the conditions for democracy. I am of the view that these attitudes should be denounced once and for all. One must show what foulness Germany is exposed to, now as always, even

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concerning a question so securely lodged in the realm of intellectual endeavor as autonomy.

For example, in Ernst Lichtenstein's influential book, *Education, Authority, Responsibility — Reflections on a Pedagogical Ethics*, one reads: "Are we not troubled precisely by the reality of an enormous and rapid decline of a sense of authority, respect, confidence, and faith in a valid order, a decline of allegiance in all spheres of life, so that sometimes any positive and constructive education at all seems imperiled?" I do not care to dwell on the slogans Lichtenstein serves up here. But the thing we should note in this connection is that he is not speaking of ties based on a position whose objective truth one assumes or has reason to assume (as one does with Thomism of the medieval period, on the basis of the spiritual situation of the era). Instead, here it is advocated that, for some reason or other, order and allegiance are good, regardless of what happens to autonomy or independent thinking. About 30 or 40 pages later, Lichtenstein adds: "What does 'autonomy' really mean? Literally, self-rule, self-determination. That is already a confusing notion." One wonders: confusing for whom? "For the concept. . . inevitably smacks of the idea of an absolute, legislative, sovereign reason, which would claim to be the only standard in education. This condition of the 'autonomous man'. . . is unacceptable for a Christian." But surely Kant was a Christian! "But historical reflection has also shown that the idea of a pedagogy based on pure reason is simply false. Educational goals are never axioms of thought, never rationally grounded or universally valid." I believe that philosophically one can indeed criticize the concept of pure reason and the illusion that the world is the product of absolute spirit; however, one must not then deny that only through thought — and precisely through imperturbable and persistent thinking — is it possible to determine the correct practice in general. That in the above case the philosophical critique of idealism is simply conflated with the denunciation of thinking I find to be horrid sophistry. It must be done away with in order to put a spark to this foulness so that it might explode.

BECKER: I don't really know whether foulness can explode, but. . .

ADORNO: I believe it is chemically possible. But whether it is socially possible, I don't know.

BECKER: The question goes considerably beyond Germany and German thinking. A few years ago the announcement that Caroline Kennedy was becoming "a more and more adapted child" made the rounds of the American press. That the goal of adaptation is considered the main success of early childhood education is a fact that should give us some cause for thought; for this brand of pedagogy arose in a world that is very far removed from the effects of German idealism.

ADORNO: Stamped more by Darwinism than Heidegger. But the results are very similar.

BECKER: That's just what I meant. I believe that when carefully studied, the question of intellectual independence is a world problem. I visited Soviet schools for several weeks. It was terribly interesting to see how in a country that carried out the transformation of relations of production a very long time ago, extraordinarily little has changed so far as the lack of childhood education for autonomy is concerned, and that an authoritarian style of instruction continues to prevail in the schools. It is a truly interesting phenomenon to see how education for dependency dominates the world now as before, although the age of enlightenment has been in the making for some time, and although Marx as well as Kant has something to say on this subject.

Now in the quotation you just cited, something struck me: the claim that the idea of

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autonomous humanity is unacceptable for the Christian. It is interesting that the whole Christian Reformation, from the Confessing Church to the Council, increasingly revolves around the so-called autonomous Christian. We certainly cannot take into account theological problems here. But it can surely be stated that there is in both churches today a theological interpretation that takes the concept of autonomy as seriously as Kant, and therefore in fact questions in earnest the traditional structure of the two churches.

ADORNO: That is certainly so. Kant's own short essay attests to this fact, when he expressly mentions that within the church of his day there were possibilities for autonomy as he envisioned it. But you are right that the problem is not just a German problem but an international one. And, if I may say so, it is a problem that goes far beyond the bounds of the political system. In the United States it is really the case that two different demands collide; on the one hand, powerful individualism that accepts no heteronomous instruction; on the other, the idea of adaption, derived from Darwinism via Spencer — precisely the "adjustment" that was practically a magic word in America 30 or 40 years ago, and which immediately shackles and curtails the very independence that is proclaimed in the same breath. Incidentally, this is a contradiction that runs throughout bourgeois history. That such diversely structured ideologies as the vulgar ideology of pragmatism in America and Heideggerian philosophy in Germany agree on precisely the same thing — the glorification of heteronomy — is a confirmation of the theory of ideology, insofar as even intellectual themes that sharply contradict one another in content can suddenly coincide in their attitude toward society, i.e., in what they want to maintain or protect. Just as, in general, the agreement between Western positivism and what is left of metaphysics in Germany is rather appalling. Actually, these points of contact virtually amount to a declaration of bankruptcy on the part of philosophy.

BECKER: Incidentally, I noticed something else in the passage you read. Is it legitimate to use autonomy in this form as a counter-concept to authority?

ADORNO: I genuinely believe that a certain amount of evil is being perpetuated through the use of the concept of authority. I believe that, as the person responsible for *The Authoritarian Personality*, I have a certain right to point that out. First, authority itself is essentially a social-psychological concept and does not directly mean the social reality itself. In addition, there is a technical authority — i.e., the fact that one person understands something better than another — that cannot simply be disregarded. Instead, the concept of authority derives its value from the social context in which it occurs.

However, since you have just brought up the subject of authority, I would like to mention something about the socialization process in early childhood. This theme concerns the relation of social, educational, and psychological categories. The way one attains psychological autonomy is not simply by protesting against every kind of authority. Empirical studies in America, as carried out by my late colleague Else Frenkel-Brunswik, have shown precisely the opposite, namely, that so-called well-behaved children tend to become autonomous and critical men and women more so than refractory children, who then as adults immediately gather 'round the beer table with their teachers to rally 'round the same slogans. But the process is such that children — Freud called this the normal development — generally identify with a father figure, i.e., an authority, they internalize it, appropriate it, and then in a very painful process that always leaves scars, they learn that the father or father figure does not correspond to the ego-ideal that they learned from him; and thus they break away

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from him. Only in this way do children become mature people. I believe the factor of authority is presupposed as a genetic factor in the process of maturation. But this fact must be no means be used to glorify and remain satisfied with this stage. Were this to occur, then not only would psychological deformities result, but also manifestations of immaturity in the sense of the artificially induced stupefaction that today is omnipresent.

BECKER: I believe it is important at this point that the process of breaking away from this authority is of course necessary, but that on the other hand, without the encounter with authority, the formation of identity would be impossible. This claim entails a series of complex and contradictory consequences for the structure of our educational system. It means that there can be no meaningful school without teachers but that, on the other hand, the teacher must see clearly that his task consists in making himself superfluous. This dual role is so difficult because in the context of contemporary debates, the danger exists that the teacher may behave in an authoritarian manner, so that the pupils disregard him. The result is that this entire process, as you have just described it, is practically destroyed by a false confrontation. The consequence then is a pseudo-autonomy of students that ends in superstition and dependence, but not in independent thinking.

ADORNO: I agree completely. The problem of immaturity today may be seen from another, less familiar viewpoint. In general, one says that society, according to Riesman's expression, is "controlled from the outside," i.e., it is heteronomous; and it is often insinuated that — as Kant does in the same vein in his essay on Enlightenment — individuals fundamentally accept without resistance whatever almighty facticity places before them and inculcates into them, as if what now exists must continue as such.

I said before that the mechanisms of identification and detachment never occur without scars. I would also like to apply this claim expressly to the concept of identification itself. Our listeners have surely heard of the concept of "role" which, since Merton and Parsons, has played such an enormous part in contemporary sociology. People generally fail to notice that in the concept of role itself, which was of course derived from theater, the non-identity of humanity with itself is prolonged. That is, when the concept of role is made into a social standard, this inevitably perpetuates a state in which humanity is not what it is intrinsically, i.e., it remains non-identical. I find the normative turn of the concept of role appalling; it is something that should be attacked with all critical energies. But phenomenologically, i.e., as a description of a state of affairs, there is something to it. It seems to me that for most people, identification with the super-ego — which defines them and from which they cannot break free — is always unsuccessful. Hence, the fact that countless people internalize the oppressive, brutal and overpowering father, even while remaining incapable of achieving this identification, precisely because the resistances are too strong. Because they failed at the identification, because there are numerous adults who really just pretend to be the adults they never became, they must attempt to overplay and exaggerate their identification with such models, boasting and feigning adult behavior in order to make more credible, to themselves and others, the role that they themselves failed to achieve. I believe that this type of immaturity can be found among certain intellectuals.

BECKER: I would think not just among intellectuals; if we apply the concept of role to society as a whole, we would discover quite similar phenomena in all social strata. Let us take the situation of a workplace, where even the individual worker, apprentices

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or office workers, precisely when they are not happy with the situation, play roles — roles taken from all possible contexts. I believe that if we apply the consequences drawn from the concept of autonomy to the work process as a whole, we must make drastic changes in our whole vocational training system. I would like to refer again to the Education Council and the recently published recommendations for training apprentices. The fact that in Germany we still have apprenticeship programs, which, if we disregard a few very exemplary large businesses, really stem from a pre-industrial era, actually leads to our perpetuating forms of dependency and making on-the-job training virtually take the form of animal training. At any rate, very often we run into difficulties. For example, we facilitate the supply of certain material skills, but constantly fail at the same time insofar as we do not simultaneously provide the necessary autonomous attitude. Consider the case of someone who previously was an accountant and is made superfluous by the introduction of equivalent technology. Now, if this person must be retrained as a programmer, it becomes necessary not only for him to learn new skills, but also to become familiar with another conceptual framework, or orientation as well. In this vein, it would then be necessary, e.g., that he learn a foreign language, even if he never really needs it, because it opens up a new horizon of experience. This combination of vocational training as such with a new conceptual horizon is something that is still very much absent in our whole concept of vocational retraining. I consider it important because in a world like the present one, the call for autonomy can almost serve as a disguise for the universal suppression of autonomy; and because it is very important to translate the possibility of autonomy into concrete educational terms.

ADORNO: Yes, this factor certainly also plays a role. Without presuming to judge authoritatively in this particular area, I would like to add parenthetically that maturity requires a certain degree of ego firmness, as it emerges in the case of the bourgeois individual. The possibility — often demanded today, and one, I admit, that is inevitable — that instead of developing a firm ego, one allows it to adjust to ever-changing situations, harmonizes in a very problematic way with the psychological phenomenon of ego weaknesses. For instance, let us take the case of people who lack a fixed idea of their own profession, adjust relatively easily, and thus easily learn a new job. Whether this disposition really contributes to maturity and independence or whether the same people prove immature by then losing their heads at the sports arena on Sunday, remains an open question.

BECKER: I hardly need to mention the dialectic of Enlightenment. Suffice it to say that, of course, the same process of emancipation that makes enlightenment possible threatens it in return by virtue of ego-weakness or the danger thereof.

ADORNO: Yes, this danger is extremely serious. This brings us, I believe, to the very crux of our discussion. Kant, in the work that I used as a point of departure, answered the question: "Are we now living in an enlightened age?" with: "No, but probably in an age of enlightenment." Hence, he defined autonomy not as a static, but quite deliberately as a dynamic category, as a becoming and not a being. Whether we can today similarly say that we are living in an age of enlightenment has — in view of the inconceivable pressure which is exerted on humanity — become very questionable, by virtue of the objective character of society and also because of the planned control of even the sphere of inner nature by the culture industry. If we are not to use the word autonomy as an empty slogan — just as the conservative mentality shallowly counterposes autonomy to obligation — then we must recognize the indescribable difficulties confronting autonomy today, and I believe we must speak to this point.

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Of course, the reason is the contradiction embodied in the fact that the society in which we live is heteronomous, i.e., no one in contemporary society can really lead a life that is self-determined; and as long as this is true, society so shapes men by countless intermediary agencies and channels that they swallow and accept everything within this alienated heteronomous form. This phenomenon then extends even to institutions, to the discussion of political instruction, and similar questions. The real problem of autonomy today is whether and how one — and how this "one" is defined is another major question — can counteract this tendency.

BECKER: In this context, it seems to me that one of the most important tasks in reform is to abolish education according to a fixed canon and instead to provide a program of varied course offerings, i.e., a school with a wide series of choices and extensive internal differentiation within the individual subjects. The whole series of "maturity games," as they have taken place, e.g., in the conventional type of student co-determination, will receive an entirely different meaning when the student, as an individual and as part of a group, himself plays a part in determining the curriculum and the choice of subject matter. In this way, he will be not only better motivated to learn, but also more disposed to regard what happens in school as resulting from his own decisions — as opposed to some that are predetermined. I am very well aware that even this system can also be turned into a facade and in reality used as an instrument of technocratic selection. But I do not believe it has to develop in this direction. It seems to me that in the often confused manifestations of student opposition today, there is a legitimate core to which one should respond by giving the students a chance to participate in the determination of their education.

ADORNO: It seems to me that as much as all this may be desirable, it remains too much embedded in the institutional framework of the school. At the risk of being scolded as a philosopher, which I happen to be, I would like to say that the form in which autonomy is being realized — something that cannot be simply presupposed, insofar as it would really have to be achieved in all aspects of modern life — consists in the fact that the few people who are in favor of it must work energetically to make education an education for contradiction and resistance. I could envision one attending commercial films in high school (but in the grammar schools, too) and quite simply showing to the students what a fraud they are, how full of lies, etc., or in the same way immunizing them against certain Sunday morning radio programs that play happy and carefree music, as if we were still living in a "healthy world" (a term that gives true cause for alarm); or reading a magazine with them and showing them how they are being taken for a ride by an exploitation of their own instinctual needs; or I can imagine a music teacher who does not happen to come from the youth music scene analyzing hit songs and showing why these hits are incomparably worse than a movement of a Mozart or Beethoven quartet, or a really genuine piece of modern music. Thus, one simply tries first of all to arouse the awareness that men and women are constantly being deceived, for the idea that "the world wants to be deceived," applied globally, has become the mechanism of immaturity today. That these relations become conscious to everyone could perhaps best be attained through the method of immanent critique, for it is likely that no normal democracy can afford to be openly against this type of enlightenment. However, I can well imagine the film industry immediately complaining if one tried something like this, claiming that we were trying to disseminate one-sided ideological propaganda and simultaneously harming the economic interests of the film industry, which is so terribly important to the German budget. Interventions of this nature would all have to be incorporated

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into a coherent whole in order to promote autonomy and independent thinking.
BECKER: Yet, one still does not know whether the films demystified in this way would still radiate a definite attraction; and thus the film industry itself might be inclined to capitalize on the efforts at demystification as a kind of advertising gimmick, rather than to seek immediately to eliminate it.
ADORNO: But one can spoil them for young people. Every age produces the expressions appropriate to it, and some of these expressions, such as "to be turned off," are very good. I would very strongly advocate an educational approach of "turning off."
BECKER: I would like to bring up one more question that has always disturbed me. Let's imagine for a moment that we did everything we have just been discussing: we would have a differentiated school system in which the range of offerings produces corresponding motivations to learn. In addition, this policy would result not in selectivity according to false concepts of talent, but advancement beyond the respective social barriers by an accompanying compensatory education. We could thus clear the way for some basic conditions for autonomy and independent thinking, and we would do similar things in the area of professional training. The question remains whether, were this to happen, the enlightened, critically conscious person might not then still be "remote-controlled" in his behavior, and thus, in this apparent maturity, not really be autonomous in the fundamental sense envisioned at the beginnings of the Enlightenment. I do not believe this is an objection to everything we have been saying. But it is, so to speak, a warning about the optimism that is possibly connected with it. I would just like to say that this autonomous individual is constantly in danger — in danger of becoming non-autonomous, as you pointed out a while ago.
ADORNO: I would like to stress this danger emphatically, for the simple reason that not only society as it is keeps humanity dependent, but because every serious attempt to assist humanity toward intellectual independence — I avoid the word "educate" intentionally — is exposed to considerable resistance; and because everything bad in the world immediately finds advocates who will prove that precisely what one intends is already long since obsolete, no longer relevant, or utopian. I would prefer to close our conversation by urging reflection on a fact that is all too easily repressed precisely in the zeal of the will to change: that attempts really to change our world drastically in any particular field are immediately exposed to the overpowering force of the status quo and seem condemned to impotence. Whoever wants to change things can apparently do so only by making this impotence itself and his own impotence as well into a factor of what he does.

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THE MANUFACTURE AND CONSUMPTION OF CHILD ABUSE AS A SOCIAL ISSUE

by John Grady

We all know that child abuse exists and is terrible. We've all heard at least one story we'll never forget. Let me tell you mine. A brief note in the newspaper reported a little boy scalded to death by his father, who sat him in the bathtub and poured boiling water over him. The little boy, it was reported, kept saying, until he died, "Daddy, I love you!" I remember weeping when I read it. Most people would. If you're a father, as I am, the emotional depth of the response would be mediated by your relationship with your own children. You'd remember your explosions of anger, the look of bewilderment and fear in your child, your realization (often not as quick as it should have been) that you'd gone too far. Your relief that, thank God, you hadn't gone *that* far. Finally, your sickening sense that you were part of a world that could generate terrible, unspeakable things, and that it was not all that unfamiliar.

Of course you don't have to be a parent to be touched by the image. We've all been children! Even as adults we know we are very vulnerable, dependent on forces and social relations that extend far beyond our ken and control. The image is that of *terror* which, put simply, is when you realize that you can no longer rely on being protected. No wonder then that when we read of an epidemic of child abuse in the country, that possibly as many as *4 million* children are abused yearly, and that we can expect to see these numbers grow, our blood chills. Our desire to see something done is pricked. It is like being called to a holy crusade involving, as one authority on child abuse tells us, "the age-old struggle between the child-savers and the child-murderers."

The first intelligent response of a humane and informed citizenry would be to survey the issue. The kinds of questions we ought to ask should tell us about the incidence and prevalence of child abuse; its trend over time; what causal factors are associated with its occurrence; and how it can reliably be treated. What would we find? Newburger and Daniel in one of the essays in *Critical Perspectives on Child Abuse*[1] are clear: " . . . because we lack a solid theoretical and practical understanding of the origins of child abuse, our clinical work is at best intuitive and kind, at worst reflexive and mean. We read a literature in each of the professions characterized by homilies, bromides, and a few scientific investigations of substance. And we look at child abuse as a phenomenon originating in the psychology of individuals, frequently ignoring the social and cultural realities that frustrate our treatment of particular families and impose formidable obstacles to the prevention of child abuse.

Because of the contradictions between philosophy and practice and our incomplete knowledge, we find ourselves wondering whether the following are unanswerable questions when cases of child abuse are identified: Is the child at risk? Can the family be helped? Are competent intervention resources available? Will I do more harm than good by reporting the case?" (pps. 19-20). I would be more blunt. A close look at the available information indicates little reason for a massive and sustained campaign

1. Richard Bourne and Eli Newberger, editors *Critical Perspectives on Child Abuse* (Lexington, Mass., 1979).

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about domestic violence toward children. There is simply no reliable evidence that more than a very small minority of American children are victimized by direct violence, or that there is an upward secular trend to their experience of family violence.

The most distressing aspect of the child abuse literature is its reliance on impressionistic studies. One of the few reliable studies is by Richard Gelles and associates, who interviewed over 2000 people to assess the extent to which they had used violence on their children. They found that "approximately 3% of the parents reported kicking, biting, or hitting the referent child with a fist in 1975; nearly 8% stated that these acts had occurred at some point in the raising of the child . . . The same statistics were found for parents admitting actually using a gun or knife — one tenth of a percent for the year, almost 3% ever" (p. 59). For Gelles and his associates, these figures are "astoundingly large" and indicate that in 1975 some 3.6% of the parents admitted to using modes of violence that had a high technical possibility of causing harm to the intended victim. But in the historical context, one wonders why they do not remark on the fact that some 96% of the parents report that they did not once that year use a mode of violence that might have been risky for their children. Recent historiography indicates that the most salient long-run tendency governing norms of intimacy within families has been an increasing pacifism. Furthermore, this has been accompanied by a growing ideology that emphasizes moral equality and a dimunition of force as a means of resolving conflict.

The most reliable statistical time series on death by violence tends to confirm the judgment that the home has increasingly become somewhat of a haven, if you will, for children. This may come as a surprise to those who are familiar with the mortality rates of the *Vital Statistics of the United States*, which do show a long-run decline in death of children by homicide until the late 1950's and early 1960's followed by a marked increase until the present. Nevertheless, the increase also coincided with growing awareness of child abuse as an issue, and it is likely that some portion of the measured increase is an artifact of classifying deaths as homicide rather than as accidents. A more adequate approach would be to combine all of the rates for death by violence — excluding only those caused by a motor vehicle. When this is done, the long run secular trend downward is maintained through the present.

The only major objection to interpreting this as an indication that the home is a safer place is to point to medical advances in the treatment of trauma. In this view, one could expect fewer seriously injured people to die due to increased effectiveness of medical care. But, if this is so — and there really is no reason to dispute this genuine accomplishment of the medical profession — then why is there such a radical disparity between the death rates by violence for 10-14 year olds and 15-19 year olds? The fact is that among this older group death rates by violence begin to rise significantly and ominously from the late 1950s on. A reasonable judgment might be that the world has become more dangerous for children as they *leave* the confines of the home for the wider world of street and peers, or the beginnings of adult status.

In short, the burden of proof should be on the "child savers" to show that their statistics indicate a reversal or even stagnation of this trend. Otherwise the dominant rhetoric of the child abuse movement consititues demagoguery.

In fact, what is occurring in the child abuse arena, to use the felicitous phrase of one of its proponents, is the manufacture of a social issue. By a manufactured social issue I do not mean that there are not numerous cases of children being criminally assaulted by their parents and other caretakers, but rather that the discussion of these events has been mediated *primarily* not by the needs and situations of the victims. Instead, the

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issue and the debate have been shaped by the social interests and values of those who have publically defined it. Essentially this process has taken place in three stages: medicalization; legalization; and finally, its increased politicization.

The cruel treatment of children has been an issue since the late 19th century primarily for sensitive members of the middle classes who were horrified by the brutalization of working class youth in industrial cities. This concern became the focus of Progressive reformers and settlement house workers who were aware of the violence within the working class family (often being attributed to the drunkenness of the father), but who paid little attention to the ostensible pathology of the family. Thus, major efforts were made to remove children from the brutalizing effects of the workplace and adult prisons.

The reason for this was simple. The Progressives believed that the destructiveness of class conflict could be mitigated by reforming American institutions. This meant eliminating the most degrading conditions of labor and urging the state to intervene in labor diputes on behalf of the public good. While in some cases this meant legislation outlawing some evil practices, it also meant legislation furthering the creation and extension of "alternative institutions." For working class children this meant not only restricting child labor, but also extending compulsory schooling and creating the juvenile court system. Children were to be protected from capitalists and kept away as much as possible from male workers. The Progressives saw the aspirations for domestic respectability among working class women as providing them with potential allies in the struggle to capture the hearts and minds of their children, and dilute class-conscious culture.

One of the effects of this movement later embodied in social work theory and practice was a deemphasis on intra-family violence by the emerging human service occupation. Of course, the more massive and visible impacts of inadequate nutrition, housing, and health care also attracted their attention to more "environmentally-determined" issues. Thus, while the child-savers succeeded in expanding the notion of the state as exercising ultimate responsibility for children, little was done to have it deal with domestic violence.

Child abuse became a social issue in the 1940s with the advent of radiology when x-rays revealed previous skeletal fractures in children that could not be routinely accounted for. By 1960, a coalition of medical professionals drawn from radiology, research pediatrics, and psychodynamically based social work became convinced that they had uncovered a medical problem of very large proportions. They identified as the culprits pediatricians and family doctors; the juvenile court system; abusing parents, and, of course, an apathetic and uninformed public. Thus, the "battered baby syndrome" came into being. Of course, labelling something a syndrome does not mean that the medical profession has isolated the causes of the disease or that they know how to treat it. It does mean, however, that it becomes a disease, requiring intervention and the exercise of their particular authority.

What the syndrome really aims at, however, is the children's caretakers and raises the question of whether they can be entrusted with the children's well-being. This is a deeply unsettling question and implies making a judgment about the fitness of families and, in extreme cases, taking children away from their caretakers. By identifying inflicted child abuse as a caretakers' psychopathology, the battered baby syndrome justifies forceful action.

The symptoms that are taken to characterize the disease of child abuse are actually an assortment of rules of thumb and uncontrolled generalizations. Among the most

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common are that abusers possess low self-esteem; tend to establish role reversal with their children; have markedly unrealistic expectations for their children, are fatalistic about their children's injuries and distress, and finally, are woefully ignorant of the rudiments of child care.

It is very difficult, however, to identify child abusers. Richard Bourne thus argues that "a clearcut psychological distinction between abusers and non-abusers does not exist," and furthermore, "not all abusers have the psychological characteristics generally attributed to them." (*Critical Perspectives* pps. 8-9). A closer look at the symptoms referred to above indicates that what gives them their analytic coherence may be no more than an expression in the formal language of psychodynamics of what constitutes role failure as a parent. Our common cultural image of what constitutes a good parent is someone who has self-esteem, acts like an adult, doesn't put too much pressure on kids to perform, is protective of the child's physical conditions, and knows how to take care of them. Thus, isn't all of the psychodynamic verbiage about the "abusing personality" really no more than saying that this person is a bad parent and the incontestable and final visible proof of this judgment is that they have become accomplices in the injury of their child?

One of the major themes of *Critical Perspectives on Child Abuse* is that the primary function of the psychodynamic approach to the subject is to provide a set of labels for designating a deviant population and to justify professional intervention. The unfortunate consequence here is that such an approach oversimplifies child abuse and may be even counter-productive.

In criticizing the medicalization of child abuse, *Critical Perspectives* challenges the most influential figures in the field, Kempe and Helfer, who first identified the "battered baby syndrome" and have influenced a model child abuse reporting law that by 1967 had helped shape legislation in all 50 states. *Critical Perspectives* is thus the manifesto of a faction fighting within the field of child abuse: a case of medical politics. Neuberger and Bourne are associated with the Trauma X unit of the influential Children's Hospital in Boston. Thus, while the early discoverers of child abuse are presented as professionals on the make, whose clinical work has been thereby flawed, the Trauma X unit comes out as less status conscious and hence more qualified to carry out sophisticated work.

While it is true that "child abuse" was invented by low status sectors of the medical profession, they were still part of those institutions that were coming to dominate American medicine after WWII: teaching hospitals affiliated with medical schools. In this sense, both Kempe and his colleagues as well as their revisionist critics are part of corporate medicine. Thus, they share a common alienation from their patients induced by the impersonality of a system built around the organizational requirements of teaching hospitals.

While most discussion of medical impersonality has posed the problem in terms of the patient rather than the practitioner, the corporate organization of medicine has in actual fact taken the practitioner out of the community and has had a more serious impact on the self-image of the medical profession than on the patients. The aggressive diagnoses provided by both those who developed the "battered baby syndrome" and their critics attempt to reconstruct for the practitioner's benefit a community destroyed by the organizational impact of the teaching hospital.

Neuberger and Bourne provide an apt summary of the origins and contours of the legalization of child abuse as an issue: "The legal response to child abuse was triggered by its medicalization. Child abuse reporting statutes codified a medical diagnosis into

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a legal framework which in many states defined official functions for courts. Immunity from civil liability was given to mandated reporters so long as reports were made in good faith; monetary penalties for failure to report were established; and familial and professional-client confidentiality privileges, except those involving attorneys, were abrogated." (*Critical Perspectives....*, p. 144). They go on to say that while one consequence of bringing child abuse into the courts was that "professional autonomy for lawyers was established, and status and power accrued to legal institutions," another was that the uncertainty problems were dumped in their laps.

If these problems are tricky for the medical profession, they are doubly so for the courts. This is due largely to the differing ways doctors and lawyers have of resolving uncertainty. As Thomas Scheff has pointed out, doctors feel uneasy until they find something wrong while lawyers assume that there is nothing wrong until proven otherwise. Thus, legal disputes tend to be resolved by a trial where a person is presumed innocent until conclusive proof to the contrary, or more commonly, by managing a settlement between the interested parties. The problem is that even in quite transparent cases of deliberate injury to a child, it is very difficult to get conclusive evidence. Furthermore, a negotiated settlement between adults (petitioners vs. parents in this case) is not really one between the aggrieved party (the child) and the assailant, but rather between the state and the assailant. The possibilities for what can only be called collusion in fact are enormous, as Bourne and Neuberger so eloquently establish. However, to expect a child to play a major and independent adversary role in a legal case involving its caretakers is nonsense. Thus, the courts tend to muddle through.

Similarly, the general tendency has been for the court to play a somewhat conservative role in this matter, by trying to keep children with their parents. The bottom line for the courts and legal profession generally has been whether there exists a just cause for the removal of children from their parents' care. Given the unappealing alternatives for the children as wards of the state and the difficulties involved in securing adoption for children from troubled homes, the courts' attitude is understandable.

The position of the courts is made even more difficult by new laws that have made reporting suspected child abuse mandatory for an increasingly wider range of helping professions. In addition, child abuse legislation or private agencies almost invariably institute a "hot-line" that urges the community to report suspected neglect or abuse. As the advertising for this service is usually sensationalist, the initial response from the community is overwhelming, requiring considerable resources for investigating reports and results in an increasing number of cases brought to court. Drawn into the problem of child abuse, the legal system becomes increasingly dependent on the counsel of medical professionals.

The medicalization of child abuse not only translated it into a legal issue, but has also led to its politicization. Since legislation allocates funds for identifying, researching, and treating child abuse, their disbursement becomes a political issue. Today, the major ideological rift among the child abuse specialists is between those emphasizing psychodynamics and those focusing on social factors: G. Henry Kempe on the one hand, and David Gil on the other. Neuberger and Bourne succinctly express the terms of this rift and identify the role of government funding in encouraging such debate: "...respected scholars disagree on issues of *focus* (Kempe, the home; Gil, the society); of *definition* (Kempe, the violent injury of children; Gil, the compromise of a child's potential); and of *method* (Kempe, the public health visitors opening 'life lines' between abusers and helping institutions; Gil, the changing of such social-structural causes of

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child abuse as poverty, racism, regressive employment policy, acceptance of violence as a means of conflict resolution, and the emphasis on competition rather than cooperation. To whom does the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare turn when instructed by Congress to develop a child abuse policy? If $20 million of a $3 billion American child welfare commitment are appropriated, how may such funds initiate effective action to protect children?" (*Critical Perspectives* . . . p. xi).

Too much should not be made of these ideological differences. They are, after,all, no more than old wine being poured into new bottles. It's a hoary middle-class argument: Do you re-establish order in society by pin-pointing the evil-doers and stopping their bad behavior? The control gambit. Or do you change the institutions and values that foster disorder? The reform strategy. Prohibition or Progressivism? Two routes for the same class to consolidate political and cultural hegemony over the intermediate institutions of capitalist society. But it would be a mistake to leap into the fray, assuming that at this point much of any significance was being debated.

The debate is not particularly acrimonious. Both Gil and Kempe advocate the expansion of the welfare state. Kempe envisions the creation of an army of semi-professionals to funnel cases into the social welfare system, while Gil's work primarily provided philosophical justifications for the priority of "primary prevention." Thus, the major effect of Gil's program would also be an expansion of transfer payments for social services. The debate's ultimate function is to intensify professional training in child abuse treatment and in social welfare.

Critical Perspectives on Child Abuse is itself an expression of this. While its contributors accept the position that child abuse is socially determined, they are primarily committed to treating it on a case by case basis. Like others who have been influenced by the new sociology of deviant behavior, they do not see the incidence of child abuse as a self-evident reality. Rather, they realize that they are dealing with a phenomenon that is labelled as such by significant others. Accordingly, any process of definition and treatment must be as attentive to the role of the self-interest and social situation of professional helpers as it is to the actions of the immediate parties in the making of an injured child. Neuberger and Bourne feel that this calls for changes that would mitigate those processes of treatment that visibly reproduce social inequality in the treatment process itself.

Their major practical recommendation is that the mandated state process should include sociologists. This has become a common pattern in the treatment of deviancy. Along with many others, the issue of child abuse has been manufactured by self-interested professionals and is maintained by its inclusion in welfare state politics. The introduction of critical thought has only increased the number of interested parties who benefit from the issue while legitimating it as a meaningful topic in the debate about advanced capitalist society. But since to be really successful for its manufacturers, an issue must also be consumed by the citizenry and their political elites, child abuse has not succeeded as much as its proponents wished.

Child abuse has not emerged as a major social issue because public concern has been uneven and sporadic, and no political elite has found a way to make hay out of it. Child abuse is simply not a good issue for a politician. Liberals find the issue too expensive. In the present climate, most liberals are fighting to keep what they already have achieved and are not particularly keen to take up an issue with no clear solutions. Conservatives have not found the issue appealing, not only because it entails considerable expense, but also because any program aimed at minimizing child abuse entails challenging familial authority and autonomy.

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The inability of political elites to figure out some way of using the issue of child abuse is a major impediment to its full realization as a manufactured social issue. But even politicians have to pay attention to an issue that has wide popular support. The proponents of child abuse as an issue are very much aware of this and have rather strenuously, and with no little skill, engaged in mass consciousness raising on the subject. The most significant and effective methods for this kind of agitation has already been mentioned — organizing for legislative and institutional innovations in the context of extraordinarily compelling and dramatic instances of child murder which have been eagerly and widely publicized by the media.

While this kind of campaign has been reasonably successful, what has most disturbed the proponents of child abuse as an issue is that they have never been able to sustain the necessary momentum that would catapult the issue to crisis status. As might be expected, the usual explanation for this failure is predictable. The public is blamed for a lack of moral commitment and, in some cases, for having such guilty consciences about their own children's treatment that they would rather see the issue relegated to the closet. My own interpretation is quite different.

Today, adults see children threatened by external forces and feel increasingly unable to protect them. The predominant response has been to redouble efforts to make their worlds of intimacy as secure as possible. Thus, it is hard to mobilize people to protect their children from themselves in a context where neither they nor their neighbors are abusing anyone. In the past, families supported institutions fostering solidarity because they never had been self-reliant and always needed support. What has been lost today is not an ethic of individual self-reliance, but a culture of self-determination, accompanied by a decline in exercising responsibility. One of the consequences of the fiscal crisis may be a politicized critique of the welfare state and a consideration of effective alternatives from below. In the short run, however, its effect has been to make many families uneasy about their relation to the outside world. Nothing captures popular imagination as an expression of this decline as well as the increase in violent crime. That the fastest rising category is apparently assault by strangers is in many ways a direct testimony that the pathways that lead from home to work, school, or marketplace and back again are places that no longer seem to be anyone's responsibility, and that you traverse at your own risk.

The same can be said about the impact of the women's movement on the family. Women's new self-image, backed by their role as breadwinners, precipitates changes in family roles. This increases open conflict within the family and undermines the traditional basis of male self-confidence. It is as though outside political struggles have been reborn in the home and intimacy has become politically problematic.

The third factor inhibiting adults' confidence in their ability to reproduce intimacy adequately is completely unambiguous. Leisure time is rapidly disappearing in American families that are having to mobilize more and more of their members' energies in the marketplace in order to keep up with the cost of living. There is a voluminous literature attesting to the increased importance of women as wage-earners. In fact, it was the secular increase in working wives and mothers that provided the structural basis for the explosion of the women's movement. Less well known is that it is not only mothers and wives but other family members as well who have to contribute to family income, and their numbers are increasing as well. A rough indication of this is provided by the Department of Labor statistics for number of earners in married couple families where the husband is in the labor force. In 1955, 1 earner families constituted 60% of the total of families with at least one earner, while 2 earner

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and 3 or more earner families accounted for 35% and 5% respectively. By 1978, 1 earner families were down to 37% while 2 earner and 3 or more earner were up to 51% and 12%.

All of these factors have shaken people's confidence in their ability to make their homes safe and secure places. Nevertheless, attitudes are not the same as behavior. One of the underlying themes in much professional literature on abuse is that the stress created by rapid social change is creating a virtual epidemic of violence within the family. What is most striking today, however, is not only the people's remarkable endurance under difficult conditions, but also their commitment to improve their worlds of intimacy. David Caplovitz, in this recent *Making Ends Meet: How Families Cope with Inflation and Recession*, tells us that while 40% of his respondents said that increased economic pressure has brought no change to their marriage, 19% have said that it has had a mixed effect, and 14% say it has made their situation worse, fully 28% state that it has made their marriage better. Caplovitz has broken down his sample into different groups on the basis of how severe the adverse effects of declining economic conditions have been, and how stressful has been their preception of their experience. Significantly, even among those most strongly and adversely hit, more indicate that their marriages have gotten better, not worse.

So what is the most adequate way of expressing the situation of a people who muddle through their lives with dignity and no little imagination and yet find that their confidence in the ability successfully to manage intimacy is eroding? Simply put, *We are witnessing a rapid deterioration of the dominant culture in American life.* The formal language of moral and political discourse is creating more problems than it is resolving for those who use it and whose lives are shaped by it. It can no longer be relied on as an instrument for ensuring securing in our daily lives. In the absence of a creditable alternative, this alone is reason for fear. In addition, our declining confidence in these tools exaggerates the impact of the imagery of violence. Why go to the horror movies when you can listen to the news? It is easy to argue that the self-interested manufacture of child abuse as an issue is what one would expect from the intellectuals of the new middle classes. Their livelihood clearly depends on creating a growing market for, and a monopoly over, the provision of their services. The capitalist state grants this kind of monopoly as a matter of course, and what it gets out of it all is an intermediate stratum that functions to mute potentially disruptive expressions of class conflict.

The process is much more complex. But in the last analysis, this political bargain, if you will, is the social contract that defines the existence of the new middle class. What is distressing, however, is the ease with which critical thinkers can be absorbed into this process. When all is said and done, *Critical Perspectives in Child Abuse* is really little more than a new sales strategy for marketing an illusion.

It must be stressed that the ease with which we as critical scholars, expounding our views in the settings where we earn our livelihoods, are absorbed into the new middle class project is not just a question of ideological frailty. Rather, we are dealing here with the practical consequences of the social organization of ideological production. I'm afraid that what stories like that of the manufacture and consumption of child abuse as a social issue indicate is just how strong our class identity is and for whose purposes we ultimately exist. An old and sad story, that is made all the sadder because of the ease with which it can be told with a changing cast of characters and settings. I suppose that if there is a lesson to be learned, and some glimmer of hope, it is that a critique that begins not with the issue as taken for granted, but subjects to critique the very process of its construction might be of some use in demystifying late capitalism in a period when the institutions of the welfare state itself are disintegrating.

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NEO-NATIONALISM AND THE WEST GERMAN PEACE MOVEMENT'S REACTION TO THE POLISH MILITARY COUP

by Sigrid Meuschel

In discussing the West German peace movement it should be pointed out that, as a whole, it does not properly fit within the tradition of German irrationalism. Nor is it appropriate to emphasize primarily its democratic and rational commitment.[1] The movement reacts to different stimuli and encompasses a vast array of people. Hence, evaluations of its overall character are likely merely to confirm one's own prejudice or hopes. The movement is an amalgam of the protests of the 1950s, 60s, and 70s: the campaign against rearming West Germany and, subsequently, the ban-the-bomb movement; the protest against amending to the German constitution laws for the state of emergency, the opposition to the Vietnam war, and the anti-authoritarian students' movement; finally, the search for alternative lifestyles and the commitment to ecology.[2] In addition, today's peace movement reacts to the increasing gravity of the world political situation created by the Iranian revolution and the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. It must also be seen against the background of the world economic recession and NATO's 1979 double decision.

Leaving aside Heinrich Böll's immediate public protest and the critical debate initiated within the Berlin daily *tageszeitung*, the German peace movement's reaction to the Polish military coup has been virtually nil. This deplorable hesitation to speak up is related to the ethical viewpoint that the nuclear age requires giving absolute political priority to life and peace *per se*, over and above the quest for self-determination. Some of the peace movement's advocates combine this position with what they call "Left patriotism" or "Left nationalism"; or they combine it with a plea for fundamental opposition, i.e., a refusal to compromise with any given political institution or social organization — all for the sake of guaranteeing humanity's survival. All these positions lead to a neglect of the specific socio-political differences between Western and Eastern type societies and thus allows for silence where protest is in order.

NATO's double decision focused public concern on two issues: the sovereignty of both German states and their populations' chances of surviving a limited nuclear war. The extent to which the reactions to these issues have a nationalist character can be ascribed to elder spokesmen of the SPD who, while not part of the peace movement, influence it nonetheless. Participants like Hellmut Gollwitzer and Heinrich Albertz sound very much like Guenter Gaus and Egor Bahr. They also maintain the outlook of the late Robert Havemann and Rudi Dutschke, which revives the perspective of German reunification out of a moral-national obligation towards East Germany.[3] Bahr

1. For a controversial discussion, see *Telos*, 51 and 52 (Spring and Summer, 1982); especially Seyla Benhabib, "The West German Peace Movement and its Critics"; Russell Berman, "Opposition to Rearmament and West German Culture."

2. Hassner points to the fact that "a declining reverence for the state," i.e., "a transition of the hierarchic-Prussian to the democratic model" coexists with "nostalgia for the nation." Pierre Hassner, "Was geht in Deutschland vor?," *Europa-Archiv*, 17 (1982), p. 522f.

3. Dany Diner, "Die nationale Frage in der Friedensbewegung: Urspruenge und Tendenzen," in *Friedensanalysen*, 16, (1982), p. 96ff.

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and Gaus argue that reunification and, ultimately, the restoration of national identity should be German politics' immediate concern: "if a German tells you that the national question is no longer important, do not be so sure. Do not believe him. Either he is dumb or he is not telling the truth, and both positions are dangerous."[4] Despite their nationalist convictions, Bahr and Gaus, as citizens of the nuclear age, place the ethical priority of peace and détente over self-determination: "There are times when you have to acquire and protect peoples' free spaces. And there are other times — and we live in one of these — when it is necessary to strive and prevent the emergence of an altogether new dimension: the end of humanity." And: "The (Western) alliance is based on the precondition of common interests that are of priority . . . peace . . . security and détente."[5] According to Bahr and Gaus, any dissolution of political alliances or change in the status quo would lead to instability and endanger peace: "Western Europe needs a stable Eastern Europe in order to survive — and *vice versa*."[6] Both claim that their ethic is one of responsibility, rejecting the demand for peace *and* human rights as an "ideologization" of politics and a dangerous adherence to the ethic of conviction.[7] Since Germans have to abstain from pursuing unity and national self-determination as a first political priority, Bahr asks other Europeans also to accept peace as a supreme aim: "If a nation's right to self-determination has to rank below the preservation of peace, then this is true also for the Polish people...I demand this of West Germany and I can demand it of the Poles as well."[8] This alternative — *either* to respect the given balance of power and to refrain even from verbal intervention into the other's sphere of influence, *or* to run the risk of war — is as one-sided as Haig's opposite statement according to which there is something more important than peace. Instead of looking for a way to secure both peace *and* freedom, the German way of assigning ethical priorities goes hand in hand with "capitulating *vis-à-vis* the unbearable."[9] These doubts were not uttered only by *Der Spiegel* and by Gorz's polemic against the German non-reaction to the military coup in Poland. Leftists from the "alternative scene" also expressed skepticism. Daniel Cohn-Bendit, for example, wrote: "As we can see, peace does not only imply zones free of nuclear weapons but also zones in which society is organized in such a way that human beings can accept it, at least a bit . . ."[10] They realize that the legitimate quest for survival in the nuclear age must not reduce to the acceptance of a postulated end of ideology."[11]

Second, by making the legitimacy of social orders secondary to the preconditions of survival, Bahr implicitly identifies what should be distinguished, namely Polish and German social organization. Such a position lends indirect support to orthodox communists according to whom Jaruzelski is the hero who saved the European peace

4. Egon Bahr, "Die nationale Frage: Das Problem der Wiedervereinigung und die Pflicht zum Frieden," *Die Zeit*, 12 (19.3.82), p. 16. Gaus regrets that most Germans have given in to the existence of two German states, an attitude he considers "not normal." On the other hand, Gaus, like Bahr, makes clear that reunification could only be obtained in the very far future. See Gunter Gaus, *Texte zur deutschen Frage*, (Darmstadt, Neuwied: Luchterhand, 1981), p. 11, 15, 25f, 38ff.

5. Egon Bahr, "Die nationale Frage," *op. cit.*

6. Günter Gaus, "Die Chancen der Entspannungspolitik," in *Aesthetik & Kommunikation*, Sonderheft 9 (1982), p. 202, 210.

7. *Ibid.*, p. 202f, Cf. also Bahr, *op. cit.*

8. Egon Bahr, *Ibid.*

9. Charles Schultz-Gerstein, "Welt- oder Seelenfrieden?" in *Der Spiegel*, 45 (8.11.1982), p. 242, 244.

10. *Tageszeitung* (15.12.1982).

11. This end Bender takes for the "order (Gebot) of the nuclear age." Peter Bender, *Das Ende des ideologischen Zeitalters: Die Europaeisierung Europas* (Berlin: Severin & Siedler, 1981).

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which Solidarity supposedly endangered. More importantly, Bahr dismisses the fact that Solidarity at no time raised the Polish national question as he would raise the German. The vast majority of Poles did not demand the end of foreign domination; rather, they tried to restore against the Polish state some essential civil rights, which are guaranteed in West Germany society.[12] Bahr's acknowledgement of the relevance of "national questions" irrespective of their specific social and political content invites old and new nationalists to obscure the systemic differences between Eastern and Western European societies. Gollwitzer, for example, maintains that the deployment of medium-range missiles would definitely render West Germany an "American satellite"; Albertz designates both German states as "occupied countries"; Peter Brandt pretends that West German dependence on the United States leaves the latter's position comparable to the one of the Soviet Union in relation to Eastern Europe.[13] These spokesmen are inclined not only to ignore internal political divergencies, but also differences of external or political conditions. The treaties underlying West Germany's sovereignty do not restrict once and for all the government's capacity for political maneuvres. Rather, they are open to legal interpretations, and are possible objects of political negotiations. The chances for reunification are not hampered primarily by U.S. power interests, but by the fact that for most Europeans the prospect of a strong German state constitutes a nightmare.[14] Poland's national sovereignty, however, depends on the very interests of the Soviet Union, which — to put it mildly — shows no inclination to release client states from its sphere of power.

While Bahr and Gaus demand that Europeans must — according to the ethical priority of peace — keep quiet and subordinate their legitimate quest for self-determination, scholars like E.P. Thompson and Rudolf Bahro demand the radical opposite: Europeans are to rise against the menace of nuclear war and humankind's ultimate extinction. It is rather astonishing that such divergent viewpoints share a common basis; like Gaus and Bahr, Thompson and Bahro also tend to neglect systemic differences between East and West. Moreover, they assert a striking similarity of socio-developmental trends. According to Thompson, both superpowers are victims of one and the same dynamic: the logic of "exterminism" inherent in their military-industrial complexes.[15] Given this logic, Bahro seeks a radical alternative, a "third way": "We can neither learn anything from, nor adapt to, anything of the other system. *And vice versa*."[16] This is Bahro's plea for fundamental opposition. But although the level of domination and repression appears identical to him, Bahro prefers the Soviet Union. He defends her road to industrialization as an example for Third World countries seeking autonomous development, whereas he understands Enlightenment rationality primarily as a means for colonization and "precarious democratism" (*prekaerer Demokratismus*) in the Western Countries.[17] His apology includes Stalinism,

12. Andrew Arato, "Civil Society against the State," in *Telos*, 48 (Summer, 1981).

13. Hellmut Gollwitzer, "Kein Verzicht auf nationales Denken," in *Aesthetik & Kommunikation,* Sonderheft 9 (1982), p. 113; Heinrich Albertz, *Ibid.*, p. 115; Peter Brandt, Herbert Ammon, "Wege zur Loesung der deutschen Frage: Der emanzipatorische Anspruch der Linken unter dem Zwang sur Realpolitik," in *Befreiung*, 21 (1981), p. 53.

14. See the comments of Wolfgang Jung, Johano Strasser, Karsten Voigt, and Erhard Eppler in *Aesthetik & Kommunikation*, Sonderheft 9 (1982).

15. E.P. Thompson, Exterminismus als letztes Stadium der Zivilisation," in *Befreiung*, 19/20 (1981).

16. Rudolf Bahro, "Überlegungen zu einem Neuansatz der Friedensbewegung in Deutschland," in *Befreiung*, 21 (1981), p. 11ff. 36.

17. See his polemic against Andre Gorz, partly translated in *Telos*, 51, (Spring, 1982); the first part of *Die Alternative*. (Reinbek: Rowohlt 1980).

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explained as a reaction to the Western threat and the Soviet Union's permanent encirclement, and even the Gulag. "I do not take even the Gulag as a final argument (against Stalinism), because I know too much about its Czarist preconditions, and about how many Prussian-German Social democratic traits influenced Leninism, how many exterior factors were involved, what a large part of world history in general this catastrophe includes."[18]

Leaving aside his ambivalence towards the otherwise dangerous Soviet Union, what type of politics does Bahro derive from the two superpowers' exterminist dynamic? His is not a nationalist perspective but one of fundamental opposition. He stays to fight exterminism, concluding from Thompson's analysis that "the issue of human emancipation must be reformulated completely." Only a "therapy aiming at total reconstruction" (*ganzheitliche Therapie*) is likely to arrest the global tendency towards humanity's self-extermination; and only (and exclusively) the united ecological and peace movement will be able to carry it through.[19] This movement's success will depend on the willingness and ability of its agents to transform themselves and to convince "without exception every man, every woman and child."[20] Bahro demands the "most radical revolution humankind ever was in need of: the rapid evolution towards an alternative pattern of civilization."[21] Anxious to be understood correctly, he does not even refrain from invoking biblical parallels: Moses who led his people out of Egypt, Jesus "who fought against all for a new principle." Indeed, he succeeds in making clear that he wants (to be?) nothing less than a "new prophet."[22]

Bahro, as a neo-Leninist, still adheres to the political leadership of the one and only organization in exclusive possession of the true way of rescuing the human species, i.e., the party. The legal system would have to submit. "The peace movement shall . . . if necessary . . . lay claim to national sovereignty . . . It shall act as if the future of German concerns depended exclusively on the movement and its actions: as if it were fully responsible. The sovereignty of the people overrules whatever legitimizing public law. Where there is the historical right, there the constitutional law will comply and adapt itself."[23] Faced with the task of bringing the impending apocalypse to a halt, customary attempts to understand and deal with "normal" living conditions also lose their meaning. Conventional class struggles, party conflicts, and bloc confrontations are to be neglected: "on every level . . . cutting across all traditional structures . . . is to be founded an alternative coalition."[24] Not surprisingly, therefore, the SPD is labeled a "party of moderate exterminism" — whatever that may mean. In any case, Bahro's "alternative coalition" excludes political combinations of social movement *and* reformism, of basic democracy *and* representative structures. Thus, the current "fundamental opposition" reminds one of the late phase of the Weimar Republic, when communists denounced social democrats as social fascists.[25]

What are the chances of success for such politics today? In Bahro's opinion the peace movement ought to transcend the bloc confrontation, because this confrontation as such entails the exterminist danger.[26] If this is so, an analysis of given structures would

18. Rudolf Bahro, *Wahnsinn mit Methode*, (Berlin: Olle & Wolter, 1982), p. 107.
19. Rudolf Bahro, "Überlegungen." *op. cit.*, p. 11ff, 36.
20. *Ibid.*, p. 37.
21. *Ibid.*, p. 15.
22. Rudolf Bahro, *Wahnsinn mit Methode, op. cit.*, p. 18ff, 30.
23. Rudolf Bahro, *Wahnsinn mit Methode, op. cit.*, p. 58.
24. *Ibid.*, p. 16.
25. *Ibid.*, p. 46ff.
26. Rudolf Bahro, "Überlegungen," *op.cit.*, p. 14.

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only be a waste of time since a "third way" beyond both social systems would be required.[27] In contrast to his plea to concentrate not on analytical efforts but rather on the means by which to stop the apocalyptic trend, Bahro formulates several assumptions concerning the character and interests of Soviet-type societies. On the one hand, the threatened Europeans may fight for political neutrality and unilateral disarmament without any risk: the Soviet Union would not intervene. Soviet economic and military-technological backwardness and the unstable political situation in its sphere prevent such action. Already now, without intervention in Western Europe, its status as a world power imposes a heavy burden.[28] This is all the more true — according to Bahro — since Poland has withdrawn *de facto* from the Warsaw Pact. "Europe, and our German home, may not...cannot...and need not be armed with nuclear weapons because there is no real existing threat of a conventional war of conquest."[29] On the other hand, Bahro never seems entirely sure about the Soviet Union's peaceful character: its overburdening appears to him to be "a threat to peace, indeed."[30] Obviously, he is not on safe ground, and his demand for political neutrality and unilateral disarmament becomes altogether implausible when he admits, but does not explain, the huge investments in the Soviet military sector,[31] and when he points out that Europe — free of nuclear weapons — could well be blackmailed without considering the possible consequences of such a perspective. To insist on his proposals, in spite of all uncertainties, Bahro finally reverts to a second variant of convergence theory. While his first convergence thesis singled out a common exterminist logic in both Eastern and Western societies, he now maintains, quite to the contrary, that both competing systems "rely on the same industrial foundation and face the same, i.e., ecological, challenge. As far as the result is concerned, they share an identical evolution, the decisive coordinates of which are ecological humanism and democratic socialism."[33] This evolutionary tendency will culminate in a "profound renewal of the whole social system," *if* only the Western peace movement creates the "precondition for such internal development in the East."[34] With this presupposition, Bahro abandons not only his first thesis of exterminism but also his second, auxiliary hypothesis. The tendency towards peaceful convergence of both systems now appears no longer as the result of their common industrial bases, but rather as a possible outcome of a previous fundamental change within the Soviet Union. *First* Eastern Europe has to be relieved of Russian hegemony, *then* she can pursue ecological and humanitarian projects.[35] Bahro's strategy of fundamental opposition is ultimately based on nothing but conjecture: "There must exist objective interests in Moscow to set free the powers needed to cope with the internal challenges of the 80s, although these interests are only subliminally to be felt, so far. We have positively to assume...a kind of prospective 'Soviet isolationism'."[36] The Soviet Union *has* to have whatever interest Bahro *wants* it to have, whether it is exterminist logic, ecological humanism, or socialist democracy.

27. *Ibid.*, p. 15, 17.
28. *Ibid.*, p. 20ff.
29. *Ibid.*, p. 27; also Bahro, *Wahnsinn mit Methode, op. cit.*, p. 79.
30. *Ibid.* "Überlegungen . . .", *op. cit.*, p. 22.
31. Rudolf Bahro, *Wahnsinn mit Methode, op. cit.*, p. 76, 127.
32. *Ibid.*, p. 76. See also Andrew Arato, Jean Cohen, "The Peace Movement and Western European Sovereignty," in *Telos*, 51 (Spring, 1982).
33. *Ibid.*, "Überlegungen . . .", *op. cit.*, p. 23.
34. *Ibid.*, p. 22f; Bahro, *Wahnsinn mit Methode, op. cit.*, p. 135.
35. *Ibid.*, p. 38f.
36. *Ibid.*, p. 45.

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Should it fail to react in accordance with Bahro's optimism, Bahro's politics could well result in the peculiar egalitarianism of Orwell's 1984. The Soviets would not necessarily respect Western Europe's neutrality; but moreover a strategy of fundamental opposition hitherto has never led to a strengthening of democracy.

Peter Brandt does not argue for fundamental opposition,[37] though he also takes exterminism seriously. Nor would he succumb to a crude nationalism, even though he sympathizes with concepts of national identity, and sees the survival of Germany as dependent on the overcoming of partition. According to him, the European peoples' survival *and* their right to self-determination depend on German politics: German reunification will secure both. Thus both East and West Germany would leave the military pacts and build a two-state federation. This federation's political institutions would be led by members of the now existing parliaments, departments and other administrative units. Although membership in different international economic organizations would be maintained, the sheer constraints of federation upon both states would direct their internal structures towards rapproachment, towards the "Yugoslavization of East Germany" and the "Swedenization of West Germany," which Brandt imagines as possible outcomes.[39] The founding of this military neutral federation needs international consent, yet all Europeans could agree since the socio-political as well as the military-strategic domination of both hegemonial powers would come to an end. Both superpowers would loose their main European strongholds and the "system of Yalta" would dissolve. German unification, in Brandt's view, is thus the precondition of European unity and, as such, it is the guarantee for lasting peace in Europe.[40] The German struggle for national unity, if only properly understood, should not frighten anyone. Even if *within* the federation the modes of solving the "German question" are an "exclusively German concern," no one "has to fear that more than nuclear war."[41]

Once again, mankind's salvation is a German concern. However, polemics aside, the younger Brandt's strategy is not plausible historically. According to him, the partition of Germany created the European bloc constellation, which will remain in existence until German reunification ends the "system of Yalta." He rightly points out that in 1952 and 1955 the Soviet Union offered German unity and neutrality in order to prevent the integration of West Germany into the Western world that Adenauer achieved in the early 1950s. Since these offers were not taken into consideration, it now remains an open question whether negotiations could have entailed the disolution of the Soviet satellite system, or whether the achievement of German neutrality, functioning as a buffer zone, could have stabilized the Soviet bloc. The latter is all the more plausible since already in the late 1940's the political and economic structures of Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia and, of course, of East Germany had been synchronized with the Soviet Union, and since "national paths" in the early 1950s were hampered by the trials and by the Party's expulsion of "national communists." One may speculate whether the achievement of German neutrality — after the processes of

37. To the contrary, he pleads for a political coalition between the Green Party and the Social-democrats. Peter Brandt/R. Ascheberg, "Fuer eine neue Mehrheit: Überlegungen zur Zusammenarbeit von SPD und Gruenen," in *Tageszeitung* (1.10.82), p. 12.

38. So he maintains that a "joint-German national-democratic (!!) identity is not to be built on the basis of separated states," or he complaints of the "bi-nationalization of the German remnants" (*Rest-Deutschland*). Cf. Peter Brandt, Herbert Ammon, *op.cit.*, pp. 42, 40.

39. *Ibid.*, p. 63.

40. *Ibid.*, p. 42f.

41. Robert Havemann wrote this in an "Open Letter to Leonid Brezhnev," in *Telos*, 51 (Spring 1982), pp. 99-100.

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Gleichschaltung already had taken place — could have tempered Soviet reactions to the Hungarian Revolution, the Prague Spring and the several Polish upheavals from 1956 to 1980/81. Beyond such speculations there remains the fact that neutrality was not achieved and that the Soviet Union did not conceed the leeway that would allow for internal independence or for breaking away from the empire. Thus, even if Brandt's hypothesis would be correct, i.e., even if the German partition had also divided Europe, it cannot be convincingly concluded that three decades later German reunification would now unify Europe. And if one keeps in mind the deep and justified mistrust of Europeans towards a strong German state, the concept loses its historical plausibility all the more.[42]

Brandt's concept is not only implausible, it is also analytically weak. Already in 1957, the SED (East Germany's Socialist Unity Party) no longer would propose the unification of both states but rather their federation *as states*. Since 1970 — i.e., since the West German social-liberal coalition formulated its policy towards Eastern Europe — the SED has argued that two German *nations* now exist.[43] This does not seem to indicate a strong and continued interest in German unity. Though Brandt explicitly resists speculating on the nature of Eastern-type societies, he seems to know about their interests pretty well: for example, he states that if the SED were to reconsider the German question and to take into account the needs and wishes of the population, it could strengthen the legitimacy and the moral basis of its rule.[44] As for the Soviet Union, Brandt posits the fear of, more than German unity, the deployment of Pershing II and cruise missiles on West German territory: An alternative policy towards Germany as a whole thus would be in its interest. This would remain true even if scholars like E.P. Thompson and Cornelius Castoriadis rightly discern either a growing influence of the military-industrial complex in Soviet socio-economic development, or analyze Soviet society as a "stratocracy," i.e., a military society. Brandt, like Bahro, formulates the most contradictory hypotheses. On the one hand, he points to legitimation deficits and the necessity to cope with them by means of liberalizing reforms; on the other, he does not exclude that systemic trends still reinforce the authoritarian setting. Since both tendencies could be found in Soviet societies, political strategy has to take both possibilities seriously. Instead, Brandt neglects or rather reconciles the differences to arrive at the climax of his argument. He claims that if Soviet society has evolved into a stratocracy, and even if the regime were to become externally expansive, Europeans — and above all Germans — he ought to pursue neutrality for the sake of self-preservation.[45] The analytical presupposition obviously stands in contradiction with the proposed political solution.

Consider for a moment that Russian development is dominated by the exterminist logic and that its capacity for economic and political integration gradually diminishes. In such a constellation — one that Brandt does not exclude — the growth of military expenditure is nothing but the solution to vanishing capacities, the alternative to reform, the trend towards integrating the empire by force.[46] On the other hand, if

42. For critiques sympathetic with the peace movement see Nils Kadritzke, Hermann Pfuetze, Otto Kallscheuer in *Aesthetik & Kommunikation*, Sonderheft 9 (1982), p. 125f, 129, 142.

43. Brandt/Ammon (*op. cit.*, p. 44f) point to this fact without commenting on it.

44. *Ibid.*, p. 64.

45. *Ibid.*, p. 59ff. Cornelius Castoriadis, "Im Angesicht des Krieges"; E.P. Thompson, "Exterminismus als letztes Stadium der Zivilisation," *Befreiung* 19/20.

46. Arato/Cohen, *op. cit.*; Zdenek Mlynar, "Polen ohne Scheuklappen gesehen," in Anna J. Pietsch, Reinhard Fenchel (eds.), *Gesellschaft gegen den Staat: Polen 1980-82*, (Hannover: SOAK, 1982).

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there were technocratic interest groups seeking to liberalizing the Soviet economy[47] and favoring social integration not by force, but by raising the level of consumption, this would be checked by three factors: 1) liberalization always runs the risk of weakening the power structure as a whole, 2) middle-level functionaries of all apparatuses — who neither bear direct responsibility for the performance of the system nor are immediately confronted with discontent from below — tend to obstruct any reform projects, regardless of who initiated them and 3) reform movements in Eastern Europe have no chance of succeeding without reform in the Soviet Union, which is most improbable. In Russia, little discontent is articulated because socialism can be identified with patriotism and imperial hegemony.[48] What does this mean for West European political strategy? It has to count on the chance for reform in the East, however vague that may be. However, it should be aware of this very vagueness. The strategy of unilateral disarmament does neither: it could result in a state of voluntary vulnerability *vis-á-vis* the Soviet Union which could then be superior in strength if it preserved its internal structure and tried to compensate for deficits by dictating trade relations with Western Europe.[49] Eastern Europe would remain in the situation it has experienced for 40 years, and the sovereignty of Western Europe would indeed be seriously endangered. The Left would have to forget its aims of enlarging the basis of participation and of increasing the chances not merely to secure life but to create the preconditions for a good life.

This leads to, or is already part of the third objection to Brandt's proposal: it is self-contradictory with regard to its means and ends. He pretends German reunification would lead to European unity and peace and would strengthen the right of self-determination.[50] Since neither the Soviets nor the Americans seem to support the proposal, and since the Europeans do not react enthusiastically at any rate, how then are the aims of neutrality and federation to be attained? A minor detour is necessary. It is the "detour of a joint European secession from the superpowers," which could be brought about by the peace movements, in East and West.[51] Leaving aside the altogehter improbable chances for such movements to gain strength in Eastern Europe, Brandt, almost by coincidence, drops the central thesis of his strategy: the solution of the German question is no longer to secure unity and peace in Europe, but European peace and unity now are to be the precondition for German unity. This is hardly a new perspective, albeit a sympathetic one insofar as neopatriotism can once again be disregarded. But when Brandt outlines the internal German steps towards reunification the other rationale of his strategy is dropped: the issue of self-determination. As the federation of both states is to be internationally consented to and to be accomplished by representatives of the given systems, the citizens will not be asked whether they share Brandt's national desires, favor a "Yugoslavization" or a "Swedenization" of their societies, nor whether they think such perspectives to be realistic. So nothing remains of Brandt's vision but the dubious honor of stirring up national sentiments.

Finally, upon which progressive legacies of German nationalism could neo-patriots rely? After 1945, patriots of social-democratic and liberal origin sought to re-establish

47. György Konrad, Ivan Szelenyi, *Die Intelligenz auf dem Weg zur Klassenmacht,* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp 1981); Rudolf Bahro, *Die Alternative*, (Reinbek: Rowohlt 1980).
48. Peter Bender (*op. cit.*, p. 27ff, 32ff) discusses impediments to reform.
49. See Arato/Cohen's vision of "Hongkongization," "The Peace Movement . . . ," *op. cit.*
50. Brandt/Ammon, *op. cit.*, p. 57ff, 70.
51. *Ibid.*, p. 64, 68ff.

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the moral integrity of the nation. Recognizing the common German responsibility, they demanded that guilt be shared: *therefore* the nation ought not to be divided. Certainly, this motive was honest. But the preconditions for bearing common liability were destroyed by Adenauer's politics of integrating West Germany into the Western system of alliances. Recently, the first social-democratic liberal coalition's endeavor to promote "change through rapproachement" has ended in stagnation.[52] Let us not forget that to parts of the elder generation the partition still causes pain. Yet, on what ground could the generations born after the war anchor their national fervor? Brandt wants to revive 19th century radical republicanism. But in 1814-15, when the German Confederation was founded, even most of the radical republicans did not refer to the principles of the Enlightenment. The assembly of free citizens was not regarded as the nation's constituency. Rather this was seen as a people united by a common language and ethnic origin.[53] Subsequently, romanticism's credo "people, Germany, fatherland" contrasted to the French triad "liberty, equality, fraternity." Recourse to ethnicity and linguistic attributes was in no way accidental. Because of Germany's politico-geographical location in Central Europe, it has never developed the identity of a territorial state. For centuries it had been just "a number of several Germanies," lacking a natural center and borders. Therefore, the concept of "nation" became a "utopian projection out of the past," with its definition open to "will and representation."[54] Arendt has analysed convincingly the origins of what she calls "tribal nationalism" within the continental imperial states of Central Europe. The modern Western nation state, the combination of nation *and* state, of cultural, historical, territorial entity *and* the rule of law and rights of man, did not develop in Austria-Hungary, Germany or Russia. The causes can be traced to this lack of territorial identity and to the fact that enlightened absolutism remained weak. Consequently, national identity was reduced to a quasi "portable matter," which in the best sense was defined by a common language, and in the worst by the notion of a common soul."[55]

Viewing the German nationalist tradition together with the conjecture of the threat of exterminism to the human species, the moral or factual indifference towards the divergence of the European social orders, the cry for fundamental opposition and for Germany's new task to save the world — who, then, is surprised that Right-wingers join Leftist patriots in celebrating neo-nationalism, that the debate ends up in blood-and-life-rethoric, in *sauve-qui-peut* and chauvinism? A recent publication, entitled "German Unity is Certain to Come," questions the meaning of "differentiating 'Left,' 'Right,' and 'Center,' while the common grave is opening up for us all." It accuses the "hegemonial powers" of not only occupying "our country but our very bodies as well."[56] Hellmut Diwald, notorious for a discussion of Auschwitz that makes the reader doubt whether the Holocaust ever occurred, is now a co-author of Peter Brandt, and conjures up the "splendor" of German history and demands that Germans work

52. Peter Brandt, Herbert Ammon, "Patriotismus von Links," in *Die deutsche Einheit kommt bestimmt*, Wolfgang Venohr (ed.), (Bergisch Gladbach: Luebbe 1982), 137ff; both authors point out these facts themselves.

53. *Ibid.*, p. 124; Brandt/Ammon mistake "Volkstuemelei" for republicanism: "Ein Reich freier Buerger/ Ein Gott, ein Volk, ein Wille soll sein/Doch die Menschheit im Volk nur schafft den Verein."

54. Hagen Schulze, "Die Deutschen und ihre Nation," in *Die Zeit* 38 (17.9.82).

55. Hannah Arendt, *Origins of Totalitarianism*. (New York-London 1973), chapt. 8.

56. Wolfgang Venohr (ed.), *Die deutsche Einheit kommt bestimmt, op. cit.*, "Introduction," p. 13, 7.

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for reunification "unswervingly, in cold decisiveness and in stolid indifference towards those who do not regard this aim their first and highest."[57]

This first and highest aim is shared by the so-called "national revolutionaries" who are primarily concerned with problems of national identity and self-determination. Former Marxist-Leninists draw upon their previous China-oriented political socialization in considering national questions. In seeking national independence, they take an equally anti-Soviet and anti-American stance. This variant of neo-nationalism is joined by members of the new social movements who react to the crisis of modernity by searching for identity in regional authenticity.[58] Unlike the "Spontis," these young people do not regard basic democracy and decentralization as vehicles that might aid in the realization of fraternity, autonomy and justice. According to Henning Eichberg, the most prominent national revolutionary, a specific combination of regionalism and nationalism is the most important means by which to secure personal identity. The increasing cultural, economic and political centralization enforces individual atomization, and motivational crisis. In Eichberg's view, the state of ever deepening alienation is dissolved by rediscovering regional tradition dialect, popular history and culture. New authenticity, immediacy and sensuousness are likely to be found again in rebuilding small units. The 16th century peasant wars appear as the good old days. He perceives reminiscence about their supposedly spontaneous and authentic patterns of communication as the final culmination of Leftist learning processes in general. In his view, solidarity with the anti-colonial struggles of the Third World finally led the bearers of "alternative culture" to recongize their own problem: the lack of national-regional identity.[59]

Be that as it may, Eichberg's regionalist fervor follows logically from his definition of nationalism. He sees nationalism as the process of building ever smaller state-organized units — a process which occurred in the 19th and 20th centuries with the foundation of several nation states from the territories of the dissolving Habsburg, Ottoman and British empires. This process of "balkanizaiton" today finds its parallel in regional movements within the nation states. Eichberg does not interpret his regionalist concept as contrasting with the way in which nationalists pose the German question. While he admits that the effort to overcome the "national misery — participation, occupation, alienation" by reunification implies the reconstitution of a larger unit, in his view the reunification of both German states would be a step towards "all-German (*gesamtdeutsch*) separatism." This separatism would break both of the Germanies out of the realm of superpowers and occupation. Insofar as separatism creates a "smaller unit: Germany," it is the necessary precondition for achieving regional identity. "To create the German nation is an act of decentralization; it means breaking away from the headquarters of Wodka-Cola, away from the metropoles . . . Gone will be the 'West German citizen' with his Americanized language and his ITT-consciousness — and German identity will arise; this is a step towards the 'balkanization of everyone.' An independent Friesland or a free Saxony fit into this development. They are further steps towards democracy from below."[60]

57. Helmut Diwald, "Deutschland — was ist das?" Venohr (ed.), *op. cit.*, p. 29, 17. The blood-and-life rhetoric is likely to ignore that war would not only menace German "bodies" but middle European if not human existence as a whole. Patriots underline that in the case of conflict "German armies would be present on both sides." Europe, and within Europe both German states (would be) the battle ground of the world powers." Albertz, *op. cit.*, p. 118.

58. See Dany Diner, *op. cit.*, p. 96ff.

59. Henning Eichberg, "Balkanisierung fuer jedermann? Nation, Identitaet und Entfremdung in der Industriegesellschaft," in *Befreiung*, 19/20, p. 63.

60. *Ibid.*, p. 68.

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Yet, the social foundations of authenticity which regionalism once might have secured have been irreversibly distorted. Any quest to revive tradition itself expresses the fact that it already has lost its power over human beings, as Horkheimer has shown in his critique of instrumental rationality. Moreover, this general result of modernization has been enforced in Nazi-Germany and after 1945, when regional mobility was extremely high.[61] Thus, Eichberg's *new* regionalism is a historically rather desolate perspective, which consequently results in *old* nationalism when he claims national unity as its political precondition.

But this specific German national tradition is exactly what he has in mind. What he shares with both the Right and the neo-conservatives is ignorance that social rationalization processes have resulted in the differentiation of social and communicative spheres that cannot be reversed.[62] Eichberg's reduction of American culture (and he means Western culture) to nothing but Coke and ITT, and the conviction that large social units *per se* lead to alienation, may be criticized within a well-known frame of reference: he simply opposes modernity, contrasting once again *civilization* and *society* against *culture* and *community*. Eichberg interprets regional-national identity formation as the only way out of the crises which secularization has brought with it.[63] His notion of identity perceives human individuals as the incarnation of a collective soul; it cannot but impede the potentialities for the realization of autonomy.[64]

Within a rational-democratic perspective the only "German question" to be raised today is not a national one but one of political morality and responsibility. First, because the partition weighs disproportionately on the population of the Eastern half — not for reasons of national concern but for the modes of political domination and social suppression that fortunately are not given in West Germany. Second, since the line dividing East and West Germany cuts across the whole of Europe it is all the more important to abandon a national viewpoint. In a rational-democratic tradition, furthermore, regionalism can only be defined as decentralization of political and economic units, aiming to put an end to the distortion of nature and communication, and to combine representative political structures with increasing chances for participation from below. The politics of the Greens and the Spontis, to the extent that they reject romanticism, fundamental opposition and neo-nationalism, can be interpreted as an attempt for such a combination. Thus, they can be seen in continuity with the New Left's overall aim to materialize what Enlightenment had promised but what bourgeois-capitalist or socialist development interrupted.

The new Left was well aware of the fact that neo-nationalism would not set free as yet repressed consciousness but, on the contrary, would presuppose the repression of German history and of the awareness that this history is not to be mastered by identification.[65] It took for granted that Germany was likely to face another and lasting partition; and it supported the social-liberal government's new *Ostpolitik* as the final end of a mischievous national continuity, as the overdue political recognition of WWII's

61. Iring Fetscher, "Die Suche nach der nationalen Identitaet," in Jürgen Habermas (ed.), *Stichworte zur geistigen Situation der Zeit*, Vol. I. (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp 1979), p. 128.

62. Jürgen Habermas, *Stichworte zur geistigen Situation der Zeit*, op. cit. "Introduction"; Jürgen Habermas "Neo-conservative Culture Criticism in the United States and West Germany: An Intellectual Movement in Two Political Cultures" in this issue of *Telos*.

63. Henning Eichberg, "Minderheit und Mehrheit," *Westermann-Colleg Zeit und Gesellschaft*, 1. (Braunschweig, 1979), p. 24ff.

64. Emil Nichtsnutz, in *Pflasterstrand*, 142 (1982), p. 21.

65. Otto Kallscheuer, "Unbewältigte Wiederkehr des Verdraengten?" in *Aesthetik & Kommunikation*, Sonderheft 9 (1982), p. 139.

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results. In participating in the extra-parliamentary opposition, the postwar generation consciously answered its parents' active involvement or passive collusion with fascism. Massively protesting against the demolition of legal rights and guarantees against West Germany's support for the Shah's regime and the Vietnam war, it demonstrated — quite intentionally — non-compliance with any misuse of state sovereignty. This misuse was regarded as consequence of the fact that West Germany had "advanced" to be a junior partner of American imperialism and had regained an important position in world economics and politics before democratic consciousness was firmly rooted.

In contrast to this awareness of the New Left and those who see themselves in its continuity, neo-nationalism suffers from a deliberate loss of memory. In order to protest the participation of the nation, its occupation, its lack of sovereignty, its victimization by the U.S., and to look for personal identity in nationalism or to claim an ethical priority of peace, it is necessary to forget the past. The undeniable danger of the nuclear age consists not only of the disruptive power of weapons that menace humanity but also of the oblivion that would empty the concept of humankind of its ethical content. This concept not only implies the responsibility of the living to preserve the conditions of life for future generations, as members of the peace movement pretend. The notion refers as well to the former generations and to our memory of their fights and hopes for the achievement of a just society.[66] The German non-reaction to the military coup in Poland is thus not an adequate expression of modesty and self-restraint imposed by the logic of our times. Its underlying attitudes provide no realistic answer to contemporary dangers and disregard the normative connotations of politics as well.

66. Walter Benjamin, "Geschichtsphilosophische Thesen," in *Schriften*, Vol. 1 (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp 1955). "Thesis 12," p. 501f.

THE "DOUBLE DECISION" MAKES SENSE — BUT FOR WHOM? A REPLY TO HERF*

by Walter Süss and Michael Lucas

In his diatribe against the European peace movement, Herf[1] invokes nearly every argument summoned up by right-wingers in the U.S. to counter it. Because Herf's article was deemed worthy of publication, there is still apparently a need to refute such slander. Herf makes three basic assumptions: that the Soviet Union poses a threat to the U.S., that this creates the need to rearm, and that inasmuch as the European peace movement ignores these facts, it is hopelessly naive.

Before turning to the specifics of his argument, though, the very method he uses

* Translated by George E. Hearthway.

1. Jeffrey Herf, "Western Strategy and Public Discussion: The Double Decision Makes Sense," *Telos*, 52 (Summer 1982), pp. 114-128 (The pages relating to this article are indicated in the text).

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requires some comment. Herf apparently feels no need to go beyond the competence he acquired from journals such as *Commentary* or *Foreign Affairs*. "The military" interests him, he says, but his curiosity is lacking precisely where it is most needed — when he is satisfied to use catch phrases like "Soviet expansionism," "freedom," "military strength," "Europe's weakness," etc. In addition, Herf's argument is ill-served by his unwillingness to deal with such areas as domestic American political concerns, the interests that lie behind the present move toward rearmament, the changing position of America internationally, and the structural conditions of Soviet foreign and "expansionist" policy. For Herf, these factors are apparently non-existent.

In undertaking an immanent critique of Herf's arguments, therefore, we have to presuppose that the system of nuclear deterrence works, although we ourselves are far from embracing this view. On the contrary, we favor complete nuclear disarmament — a goal that was endorsed by both the U.S. and the Soviet Union in signing the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1970. For the time being, though, we are most of all concerned by the dramatic intensification of a situation that is already far too dangerous.

The Soviet Threat. The basic premise of Herf's argument is the Soviet threat. His justification of the arms policy of the present U.S. administration and his fears with respect to the future of West and Central Europe center on the assumption that a weakened NATO would induce the Russians to blackmail or aggressive actions (p. 124). He does not say what has led him to this assumption. Such dubious scholarly concepts like "totalitarianism," examples like "Afghanistan" or the Soviet pressure on Poland are not enough to prop up this central premise. In "NATO and The Warsaw Pact"[2] we distinguished between an "imperial" foreign policy, guided by superpower political considerations but nonetheless defensive in nature, and an "imperialist" foreign policy. The latter would imply in the long run the establishment of Soviet world domination. But this approach can in no way be imputed to the present Soviet leadership, which in any event would founder on the structural deficits of the Soviet system if it did aspire to an "imperialist" policy. The Soviet system can certainly serve as a "model" and be transplanted to other countries, particularly "underdeveloped" ones. But there is no example of this system firmly taking root in the social infrastructure of a dependency for any length of time. The two most effective instruments of capitalist or imperialist expansion are integration into the world market dominated by the developed capitalist countries and the creation of a dominant class whose very existence is dependent on this integration. The USSR lacks corresponding possibilities, notwithstanding all the Soviet propaganda of a "socialist world economic system." Such a system exists only marginally as a vast fringe area to a world economy dominated by capitalism. Cooperation between the USSR and Third World countries is always subject to the competitive pressure of this market which has often enough meant that "bonds of eternal friendship" survive only a few years, as in the cases of Egypt, Guinea, Somalia and the Sudan.[3] These countries only followed the example of

2. Walter Süss, "NATO and the Warsaw Pact: 'Armament Insanity' versus 'Calculated Power'," *Telos*, 51 (Spring 1982), p. 78; on the politics of the US see also: Michael Lucas, "Reagans Erneuerung des Kalten Krieges: Hintergründe und Formen der neuen US-Militärpolitik" in *Dollars & Traume: Studien zu Politik, Ökonomie, Kultur der USA*, No. 4, 1981 (Hamburg), pp. 71-99; Michael Lucas, "Die Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika und die Krise des Kalten-Kriegs-Systems" in *Prokla: Zeitschrift für politische Ökonomie und sozialistische Politik,* No. 48, 1982; Michael Lucas and Ekkehart Krippendorff, "'Eines Tages Werden wir Amerikananer Über die Zerstörung Europas nachdenken Müssen:' Die USA und Westeuropa," in *Weltpolitik: Jahrbuch für Internationale Beziehungen 1* (Frankfurt and New York: 1981), pp. 10-28.

3. The Center for Defense Information demonstrates that the foreign policy successes of the

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the Soviet Union in foreign policy and trade (above all, arms imports). Where the Soviet model was copied, as in the People's Republic of China in the 1950s, the Soviet influence lasted only for a very brief period of time. The example of China demonstrates moreover that a "communist world state" under Soviet leadership, the hobgoblin Reagan paints on the wall,[4] can be envisioned only if one stubbornly refuses to draw the lesson from world historical development in the last 36 years. An extension of the "Soviet model" would probably lead to a reduction rather than an increase of the USSR's influence in the world, including in North, Central and Western Europe. The Soviet leadership would have to have lost all will to self-preservation, which as a rule it hardly lacks, if it ardently wishes to have this region imitate its own system. In view of the economic superiority of Western Europe and the cultural levels of development in these countries, a position of hegemony by the USSR in a "sovietized Europe" is inconceivable. It is far more probable that the non-Soviet COMECON states would reorient themselves to the West and the Soviet sphere of influence would even lessen. This was already clear to Stalin in 1945 and accounts for his break with western European Communist parties.[5] There is no reason to assume that the present leadership would see the situation any differently, since this view is indeed realistic enough.

To be sure the Soviet Union is pursuing an "imperial" foreign policy according to the distinction made above.[6] In no way do we regard this distinction as academic; on the contrary, we intend to underscore the grave consequence it has for the perception and prognosis of future Soviet conduct. The reason why we characterize this policy as "imperial" or as the policy of a super power (great-power-policy) is because it implies the pursuit of the security interests of the Soviet Union even at the price of violating the right to self-determination by neighboring countries. These interests in security served to establish a *cordon sanitaire* of "friendly" states after 1945 on the Soviet western boundary and led also to the more recent invasion of Afghanistan on the eastern front.[7] It could be argued that a state which will not remain confined to its own boundaries in the realization of its security interests can be just as dangerous as an imperialist state. If so, then the distinction we propose is purely academic. But, the objection is invalid. For one thing, it ignores the structural limits to Soviet expansion. For another, it

USSR are frequently of a short-term nature and can in no way be regarded as an extension of Soviet global influence in the last decade. See *The Defense Monitor*, V. 9, No. 1 (Washington 1980).

4. See President Reagan's first press conference on January 29, 1981.

5. On the Soviet foreign policy in the years after WW II see David Horowitz, *Kalter Krieg: Hintergründe der US-Aussen-politik von Jalta bis Vietnam*. 2 vols. (Berlin 1969), pp. 80 ff. Fernande Claudin, *The Communist movement: From Comintern to Cominform*, chap. 5 "Revolution and Spheres of Influence" (Harmondsworth 1975); George F. Kennan, "Interview with CBS" July 9, 1975 in George F. Kennan, *Im Schatten der Atombombe* (Köln 1982), pp. 114ff.

6. See Süss, "*Die Vereinigten Staaten...*", *op. cit.*, pp. 76f. In an otherwise very good translation of our article in *Telos*, No. 51 "great power policy" (*Grossmachtpolitik*) has been translated as "characteristic of a superpower." The use of this term stemming from Maoist propaganda does not correspond to our intention of elaborating precisely the differences between Soviet and US foreign policy. This distinction is, by the way, not an especially artful discovery by B.N. Ponomarew, G. Arbatov or other Soviet functionaries specialized in foreign propaganda, but could also be read in publications of the US Government Printing Office. See: "An Assessment of the Afghanistan Sanctions: Implications for Trade and Diplomacy in the 1980s." Report prepared for the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, US House of Representatives by the Office of Senior Specialists, Congressional Research Service (Washington, 1981), pp. 11-19; and: "Soviet Policy and United States Response in the Third World." Report prepared for the Committee on Foreign Affairs US House of Representatives, by the Congressional Research Service (Washington 1981), pp. 89-94, 300f.

7. See *op. cit.*, pp. 14-17.

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overlooks an important point: seen from a perspective of a security policy, the costs-limit of expansion plays a much greater role than it would play when viewed from the perspective of an imperialist policy. Additional territories and spheres of influence cost men, material *and* security. The farther this sphere is extended, the greater the additional costs, and the less the advantage, until finally the relation is inverted. If one takes Afghanistan as an example, then one may justifiably ask whether there this point has not already been passed.

A final, but no less important point: a security interest, as we have defined it and applied this definition to the Soviet Union, can be achieved in ways other than conquest. Imperialistic expansion would be an entirely one-sided matter of extension and subjection. The policy of imperial security can, however, at least within the limits of these assumptions, be seen as the pursuit of mutual interests and cooperation. We should also be wary of turning the opponent into a monster — a move that can be avoided by taking into account the historical experiences and interests of the Soviet Union.

It is indispensible that we take up this problem for the alternative to a policy of cooperative security, particularly for Western Europe, is security by military strength. Because the other side likewise has an interest in maintaining its security, the military option leads not only to a reciprocal escalation of expenses for armaments, but to a diminished security for both sides in an age of nuclear weapons.

We know that many of the activists from the opposition movements in Eastern European countries shake their heads in disbelief at the notion of a cooperative policy of security with the Soviet Union. A solution to their strivings for emancipation is still not actually included by this policy or the policy of détente bound with it. We believe nonetheless that we can represent our position to them in good conscience. We share the common interest of avoiding a new war (this time perhaps the last) in Europe and the intention of our policy is at the very least to improve conditions for the emancipation in the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact states. We will take the example mentioned by Herf. He claims that Rudolf Bahro credits his release from an East German prison to "Western military power" (p. 115). This is nonsense.[8] The essential point was probably established earlier by the fact that his incarceration did not hinder, but in fact promoted the diffusion of his thought and that in East Germany the most effective means of isolating a troublesome thinker and thereby immunize the people to his criticism is to deport him to the West.[9] Not only is this example worthless but the underlying thesis is false. The policy that Herf proposes had been accepted in the 1950s, years that were characterized by sharp confrontation and the superior powers of the "West." This however did not prevent but rather insured that the revolts in East Germany in 1953 and in Hungary in 1956 would be suppressed. Unless one proposes that NATO invade the next time — which would be insane since it would lead to war — only two possibilities remain: a) to entangle the Soviet Union in a mesh of cooperative relationships that it would endanger with such measures, and b) to transform the current situation in

8. Such global claims are naturally difficult to refute, but here there is a counter-example. In the middle of the 1950s the philosopher Wolfgang Harich was imprisoned for advocating thoughts that were similiar in many respects to those of Bahro. Indeed, during this time the "West" concentrated only of its own superior military strength. This did not benefit Harich at all; he remained in prison till 1964.

9. With this Bahro may have played a certain part in the Solidarity campaign of the Western European Left. In this connection see Rudi Steinke, Walter Süss and Ulf Wolter, "His Refrain is Heard Around the World: An Initial Assessment of the Bahro Congress," in *Rudolf Bahro: Critical Responses*, U. Wolter, ed. (New York 1981), pp. 213-233.

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which, due to the bloc confrontation in Europe, every separation from Soviet hegemony is necessarily perceived as an integration into the other bloc and hence a threat to Soviet security interests. If it is correct that Soviet foreign policy is a function of such security interests, then the flexibility of movements of national self-determination would thereby be increased.

The events in Poland do not contradict this view. The precondition for the mere development of a prerevolutionary situation was the profound legitimation crisis of the state and the party. Economic and cultural factors were certainly determining and détente symbolized by Willy Brandt's visit to Warsaw undermined the fear of West German aggression, i.e., the violent revision of Poland's western border. These factors combined to make obsolete what had been a very effective means of ensuring political integration. But neither détente nor the peace movement could prevent the suppression of the Polish emancipation movement. The fact that it was suppressed by the Polish state itself without Warsaw Pact intervention, attests to a concern by the Soviet Union that such intervention would irreparably harm ties to the West. Hence, it becomes important to distinguish between a Poland suppressed by a military regime and one suppressed by intervention which almost certainly would have led to a civil war. This outcome would have thrown the movement back for years or even decades.

There is no denying that the European peace movement, particularly in West Germany, reacted weakly and cautiously to the establishment of military rule. We criticize this in Poland but do not conclude from it that the peace movement is only interested in preserving the status quo. Most in the peace movement followed the political and social revolt in Poland with sympathy. When this revolt was suppressed, the problem was how to express these sympathies in a way that would avoid aggravating the situation. The fear that their interests would be linked to pro-Solidarity statements of such self-styled "workers' representatives" as Ronald Reagan, Margaret Thatcher and Bülent Ülüsü paralyzed any move to demonstrate publicly against the Polish government. The statements of Reagan, Thatcher *et al*, thus served the propagandistic goal of returning to a Cold War system, despite all the high-minded speeches that have not benefitted the Poles one bit. Still, the task of developing specific, non-cooptable forms of protest and solidarity with the Poles has not dissolved the peace movement. And their powerlessness to speak out against the events in Poland does nothing to change the fact that the goal of the peace movement — to dismantle the bloc confrontation — goes hand in hand with the Polish interests for self-determination.

When Herf finally gets around to specifics, he presents three arguments to support the thesis of the Soviet threat: alleged Soviet rearmament during détente; Soviet strength in comparison to NATO forces, and the nuclear armament policy of the USSR.

Rearmament and Détente. Herf claims that Soviet military expenditures devour 12 to 16% of the Soviet GNP, while the US spends only 5 to 6% for the same purpose. How he arrived at the figure for Soviet arms is not disclosed, probably for good reason, because even the Pentagon propaganda brochures cite a figure of "only" 12 to 14%.[10] Such statistics are furthermore completely worthless if their frame of reference is not mentioned. The Soviet GNP in 1979 came to $1,082 billion and that of the US to $2,377 billion.[11] Furthermore, two alliance systems confront each other, NATO and the Warsaw Pact; the fraction of expenses in the respective alliances considered jointly comes

10. *Die Sowjetische Rüstung: Pentagon-Papier zur sowjetischen Rüstung*, (München 1981), p. 12.
11. Data based on *Der Fischer Weltalmanach 1982* (Frankfurt 1981), pp. 451, 487.

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to 56% for the US in 1981, but 90% in the USSR.[12] If one compares the alliances, which is the only procedure to be considered seriously, since 1950 not a year has passed in which the military expenditures of NATO have not been substantially higher than those of the Warsaw Pace.

Up to this point we have argued as if we accepted the base date of Soviet military expenses presented by the Pentagon. But this is itself problematic — for reasons too complex here. In short, though, such figures are more fiction than fact. Starting from an estimate of the material and personnel potentials of the Soviet Army, an extrapolation is made of the comparable costs in the US. The personnel costs, for example, of the Soviet's compulsory military service are computed according to the soldier's pay in the professional army in the US, with the result that an increase in the latter automatically leads to an "increase" in the Soviet military budget.[13] Basically, the same holds true for an inflationary development of costs for the weapons stockpile in the US, or also — if the computations are done in dollars — in case of an improvement of the position of the dollar in comparison to the ruble on the international exchange market. That the sources of the computation come from an interested party is cause for additional skepticism. Assertions about Soviet military expenditures coming from the Pentagon or the CIA always have the purpose of justifying US weapons expenses. Furthermore, these assertions are hardly verifiable without classified intelligence data. The independent research institutes for peace such as the Center for Defense Information or the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) also face these problems. However, their figures are a little more credible, since their researchers are not bound to the interests of the munitions lobby. In 1979, the last year SIPRI published details on this problem, this institute estimated that the military expenses of the USSR came to 9.1% of the Soviet GNP.[14] According to the same source, the Soviet military expenses in the détente years climbed altogether by 13% from 1971 to 1979. Whoever deems this incompatible with détente must answer the question why the strongest European NATO force, West Germany, which surely laid much of the groundwork for détente at the same time increased its military budget by 21%.[15] That the military expenses of the US during these years sunk (by 9%) probably has less to do with the fact that Nixon, Ford or Carter heeded the Siren's song of détente politicians, than that the US was carrying on a war in Vietnam in the base year of 1971. Only weapons lobbyists could accept as self-evident the need to keep the military budget in peacetime at the same level as during a war. In sum, it is clear that a comparison of the Soviet Union's armament expenses with those of the West during the last decade does not warrant alarmist conclusions regarding Soviet superiority, etc.

The Comparison of Forces for Europe. The demand for the military balance of both sides, also implicitly contained in Herf's argument, presupposes at least two points: that one define what is to be understood by "balance" and that one determine a weight for both sides. We will begin with the latter. The demand that the Warsaw Pact should find itself in "balance" with Europe and, at the same time, with the US is nonsense. Were Herf serious about the call for "balance" as the highest criterion of arms policy standards *and* about the call for the establishment of a state of balance in Europe, then he would — were he consistent — have to call for the complete decoupling of Western Europe's security from the US. But what is "balance"? From Herf's exposition it follows that he

12. *SIPRI Yearbook 1982*, (London 1982), p. 140.

13. On the problematic nature of this computation see chapter 1, "Die Militärausgaben der Welt im letzten Jahrzehnt," in the *SIPRI Yearbook 1982, op. cit.*, pp. 150ff.

15. *Ibid.*

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understands this concept to mean that an equal number of weapons are matched. He seems to consider warfare as a duel in which there is knife against knife, revolver agasinst revolver and missile against missle. But since ground and air-supported anti-tank weapons are far more important in repelling a tank invasion than a tank of one's own, one can only describe such an approach as foolish. Moreover, Herf handles the figures that he cites as proof of Soviet superiority in a most dishonest way. He quotes from "Military Balance 1981/1982"[16] without mentioning that here it is a question of a "worst case scenario" based on a highly dubious premise: while NATO is seen starting without supplementary support from the US, the Soviet side undertakes the complete mobilization of its Western and Southern military districts, deployed to the Central European front. The distance that must be traversed by them may seem minimal as seen from the US, but if one looks more closely, it appears somewhat differently. First, the divisions thus mobilized is made up of troops constituting only 30% of the military establishment which must be filled up by the call to reservists. Secondly, they would have to be transported to the front lines. Tanks are simply not capable of motoring the 650 cross-country kilometers which is the minimum distance they would have to cross enroute to the front. Therefore, if we work with the figures cited in "Military Balance," then 19,200 tanks, for example, would have to be loaded onto railroad cars, brought to Russia's Western boundary and there again unloaded (since the Soviet railroads have wide-gauge tracks while the Poles have regular gauge), loaded onto other railroad cars and then they could finally head West where more unloading would be needed. Inevitably the entire logistic process would be concentrated at a few railroad nodal points within the range of the Foreward Based Systems of the US and moreso of the Pershing I-A which has a target accuracy of approximately 450 meters. Herf operates on the assumption that during this whole time the North American Military would remain inactive. Should it use the time to transfer the NATO high command (SACEUR) — as was recently announced — from West Germany to England in order to make room for the battle?

A final comment on this point. The figures supporting the comparison of forces cited by Herf are questionable for still other reasons. The NATO countries have factored only the tanks in an actual state of war preparedness, and disregarded the tanks stored in depots, whereas on the Soviet side everything is factored into the computation, even things manufactured 30 years ago (like the T 54). Besides, according to the reports of exiled Soviet citizens, there is reason to believe that much of the material has no more value than scrap iron.[17] In the Yom Kippur war the Israelis annihilated within a few hours 1,300 pieces of these "wonder weapons."

Soviet Nuclear Armament. In terms of intercontinental missiles, Herf mentions only the Soviet SS-18. His comments on this point are so illuminating of his self-serving methods that they deserve to be quoted: "If the Russians were adherents of assured destruction theory, they would have no reason to build SS-18s, which made American ICBMs vulnerable . . . in a familiar pattern, the Soviets take an initiative and the Western response is attached by the Left as NUTS."[18]

16. As a precaution Herf does not cite the page numbers. (London 1981), the data are found on pp. 124f.

17. See *Die Rüstung der Sowjetunion: Rüstungdynamik und bürokratische Strukturen*, Dieter S. Lutz, ed. (Baden-Baden 1979), pp. 82-85. Wolf Perdelwitz, *Wollen die Russen den Krieg?: Ein Portrait der Roten Armee*, (Hamburg 1980), pp. 18f., 250f. On the qualitative development of the Soviet tanks compared to NATO's tanks see David Holloway, "Military Technology," in R. Amman, J.M. Cooper and R.W. Davies, *The Technological Level of Soviet Industry*, (Cambridge, Mass. 1977), pp. 407-489.

18. ICBM, Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles; NUTS, Nuclear Utilization Target Selection.

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The following assertions are contained in his thesis: 1) With respect to the modernization of intercontinental missiles "The Russians" have seized the initiative with the SS-18; 2) They have thereby unilaterally secured for themselves the possibility of a first strike; 3) The US military is also rearming in this area; 4) "The Russians" are not adherents of "massive retaliation" but of Nuclear Utilization Target Selection, i.e., a doctrine of limited atomic war strategy.

The SS-18 was tested in 1972 and deployed in 1974. As opposed to its forerunner, the SS-13, it had certain improvements that are relevant to the first strike capability claimed for it, especially a greater target accuracy(CEP)[19]: instead of 1.3-1.9 kilometers for the SS-13, the target accuracy of the SS-18 is 450-900 meters. In 1975 the "modal II" of the SS-18 was deployed as well with eight individually targetable warheads (MIRV). Were there actually no comparable missiles on the US side as Herf implies? Such American missiles existed: Minuteman II and III. Minuteman II was tested in 1964 and stationed in 1966. This missile has a target accuracy of 650 meters and only one warhead. This situation was changed by Minuteman III which was tested in 1968 and deployed in 1970.[20] It was the first missile to be equipped with over 3 individually targetable warheads (MIRV), five years before the SS-18. Its target accuracy (CEP) of 370 meters was more than four times greater than the SS-13, the Soviet's counterpart at that time, and it surpasses the SS-18 nearly by half.[21] Thus, the claim that the USSR initiated the arms race in the area of the technology of intercontinental missiles, can only be explained, even with the best intentions, by the ignorance of its spokesman.

Equally untenable is the claim that the Soviet Union has beefed up its nuclear stockpile in a time of détente, while the well-behaved US calmly maintained or had even reduced its own. The truth is rather that during the period both sides have energetically re-armed. The USSR at first attempted to balance out its deficit in delivery systems that it had *vis-à-vis* the US (i.e., to press forward construction which the US had already carried out in the 1960s), then converted to individually targetable multiple warheads — a development in which the US was ahead by five years. Before citing a few more statistics, an argument by Robert McNamara comes to mind from a speech he delivered on February 24th, 1967, when he was still responsible for American nuclear armaments: "The most meaningful and concrete estimation of nuclear capacity is provided by the number of individual warheads which can be employed precisely and with sufficient destructive power against specific priority targets."[22] Thus, it is not just the number of missiles that matters (which, as Kissinger once remarked, only make an enormous noise when they hit), but the number of individually targetable warheads that directed the US re-armament policy. (In the following we will confine ourselves to

19. CEP, Circular Error Probable.

20. The first strike quality of the Minuteman III is also, by the way, not disputed in official NATO publications and this is true also before the modernization of its warheads in 1979. See *War or Peace: The Official NATO Study of the Military Balance,* Rudiger Moniac, ed. (München 1982), p. 50.

21. On the SS-18 see Holloway, "Military Technology," *op. cit.,* p. 473 and *SIPRI Yearbook 1982, op. cit.,* p. 277; on the Minuteman II and III see: Holloway, "Military Technology," *op. cit.*, pp. 450, 473, and "*Rüstung und Abrüstung im Atomzeitalter,*" in *SIPRI 1977: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute,* I (Reinbek 1977), p. 56. Regarding Minuteman II we should mention that in October of 1979 the reequipping of 300 of the total 550 missiles with "Mark-12-A reentry missiles had begun, which have a target accuracy of 200 meters. See SIPRI 1980-81: *Rüstungjahrbuch '80-81* (Reinbek 1980), pp. 28f. On the SS-13 see: Holloway, "Military Technology," *op. cit.*, p. 462.

22. Robert McNamara, *Die Sicherheit des Westens: Bedrohung und Abwehr* (München 1969), p. 51.

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sea and land based missiles and exclude the bombers. This distorts the comparison in favor of the US because it has 27% of its nuclear attack force stationed on bombers, as compared with only 9% of the USSR's). As long as American missiles could deliver only one individual warhead, which was true in the sixties, their numbers climbed enormously from 18 in 1960 to 1,710 in 1969. During this same period the USSR raised their stockpile from 12 to 1,355.[23] By the end of the 1960s, the US had mastered the MIRV technique, i.e., it was now in a position to deliver more individually targetable warheads with fewer carrier missiles over vast stretches of territory. This is why in the 1970s they could hold constant the number of their missiles and now step up the quality of warheads from 1,710 in 1969 to 6,410 in 1975 and 7,032 in 1981.[24] Concurrently, the target accuracy of strikes was refined. The USSR utilized the MIRV technique only from approximately 1974 and sought to remedy this deficiency by the production of more carrier missiles each with one warhead. They thus increased their quantity of sea and land based missiles from 1,355 in 1969 to 2,308 in 1975. When they had succeeded with their technical breakthrough, they did what the US had done five years earlier: they held the number of carriers almost constant until 1981 (1981: 2,348) while the number of warheads was increased to 6,848.[25] How one could infer from this a unilateral Soviet policy of increased armament is inexplicable.

We also disagree with Herf's presentation of the problems of nuclear strategy. The scenario he unfolds to frighten his reader makes no sense. First, he implies that the Soviet leadership accepts the following line of reasoning: the Soviet army launches a first strike against American intercontinental missiles, costing the lives of 20 million Americans, but leaving in tact 78% of NATO's strategic nuclear potential (of which, 27% of the warheads are bomber based and 51% are submarine based).[26] Now the US leadership would begin to calculate — according to this presumed line of reasoning — that "only" 20 million are dead and refrain from pressing the buttons for a retaliatory strike. Whoever conceives the Soviet leadership capable of such a line of reasoning must take them to be a gang of irrational and insane adventurists (nuclear strategists, however, count on a rational and calculating opponent), or has never thought over the consequences of the thesis. Secondly, Herf says, the US no longer possesses even adequate means for a counterstrike. On this point, he should take a look at the relevant data. The Poseidon submarines re-equipped since 1979 with Trident I missiles still remain. Each submarine carries 16 missiles having a range of 7,400 kilometers and each missile carries 8 individually targetable warheads with a target accuracy better than that of the SS-18, i.e., 500 meters.[27] Thirdly, Herf does not explain what sense it makes to answer the stationing of first strike weapons on the one side by stationing of one's own first strike weapons (the MX with its 10 warheads and a target accuracy of 100 meters or less[28]) that would be eliminated by an actual first strike.

Herf also misrepresents the doctrine of nuclear war strategy advocated by the Soviet leadership. He rightly claims that the Soviet military has integrated into its war plan all kinds of nuclear weapons. We also made reference to this in "NATO and the Warsaw Pact."[29] Yet, it still cannot be concluded that the Soviets would advocate "limited

23. This occurred in 1960 according to Holloway, "Military Technology," *op. cit.,* pp. 465f., and in 1969 according to *SPIRI 1977, op. cit.,* pp. 56f.

24. (Land and sea-based systems, i.e., ICBM AND SLBM). *SIPRI Yearbook 1981, op. cit.,* p. 175.

25. *Ibid.*

26. See Moniac, ed., *War or Peace, op. cit.,* p. 49.

27. See *SIPRI 1980-81, op. cit.,* pp. 32f.

28. *Ibid.*, pp. 29f.

29. *Op. cit.*, p. 72.

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nuclear war." Had Herf adhered to his own postulate, "to look carefully at what they write" or had he only looked at the book *Soviet Strategy*[30] edited by J. Baylis and G. Segal, then he would have known that the Soviet military advocates a defense strategy which combines "massive retaliation" and "NUTS" — deterence by denial. What this doctrine has in common with "NUTS" is that nuclear strike weapons are aimed against selected military, logistical targets, etc. and the stationing of the SS-20s is actually in keeping with this doctrine. As opposed to a doctrine of "limited war," as put forward by Pentagon strategists, there is no proof that the Soviets believe nuclear war weapons can be stopped at some point. If one attends to "what they write," then it can be seen that they believe rather in an extraordinarily quick escalation to an all-out nuclear war in which — on this the military had to modify the position it held during the 1960s[31] — human civilization as a whole would suffer the most oppressive loss.[32] Herf suspects this when he — correctly — writes: "that the Soviets made it perfectly clear that they will retaliate against the United States if American missiles are fired at the Soviet Union from Western Europe." Yet, he draws no conclusions from this observation. We have probably occupied ourselves for too long with the "Soviet threat" and in particular with the claim that the USSR believes it can win a nuclear war. Our discussion has been excessively long because Herf does not ever intend to contrast this assumed Soviet strategy with a clear concept of US "nuclear deterrence." On the contrary, he wants to justify something with his claims about the Soviet Union that cannot be justified at all. Even if everything he says about Soviet armament were correct, then it would still not follow that the transition to a strategy of waging nuclear war is acceptable for the US.

The "Necessity of Rearmament." The real motive of Herf's article is an attempt to demonstrate the necessity of stationing Pershing II and Cruise missiles in the interest of world peace and European independence. In particular, Herf expects us to accept the following arguments: 1) That there are "crushing Soviet superiorities in intermediate range missiles aimed at Europe" and that the Soviets "face no threat from Western Europe which must be deterred," 2) That "it was the shift in the balance of forces at the strategic and theater levels caused by the growth in Soviet Military power that led to the NATO double decision," 3) That "rearmament" is necessary in order to block a decoupling of the US from Europe, 4) That Cruise missiles and Pershing IIs had to do with neither the idea of a first strike nor a change over to a doctrine of nuclear war strategy (NUTS).

While Western Europe in this intermediate range allegedly stands bare and unprotected, the Soviets have their SS-4s, SS-5s and SS-20s. If the Soviets actually mean well, then they could readily accept Reagan's "zero option," scrap their missiles and be content that the Pershing and Cruise missiles would not be installed. But in this calculation something has been overlooked here. Gert Bastian, major-general (retired) from the West German army (who because of his courageous criticism of NATO's double deci-

30. (London 1981).

31. The first time *Boennaja strategija* was published in 1962 the idea of a nuclear war limited to Europe was already denounced as an illusion, yet from the description of wars scenarios it can rightly be concluded that this military entertains the thought of victory in such a war. Meanwhile on the Soviet side the claim is made, among others by the head of the Soviet Military Academy in Moscow (GLEB), (at a press conference in Washington at the beginning of last year), that this work is completely antiquated.

32. See the contributions in *Soviet Strategy*, J. Baylis and G. Segal, eds. (London 1981), particulary the article by Robert L. Arnett, "Soviet Attitudes Towards Nuclear War: Do They Really Think They Can Win?" Arnett is a specialist in the US Army on Soviet Strategic Forces.

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sion was retired by a Social Democratic minister of defense), has added up all the intermediate range weapons systems that NATO would then still have in place: the US F-111 and FB-222 bombers, the A6E and A7E aircraft carrier based bombers and the submarine Poseidon C3 missiles under the command of the European commander-in-chief. There is, furthermore, the Vulcan bomber and the Polaris A3 missiles on British submarines and finally the French intermediate range missiles, the Mirage IV bomber and submarine missiles.[33] It may be that Herf considers all of these systems insignificant. However, the US's Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff, General Jones stated in his 1979 report to Congress: "The contribution of the US to the tactical nuclear potential of NATO consists in the F-111 and A-6 jets stationed in Europe as well as a considerable quantity of Poseidon warheads coordinated by SACEUR."[34] Should anyone claim, as was insinuated in Reagan's propaganda slogan "zero solution," that the primary consideration is where the detonations come from, i.e., whether they are land or sea-based, then one can only reply that it is always the approaching warheads that cause the damage.

We have already explained that there is no Soviet superiority on the strategic level that could justify "rearmament." Nor is there such a superiority within Europe. Undoubtedly, the SS-20 represents, in technical respects, an improvement as opposed to the SS-4 and SS-5 installed in 1959 and 1961. But there is no reason to dramatize this development. Thus, the armaments experts S. Lodgaard and P. Berg believe: "For intelligence services and military experts, the introduction of the SS-20 was (...) no surprise; on the contrary, it was technically overdue. (. . .) while the SS-20 meant to leap forward in counterforce capability, it represented no radical departure in doctrine. Both technologically and doctrinally, the phasing in of SS-20s was a 'natural,' almost unquestionable move. The decision may have seemed an easy one to make, and to a large extent it may have been reduced to a matter of military-bureaucratic automaticity, without much consideration of its impact on international affairs."[35]

It is important that the Soviet Union's SS-20 does not lead to a military option not previously available. The Soviets already had the possibility of launching nuclear weapons against NATO bases, nodal points of commerce, industrial installations, etc. and this possibility would remain with them even in the event that they scrap all the SS-20s: for the intercontinental missiles like the SS-18 are certainly also able to strike over short distances. On the other hand, the megatonage of a SS-20 warhead is even more than 10 times greater than the bomb dropped on Hiroshima. To speak here of "surgical strikes," "damage limitation" or of a selective strike whose effect could be precisely limited and thereby calculable is, in densely populated Western Europe, absurd.

Of more importance is the argument that the acceptance of the double decision by West European governments was intended to prevent a "decoupling" of the US. This is indeed one of NATO's major problems. This fear did not originate in the European thinking governments in the 1970s when the Soviet Union was gaining on the strategic nuclear level, nor in 1975 when the first SS-20 was spotted on an experimental flight, but somewhat earlier, when the US strategic nuclear superiority changed from an

33. Gert Bastian, "Notwendige Anmerkungen zum NATO — Doppelbeschluss in der Darstellung der Bundesregierung," in *Nachrüsten? Dokumente und Positionen zum NATO-Doppelbeschluss*, ed. by A. Mechtersheimer (Reinbek 1981), pp. 68-94. By way of fairness there still must be added that this computing method as applied to the Soviet side has to mention the Backfire bomber and the SS-N-5 submarine missiles besides the land-based missiles.

34. General D.G. Jones, US Joint Chiefs of Staff, "United States Military Posture for FY 1980," (Washington D.C.), pp. 32ff., 68ff. SACEUR, Supreme Allied Commander Europe.

35. *SIPRI Yearbook 1982, op. cit.*, p. 8.

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absolute to a relative one in the early 1960s. Afterwards, every thoughtful person had to realize that — presuming a Soviet attack — no American government would be prepared to jeopardize the US in defense of its European allies. As a Congressional subcommittee recognized in 1980, the introduction of a "flexible response" was an attempt to reach an accomodation between interests that are in fact irreconcilable in terms of the role of nuclear weapons.[36] The interests of the European states in being covered by the US nuclear "protective shield" are basically incompatible with the US's interest in keeping a possible nuclear conflict far from its territory and remaining below the level of strategic nuclear weapons, which however would relativize the American "protective shield." Herf senses something of these connections when he argues against the notion that the nuclear submarines attached to the European commander-in chief (SACEUR) and are a counter-weight to the SS-20s. He argues that they would be no creditable counter-threat. Why land-based missiles, at the exclusive authority of the American president, should be preferable in this respect is far from clear. We quoted above Herf's statement "that the Soviets made it perfectly clear," that they would answer an invasion of these missiles against their own territory with a strategic strike against the US. If even Herf knows this, then the President does as well, and that is why he would not use the missiles in *this* instance. In light of this, we are certainly not disputing that a few European governments intended to be "coupled" to the US by the stationing decision. But fundamental differences of interests cannot be overcome with the help of clever devices. Self-deception is even more likely when probably all of the concerned governments hardly consider the "emergency case" of a Soviet attack on Central Europe conceivable. Naturally one could also ask, on the other hand, whether the Soviet threat of a strategic counter-attack is actually serious and whether situations are not conceivable where the USSR has no other option than to answer on the intermediate level and that means Europe.

Rearmament, Limited Nuclear War and US Hegemony. The rhetorical image which Herf presents is so structured that he proceeds from an opposition between "MAD" and "NUTS," i.e., between "mutually assured destruction" as pure deterrence strategy and a doctrine of nuclear war. Then he refers to a series of critical points in MAD in order to establish conclusively the thesis — discussed already — that the SS-18 proves the Soviet Union's transition to NUTS. Nowhere, however, does he forthrightly advocate the adoption of the NUTS strategy as an American defense doctrine: rather he allows this notion to seep in as self-evident to the argument. This tactic has two advantages. On the one hand, he can avoid justifying "rearmament" and carrying his argument that it serves the strengthening of deterrence and Europe's coupling *ad absurdum.* On the other hand, since he does not exactly define the transition to "NUTS," he can leave the specificity of the present situation blatantly ill-defined.

Because we do not want to adopt this kind of argumentation, we will briefly have to call attention to what constitutes the difference between "MAD" and "NUTS."[37] In brief, MAD means that both sides cannot use their nuclear weapons since that would provoke a counter-strike from the other side thus leading to one's own annihilation. Naturally, this supposes that this capability for a "second strike" is not eliminated by a

36. *The Modernization of NATO's Long Range Theater Nuclear Forces*. Report prepared for the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, US House of Representatives, by the Foreign Affairs and National defense Division, Congressional Research Service (Washington 1981). (Ditto in "*Militärpolitik Dokumentation*," *Heft* 22, (Frankfurt 1981), pp. 9-76, here p. 28.

37. Süss, "NATO and the Warsaw Pact...," *op.cit.*, pp. 53-58.

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first strike. In contrast NUTS is used: "to characterize the various doctrines that seek to utilize nuclear weapons against specific targets in a complex of nuclear war-fighting situations intended to be limited, as well as the management over an extended period of a general nuclear war between the superpowers."[38]

"MAD" is just as much a self-deterrent as it is a deterrence to the other side. "NUTS" represents the attempt to eliminate the effect of self-deterrence and to make nuclear war calculable. The successful strategy of nuclear war in the sense of NUTS is linked to the following conditions: the opponent must be denied the capability of a second strike and/or one's own side must be in a position to deal out, on the one hand, such selective blows that a second strike is not provoked, or, on the other hand, one's own "third strike potential" is so great that the opponent then gives up the second strike. NUTS represents an interim solution when the opponent is offered a substitute battlefield that neither compels him to capitulate simply and passively nor to initiate an ultimate exchange. For one's own side this provides a kind of security buffer. We are speaking here of Europe. It may well be that all ideas about the limitability and manageability of a nuclear war are illusory, but when these illusions are in the heads of those who sit at the trigger the situation becomes even more dangerous.

The most significant lack of Herf's argument is that his exposition of NATO's double decision is not set into the context of the rearmament policy and strategic discussion in the US. This development can be understood fully only if it is seen against the background of the decline of American power, the loss of the US hegemonic position in the world market and the struggles for freedom in the oppressed and underdeveloped countries.[39] Equally appropriate here would be an analysis of the rise of the New Right which has a direct interest in the revival of the Cold War system adapted to changed conditions (dismantling the welfare state).[40] Both components combine in the attempt to compensate for the loss of the economic and ideological positions of hegemony with military force. Because of limited space we can only postulate this here. For now we must confine ourselves to the transition from "MAD" to "NUTS."

Herf glosses over the problem when he refers to the tactical nuclear weapons in Europe in order to suggest that "NUTS" has been basically operative since the 1950s. In so doing, he ignores the dimension of self-deterrence. He distorts the problem when he attempts to deny the suspicion that the stationing of Pershing IIs and cruise missiles is tied to a NUTS strategy by disclaiming their capability for an effective first strike. He can do this because he does not place these missiles in the context of the related armament measures.

No discussion of the stationing of these missiles in Europe can ignore the fact that 464 cruise missiles are only the tip of the iceberg. The US Navy projects the acquisition of 3,994 cruise missiles by 1989 and the US Air Force projects 3,020 for 1990.[41] Brzezinski summarized this project once in the follwoing words: "...as head of the

38. Spurgeon M. Keeny, Jr., and Wolfgang K.H. Panofsky, "MAD versus NUTS," in *Foreign Affairs* (Winter 1981-82), p. 289. Keeny was Assistant Director of the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency from 1969 to 1973, and Deputy Director of that Agency from 1977 to 1981. Panofsky was from 1977 to 1981 a member of the General Advisory Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament.

39. One must allow for the fact, on the other hand, that the (former) Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General David C. Jones thoroughly sees these connections. See "United States Military Posture for FY 1981," (Washington D.C.).

40. See Lucas, "Die Vereinigten Staaten...," *op. cit.*, and Lucas, "Eines Tages..." *op. cit.*

41. *Aviation Week and Space Technology*, August 31, 1981, p. 61; *SIPRI 1980-81, op. cit.*, p. 34.

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Soviet air defense I should prefer to defend the Soviet Union, by the middle or end of the 1990s, with the permanent air defense system in use against a 100 still very modern jets like the B-1 than against 5,000 cruise missiles that could penetrate the air defense system like a swarm of bees." In contrast, Reagan, Weinberger and Clark would like to have both the B-1 and the cruise missiles. Of equal if not greater importance are the extremely accurate Trident II missiles and, of course, the MX missiles. Lastly, we have to mention the construction of the submarine defense and world-wide satellite surveillance. In this mosaic, the Pershing II deserves a prominent place; after a flight time of 5 to 10 minutes it is still in a position to wipe out the logistic center of the military and political apparatus of the Warsaw Pact even though it is entrenched in bunkers that lie 30 or 60 meters beneath the earth's surface. Altogether we have a portrait of an army close to the dream of all nuclear planners — that of disarming the opponent in one blow. If this succeeds, then the number of causalities is no longer of military interest.

American military strategists have kept pace with these growing technical possibilities. These are not only, as Herf irresponsibly trivializes, "some younger, less cautious strategists" (p. 118) who make their plans. Keeny Jr. and Panofsky, who obviously have a somewhat better access to the relevant information,[42] confirm: "The theme that nuclear weapons can be successfully employed in war-fighting roles somehow shielded from MAD appears to be recurring with increasing frequency and seriousness."[43] In November, 1981, Weinberger, who would hardly be covered by Herf's qualification argued before the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee, that the US must create the means pursuant to winning a nuclear war against she USSR.[44] Emanating from this gentleman's Defense Department is also the first comprehensive plan for putting the new doctrine into practice: the "Fiscal Year 1984-1985 Defense Guidance" that was published by the *New York Times* in abridged form on May 30, 1982. There can be found the operational use of what can be done with the new technical possibilities: "Nuclear war strategy would be based on what is known as decapitation, meaning strikes at the Soviet political and military leadership and communication." To this end the Pershing IIs are, in particular, well suited. Should these plans fail and the war drag on longer, then there would still be no problem for the cruise missiles to reach their targets even though they might need a few hours to do so. "The new nuclear strategy calls on American forces to be able to 'render ineffective the total Soviet (and Soviet allied) military and political power structure... Those forces must be able to maintain 'through a protracted conflict period and afterward the capability to inflict very high levels of damage' on Soviet industry."

It is no longer a question of deterrence but of victory in nuclear war. "The civilian and military planners, having decided that protracted war is possible, say that American nuclear forces 'must prevail and be able to force the Soviet Union to seek earliest termination of hostilities on terms favorable to the United States'." It is now a matter of a global concept, and in no way only a matter of a direct confrontation with the USSR. The new nuclear strategy requires the "American forces to be ready to force their way into, say, the Persian Gulf, "if necessary, and not wait for an invitation from a friendly government..." The Rapid Deployment Force it is said, forms the instrument of this policy. In the latter case we conclude that the US nuclear weapons, whether they are in the US itself, stationed at sea or in Europe, would guarantee the dominance of

42. Interview with *Der Spiegel*, April 13, 1981, p. 164.
43. Keeny and Panofsky, "MAD versus NUTS," *op. cit.*, p. 293.
44. *Frankfurter Rundschau*, May 11, 1981 (According to Reuter).

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escalation and thereby subdue the USSR.[45] In the face of such planning it appears difficult for us to make sense of Herf's dictum "that there is a direct connection between the military power of the West and political freedom." Of course, in the Pentagon contingency plans are not only worked out; they are tested too. The staff maneuver "ivy league," that took place in March of 1982, tested for a simultaneous conflict by an attack of tactical nuclear weapons in South Korea, South West Asia and Western Europe.[46]

Conclusion

Herf is extremely critical of the European peace movement. To the extent that he does not brand the representatives of the peace movement as propagandists for Moscow, he reproaches it mostly for its hysteria, incompetence, neutralism and tendency for unilateral disarmament. The reproach of "naiveté" however appears to us as the most interesting. If he wants to say that many engaged in the peace movement are in fact not "specialists," until recently had little or no expertise in this area and are, therefore, dabbling into questions of military policy, then he is right. But he is certainly wrong if he believes that he differs from the activists in the peace movement on this point. The difference lies in the conclusion to be drawn from this situation: Herf is determined to hide his naiveté —here in the sense of inexpertise, but perhaps also indecisiveness— behind a not very successful deception. At one point he describes the path of "ultra-Leftists reeling over the Western Right." It appears here that he unintentionally describes his own political migration. This explains something: the Left in the US as in Western Europe, had to experience the loss of perspective and influence in the 1970s. We apparently share the experience with Herf. Many "ultra-Leftists," though, differ from others on the Left by their particular predilection for doctrines and by their loss of connection with reality. The political migration to the Right is even faster when such figures painfully feel the disconnection with reality all of a sudden and then take up doctrines as reality substitutes: e.g., an article in *Commentary*. That would account for Herf's uncritical dealings with propaganda material, and his rage against those who question his new beliefs. It is everyone's right to err and occasionally take off in the wrong direction, but one may not write sentences such as the following if one takes himself seriously: "I will argue that Western strategy (...) is fully compatible with the social and cultural values of the democratic, non-communist Left..." We are prepared to entertain many possibilities —even the notion that NATO would have to defend itself against an attack by the Warsaw Pact. But Western strategy is based on the threat of a massive invasion of nuclear weapons and therewith Europe's complete annihilation, probably the annihilation of the US as we and, because of the ecological consequences of such a war, perhaps even of the rest of the world. The use of nuclear weapons in case of defense is also genocide which cannot be compatible with the basic principles of any "Left." The "Left" of which Herf is speaking here is a label, and a label is something we will not argue about.

We believe that the European peace movement has put its "naiveté" to good use in the sense of a refusal to accept what is considered to be self-evident, of moralistic indignation and the disclosing of worst case thinking of Western military strategists. This disclosure has shown the above for what it is, namely, a professionally cultivated

45. For more detail on this see Süss, "NATO and the Warsaw Pact...," *op. cit.*, pp. 61f.; on the authenticity of these documents see Theodore Draper, "Dear Mr. Weinberger: An Open Reply to an Open Letter," *The New York Times*, November 4, 1982, pp. 26ff.

46. *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, March 31, 1982.

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paranoia. The world picture Herf offers is at bottom resignation. "In an anarchic system of nation states there is no alternative to deterrence as a means of preventing war." Were Herf's claim a correct one, then the procuring of nuclear weapons by all states would be absolutely unavoidable. The conviction that this kind of thinking would lead to greater security is an absurd hypothesis pure and simple. In the present situation such resignation is dangerous. In a naive way and without an accurate understanding of strategic and technical military development, it implies that nothing must change. What we are actually experiencing is an increasing destabilization of "deterrence" as a strategy owing to a nuclear war strategy. If rearmament presses forward, as desired by Messrs. Reagan and Weinberger, then it is very likely that within 10 years one side, i.e., the US, would have at its disposal the capability of a disarming first strike. Even those who identify wholeheartedly with this state cannot wish that result since the pressure on the other side to launch a preemptive first strike in a crisis situation would be almost overwhelming. The peace movement, in Europe as well as in the US, has not simply closed it eyes resignedly when confronted with this development. Rather, it opened them widely and thereby has recognized that this "security" system is rotten to the core. We live here in Berlin 80 kilometers from the Polish border and 600 kilometers from the Soviet border in a situation which is hardly conducive to self-deception regarding any laxity with which the USSR carries out its security interests. Naturally, we have also not forgotten the event which generated and still generates a broad foundation of legitimacy for this security policy in the Soviet people. During World War II 20 million Soviet citizens died. Other peoples have suffered similarly by this war or even worse, like the Polish people. The Polish people do not have the power to realize in like manner their historically correspondent security needs. They must, rather, even today, pay the price for what the *Deutsches Reich* inflicted on the Soviet Union. We —as little as anyone else in the peace movement— do not intend to put ourselves into a situation similiar to that of the Poles. Yet, the alternative between subjection and nuclear deterrence by the additional recognition of American leadership, as interpreted by Herf, is as false as it is unimaginative. To maintain, "there is a direct connection between the military power of the West and political freedom" with respect to the "freedom" the US defends in, say, Latin-America or in South Korea by its "military power," is political cynicism. We learned of the "American mission" during the Vietnam war, and our memory is not so feeble that it could be lost because of an easily recognizable alarmism. Political freedom is achieved in a large part of the world only against the US dominant interests and in a small part of the world against the dominant Soviet interests. We do not want to be bound to either one of these superpowers.

It is not a question of a conflict between "the capitalist, rich, politically divided and militarily weak West European consumer societies," preparing themselves to subordinate "the Russians" and a pure, free, strong America. This populist, nationalistic and militaristic jargon we know all too well from German history. It is also not a question of a conflict between the "European" peace movement and the "US." Since the spread of the American peace movement this perspective is fully outdated. The peace movement, whether American or European, is opposed by a dwindling number of governmental ideologists for rearmament who, in the face of a growing consciousness for peace in their respective countries, are increasingly on the defensive. Jeffery Herf must decide to which side he wants to belong.

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STRANGE ENCOUNTER WITH A FAMILIAR GHOST*

by Axel Honneth and Otto Kallscheur

A ghost is haunting North America — the ghost of the European peace movement. But not only have all the ruling powers of the US united in a holy alliance against the ghost of "neutralism;" even in some corners of the academic Left — including the editing rooms of *Telos* — horror is spreading: are not mass demonstrations in all major Western European cities against the installation of American Pershings simply trailblazers for Soviet expansionism? How can these otherwise celebrated "new social movements" not realize that only the strengthening of the "nuclear link" between the US and West Germany can protect their struggle for more freedom and civil rights against a totalitarian future in the shadow of the Soviet stratocracy? Have voices not been heard even from France, West Germany's socialist-governed neighbor, warning of the reawakening of German nationalism and its totalitarian proclivities?

Of course, friends, all this is rubbish. But have no fear, we do not want to replay for you the **boring melody** of the strategic computations about range, target accuracy, transportation systems, land or sea bases (whether it be to the Stockholm's SIPRI, London's IISS, **forget about the Pentagon**). Rather we want to shed some **light on your horror stories with three simple arguments.** While comrades Walter Süss and Michael Lucas in their article in this issue have kindly taken the trouble of dismantling the arguments of would-be strategist Jeff Herf step by step, we want to say briefly something concerning the political identity of the West German peace movement.

The West German peace movement is neither a puppet of Soviet interests nor an actor with any uniform strategic practice. Its consensus does not consist primarily in common conceptions of goals but only in the common resistance to further nuclear armament. Although the immediate cause of its formation and mass appeal was the NATO decision to station a new medium-range system under American command by the end of 1983 in West Germany, already the country with the greatest density of missile bases, the historical roots and political breadth of the West German peace movement reach farther back. *Historically*, it is connected to the "Struggle Against Atomic Death" campaign, with which trade union and church groups in the early fifties unsuccessfully sought to prevent the rearming of West Germany. Both movements even then could draw on the experiences of the antifascist resistance, to which domestically circles in the Protestant Church and — mainly from England — the exiled Social Democrats had contributed. Moreover, the student movement of the sixties, whose protest against the Viet Nam War made the imperialistic face of the "free West" a moral issue in domestic politics, is an additional antecedent of the contemporary peace movement. *Politically*, the spectrum of the mass demonstrations today in Bonn and Berlin as well as in the peace initiatives in many provincial cities is even more comprehensive. In addition to ecclesiastical and trade-union groups, the ecology movement, which during the seventies warned the public of the danger of nuclear power plants as "stationary bombs," the women's movement, the "Greens" as a party, and growing sectors of the Social Democratic Party are now contributing to a broad-based peace movement. This

* Translated by Karen G. Jefchak. Boldface indicates English terms used in the original text.

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movement could attain the strength which it now has only because it is an open alliance of the most varied social movements and political initiatives whose common denominator is a *moral stand* for the determined rejection of further *rearmament in the Western as well as in the Eastern bloc*. For this very reason the doubtlessly existing "adherents of the other super power" (Bahro), i.e., the pro-Soviet splinter-group of the German Communist Party (DKP), can never play more than a marginal role. Otherwise there would be no peace movement.

Secondly, it is for this very reason false, when the articles by Herf, Lee and Berman circumscribe the central political option of the new peace movement as "neutrality," the "nationalist" danger which Berman documents with a curious cocktail of impressions from Böll, Grass, Syberberg and the Berlin Prussia Exposition. The "quest for national identity," it is claimed, tends to propel the peace proponents out of the "internationalist" community of the North Atlantic Pact into the uncertain waters of neutrality or, in other words, into the arms of the Soviet Union.

Disregarding Berman's improvised feuilleton (the thesis of moral and cultural similarity between Heinrich Böll and Rolf Syberberg can in fact be based only on a lack of familiarity with their works, not to mention the difference between Böll's Rhenish-Catholic humanism and the Prussian-Protestant "nation state"...), no goal of the peace movement beyond preventing the installation of a West German "theater" for "limited nuclear wars" can be designated as "neutrality." *If* there is such a common goal, it would be for the "*disengagement*" of both nuclear super powers, i.e., the pulling back of the nuclear potential from the front line of the bloc-confrontation in Central Europe. Within the peace movement there are very diverse understandings of how this goal can be achieved; the neutralist option is just *one* among many, as was correctly determined in a recent anthology on alternative defense policy.[1]

The creation of a nuclear-free zone in Central Europe — at least in those countries which are not themselves atomic powers — and therefore have absolutely *no control* over their use! — has, moreover, nothing to do with the demand (made at most by a minority in the peace movement) to leave NATO. Nor does, for example, the demand of the CND or the Dutch Ecumenical Peace Council for unilateral disarmament as the path to disengagement. On the contrary, most criticisms of medium-range and tactical nuclear weapons are based precisely upon the intention, from within NATO, of making the *global* strategic balance of the super powers — and not the existing imbalances in almost all areas of weapon types — the starting point for a reduction in the arsenals stationed on both sides of the iron curtain. The goal of all of these disengagement concepts — from the "Palme Commission's" proposal before the UN and that of the SPD defense-expert Bahr for a 300 kilometer-wide denuclearized zone in Central Europe to the campaign of the Russell Peace Foundation for a "nuclear-free Europe from Portugal to Poland" — is therefore the establishment of a European security system, which no longer depends solely on the (still existing) "second strike capability" of the super powers. Thus, they are all connected to the *intentions* of the policy of détente, which as West Germany's "new ostpolitik," doubtlessly also had *national* components: reconciliation with World War II opponents in the East (the German-Polish Treaty) and the relation with the second German state, in which, not accidentally, there now also exists a new, although less spectacular, peace movement. We are unable to see what all this has to do with "reactionary nationalism." One could more easily propose the opposite thesis: if there has been a deepened awareness of the unmastered *problem*

1. I.F. Albrecht, Buro, Narr, Vach, et. al., *Frieden mit anderen Waffen* (Reinbek: 1981).

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of German national identity in the peace movement, then it is precisely because the division of Europe into two military blocs and the dangers arising from their rearmament are increasingly becoming comprehensible as *results* of German National Socialism and World War II. That the French Socialists, now that they are in power, continue to pursue a Gaullist military policy and therefore have an interest in strengthening the atomic buffer-zone in West Germany — as a glacis for their autonomous "force de frappe" — may explain a partial convergence of interest between Mitterand and Reagan (or Helmut Kohl) but hardly justifies Andre Gorz's global suspicion of totalitarian leanings in the Social Democrats' efforts towards détente.

Finally, the thesis that détente is incompatible with moral or practical solidarity with civil rights and emancipation movements in the Soviet sphere derives not only from the classical argumentation pattern of the Cold War, but it is also empirically refuted by the fact that precisely as a result of the European "détente" phase the coercive consensus in Eastern Europe repeatedly fell apart, most recently in Poland with Solidarity, and a very much lower, more modest and less comprehensive social level with the peace movement of youth and the churches in East Germany. It is hardly an accident that the Helsinki Accord has become an ideological explosive in the Eastern bloc. Here too, the opposite of Herf's hope to support the comrades in KOR with Pershing rockets can more readily be recognized as the political and moral aim of the peace movement. It is concerned with a *critique of the "bloc logic"* which permits the political elites in East and West to defame *social movements* in their own countries as partisans of the hostile superpower, thereby replacing the logic of *publicity* — which is one of the prerequisites for the collective learning process of social movements — with the logic of *Berufsverbot* and domestic espionage.

Certainly the most paradoxical objection raised against the goals of the European or German peace movement lies in the apodictic statement that "Western values" can be defended only with the help of Reagan's nuclear policy. This assertion contains at least one empirically questionable assumption and one logically questionable conclusion. It is based on the claim of the empirical social realization of universal values in the countries of Western capitalism. Even if, just for a moment, we accept the problematic formulation of "Western values," i.e., that the universal principles of justice, democracy and equality are solely the ethical result of a "Western" process of enlightenment, there still remains the decisive and in fact trivial question as to whether these principles have actually been socially realized in the countries of the capitalist West. Not even an elementary knowledge of the results of social research is necessary to doubt this. Simply a look at the daily newspaper — at least if it is *The New York Times* — should, in view of the unemployment figures, the reports of persistent racial discrimination, and the news about the open support of bloody military dictatorships, make clear that it is altogether cynical to describe Western capitalism as the "really existing" form of universal principles. Of course, we all share the goals of "equality, fraternity and justice." But while ten years ago it was still normal to make precisely these values the standard for a critique of capitalism, we had to wait for Jeff Herf to experience the spectacle in which they emerge as arguments for the accumulation of overkill potentials in a "quarterly journal of radical thought."

The central tenet not only contains an empirically naive insinuation but also draws a false conclusion. Universal principles, which it is arrogant to even refer to as "Western," demand by their very nature that every possible political form, including military policy, be measured not just by the standard of technical appropriateness but

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also with regard to its compatibility with democracy. Thus, the military arms policy of NATO must not — without violating the very ethical values one seeks to defend — be judged solely in terms of their deterence value but also for its effect on détente and its democratic legitimacy. The "Hessian Institute for Peace and Conflict Research" in Frankfurt, a distinguished research institute, has proposed the introduction of at least five comparative criteria with which to test the value of different military defense concepts: the prevention of war is not only a question of the best possible defense concept. It is first of all a political, not a military-technical problem. We therefore propose that the possible advantages to détente arising from changes in the defense concepts be tested gradually. This could include a further unilateral reduction of nuclear field weapons as well as the withdrawal of delivery systems stationed near the border. These measures should be combined with the offer to discuss the military strategies pursued by both sides as well as their effects upon stability in Europe in the context of the arms control negotiation." Thus the peace movement is precisely an attempt to pursue the universal principles within the realm of military policy. But Herf, who appropriates these principles for his line of argument, violates them himself by disregarding all criteria that go beyond strategic perspective. He is a mere technocrat to whom military policy seems to have nothing to do with ethical values.

We in no way deny (but who does deny it?) that social movements might need radical criticism. This is especially true for such a heterogenous phenomenon as the European peace movement. But the weapon of critique which is here necessary will meet its mark only if — facing the war — it includes a critique of weaponry.

As we in Europe have been able to learn — though not yet from the pages of *Telos* — this critique of weaponry is arising from the spirit of Western values in the North of America as well. The ghost of pacifism — in the form of the freeze movement which encompasses ever more citizens — has little material, but plenty of moral force.

Encore un effort, camérades!

THE VIEW FROM AUSTRALIA

by Boris Frankel

Recent articles in *Telos* raise the question of whether the journal is moving in a Right-wing direction or is developing a new theoretical analysis which the rest of the Left cannot comprehend. Herf's article which came out openly in defense of NATO policy, has shocked and bewildered many *Telos* readers. While it is clear that Herf's position is not a popular one, it can nevertheless be seen as a logical extension of the critique of the Soviet Union and the peace movement put forward by people such as Arato, Castoriadis, Cohen, Feher, Heller, Piccone, Zaslavsky and others. While the latter all seem to reject Herf's open support for NATO, they are all preoccupied with the USSR as the major threat to world peace. The following comments are not meant to reiterate the polemics concerning the role and nature of the various peace movements. Rather,

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I will focus briefly on controversial issues such as 1) the Soviet Union as a major threat to world peace; 2) Hong Kongisation of Western Europe; 3) interpretations of Atlanticism; 4) the *Telos* position on Third World countries; and finally, 5) the political consequences of seeing the world through American eyes.

The Soviet Union

Although Arato, Cohen, Piccone and Zaslavsky disagree with important aspects of Castoriadis' analysis of the nature and role of the military industrial complex in USSR, they have generally conveyed the impression that the rest of the Left is naive and grossly underestimates the danger to the rest of the world posed by the Soviet regime. While there is no doubt that important elements within Western peace movements project a naive, Christian or charitable trust towards the USSR, it is another thing to smear the whole Left as being soft on Communism. There is much irony in the fact that Herf's view of the Soviet threat is, in many respects, indistinguishable from the Maoist line on "Soviet social-imperialism." Certainly, Herf's open support for NATO reads like the Chinese support for the Thatchers and Strausses of this world. Similarly, Arato's claim that NATO has never been anti-Left but only anti-Soviet, is not only laughable, but also an indication of the dangerous misconceptions of recent history flowing from an obsession with the Soviet Union.

This obsession with the USSR as the major threat to world peace has already had negative effects in countries such as Australia. For example, Maoists have lined up with Fraser's conservative government in calling for the defense of Australia against a non-existent "Soviet threat" in the Indian and Pacific oceans — a position which consolidates the worst forms of militarism, secures American bases and makes an independent foreign policy very difficult to achieve. Although Arato and Cohen recognize that Herf's position ignores the struggle for national sovereignity (i.e., independence from U.S. domination), their own position is nevertheless so contradictory that they could be easily cited with approval by Right-wing hawks. *Telos* editors such as Arato, Cohen, Piccone and Zaslavsky probably see themselves as Left *Realpolitik* analysts who are able to hold unpopular views for the greater and long term cause of freedom. But their reading of the relations between the Soviet Union and the West is becoming so distorted that it threatens to overshadow all their analyses and support of social movements fighting against capitalist class domination.

While I share the general analysis of most articles published in *Telos* on the internal situation in Eastern Europe (with the notable exception of Castoriadis' analysis), it is absolutely vital that one does not blur the differences between the Soviet regime's domestic and foreign policies. Soviet foreign policy is much more complex than subtle variations of the simple thesis of "expanding totalitarianism." If *Telos* editors disagree with Castoriadis' interpretation of the Soviet threat, then they will have to provide their readers with much more convincing and detailed explanations of the varying patterns and relations which the USSR has with other countries. American foreign policy has been a disaster in recent decades as a consequence of seeing the Soviet threat in simple domino terms. It is rather ironic that *Telos* editors now present variations of this half-baked domino analysis under the name of 'Hong Kongisation,' or other such theories. *Telos* readers demand a more detailed analysis of a) the historical development of conventional and nuclear capacities in Eastern Europe; b) how the Soviet regime could destroy the Western European parliamentary systems; and c) whether the USSR would actually benefit or suffer from military expansionism. Up until this point, *Telos* has only provided convincing analyses of the internal situation in the Soviet Union. It has not

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stated how the USSR could crush the Western European powers with conventional forces — in fact Piccone and others do not believe this is a Soviet goal or that the Soviets have the capacity to actually embark on such a devastating adventure. Moreover, Zaslavsky does not believe that the Soviet military industrial complex is expanding irreversibly. On the contrary, the Soviet regime is more threatened by domestic economic reforms — especially if such reforms weakened the far from unified and homogeneous military industrial apparatus. All the more reason to promote disarmament rather than stress the military threat, as do Castoriadis and Gorz, who echo the military rearmament policies of Mitterand.

If *Telos* wishes to develop a critically independent policy distinct from Reaganism and French national chauvinism, it will have to be more specific about the short term proposals for disarmament instead of merely criticizing peace movements. For, if one has the Soviet threat as one's primary focus, it is difficult simultaneously to propose nuclear disarmament and military parity with the USSR. For example, Mitterand's pre-election commitment to disarmament has easily given way to a revamped Gaullist ideology of military independence from the superpowers. Arato and Cohen believe that in the modern age nation states in Europe can only defend themselves with nuclear weapons. Hence, they believe that a non-nuclear Western Europe would be subject to Soviet blackmail. Their defense of free "civil societies" is thus locked into the logic of exterminism. In their critique of European peace movements, various *Telos* editors are in danger of recycling the old American recipe for freedom in Vietnam — namely, "we had to destroy the village to save it." After all, Gorz has openly proclaimed that it is "better to be dead than Red."

The various critiques of the demand for unilateral nuclear disarmament in Western Europe tend to forget that the short term implications of unilateralism in Europe actually means no nuclear weapons in Western Europe (even though both the Soviet Union and the United States will retain their weapons in the forseeable future). Serious proponents of unilateral disarmament do not believe that Western peace movements have power over the governments in the USSR or the U.S. But the immediate objective is to free Western Europe (if not the whole of Europe) from the spiralling arms race. In contrast, bilateral disarmament is another way of justifying the proliferation of more Mitterand style forms of "national nuclear independence" — a position which has nothing to do with Left-wing politics. The counter-argument that Western Europe needs an independent nuclear deterrent to bargain with the superpowers, is precisely the logic of the arms race which has brought the world to the brink of disaster. Nuclear weapons, and the military-industrial establishment that goes with them, are extremely difficult to dismantle. For the Left to advocate German, Dutch, Belgium, Italian and other European versions of British and French nuclear forces is both myopic and anti-human. For it is naive to believe that European governments can uncouple themselves from the United States and pursue bilateral talks with the USSR without provoking a major domestic and international crises within the NATO member countries. Mitterand is a staunch supporter of American policies in Europe. It is also myopic to believe that other European powers will be content to rely on the British or French nuclear deterrent. The chance of a new European arms race, with each power building its own "independent force," cannot be discounted (given the existing rivalry between E.E.C. countries). More importantly, it has only been the new peace movement demanding unilateral disarmament which has increased the chances of peace. Bilateralism will only fragment the international peace movement, possibly lead to a freeze of certain weapons, but perpetuate and most likely exacerbate the arms race in

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the future. The onus is thus on *Telos* contributors to show that bilateral, Mitterand-style forms of military expansionism will not be duplicated by other European governments. All previous policies short of unilateralism have not only failed to bring about nuclear disarmament, but have been responsible for the current state of nuclear stockpiles.

Hong Kongisation

Piccone has been promoting the line that the West European peace movements are in danger of simply furthering the interests of West European Capital against American corporations. This scenario is merely an extension of Piccone's artificial negativity thesis which conceives most social movements (whether peace or ecology movements, etc.) as being manifestations of Capital's omniscient logic of rationalization and integration. Not only does this thesis block the possible alternatives for change (for it is very hard to recognize genuine negations as opposed to "artificial negations"), but it raises the whole issue of how does the Left in Western Europe, Japan or Australia mobilize mass movements which attempt to preserve human life — even if it is not immediately "the good life." Yet, one of the reasons for rejecting the view that the Soviet Union is the major threat to peace flows directly from the Piccone and Zaslavsky line on the Soviet regimes' dependency on Western technology. For pragmatic reasons, the Soviet leadership will not wish to invade the West with conventional or nuclear arms. The cost would be prohibitive and the end result counterproductive. I agree with Zaslavsky that within Eastern Europe minor economic and social reforms will not dramatically improve the social order, while major reforms threaten the survival of the party dictatorship. But if minor socio-economic reforms will not resolve the tremendous crises facing the Soviet regime, military expansion certainly will not either. It is one thing to invade Afghanistan, and quite another to march into Western Europe or selectively blow it up with nuclear weapons. Arato and Cohen overestimate the accuracy and reliability of nuclear weapons which could contaminate Eastern Europe in any attack on Western Europe. The issue then boils down to whether the USSR can domiante Western Europe indirectly. The answer to this must be related to the current state of health in Eastern and Western Europe rather than evaluated on purely technical grounds.

If we look at Hong Kong, it can be seen that this capitalist enclave is having far more affect on China than vice versa. Even the future official takeover of Hong Kong is most unlikely to result in the feared destruction of existing social relations in the British colony. Either Arato and Cohen fear the eventual destruction of civil liberties in Hong Kong and Western Europe (through indirect Soviet control), or else the current state of capitalist production and civil liberties in Hong Kong and Finland hardly justifies the risks involved in building up an independent nuclear deterrent in Western Europe. But Hong Kongisation is a poor metaphor to use in relation to Western Europe. Put in blunt terms, it is impossible for the USSR to digest the whole of Western Europe (as China can Hong Kong), without seriously stretching the capacity of the Soviet regime to maintain social hegemony in all of its old and new empire. In contrast to the U.S., which has massive economic investments in Western Europe (and can destabilize individual countries by threatening to withdraw investments or impose other indirect penalties), the USSR has very little indirect economic leverage over Western Europe. Any attempt by the Soviet leadership to control Europe indirectly, would involve balancing the Russian desire for more technology against the strategic difficulties entailed in managing such a diverse range of volatile populations. Indirect control of Western Europe would only become a major burden to the Soviet leadership if

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capitalist production failed to ease the problems facing the Soviet regime, i.e., how to deliver more goods to the people of Eastern Europe without losing control or creating more Polands. Also, very importantly, if life in Western Europe deteriorates further as a result of Soviet indirect economic policy or military blackmail, (thus adding to the current insoluable depression), it is difficult to imagine that governments in Western Europe will be able to cope short of neo-fascist solutions, or that the USSR will be able to control social rebellion short of military garrisons.

At the moment, it is mainly the Left anti-Atlanticist and anti-Monetarist social movements which stand between more democracy or capitalist authoritarian solutions to the depression. Hence, the Soviet regime would have to confront and overcome an already seriously polarized Western European political scene before it could even dream of imposing indirect control. The worst possible scenario of Soviet military suppression in Western Europe is just not on; but in reality, such a conventional attack (assuming that muchof Western Europe's industry remained intact — which is highly unlikely!) would be a short term scenario. Conventional war has led to the collapse of all empires in the twentieth century — whether Czarist, Hapsburg British or Portugese. Any new Soviet empire would be no exception. Its collapse would also bring with it the liberation of people in Eastern Europe. But this whole scenario is not even on the agenda simply because the Soviet Union is not contemplating a military takeover of Western Europe. Ultimately, Arato and Cohen do not show how the Soviet Union can establish indirect control over Western Europe. In any event, if one has a choice, it is better (in Gorz's terms) to be Hong Konged than dead.

Atlanticism

So far, contributors to *Telos* have analysed the peace movement in narrow terms, i.e., how has the peace movement related and responded to events in Eastern Europe. Just as the old Left evaluated the rest of the world through the single question of how does this or that policy affect the Soviet workers' state, so too, *Telos* sees everything through the prisms of Eastern European dissidents. Just as the old Left had to abandon radical domestic strategy in the interests of Soviet foreign policy, so too, *Telos* contributors are placing the Soviet threat above all domestic radical struggles. Writers such as Arato, Cohen and Piccone reduce the European Left's critique of Atlanticism to the issue of military strategy and naive calls for peace. They almost completely ignore the internal struggles within most West European Socialist and Labor parties. These struggles are not just about the issue of NATO or Cruise missiles. they also involve the struggle between the Left and Right over a whole range of domestic socio-economic policies. Given the legacy of Schmidt, Callaghan, etc. — plus the austerity programs of Thatcher and her European counterparts — it is no accident that the opponents of Atlanticism happen to be also opponents of Monetarist domestic policies.

If *Telos* is serious about a third way between Reaganism and the so called naive peace movements, then it has to confront the political economic costs of Western defense in the midst of grave socio-economic depression. National sovereignty becomes a Right-wing farce if it entails continued mass unemployment, austerity programs and rising levels of poverty. On the other hand, Piccone and Zaslvasky's concept of 'military Keynesianism' (to describe Reagan's policies), sounds good but has nothing to do with either Keynesianism or Reagan's actual policies. High-tech, military expansion does not create aggregate demand and thus acts as the antithesis to a Keynesian consumer-led recovery. It is the attempt of the Social Democratic Left to introduce a Left-Keynesian economic program which goes against the conservative support of NATO and the

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introduction of military hardware such as Trident submarines. If *Telos* writers believe that West European societies need to defend themselves against the Soviet threat, then it is necessary to show how near-bankrupt governments can afford new sophisticated military hardware (to match the USSR) and still afford Left social programs. If the Left Keynesian domestic policies are themselves most unlikely to resolve deep seated crises (and the proponents of these alternative economic programs wish to cut military expenditure drastically!), then what socio-economic strategy does *Telos* propose in Western Europe, Japan and Australia? Perhaps a lot more political economy and less abstract defenses of the public sphere may illuminate *Telos* readers as to what viable *short-term* policies can reconcile the old guns versus butter dilemma confronting societies today. For how can such independent national defense policies a), extricate societies from U.S. hegemony — especially the removal of U.S. bases; b), not become excuses for increased militarisation of Western Europe, Japan and Australia; and c), get working class populations out of the depression without corporatist, fascist or other authoritarian programs.

The Third World

Until very recently, *Telos* has devoted very little space to analysing Third World countries. Piccone has made it clear that he opposes Marxist-Lininist regimes in these countries. Two issues are involved: 1) Is the USSR a progressive force in the Third World even though it represses its own people; 2) Are there *any* revolutionary movements that *Telos* readers can identify with. While *Telos* is perfectly correct in describing the Soviet regime as one which has to be stripped of all images associated with social revolution, it is a gross oversimplification to lump into the one boat the invasion of Afghanistan and Soviet policy in other countries. The cynical and pragmatic support for any movement or regime which enhances Soviet interests is well documented. Yet, the USSR can still play (indirectly) a revolutionary role in certain countries despite its self-calculating interests — or more precisely, because of its cynical adventurism. Hence for example, it gave vital military aid to revolutionaries in African countries such as Angola who would have been overthrown by right-wing movements and mercenaries supported by South Africa and the U.S. *Telos* ignores the contradictory nature of Soviet foreign policy and also remains silent on the many reactionary policies of the Mitterand government in Third World countries. In uncritically siding with the French "self-defense" capacity against the "Soviet threat," *Telos* has conveniently divorced this military capacity from the vital role of the French military industrial complex in furthering French imperialist policies, e.g., its military bases in Africa, massive arms exports proliferation of nuclear fuel and nuclear testing in the Pacific. But just as one does not have to reduce all of Mitterand's policies to the same negative level, e.g., the French critique of American policy in Central America, so too it is necessary to recognize the varying consequences of Soviet policy in Third World countries.

If *Telos* cannot identify with Marxist-Leninist movements in the Third World, then it is reduced to a position of abstract Leftism. The problem with some *Telos* writers is that they work with an implicit check list of ideals such as decentralized, non-bureaucratic control which most revolutionary movements in Africa or Asia fail to meet. *Telos*, quite correctly, does not deny support to Soviet dissidents or the Solidarity movement simply because many of these dissidents are religious nationalists or because Solidarity contains significant elements of conservative anti-Semites, sexists and national chauvinists. One can still support large independence or revolutionary movements even though one should never cease to attack the sexist, and chauvinist elements or

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apologize for concentration camps whether Cuban or Iranian. While *Telos* is quick to attack Marxist-Leninist movements or the Iranian regime (which most Left people would not support in any case), where is *Telos*' condemnation of the reactionary Afghan tribes fighting the Soviet troops? Or do 'traditional organic' non-Marxist movements which are anti-Soviet (and which would almost certainly carry out a Pol Pot style blood bath if they were victorious), meet with *Telos*' approval? At least, *Telos* could try to be morally consistent.

If *Telos* has its way with movements in the Third World, the purity of its checklist will mean that the oppressed in Central and Latin America, Asia and Africa will be forced to wait another hundred or so years until capitalists develop these societies to a level of culture which enables people to read *Telos* articles on artificial negativity. Then, it is assumed, the ground for social change may be ready. There has never been an ideal or pure revolutionary movement in the whole history of humanity. *Telos* editors do not want to dirty their hands with the dilemma of social change; but the historical reality of struggles in El Salvador or Namibia do not conform to scenarios of non-violent, rational change. Also, *Telos* editors must confront the reality that there can be no independent initiatives in the Third World (which are viable outside American or Soviet influence) unless there is a shift in the balance of power in Western Europe, Japan and other countries. There can be no shift in the balance of power in Western Europe unless there is a broad rejection of Atlanticism — meaning a rejection of military buildup, monetarist socio-economic policies and the continued impoverishment of the Third World "South" by the imperialist "North."

Telos' American Parochialism

As a journal which devotes very little space to the analysis of American society, it is ironic the *Telos* projects an American parochialism underneath its European translations. The old Marxist Eurocentrism has migrated to U.S. where, in a new form, the general neglect of the Third World and other countries has been clearly evident for the past 15 years. Most *Telos* writers are ill equipped to analyse concrete political economic strategies and programs. The consistent theoretical critique of Marxism-Leninism has now foundered on the rocks of real political choices — namely, what to do about the threat of nuclear war. But the reliance of *Telos* projects a policy which, for all its theoretical differences with American foreign policy and capitalist values, nvertheless takes sides with the U.S. against the majority of the Left in other countries. Just as the French Left is the odd Left out in Western Europe, so too, *Telos* is objectively siding with its supposed enemies in the Pentagon and in Right-wing Social Democratic parties.

If *Telos* wishes to develop a new Left paradigm which can defend the valued concepts of social justice, freedom and democracy, it faces practical and theoretical dilemmas: 1) Can *Telos* contibutors overcome their ignorance of other societies and avoid embarrassingly over-generalized analyses? 2) If *Telos* claims the majority of the Left are naive or working with old categories, then just what does *Telos* mean when it uses terms such as imperialism, capitalism, class, etc. — or are these concepts also obsolete? 3) If American capitalism is being restructured and the peace movements are mere pawns in this strategy, does *Telos* believe this restructuring will be successful? 4) If not, is *Telos* leaving its readers with more black news — reflecting the lack of mass movements in the U.S. — or do *Telos* editors have new ideas about what liberation means and which strategies are viable in the short term? 5) Which social movements does *Telos* actually support, and is this support compatible with its current advocacy of military preparedness against the "Soviet threat?" The answers are crucial if *Telos* is to reestablish its credibility as a journal fighting for human liberations. Or has *Telos* lost its 'telos'?

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The Double Decision Still Makes Sense: A Response to My Critics

by Jeffrey Herf

If the beliefs and proposals of the peace movements and their intellectuals were to be implemented, war would be likelier and political freedom in Western Europe would be placed under the growing pressures of increased Soviet influence. Nothing more damning can be said of movements whose stated goal is peace but it is a conclusion which the responses to my defense of the NATO double decision confirm. The intellectuals of the peace movements want to have it both ways. On the one hand they reject nuclear and conventional deterrence, call for unilateral disarmament by the West, equate the United States and the Soviet Union as threats to both peace and freedom, and fail to organize demonstrations against Soviet missiles pointed at their own countries. On the other hand, they are indignant when observers draw the obvious implications of these views, namely that they are advocating neutralism, fail to think through the consequences of unilateral disarmament, and do not consider the dilemmas faced by democracies confronting dictatorships in the nuclear age.

They cannot have it both ways. Either they are pursuing a policy aimed at the disarmament of Western Europe and erosion and eventual expulsion of American influence there, which makes perfect sense if one's main concern is the struggle against aggressive, expansive American imperialism. As it is obvious that the erosion of American influence would mean growth of Soviet influence — and not dissolution of both blocs — one might justify such a strategy as a rather manipulative but not historically unprecedented effort to erode the power of capitalist states with the peace issue as a pretext. It is conceivable that if the West European states were to drastically increase their defense efforts in the wake of an American exit, Soviet influence might be checked somewhat. But the peace movements would certainly oppose such domestic militarism no less than they now oppose NATO decisions. Or the intellectuals of the peace movements are the utopians they present themselves as being, people who generally believe that undermining Western defense, eroding deterrence, rejecting arms control agreements, and allowing the military balance that has preserved peace and freedom in Western Europe for 35 years to continue to tilt in favor of the Soviet Union, safe from its nuclear weapons, and separated from the blocs of East-West confrontation.

This outcome is so unlikely that Paul Piccone and Russell Berman stress its origins outside the Left. Something else — artificial negativity or nationalism of the Left — must explain it.[1] But Axel Honneth and Otto Kallscheuer Walter Süss and Michael

1. Russell Berman, "The Peace Movement and Its Critics: Reply to Breines and Ben-Habib," *Telos* 52 (Summer 1982), pp. 99-107. It would be unfair to suggest that independent thinking has been completely smothered by the peace movement in West Germany, or that concern over renewed nationalism of the Left is an exclusively French or American worry. On the parallels between the nationalism of the peace movement and the themes of German nationalism in the past, see Wolfgang Pohrt's brilliantly written essay collection, *Endstation: Uber die Wiedergeburt der Nation* (Berlin, Rotbuch Verlag), 1982; Michael Naumann, "German Neonationalism," *Partisan Review* (1983, 1), pp. 85-93; and Josef Joffe, "The Greening of Germany," *The New Republic* (February 14, 1983), pp. 18-22.

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Lucas, and Boris Frankel echo the conventional Left-wing wisdom on both sides of the Atlantic: the expansive, imperialistic United States confronts the essentially defensive Soviet Union.[2] As Kallscheuer and Honneth correctly point out, they harken back to the SPD Left of the 1950s and the new Left of the 1960s and were nurtured in the alternative scene of the 1970s. Boris Frankel is even more explicit: he recognizes that a shift in the balance of forces in Europe would have implications for the possibilities for "national liberation struggles" in the third world, and that he supports these movements. In other words, Frankel supports the peace movements precisely because they hold out the possibility of shifting the balance of forces against what he views as the major threat to peace in the world: American imperialism. Eugene Rostow, speaking of the "shifting nuclear tide" and its importance for international politics, would agree. But if Frankel wants to pay attention to the shifting nuclear tide, I'd rather hear less from him about the absurdity of nuclear deterrence and the meaninglessness of the balance of forces.

If I were in favor of a revolutionary offensive against West European capitalism, then I might also seek to deprive the West Europeans of the American balance so that they would have to face the carrots and sticks of Soviet power on their own. The disingenuousness of the peace movements and their accompanying peace researchers is to disguise this strategy as a moral crusade for peace against the spectre of nuclear holocaust. They have been blessed with a conservative American president who helps them in their task by spreading doubts about the American commitment to arms control and engaging in a military build-up with little apparent sense of strategic priorities abroad and political consensus at home. If one's main political enemy is American imperialism, then weakening the military power of the United States and its Allies ought to be a first priority. But it is more effective to pose this effort as a "peace movement" than as a conventional attack on American imperialism. But the intellectual foundations of the peace movements do not primarily derive from the manipulations of Soviet strategy — not for any lack of effort on the part of the Russians — but, from illusions and failure to think through the consequences of political action.

There are two dangers that the Western democracies face: nuclear war and Soviet totalitarianism. The peace movements pay attention only to the first and reject deterrence. Why then do they quibble over numbers? For if one accepts their view of American power, any Western defense, conventional or nuclear, is too much. Rather than say that — which would not be politically palpable beyond the boundaries of the Left — they quibble over numbers, as if they have an idea of what would be enough. But because they have rejected deterrence, they can have no notion of what is enough. While there is a connection between this view and the erosion of the political power of Western capitalist democratic states, there is no necessary link to disarmament or peace. One-sided attacks on the West will not mean the abolition of nuclear weapons but their preservation by the dictatorships which do not face internal restraints like free speech, demonstrations — in short, political life. Nothing could demonstrate the political utility of these monstrous weapons more than the peace movements. And what is politically useful for one dictatorship will be all the more attractive for the numerous authoritarian regimes voting for world disarmament in the United Nations. Such are the contributions of peace research.

Wolf Bierman is supposed to have recently said that just because Franz Josef Strauss

2. Axel Honneth and Otto Kallscheuer, "Strange Encounter with a Familiar Ghost," *Telos* 56 (Summer 1983); Walter Suss and Michael Lucas, "The Double Decision Makes Sense — but for Whom?," *Telos* 56 (Summer, 1983); Boris Frankel, "The View from Australia," *Telos* 56.

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insisted that two plus two equals four, a Left-wing intellectual is not required to insist that the correct answer is five. This gets to the heart of the matter. In a climate poisoned by ideological politics, the will for truth withers. The fundamental dilemma facing Western Left and liberal intellectuals in the nuclear debate is that the growth and dimensions of the military power of the Soviet Union is an anomaly that does not fit Left-wing conventional wisdom concerning the "essentially defensive" nature of Soviet foreign policy in the face of world imperialism. Consequently the facts of the matter must be either denied (the Western governments are lying), explained away (the Soviets are merely responding to the arms race spurred on by the United States), or ignored, because to face them squarely places one in strange political company.[3]

The results of this outlook are clear: we now have Left-wing and Right-wing facts. It is simply inconceivable to the peace movements that the Western governments could be more reliable sources of information than Swedish peace research institutes or retired West German generals. Even if the Pentagon is telling the truth about the Soviets, anti-anti-communism is preferable to making common cause with the imperialists. But two plus two equals four whether the source is Ronald Reagan, Strauss or Petra Kelly. A Russian missile, plane or tank is a physical fact. It either exists or it doesn't. There is not a Left-wing or a Right-wing number of tanks, nor is there any connection between the Left and the Right and discussing the facts of the Soviet military build-up. Political differences ought to focus on the most appropriate way to respond. Any reader of the Western press knows that there are many who believe Soviet power is real but do not accept all of Reagan's policies.

There are two contradictory premises of the peace movements's ideological politics. The first is *Um so schlimmer fur die Tatsache* — so much the worse for the facts. We are told that the nuclear debate is conducted in "nukespeak" by Strangelovian technocrats who have lost any connection to common sense, given the obscene size of the nuclear arsenals posing a threat to "the fate of the earth." Numbers make no difference. The second premise is that the facts do matter, but the NATO and the Pentagon are no more trustworthy than the Kremlin. There ensues a search for more comforting numbers concerning Soviet power, a search that inevitably ends up in Stockholm with Sweden's peace researchers. Just as we are about to conclude that numbers make no difference, along comes a reliable and neutral — therefore presumably more objective — source to assure Western publics that the balance is being preserved and that the main and only issue is the arms race. Liberals and Leftists incline to lower estimates of Soviet power and accuse those who accept more alarming figures of "moving to the Right" or renewing the cold war.

Honneth and Kallscheuer, and Süss and Lucas know a thing or two about positivism, knowledge and human interests, so I will avoid lectures on the epistemological naivete of assuming neutralism has anything to do with an aspiration toward truth. But it is peculiar that German intellectuals who are immersed in debates over these issues should suddenly find solace in the supposed objectivity offered by neutralist peace research. The moral confusion of the Swedish Left today recalls Sweden's inability to make up its mind to resist another totalitarian system forty years ago, Nazi Germany. If, after the invasion of Afghanistan, interventions in Angola, Yemen, Nicaragua, Indochina, and the suppresion of Solidarity, my West German critics still believe in the "essentially defensive" nature of Soviet foreign policy, the following facts and figures concerning the military balance in Europe will do little to change their minds. Süss and Lucas suggest that the more the Soviets expand, the

3. Cornelius Castoriadis, *Devant la Guerre*, Paris, 1981.

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greater will be their burdens and hence the greater their domestic problems. The reasonable conclusion from this premise is that unilateral Western disarmament will hasten the collapse of the Soviet regime! Very dialectical, gentlemen. It is only fair to point out that the growth of Soviet military power in Europe is directed against Western Europe and that this build up alone is sufficiently alarming to abandon the notion of the essentially defensive nature of Soviet intentions.

The basic point is a simple one: Without a single landbased intermediate-range nuclear missile, the Soviet Union has more than enough nuclear and conventional force to deter any conceivable threat from the NATO alliance, should NATO for some unexplained reason seek to threaten the Soviet Union. In 1979, when the Soviets had installed only 30 S-20s, Brezhnev said that a balance of forces existed between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Today, when there are 350 SS-20s with over 1000 warheads aimed at Western Europe, Gromyko claims that there is still a balance of forces. In 1979 as today, these statements are lies. Even if the statement were true in 1979 — which it wasn't — how can it be true today, given that NATO has not deployed a single new missile of any kind in the interim? Neither Honneth and Kallscheuer, nor Suss and Lucas offer a convincing explanation for the deployment of the SS-20s. Suss and Lucas imply that these weapons offer no new military options and are mere technical improvements, that is, that the Soviet military doesn't know what it is doing and is wasting its money. According to this reasoning, there could be no limits at all on Soviet rearmament. On the contrary, the more modern, technically improved missiles, the better. Why are intellectuals claiming to speak for peace, offering justifications for deployment of hundreds of nuclear weapons pointed at their own country?

None of my critics engage my arguments concerning the political uses of the SS-20s — splitting and thus dissolving NATO and the Atlantic Alliance, neutralizing Western Europe, negotiating trade and financial agreements favorable to Soviet interests, and eliminating Western Europe's voice from consideration in other areas of the world due to fears of Soviet power in Europe. I think they are quite wrong to suggest that this armada of accurate warheads would not have a clear military purpose, i.e., the destruction of all of NATO's military installations and command centers in one blow, something the SS-4s and SS-5s do not have the accuracy to do. As I argued in my first essay, the SS-20s give the Soviets a first strike capacity against Western military targets in Europe. Their deployment is simply not compatible with the maintenance of the balance of power or the balance of terror.

The Soviet Union is not deploying these missiles because it wants to fight a nuclear war but because it wants the benefits that come from military power without having to risk or bear the disastrous consequences of nuclear war. My Western German critics have no convincing answer to the question of why the Soviet Union continues to expand its military power so far beyond what is required for maintaining deterrence, perhaps because the obvious answers are too upsetting. I repeat my earlier assertion: in the 1970s, NATO deployed some new weapons but none that required the SS-20s as a response. The conclusion is inescapable: the Soviets hope to use their intermediate-range arsenal to attain obvious political goals. Is it an "essentially defensive" policy which seeks to split the Atlantic Alliance, neutralize West Germany, and crush Solidarity? Yes, if one defines defense for the Soviet Union as the absence of any threat whatsoever to the achievement of its national interests wherever it seeks to realize them, especially in Europe. No, if one defines defense as the right to live unmolested within national boundaries. Suss and Lucas regularly pass by the Berlin wall. Is this monument to dictatorship also "essentially defensive?"

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The Soviet Union does have a serious problem. All of the other nations possessing nuclear weapons are potential enemies. Thus the Soviets are trying to introduce a new principle into international relations. While the United States is insisting on parity with the Soviets, the Soviets are trying to gain parity with all of their potential enemies combined. This is part of the significance of the SS-20s. But parity with all means superiority to each. something that is nowhere clearer than it is in Europe. This is why the Soviets are so insistent on including the French and British deterrents in the Geneva negotiations over *intermediate* range missiles. The 162 British and French missiles are the only ones these countries possess, the weapons of last resort, strategic weapons. They are the nuclear deterrent, while the 162 SS-20s Andropov proposes to keep are only a fraction of the much larger Soviet arsenal which can, of course, be targeted on Western Europe as well as the United States. Given the enormous size of the Soviet ICBM arsenal, it is absolutely impossible to believe that the Soviet Union is genuinely concerned about the possibility that France or England will launch a pre-emptive nuclear strike. To equate the French and British missiles with the SS-20s now would allow the Soviets in the future to try to disarm France and Great Britain at the negotiating table by proposing to dismantle the remaining SS-20s in exchange for complete dismantling of the French and British deterrents, thus bringing about a non-nuclear Western Europe facing the full complement of Soviet ICBMs and submarine-launched missiles. No wonder the French and British refuse to have their weapons counted in the current negotiations. The SS-20s were not a response to them in the first place. This is just one of the several ways in which Soviet military power can bring about political objectives. (The Soviets have a point that British and French missiles should be counted in arms control negotiations. But the proper place is in negotiations over the global strategic balance — not intermediate range missiles. Even then the United States certainly cannot infringe British and French sovereignty by presuming to negotiate over someone's else's missiles.)

The accumulation of Soviet weapons in the last decade and a half when there has been no military danger from the West to justify them leads us to consider Soviet foreign policy goals in Europe generally. Though not always successful the Soviet Union displays a formidable strategic coordination of military, political, economic and ideological components aimed, in my view, at expelling or minimizing the American balance to Soviet influence in Europe, neutralizing West Germany in particular, and placing the enormous wealth and technology of Western Europe ever more at Russian disposal.[4]

Consider some of the actions of the Soviet Union in the last decade that conform to these goals: The greatest Western European vulnerability, of course, is oil. In encouraging the OPEC oil price increases, fostering political turmoil in the Middle East, using proxies in strategic locations such as Angola, Ethiopia and Yemen, and invading Afghanistan and thereby placing its troops closer to Iranian oil fields, the Soviets have heightened the threat of a cut-off of oil supplies of the Middle East which constitute Europe's economic lifeline. In the sphere of East-West trade the Soviets have exploited the appetites of Western producers and banks for profitable exports and loans, pursuading them to work for governmental policies which make it possible for the Soviet Union and its satellites to obtain goods, technology and credits they desperately needed. Detente was intended to promote peace through mutual interdepen-

4. See Louis Walinsky, "The Case for Economic Denial," *Foreign Affairs* (Winter 1982/83), pp. 272-91.

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dence but the Soviets have sustained trade with Western Europe without reducing their military build-up at all. For those who would minimize the significance of Soviet military power there was the promise of large commercial contracts with the Eastern bloc and insulation from tensions caused by the American cold warriors. Having thoroughly upset the military balance, the Soviets are now seeking to exploit the fear of nuclear holocaust to prevent the Western Alliance from righting the balance. These policies have been pursued without the American accoutrements of reinventing the wheel every four years but with a combination of persistance, determination and caution that make the Soviets a more, not a less, dangerous adversary. In each case — oil, trade, arms, fear of nuclear holocaust — it is important to notice that Soviet foreign policy seeks to overcome Russian weaknesses by intelligent use of Western strengths, awareness of Western European vulnerabilities, and acute grasp of the conflicts of economic interest and political perception between the U.S. and its European allies.

While East-West trade has the potential to create mutual dependencies that sustain peace, the Soviets have used its expansion to make up for their own economic weaknesses and to assist their military build-up. Their access to Western technology allows them to improve productivity, output and quality of goods for the domestic market, thereby reducing the proportionate burden of resources allocated to the military sector, and help to appease workers' demands for more and better consumer goods, thus reducing troublesome tides of discontent. they are able to shift their very best technicians and research talent to the military sector and still avoid the collapse of their civilian industries. Access to Western technology enables the Soviets to save huge sums which would otherwise have to be spent on civilian research and development, again increasing the resources available to the military. The have-your-cake-and-eat-it-to aspect of military power plus trade means that the Soviet government can use trade with Western Europe to postpone or completely avoid the crucial social and economic reforms of the Soviet economic system that are the real requirements for peace. And now the Siberian gas pipeline deal will both bring the Soviets huge sums of foreign currency to finance their military and also increase the dependence of Western Europe on the Soviet Union for oil and gas supplies.

The Soviet Union is interested in exploiting Western wealth and productivity, not in destroying them. The Soviets are not seeking an armed conflict with the West with conventional, nuclear arms or both. Low-cost, low-risk exploitation of Western weaknesses are combined with huge armed forces, massive weaponry, and well timed military bluster to bring tangible benefits to the Soviet Union. Whether this policy is guided by Marxist-Leninist aspirations toward world domination or by great power politics restricted to Europe is less important than the observation that it presents a coherent coordination of military power with political, economic, ideological and social initiatives. But from the Soviet standpoint, a neutral, "nuclear-free" zone from Poland to Portugal freed from American influence would serve its goals quite well: capitalist economies to exploit — eventually to ruin — without any need to tie down so many troops, except to maintain law and order in Eastern Europe. This would free the Soviets to deal with their real adversaries, the Americans and the Chinese. This is not a policy aimed at initiation of war but it is aggressive and expansive, not defensive.

As I argued in my previous essay on the double decision and the peace movements, the stationing of the SS-20s ought to be understood as use of military power to attain these political, foreign policy goals. Opponents of the NATO double decision often say that they are not opposed to NATO but to this particular decision. Like any deci-

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sion, it is imperfect, subject to criticisms some of them telling. But rejection of the double decision now would signify a victory of enormous significance for Soviet foreign policy, demonstrating against all the claims of the peace movements how very useful nuclear weapons can be when intelligently coordinated with political, economic and ideological initiatives. If Western Europeans at some point decided they were getting the worst end of the bargain in their trade relations with the East, they would have little or no leverage with the Russians if the military balance is allowed to continue to deteriorate.

It is possible that many of the Russian people and some of the Soviet leadership actually believe the official propaganda that the Soviet build-up is defensive in nature. The legacy of World War II offers the regime a powerful emotional prop for its arms policies. But Russian paranoia is potentially infinite. The advantage of the Soviet dictatorship in having no public political life or bothersome critics to answer is a disadvantage for peace. This is a disadvantage which cannot be overcome by disarmament in the West. On the contrary, the fact that the Soviet Union is a dictatorship means that Russian paranoia cannot be pierced by hopes for peace movements in the East that will not be allowed to exist, but only by making clear to the Soviet leadership that it has nothing to gain from its military buildup. When the Soviet leadership understands this fundamental fact about the resolve of the Western democracies, it will hopefully agree to arms reductions and to the internal social and economic reforms that are so long overdue. But making the Soviet leaders understand these facts is something that cannot be done by movements of the people but only by governments who possess both a democratic consensus arrived at through public discussion as well as the instruments of power that only states possess.

What then about the military power of the United States and its purposes in Western Europe? In one sense it is a conservative policy in that it aims at preserving the status quo. It is defensive. It is not a policy aimed at undermining Soviet influence in Eastern Europe, although one of the major dilemmas of Western policy in the coming years will be how to respond to the probable revolts to come in the satellites. Suss and Lucas claim that it is political cynicism to see any connection between American policy and political freedom, pointing to the war in Vietnam and American policy in Central America today to make their point. It is hardly news that the U.S. has propped up right-wing dictatorships in the post-war period in the third world. It is also not news that the Carter administration pursued a human rights policy that made life somewhat more difficult for some of these regimes. In the third world, neither the far Left nor the far Right has anything to do with political freedom. I would like to see the U.S. pursue a different policy in Central America, but by no means would American foreign policy be serving political freedom by supporting the "liberation struggles" that Lucas and Süss imply they favor. While American military power is no guarantee of political freedom, neither is its defeat or weakening necessarily a gain for freedom, as events in Iran, Vietnam and Nicaragua demonstrate. These and other dictatorships were replaced by new dictatorships even more powerful.

But the pluses and minuses of American policy in the third world are really beside the point, which is that the Federal Republic is not El Salvador, Nicaragua, or Vietnam, and, unlike Greece or Turkey, it has had no recent experience of Right-wing dictatorship. It is one of the few stable democracies in the world and the oldest parliamentary democracy in German history. It is making a mockery of language for the SPD Left and the Greens to sit in the West German Bundestag — while Solidarity activists sit in Polish prisons — and proclaim that West Germany must be liberated from American

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domination just as Eastern Europe must be liberated from American domination just as Eastern Europe must be liberated from its satellite status under the Soviets. True, American military power does not always guarantee political freedom but there is no doubt at all that it does so in Western Europe and has done so in the post-war period.

Conversely, there is an intimate, omnipresent and unavoidable link between the military power of the Soviet Union and the establishment of the most stable totalitarian political systems yet invented, modern communist states. Nowhere — certainly not in Eastern Europe — does Soviet military power insure political freedom. NATO is a voluntary alliance whose members have it within their power to decide to leave. The Warsaw Pact is an involuntary imposition by the Soviet Union on Eastern Europe. It is conceivable that a West European country, France for example, could decide to leave the military structure of NATO without the slightest fear of an American coup or invasion. It is inconceivable that the Soviets would tolerate such a voluntary decision — in Hungary, Poland or Czeckoslovakia for example — to leave the Warsaw Pact without an invasion, and this not because of Soviet fears of a second operation Barbarossa — who can seriously believe that the Federal Republic poses the slightest threat to the Soviet Union? — but because political freedom in Eastern Europe would be a contagion that the Soviet system cannot allow to spread. These differences between free and totalitarian societies cannot be dismissed as the "boring melodies" of American provincialism, or a new cold war. It is easy and fashionable to mock and scorn them, less so to demonstrate that they are false. That these distinctions remain an embarrassment for West German Leftists reminds us of the weakness of the liberal political tradition in modern Germany.

I presented the rationale for the double decision in my first essay. The rhetoric of the early Reagan administration concerning limited nuclear war, the statements about "prevailing" in "protracted" nuclear war in Weinberger's posture statements, widely cited essays about nuclear "decapitation" and "concepts of victory" (what Leon Wieseltier has aptly called the Sovietization of American strategic thinking), the massive increases in the defense budget without clear strategic priorities accompanied by cuts in welfare spending, all fueled the anti-nuclear movements in Europe. No matter that the Pershing IIs do not have the range to reach Moscow and its command centers, not to mention the Soviet missile fields further East.[5] Or that the Soviets made clear that they would attack the United States if American missiles were launched from Western Europe, thereby confirming the NATO argument that the double decision would make limitation of nuclear war to Western Europe that much less likely — and

5. The peace movements never miss a chance to remind us that the Pershing IIs take only six minutes to reach Moscow, thus constituting a first strike weapon that fits into a supposed American strategy to strike first at Soviet command centers, and to quote the looney American strategists who talk about "decapitation." Kevin Lewis, in "Intermediate-Range Nuclear Weapons, *Scientific American* 243 (December, 1980), pp. 63-73. Wrote that the range of the Pershing II was 1,500 kilometers. Lewis opposed the stationing of the missiles. According to the Department of the Army, the range of the Pershing II is 1,800 kilometers. See *1983 Weapon Systems: United States Army*, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402, p. 47. The Pershing IIs will be deployed in the Western parts of West Germany. Placing them near the border with East Germany is unthinkable given the ease with which they might be captured. Assuming that the range is 1,800 kilometers, the Pershing II are *not* able to reach Moscow. They would fall between 200 to 50 kilometers short depending on where they were launched from. They could strike targets in the Western parts of the Soviet Union but not the command centers in Moscow and certainly not the ICBM and SS-20 missiles fields further to the East. The range of the SS-20 is 3000 kilometers.

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hence reinforce deterrence and prevention of any war, period. No matter that Western governments tried to explain that placing the missiles in Europe would be evidence of coupling the U.S. to Western Europe's defense, reassuring the West Europeans that the U.S. would make good on its nuclear guarantees even though the Soviet Union could and would attack the continental United States itself. No matter that the absence of "flexible response" or doubts that weapons systems might be unable to penetrate enemy defenses would lead to the lack of credibility of the deterrent. In the eyes of the peace movement intellectuals, these are rationalizations — not reason. Reason, in their view, requires rejection of deterrence as immoral, and arms control as a ruse for the arms race.

I would argue that anything that preserves deterrence preserves peace and freedom and is therefore moral. Anything, be it unilateral disarmament, lack of attention to the military balance, rejection of arms control, or amnesia about the destructive force of nuclear weapons, that undermines deterrence endangers both peace and freedom and is therefore immoral. Deterrence, whatever its critics may say, has worked and helped to preserve the longest period of peace in Europe in this century.

The doctrine of deterrence is filled with ambiguity. A nuclear weapon nobody believes will be used will not deter war and hence probably will be used, while a weapon that an enemy believes might very well be used will have a better chance of deterring war and thus will not have to be used. Until or if there is an effective defense against nuclear missiles, this ambiguity stands at the center of preserving peace and freedom. To think about the destructive power of these weapons alone, or about how one would use them alone — the errors of the unilateral disarmers and the strategists of nuclear war fighting — will erode deterrence and make war likelier. Technological advance and political change mean that deterrence requires new weapons as well as arms control. Further, if disarmament is ever to come about, it can do so only if deterrence and arms control are sustained, for there is no other principle for a peaceful process toward eventual disarmament than gradual reductions of weapons based on the principle of parity. To reject deterrence as immoral is to doom the world to a future without any possibility of disarmament, especially because the world is now divided into democracies and dictatorships.[6]

No Western government or analyst has said that the military balance in Europe is so adverse as to tempt the Soviets into thinking that the benefits of aggression might outweigh its costs. What they have said is that the trends are disturbing. Let's begin with a constant, geography. Lucas and Suss are touching in their understanding of the difficulties the Soviets would have reinforcing their troops in Europe. They imply that the problem of transporting troops and material from the Soviet Union to Central Europe, with all the advantages of secure internal lines of communication and total control of the air, compares with the difficulty of transporting American and Canadian reinforcements across the Atlantic Ocean in ships and planes which would have to be defended against the now formidable Soviet fleet of submarines and expanded air force. This is certainly an innovation in military thinking.

In view of Suss and Lucas's description of the Warsaw Pact's difficulties in moving reinforcements 650 kilometers, a few comments on the balance of forces at sea might show readers what an easy time the imperialists would have making it safely across the

6. The single best defense of deterrence against the attack of Left-wing and Right-wing critics is Leon Wieseltier's "Nuclear War, Nuclear Peace," *The New Republic*, (January 10 and 17, 1983), pp. 7-38. I have found Lawrence Freedman's *The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy* (New York, 1981) to be the best discussion of the subject.

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6000 kilometers of the Atlantic Ocean. The purposes of the naval forces of NATO and the Warsaw Pact are rather different. The NATO navies have to protect and maintain sea lines of communication and reinforcements; the Warsaw Pact navies would attempt to hinder this effort. Defending these lines of resupply requires a substantial numerical advantage in naval forces. According to NATO figures for 1981, NATO does have advantages in aircraft carriers, 7 to 2; destroyers and frigates, 274 to 182; ocean-going amphibious ships, 41 to 16; sea-based, tactical and support aircraft, including helicopters, 712 to 146; and land-based anti-submarine warfare aircraft and helicopters, 450 to 179. But the Warsaw Pact has advantages in the following areas: cruisers, 21 to 15; coastal escorts and fast patrol boats, 551 to 167; amphibious independent coastal craft, 155 to 69; mine warfare ships, 360 to 257; land-based tactical and support aircraft, 719 to 180.[7]

As for submarines, the Warsaw Pact enjoys these numerical advantages: ballistic missile submarines, 52 to 35; long-range attack submarines, 149 to 60; other types of submarines, 57 to 95. (These figures do not include Soviet and American forces in the Pacific or Soviet forces facing China.) The addition of the Ohio class submarines will strengthen NATO forces, but the decline in numbers of submarines has continued while the Warsaw Pact numbers have been increasing. In short, NATO does not now have the numerical advantages at sea that its task of defending resupply and reinforcement routes requires. The NATO forces in Europe are not considered adequate to hold off a Warsaw Pact attack by themselves, certainly not without using nuclear weapons. Thus the probability that reinforcements from the U.S. and Canada would get to Europe is crucial in raising the nuclear threshold. If the balance in Europe stays what it is, NATO will be forced into use of its nuclear weapons to avoid defeat. Where is the "peace movement" intellectual urging a conventional build-up at sea to insure that reinforcements can arrive?

It is worth noting that for all the sound and fury, Süss and Lucas do not dispute the IISS (International Institute for Strategic Studies in London) figures I offered on the military balance. According to the IISS and NATO calculations, the Warsaw Pact has numerical advantages in all categories of weapons, nuclear and conventional, with the exception of some naval aircraft, ships and helicopters — that is, in numbers of troops (173 to 84 divisions), main battle tanks (42,500 to 13,000), anti-tank weapons (yes, anti-tank weapons) (24,300 to 8,100), artillery and mortars (31,500 to 10,750), and armored personnel carriers (78,800 to 30,000). The IISS estimates are somewhat less alarming — 26,000 tanks in the Warsaw Pact, 9,980 artillery tubes — and quite different estimates of anti-tank weapons — 5,784 to 1,437. Because NATO is a defensive alliance, it is not necessary to completely match the forces of the Warsaw Pact, but these figures are further evidence that the West has no aggressive intentions directed at the Soviet Union in Europe and that even if it did, it lacks the capabilities to carry them out.

Since most attention has been focused on the missiles, advances in Warsaw Pact aircraft have received less attention, but they are crucial in terms of the Warsaw Pact's ability to defend against NATO aircraft and to attain control of the air in war. The Israeli successes in Lebanon last summer were against less advanced planes and air defenses which were not manned by Soviet pilots or technicians. The density and quality of Soviet air defenses is simply not comparable, so it would be a mistake to take

7. The following assessments of the military balance are taken from: International Institute for Strategic Studies of London, *Military Balance 1982-83;* and *NATO and the Warsaw Pact: Force Comparisons* available from the Army Office of Public Affairs in Washington, D.C.

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the Israeli successes as a rationale for dismissing concern over Warsaw Pact air power. The following figures refer to aircraft that would not be carrying nuclear weapons. according to the IISS, the comparisons in aircrat in Europe between NATO and the Warsaw Pact are as follows: medium bombers, 81 to 365; fighter-bombers, 2,300 to 1,750; fighters, 200 to 665; interceptors, 572 to 1,490. NATO figures comparing NATO and the Warsaw Pact include Soviet aircraft as far east as the Urals but excluding the Moscow Military District: total aircraft in Europe, 2,975 to 7,240; bombers, 0 to 350; fighter-bombers, 1,950 to 1,920; interceptors, 740 to 4,370; reconnaissance, 185 to 600.[8]

In the 1970s, NATO was hardly disarming and did introduce new aircraft. But the Warsaw Pact introduced both a larger number of different planes and a larger absolute number of planes. The expansion of its air forces was not a response to NATO initiatives. The substitution of quality for quantity is less true than before, as the technological gap narrows between Warsaw Pact and NATO weapons. The new aircraft in the Warsaw Pact are capable of carrying twice the payload, traveling at over three times the range and at higher speeds, and conducting operations at lower attitudes than the planes they are replacing; this renders them less vulnerable to NATO's air defenses. Their increased combat radius would allow for Warsaw Pact operations from more distant bases, rendering counter-attacks more difficult, since NATO fighter-bombers would have to penetrate deeper into Warsaw Pact air space. There are some, particularly French, analysts, who argue that this expansion of Warsaw Pact air defenses renders NATO's aircraft-based nuclear deterrent increasingly vulnerable and thus necessitates introduction of more missiles capable of reaching the Soviet Union from Western Europe.

According to NATO figures, Warsaw Pact nations have a standing force of 5.7 million, of which some 4 million are stationed in Europe, compared to a NATO standing force of 4.4 million, of which 2.6 million are stationed in Europe. The Warsaw Pact units are more combat-ready, more motorized and prepared for rapid forward movement. Reinforcements would be able to arrive sooner, as Russia is closer to the middle of Europe than the U.S. When the numbers of troops and the balance of military equipment is considered, most observers conclude that the Russians would break through to the Ruhr and France in a matter of days or weeks unless NATO fired its nuclear weapons. Last summer, *The Economist* estimated that a 4.5% increase in defense spending in Western Europe would pay for forces able to sustain a defensive battle for thirty days on the central front.[9] One waits in vain for representatives of the peace movement to suggest raising the nuclear threshold by expanded conventional defense efforts. Do the advocates of peace prefer lower taxes to raising the nuclear threshold? However, even if NATO were to increase conventional forces, this would be no panacea, for a NATO without nuclear weapons would be defenseless. There is no point in spending money on conventional weapons if the nuclear balance remains unfavorable.

Concerning the strategic nuclear balance, I stand by what I wrote concerning the importance of the SS-18s. Süss and Lucas are right to point to the accuracy of the Minuteman III, but these missiles do not carry as much weight as do the larger SS-18s and hence are not considered as threatening to Soviet missiles as the SS-18s are to

8. On the importance of the balance in air power in Europe, see Edward Luttwak, "European Insecurity and American Policy," in *Strategy and Politics*, pp. 11-13.

9. "Defending Europe without the Bomb," *The Economist*, (July 31 - August 6, 1982), pp. 30-32.

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American land-based missiles. The SS-18s are now considered to be as accurate as the Minuteman III. I stand by my assertion that building the SS-18 is superfluous as a weapon against civilian populations, since the Soviets have the capacity to demolish the United States as a society many times over without them. Hence, the Soviets hoped to gain some political advantage through its construction. MIRVing missiles turns out to have been one of the great American errors of the nuclear era, since it placed a premium on striking first. The report of the Scowcroft commission rightly urges that arms control negotiations aim at returning both sides to arsenals composed of missiles with only one warhead. More targets with one warhead each reduce the tempation for the fear of a first strike.

I did not suggest that the U.S. lacks a secure second-strike capability now or that it would not have it in the coming decade, but that at the moment this second-strike capacity cannot be aimed at Soviet missiles with the same confidence of success that the SS-18 offers to the Soviets. As I wrote last summer, counterforce weapons have been part of nuclear deterrence for several decades, however unreal the scenarios for their use may sound. My concern was trying to understand why the Soviet Union has built the weapons it has built. I still believe that it has done so to gain political advantages. The construction of the SS-18 does not conform to the "action-reaction" scenario of the dynamics of the arms race. The SS-18 provides the Soviets with an option the U.S. does not now have with its ICBMs. A move away from MIRVed missiles makes sense, but this does not refute the argument that construction of the SS-18 is evidence that the Soviets have applied conventional military doctrine to the formation of their nuclear arsenal. Their military doctrine is closer to Clausewitz than to Robert McNamara.

The Warsaw Pact has about 2,200 nuclear warheads in the European threatre on its aircraft, and approximately 600 intermediate range land-based missiles, the SS-4s, SS-5s and about 350 SS-20s, the latter each having three warheads. There are now over 1,200 warheads on these missiles pointed at Western Europe. NATO, of course, now has no land-based intermediate-range missiles. After the deployments of the Cruise and Pershing IIs, it will have 464 on Cruise and 108 on Pershing IIs. NATO has about 1,170 warheads when one includes the American forward-based system, the British deterrent, and the Poseidon missiles on three Polaris submarines assigned to NATO. If one includes the NATO submarines, the Warsaw Pact has an advantage of 1.6 to 1 in warheads, 3.3 to 1 if the submarines are not included. These figures do not include missiles on Warsaw Pact assigned to the European theater. (The peace movements have made a great deal of the Polaris submarines but, as far as I know, have said little or nothing about Soviet missile carrying submarines focused on Europe.) The Warsaw Pact also has advantages in short range missile systems, such as the SS-12/22s and SCUD. There are 650 of these systems compared to 180 Pershing lA's which would be reduced to 72 upon deployment of the Pershing II. Is this balance evidence of the "essentially defensive" nature of Soviet foreign and military policy? I think not.

The Russians nevertheless continue to claim that their military build-up is a response to Western initiatives, the American forward based systems, the F-111s, for example. When one adds up all of the aircraft on land and sea in the NATO Alliance capable of carrying nuclear weapons — F-111s, the British Vulcan, F-4, F-104, Jaguar, Buccaneer — there are 800 planes with intermediate range. When one adds the Warsaw Pact planes with intermediate range capable of attacking Western Europe (not including the Backfire bomber, which has inter-continental capability but could be used against Europe) — the Badger, Blinder, Fishbed, Fitter, Fogger, Fencer and

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Brewer — NATO estimates the number at 2,500. 2,500 planes, compared to 800. Why don't Suss and Lucas wax indignant over this dimension of the Soviet military build-up pointed in their direction?

I stand by my original argument. The military build-up of the Soviet Union is not a response to a prior American or Western initiatives but is a designed to further Soviet interests defined in a way that can only be described as alarming from the perspective of the West. It has been taking place over the last 15 years, long before the formation of the Committee on the Present Danger and Reagan's election. My critics have things backwards: the Western military policies against which they are protesting are very much responses to the Soviet initiatives that are well documented by the Western governments and are not denied by the Soviet Union.

The second point concerns the relationship of the NATO decision to global American strategy. The purpose of NATO is the defense of Western Europe. If the only consideration of American strategy was the avoidance of war due to attacks on allies and/or seeking strategic advantages over the Soviet Union, placing landbased missiles in Western Europe would be counterproductive in the first instance and superfluous in the second. Should the intellectuals of the peace movement succeed in convincing more of their fellow citizens that they would have nothing to worry about from the Soviet Union if only the U.S. would get out of Europe and their own governments would stop building so many weapons that scare Andropov and Gromyko, they would create an interesting political coalition in United States: conservatives disgusted with neutralism and pacifism in Europe and eager to turn scarce American resources to other parts of the world, and liberals eager to spend more on butter at home than on guns for Western Europe.

Third, just as there is nothing essentially defensive about the Soviet build-up in Europe, the double decision was not conceived as nor will the NATO deployments serve as part of a global strategy of expansion by the United States, as Suss and Lucas suggest. The United States does not now need Western Europe as a launching platform for nuclear weapons aimed at Soviet military targets. In the future, air and sea-based Cruise missiles as well as the D-5 missile to be deployed in Trident submarines in the late 1980s make the NATO missiles even less essential from that point of view. In fact, the United States does not need to have any troops or weapons in Western Europe at all if it's main concern was being able to reach targets in the Soviet Union rather than retaining the credibility of its commitment to extend nuclear deterrence to Western Europe.

Lucas and Suss make an error common in the peace movements in Western Europe: they exaggerate the strategic importance of the defense of Western Europe for the physical survival of the U.S. It is in the national interest of the United States to insure that neither neutralization or Finlandization place the enormous economic and political resources of Western Europe at the disposal of the Soviet Union. But the United States does not need to deploy Pershing II and cruise missiles on land in Western Europe either for the sake of its own immediate security or to enhance its capacity to reach the Soviet Union with nuclear weapons. It is doing so primarily with the political purpose of reassuring its allies that the nuclear guarantee will not evaporate in the face of growing Soviet power. Perhaps there are other and better ways of combining both reassurance and deterrence — though the peace movements haven't come up with any.[10] But what my critics refuse to see is that the threat to their own countries is real

10. Michael Howard, "Reassurance and Deterrence: Western Defense in the 1980s," *Foreign Affairs*, (Winter 1982/83), pp. 309-24.

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and comes from the Soviet Union, not the United States. The belief that the opposite is the case appears to be so deeply grounded in ideological proclivities that no amount of argumentation or facts may change their minds.

At the very least, the intellectuals of the peace movements should be forced to recognize the consequences of the unilateral disarmament they are advocating. The peace movements have been animated by a utopian notion, namely that unilateral disarmament in the West would cause a revolution in human consciousness among the peoples beneath or above the level of governments that would spread to Eastern Europe, thereby setting off a process of "dissolution of the blocs," this despite the fact that Eastern European dissidents have urged Western liberals and Leftists to look more carefully at Soviet power. Like all utopian visions, this one shattered as soon as it came up against political reality. The rhetoric of "a plague on both your houses" has become, in fact, an attack on the nuclear weapons of the NATO alliance alone. The movements for peace in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union are non-existent, government-sponsored, or harassed and persecuted into insignificance. Should either of the blocs dissolve because of the peace movements in the West, it would be the Atlantic Alliance. Ironically the one-sidedness of the peace movement has placed it in a remarkable situation. While Reagan advocates the zero solution or zero plus solution, that is the elimination of all intermediate range missiles in Europe, the peace movements would have us accept some Russian intermediate range missiles rather than none at all. Perhaps because their fellow citizens perceived how bleak a future this would be, the peace movement contributed to the defeat of the SPD in the March elections in West Germany.

The noble vision of avoiding nuclear holocaust has brought with it some uncomfortable baggage, especially the old romantic *schwarmerei* about German national identity in a new Leftist-neutralist-pacifist *Heimat*. Twice in this century, politics based on Germany's special mission between East and West has lead to disaster. The peace movement today rejects the militarism of Germany's past but the same anti-Western themes from an earlier period are repeated today. It is hard to say where anti-nuclear and renewed national sentiment begin and end but it is undeniable that they interpenetrate in some disturbing ways. It is hard, to understand how it is "in German interests" to acquiesce in Soviet military preponderance.

There is one point on which I am in basic agreement with Süss and Lucas, namely that "fundamental conflicts of interest" cannot be overcome with technical means. The Atlantic Alliance is not primarily a technical arrangement nor a bond held together primarily by shared allegiances to capitalism. If this were the case, if it were the Right-wing technocratic shell the peace movements depict it as, it would have collapsed long ago. This alliance can only survive in the long run if the shared moral and political commitments on which it is based are recognized and appreciated. The arguments over numbers and nuclear strategies often obscure the basic point that, for all their faults, these societies are worth defending. If the moral basis of NATO is obscured in the fog of argument over the military balance, no strategy, conventional or nuclear will suffice.

We thus come back to this basic point: democracies cannot abandon the principle of nuclear deterrence and arms control. Should they forget to sustain deterrence, they will have no levers to urge dictatorships to disarm and will subject themselves to political blackmail. Should they neglect arms control, they will lose the support of their own people. The peace movements would abandon both principles. Unilateral disarmament or a refusal to support the double decision would send the wrong message to the dictators around the world: nuclear weapons pay political dividends when deployed

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against the democracies of the West.

At the core of the peace movements is the 1980s version of the Great Refusal, the Great Equation between East and West, dictatorship and democracy. This is a debilitating equation and it, not the nuclear issue alone, drives the peace movements forward. It is common to describe the peace movements as reason's revolt against the madness of the technocrats. There are rational reasons to be concerned about nuclear war, just as there are strategists who forget the uniquely destructive features of nuclear weapons. But in addition to our most intelligent fear, there is in the worldwide denunciation of the arms race a positivistic spirit, one unable and unwilling to make distinctions, the most important and the most unfashionable of which is the difference between freedom and totalitarianism. Gunter Grass is quite wrong when he compares Solidarity and the Sandinistas, just as the Western press was wrong when it compared the Israeli invasion of Lebanon to the Holocaust. The peace movements participate in this mania for comparison when they equate the American presence in Western Europe to the Soviet presence in Eastern Europe.

Critical theory has an ambivalent relationship to the comparison of the incommensurable and the blurring of important distinctions. It has provided the Great Equation with some of its most important slogans — the dialectic of enlightenment, the critique of instrumental reason and/or domination, protest against an administered world. As the discussion in *Telos* demonstrates, these slogans have now entered the peace movements. But there is a less pervasive but not insignificant theme in the critical tradition that works against the urge to blur everything to one common denominator, what Adorno prized as the attempt to save the unique and particular from the universalizing logic of exchange and administration. My point is not to justify my views on the nuclear issue with reference to Adorno but to insist that one crucially important task of literature and of critical social theory ought to be to resist these fashionable comparisons. I do not need Honneth and Kallscheuer to point out the contrast between the hopes of the Enlightenment and the realities of suffering and injustice in 1983 in the West. In sharp contrast to every single communist regime, the Western press and media drive the point home every day — and with effect. I did not argue that Western societies are perfect but that the distinctions between political freedom and totalitarianism are meaningful ones. Though Honneth and Kallscheuer find this to be a "strange encounter with a familiar ghost," they draw all the wrong conclusions from Germany's own experience with totalitarianism.

Finally, as Andrew Arato and Jean Cohen rightly point out, the issue of West European sovereignty is raised by the double decision.[11] I do not agree with them that the double decision reduces such sovereignty, any more than do the basic Atlanticist structures on which it is founded. One of Atlanticism's central dilemmas was establishing a credible defense of Western Europe without allowing West Germany to have its own nuclear weapons. In this sense, and in this sense alone, does West Germany lack the independence which Britain and France have. But on their own the French and British deterrents are not large enough to deter the Soviets. The gaullists of the Right and the Left in France — that is the entire political spectrum outside the Communists — are now firm supporters of recoupling to the American deterrent precisely because they understand that the size of the Soviet threat has grown so considerably.

The implications of the growth of Soviet military power and of the fact of West European economic power are clear: some kind of European defense policy, perhaps

11. Andrew Arato and Jean Cohen, "The Peace Movement and Western European Sovereignty," *Telos* 51 (Spring 1982), pp. 158-71. On this see Hedley Bull, "European Self Reliance and the Reform of NATO," *Foreign Affairs* (Spring 1983), pp. 874-92.

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including France's re-entry into NATO and almost certainly encompassing greater Franco-German cooperation. More European self-reliance would have a number of advantages. The American whipping boy could not be used so easily to turn one's gaze away from Soviet military power. Differences with the United States over foreign policy — trade with the Soviets, north-south relations, OPEC and the Middle East — could be expressed without the overtones of neutralism or desire to be insulated from world politics that we have seen the last several years. Neutralism in West Germany, Holland and the Netherlands might be tempered if there was more strategic thinking in Western Europe about defense.

In short, greater European self-reliance need not be synonymous with anti-Americanism or neutralism. There ought to be an alterative to Atlanticist structures conceived when Western Europe was still recovering from World War II, as well as to neutralism which takes the accomplishments of Atlanticism for granted. Despite the current economic troubles, Western Europe has enough collective wealth to do far more for its own security than it is now doing. The question is, does it have the political will and wisdom to do so. Western defense is not, need not, and cannot be established at the expense of West European sovereignty. That is why it is so important for liberal and Left-wing intellectuals in America and Europe to reassert the need to make the crucial distinctions concerning the issues of democracy and dictatorship, and war and peace in the nuclear age. Once these fundamental distinctions are clear, the unavoidable differences of interest and outlook on both sides of the Atlantic will be able to play themselves out without fear of rewarding the Soviet Union for its massive investments in arms pointed at Western Europe.

Why movements which would reward a dictatorship for accumulating weapons pointed at their own countries are given the label "peace" is a question historians of failed utopias can perhaps answer best. If the peace movements do not succeed in convincing a majority of their fellow citizens that their view of the world is correct, they will claim that the propaganda campaign of the Western media and governments stifled the will of the people. In my view, their failure will be due far more to the deficiencies of their arguments, their willful refusal to face facts, and the fortunate if humdrum observation that most people in the West are neither utopians nor — in the final analysis — inclined to believe that the intentions of the Soviet Union are no more venal than are those of the Western democracies.

It is utopian in the worst sense of the word to believe that popular movements in the West can or ought to do what states alone can and must do. The people must influence and choose their governments but they cannot influence dictatorships which themselves suppress their own people. The desire for peace and freedom, and the fear of nuclear holocaust is not the monopoly of the peace movements. Nor is disgust with the Soviet dictatorship and concern over its armed might a monopoly of Reaganism. The Soviets as well as the Western Alliance are pursuing their interests in Europe. French, Spanish and Italian socialists understand that there is no third force of eloquence, moral purity, or popular movement which will turn the Soviet Union away from its present course. Deterrence and arms control lack the grand vision of cultural revolution but they are the only answers to the dilemmas of preserving peace and freedom in the nuclear age. Damn the day nuclear weapons were invented, but they are here and it is our task as intellectuals to help preserve peace and freedom in a world that includes the Soviet Union. This is a task that demands tolerance of complexity — in argumentation, in politics — and the complexities of tolerance — in the civility with which we discuss these matters with one another. It is our curse and our blessing that it will be in the Western democracies alone that these discussions will occur.

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BETWEEN FUNDAMENTAL OPPOSITION AND *REALPOLITIK:* PERSPECTIVES FOR AN ALTERNATIVE PARLIAMENTARISM*

by Joachim Hirsch

What years of ecological conflicts, the struggle against nuclear power plants, a spreading alternative lifestyle, and the mass demonstrations of the peace movement could not accomplished became a reality with the change in the government in Bonn and the two Landtag elections in Hamburg and Hessen: there is political discussion again — political in the sense that people are reflecting about long-term, society-wide perspectives and the relation to the institutions of the bourgeois state. It is astonishing what a few parliamentary shifts can do. Suddenly conversations in taverns have become very statesmanly and the old rebels have turned into responsible *Realpolitiker.*

The at times somewhat strange peripheral phenomena, however, point to a serious background. The protest movements, oppositional cultures and anti-social initiatives have become more widespread and intense in recent years. But this has changed neither their social exclusion nor the fact that they have had only an indirect influence on government decisions. The disputes about the Frankfurt airport expansion have shown how a mass movement can build an unparalleled breadth and militancy against the hermetic apparatus of legislature, courts and police. The movement at first lost out against the notoriously unanimous parliamentary decisions, a brutal, club-swinging police force, and a judiciary system that dealt out masses of guilty verdicts. Not least of all, this and similar experiences were reason enough to abandon grassroots fixations and an anti-parliamentarism that had become very abstract. It became clear that social changes, though they cannot be attained by means of the government apparatus, also cannot be simply ignored. What at the beginning of the "new social movements" — at the end of the sixties — came back on the agenda by its own continued development. The Green Alternative parties owe much of their most recent electoral successes to this change.

The question is, however, where to go from here: Will the Greens now also develop into a regular party that plays its part in the concert of the established parties, possibly as a replacement for the dwindling Free Democrat Party? Or are they threatened with the fate of a sectarian splinter group, destined to be wiped out sooner or later by the five percent hurdle? Will they give a new impetus to well-known illusions concerning parliamentarism, i.e., feed the faith that the *Bundestag* or the *Landestage* are centers of political power and places where social development is decided? Will the refurbished parliamentarism in the end lead to a weakning of the movements, a turning away from the policy of immediate preservation of interests and practical social change? No doubt, a great deal depends on this not only for the further fate of the Green-Alternative parties but also for the development of the alternative and protest movement in general.

"Model Germany" and its Logic

Before reflecting on current parliamentary strategies, it may be useful to recall the

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conditions that led to the present political situation. Since the 1960s politics in West Germany has been essentially determined by the attempt to guarantee the international competitiveness of West German capital by a massive support of technological development and a corresponding "change of the structure" of society. The conquest of foreign markets and investment territories with "intelligent" products and advanced production techniques is the way by which prevailing capitalist groups want to secure their profit in the long run and have hitherto been able to do so. The "victims" of this strategy are well-known: a rapidly spreading threat to the natural foundations of life, urban destruction, and "internal colonialism," increased waste of labor combined with rampant mass unemployment. Meanwhile, unemployment is making it clear that we are not dealing with the temporary consequence of a periodic economic crisis. If the prevailing economic-political strategy banks on a most drastic rationalization in the domestic economy and the transferral of wage-intensive productions to low-wage countries, then mass unemployment is not an economic accident, but an integral component of the plan. Something similar is true of projects such as the construction of the Frankfurt Airport. Its economic "rationale" can be seen against the background of a regulation of space and a policy dealing with infrastructures aimed at the development of a few industrial and financial centers with world-market connections, while surrendering the "peripheral" zones. The airport expansion in the Rhine-Main world market center corresponds to a policy of turning the North-Rhine and Lower Saxony "periperhal regions" into nuclear wastelands. Such abandoned regions are thus degraded into internal colonies.

Among comparable countries, this policy of capitalist modernization has been implemented most drastically in West Germany and has led to a very dramatic transformation of social conditions. Taylorization of vital conditions, forced geographic and professional mobility, and the disintegration of traditional social milieux brought about an extremely atomized and socially disintegrated society whose cohesion must be increasingly achieved by rampant regulation and control bureaucracies. The successful *complete capitalization* of West German society resulted in its progressively *complete state domination.*

This not only led to an essential change of the political system but it also produced new dimensions of social conflict. The traditional, ideological, class-oriented interest parties have been replaced by a complex of bureaucratized, quasi-nationalized "popular parties," whose policies are determined by the no-longer-questioned regulating logic of a capitalist system integrated with the world market. Such parties function according to the mode of tactical mobilization, the splitting and exclusion of interests. Even unions act as separate bureaucracies for managing interests. They are essentially busy defining and filtering out "employee" interests so that they remain compatible with the capitalist modernization strategies and the structural changes determined by the world market — which means: representation of the wage-interests of the (qualified, male, German) "core employee groups" in the production and service sectors tied into the world market.

On this foundation a "corporatist bloc" was able to develop in West Germany consisting of the technically advanced capital groups and the bureaucratic apparatuses of the unions and the major parties. The latter differ less in their fundamental objectives of an economic and social modernization policy than in the details of their implementation. This is the "world cartel" that governs West Germany. What came out is a new type of authoritarian-democratic system based on bureaucratic mass organizations without mass participation. It is permeated with various supervisory and control

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apparatuses that increasingly exclude entire groups (the unemployed, unskilled, worn-out, youths, the aged) and interests (e.g., ecological ones). The Social Democratic Party had, since its participation in the government, assumed the ideological function of disseminating the values corresponding to this modernization strategy (progress, statism, technocratic feasibility). Politically, it organized the social compromises required for the implementation of a consistent policy of "structural change" and "growth," including the social-partner incorporation of the labor unions into the corporatist regulation cartel.

This social and political structure explains a few particularities of the social movements that arose in the 1970s. They are stamped by new, non-productivist values and interests. They stand out sharply from the petrified fossils of the labor movement. They propagate changed, non-Taylorized and uncommodified ways of life and social relations, are anti-bureaucratic, decentralized, and rather heterogeneous in class, and extremely ideologically diffuse. Thus, they are also the product of a violently transcapitalized and "Fordistically" modernized society. With their grassroot democratic, middle-class oriented, anti-statist, and hence tendentially populist nature, they are connected with its "security statist," corporatistically rigid political system. When one speaks of the Green Alternative parties, it must first of all be remembered that they are based on trends, movements, and cultures which must be understood specifically as the negation of prevailing socio-political conditions with all the consequent contradictions and ambivalences.

A New Majority "This Side" of the Christian Democratic Union?

The Green Alternative parties are, of course, not at all the "parliamentary arm" of these movements, but quite independent political organizations with comparatively small memberships and their own ideological stamp. Not without reason, citizens' initiatives avoided identifying with any party — including the Greens. In a relatively short time the Green Alternative parties have developed from a transitory component of the party system into the role of a potential majority builder in forming the government. Does this mean that after the disintegration of the social-liberal coalition and the crumbling of the Free Democratic Party a new majority has developed, socio-ecological and somehow to the "left" of the CDU/CSU? If there have been parliamentary illusions within leftist and alternative circles recently, this is the major one.

Important for judging the present situation is, first, that the Social Democratic Party did not fail because its *government* policy proved to be a danger to the system and ended by challenging prevailing class interests. Rather, the *Party* as a mass-integration apparatus was no longer able to mobilize sufficient electoral support for this policy. A reason for this is that with the increasingly evident crisis of "Model Germany," government funds no longer sufficed to counterbalance the horrible damages wrought by the prevalent economic course. With the adjustment to an economic course of scarcity and austerity, the Party had to deny its own "Keynesian" program oriented toward growth, increased prosperity and social equalization and it thus itself abandoned its basis of legitimacy. Moreover, the growing protest movements brought the Party further on the skids. As underlying social and political conflicts became increasingly explosive, these movements could less and less be channeled by the Social Democratic integration policy. In other words, with the Social Democratic Party as the governing party, the excluded "edges" of West German society were growing and this increasing protest could no longer be kept under control. The themes raised by the movements disturbed activists and made their functionalization for the government's policy more difficult. Thus, voters stayed away from the polls.

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The new coalition of the CDU/CSU and FDP could therefore quite well promise a return to "continuity." It will continue and intensify the tendencies to exclusion, to social inequality, to ecological destruction and to the authoritarian state, which were built into the previous policy. The old "Model Germany" has merely received new political administrators. Of course, the Social Democratic Party now has the problem of restoring its base of political support in order to govern again. *That* and only that is the topic of current inner-party discussions. There is no talk of a political alternative to "Model Germany." What is being debated in the Social Democratic Party are alternative strategies for maximizing votes, but not a different policy.

Therefore it is no accident that Brandt and others were the ones who brought up the concept of the "majority this side of the union" and yet very carefully avoided speaking of political changes. Indeed, very little speaks for a new political reorientation. Over the years this party has gradually degenerated into a bureaucratic quasi-state apparatus, gradually shedding its social references (as, e.g., the fate of the Young Socialists shows) and replaced them with the pomp of office, allowing the Party's life to die out and systematically choking off inner-party discussion. Instead of developing perspectives, it has at best reacted compulsively to themes forced upon it by the new movements. These reactions were determined solely by electoral considerations. These also limit the scope of people like Eppler and Lafontaine.

Except for a few Green-checkered ideological fire-crackers, the Social Democratic Party has for a long time been moving consistently back in the direction of a traditional "workers party" of the Godesberg type. More than the various Löwenthal papers, the last party-congress decisions are a sign of this. In terms of power strategy, this means: to solidify relations with the unions (and thus to assume the profile of a necessary component in the "corporatist bloc") and also with some socially tinged oppositional rhetoric to re-attract disgruntled voters and parts of the FDP followers. The political alternative to this, i.e., a contentual "opening" to the ecology and peace movement, would presuppose a far-reaching transformationof the internal structures of this state-party. For such a policy would precipitate a conflict with ruling capital groups which could be withstood, if at all, only through a strategy of mass mobilization. Yet the Party has long since cut itself off from this possibility. Social Democratic critics of Brandt are not so far from wrong when they say that such a policy could maneuver the Party into a position of being neither fish nor fowl. At any rate, if necessary, the unions could come to terms with a CDU state.

Apart from this, the social divisions which have opened up between the "new social movements" and the bureaucratically entrammeled bloc of the "silent majority" are simply too deep to be bridged by a few parliamentary maneuvers. This presupposes long-term reorientations which can hardly be achieved through parliament. In terms of election tactics, what is located "this side" of the CDU/CSU can be defined only negatively and cannot be the basis for a common policy.

All in all, there is thus hardly a sign that the Social Democratic Party could in the current situation have a real interest in an "opening" or even in a political rather than just a tactical cooperation with the Green Alternatives. What seems more probable is the attempt to regain territory it has lost in its traditional electoral milieu from the opposition by means of a refurbished social rhetoric. This is likely because during the crisis guaranteeing the simplest material interests such as jobs, housing, minimal social security, etc., becomes increasingly important. If the Social Democratic Party can no longer seek a majority, it can at least opt for a place in the government in the framework of a new (possibly large) coalition, once the current reorganization of the

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established parties is completed.

In view of this, its first goal must be to outmaneuver the Green Alternatives in vote-getting. If it succeeds in showing them to be ineffective or incompetent, it can hope to attract part of their voters or, what is more likely, drive them back out of electoral politics, thus neutralizing them. What is being discussed in the party is, at most, how this can be done. Meanwhile, the method of "gentle" parliamentarization is preferable to a policy of open confrontation since it is more elegant and more effective. "Parliamentarization" means observing the rules of the game, acting responsibly, accepting objective necessities and becoming a regular party. This would lead to a break between the Greens and the radical protest movements and their party would be left politically high and dry. In this regard there is complete agreement between the established parties (even though Strauss at present wants to ban the party). That the parliamentarization strategy for a "transition period" also involves negotiations, verbal concessions, and little compromises should not occlude basic intentions or even the fact that as long as it is in the opposition, the Social Democratic Party can alter its colors.

The Green Dilemma

The situation of the Greens is somewhat complicated. Not only are other parties seeking to finish them off, but their own electoral basis is far from being unified and stable. As is well known, ideologically an important part of those who voted for the Greens recently are not really "green." The Greens do not appeal to a closed and unified social camp but to a broad spectrum of often diffuse interests. They are primarily a *protest party* for all those who do not think that things can continue economically and socially as they are and for whom the established parties are thus out of the question. For a share of the votes between six and eight percent this provides a pleasant situation: but even the splintering off of a very slight percentage places their parliamentary existence in doubt.

Furthermore, the term "fundamental opposition," hotly disputed in connection with the Green Alternatives, has several meanings. First, it includes a bit of party tactics determined by the given situation. The retreat to general and vague political principles can temporarily protect them from being outmaneuvered tactically into the bushes of "technical questions" and thus parliamentarily neutralized. This also has the advantage of avoiding being pinned down on the issues disputed by their own electorate and thus decreasing the risk of losing their support.

The term has quite a different meaning when used, e.g., in Bahro's sense. Here the Green Party appears as the expression of a new, closed world-view seeking a radical break with previous ways of life and the introduction of a new ideological hegemony. Then, even in parliament, politics is not so much tactical compromises and situational exploitation of possibilities but manifestation, warning, the clarification of principles. Parliament becomes a public stage. The radical emphasis on a closed and yet completely different program as well as the non-cooperation with established political parties and other political forces must aim at a gradual long-term change in mass consciousness or, in parliamentary terms, at somehow winning an absolute majority, sooner or later.

Of course, the question is how can this succeed. Two factors militate against it. First, it is not clear how the different interests of the electorate or even only within the protest movement could be won over to a Green program. Currently even the ecology movement is not entirely identified with it. Formulations such as "a question of the entire human race" or "the preservation of natural cycles" tend to hide the fact that it is a mat-

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ter of concrete *social organizations*, of forms of production and the division of labor, and that there are extremely different ideas on these subjects. Secondly, a lot of people vote Green because they hope for practical and immediate political changes. They want to alter the rigid and authoritarian political apparatus. Many have rediscovered parliamentarism because over the years their own "fundamental opposition" was somewhat frustrating. A policy of "fundamental opposition" based on fixed ideological positions could thus have undesirable results: a very fine but extremely small and not very long-lived Green party.

What Can the Green Alternative Parties Do In Parliament?

After the first Hamburg and Hessen elections, hopes that the Green Alternative parties, as a parliamentary "third force," could influence the government-formation processes, stabilize new majorities, and thus acquire practical political relevance were quickly dispersed. They were full of illusions about what the distribution of parliamentary seats has to do with political power relations, the nature of the established parties (especially the Social Democrats) all the way to errors as to what affects policy in capitalist societies: capital strategies, international economic relations, world market conditions, etc.

Disillusionment tends to diminish a few of the dangers which such ideas entail. Actually, no matter in what shape, at the time an "alliance" with the Social Democrats would have done the very opposite of stabilizing a leftist, ecological, social and liberal majority. Instead, through a few tactical concessions that did not alter the overall political course, the Greens Alternatives would have been degraded to a temporary majority-decider, and possibly even have been misused as a political auxiliary for the implementation of new capital-"ecological" industrial strategies *a la* Huber. That would have meant bearing joint responsibility for whatever the political managers of "Model Germany" would do in the future. At any rate, there was the definite likelihood of playing off against one another the various currents within the protest movement, by carefully selected offers within the framework of the "feasible" and by repressive obligation to parliamentary good behavior, thus dividing and disconnecting the Greens from the political base.

Thus, in principle, it can neither be a matter of pretending to have a "majority" in parliament, which it does not have, nor of undertaking a "fundamental opposition" that paints itself into a corner ideologically. To enter parliament can only mean "to set in motion processes and developments" in the state apparatuses, in the movements themselves and in people's consciousness. The Green Alternatives are not part of an "alternative bloc" that could ever gain a majority, but only a *minority,* i.e., the expression of a movement that has yet to develop. They must see that they are a *protest party,* i.e., the voters' choice for very different interests which cannot be combined in a unified program but which must first be discussed, decided upon and then tested. At any rate, the parliamentary system has its own logic, which must be acknowledged. Given this, it is then possible to sketch what a parliamentary policy would have to look like in order to avoid being reduced to election tactics and, rather, pursue real change of social conditions and of political power relations.

First, it is necessary to become involved in the practical parliamentary work, in the sense that the administration's bills and measures require careful criticism and must be countered with concrete alternatives. This is a matter of uncovering the distortions that government policy is always subject to by apparent technical constraints and the systematic attempt to disregard problems, i.e., to see what the policies do *not* deal with. Thus, it is hardly possible to negotiate compromises for a governmental or legislative

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program in the familiar parliamentary pattern. Rather, supported by the common goals of the protest movement, one can mark off clearly defined demands and veto-positions which confront established parties with a choice between concessions or an open, large coalition, which for electoral and tactical reasons, they cannot agree to.

Yet, concrete parliamentary work in this sense is not just meant to force the political managers of "Model Germany" to grant concessions. It is also meant to stimulate political development within the opposition movements themselves. As to practical social changes and how they are to be achieved, a lot has to be clarified between bio-gardeners, critical labor unionists, women's liberationists and Left intellectuals. Such clarifications are achieved not just through general agreement concerning what is desirable, but also by means of a discussion of practical measures. Even if parliament generates a wrong image of reality, working at it can foster a consciousness of reality.

Consider social policy: should one unconditionally defend the traditional social state or let it be scrapped by neo-conservatives? Neither course is possible. Yet presently no one has a viable alternative to the bureaucratic, controlling and disenfranchising "welfare" state which does not, at the same time, imply a relapse below its historical accomplishments. If one acknowledges that mass unemployment is not a transitory accident but a planned component of "Model Germany" which is here to stay, and if one further assumes that the usual demands for more industrial jobs regardless of the purpose are not only futile but may actually be politically harmful to human beings and nature, then one must go beyond traditional social-democratic ideas. Can a mere modification of the prevalent Taylorized society by globally reducing work time suffice? Or is it a matter of creating new, more satisfying and more useful forms of work? And how can that be done? Is the state promotion of autonomous and self-managed projects meaningful?

Dealing with such concrete questions could force the splintered movements to look beyond their own narrow sectors and try to deal with the complex problems of society as a whole and its future development: to come to political terms with the destruction of forests, nuclear power plants, missiles, patriarchy and unemployment. Then, although never unchallenged, the contours of a practical social and political conception could gradually emerge. Only in this fashion will parliament become a "public stage" — or, in other words, only this way will parliament command the permanent attention of the media. For the constant emphasis on the same principles becomes tiring. And this applies to elections, too: majorities that are more than election statistics cannot be won by upholding general principles or by prophetic appeals to inner conversion. They are obtained by working out concrete ideas and by showing that things can be done otherwise. Parliamentary details in the everyday business of legislation and management could help in the development of a "new majority," or, more modestly, in the development of a relevant force for change in society. But this requires a political and administrative competence that far exceeds that of established parliamentarians and which is difficult to reconcile with the views of grassroots politicians.

Secondly, if a parliamentary initiative contributes to making the protest movements more political and to moving opposition political cultures to concrete social problems, this could also promote some urgently needed ideological clarification within their own ranks. Since "Model Germany" has entered into a crisis and a drastic restructuring is due for the Social-Democratic, Keynesian state-regulated society in the direction of increased competition, more rights to the powerful, more inequality, and greater social exclusions, the rulers must first impose on society the necessary new legitimation and values. Very complicated fronts result in the process. Increased

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"claims" stand in opposition to an unlimited extension of consumer society, and the bureaucratically managed social state is opposed not by Reaganomists and Thatcherists, but by a good number of Greens. Some of the virtues propagated by the Green Alternatives, such as modesty, self-help, retreat to private life, new femininity, the village, and Protestant ethics, could easily be misused to implement a new and reactionary dominant ideology. If an ecological catastrophe is actually imminent, then one might be prepared to pay a high price for survival. At any rate, the Green Alternatives are very ambivalent toward the lowering of mass incomes, the reprivatization of social risks, or the marginalization of ever greater parts of society. To acknowledge this is not to defame as reactionary something that is the expression of a social contradiction. But it does show the need for serious discussions in one's own camp and in one's own mind. This takes place not by quarrelling over principles and squabbling over abstract theory, but in the conflicts over concrete policy. What happens in parliament is not a social change. It seeks practical social developments in which a few ideological clouds may burst.

Thirdly, parliamentary work can also enhance the possibilities of development for the protest movements in several ways. First, it could counter the constant attempts to criminalize the movement and repressively exclude it from society. Interference on the level of the official political movements means not simply to leave an open field to the established powers, but to throw sand into the gears of the increasingly authoritarian security state. At the same time, this establishes political and social legitimacy and demonstrates that there is *no* political area where the opposition is not present.

In more positive terms, parliamentary initiatives must be directed as much as possible toward creating the legal, organizational and financial conditions for developing and strengthening practical measures for changing society. If anything is really to be changed in this society, it will be only because people begin to live and work differently, develop new divisions of labor, and run the economy differently. Obviously, this does not take place in parliament. Parliamentary work and influence on the state bureaucracy can improve the conditions for these developments, though. "Alternative" parliamentary and party work can gain impetus and conviction only by relating to such initiatives. Only when this connection is really established will it be possible to avoid having Green Alternative parliamentarism end up in irrelevant separatism, in cooptation by the ruling power and in the movement's social and political exclusion.

A closed power bloc that disposes over the decision and propaganda apparatuses and holds a marginalized, politically apathetic and socially hopeless majority under control by a mixture of physical repression and ideological splintering is no longer unthinkable for West Germany. This demonstrates the need for an institutional policy and participation in the established apparatus of domination. Finally, this is the only way the movement can stimulate the parties and society. In the last analysis, events in parliament reflect social praxis and real power relations. But that is not a one-way street. Parliamentary activities can have a significant effect by creating parameters of action, promoting political clarification and self-understanding, and promoting the study of concrete political steps on the level of society as a whole — in short, supporting the development of an alternative hegemonic structure. The foundation of all this, however, remains the autonomous project, the independent context of discussion, immediate conflict, and last but not least, street action.

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ONE NATION, ONE REICH, ONE PEACE*

by Wolfgang Pohrt

If the atom bombs are set off, we'll be dead, but we have to live with the opponents of increased armaments and the neutron bomb. Once the bomb has fallen no one suffers any more. We suffer from its anticipated political consequences — for in the nuclear age the consequences of war precede it. After a nuclear war there will supposedly be cockroaches with five heads and legs four meters long. The mutations that interest us, however, take place beforehand, and they look quite different: one wanted to start a peace movement and it turned out to be a German national revival movement.

"No German can accept this unconditional subordination of the interests of our people to foreign interests, this surrender of disposal over the existence of our people to a foreign government." The well-known slogan, the familiar tone: it ought to be followed by the "Deutschland" song, and then the oath to the flag. When such slogans drone from the radio, then we get the feeling that we are in our homeland. The populace is welded together into a humiliated community of destiny, indeed, one doomed to death; no one can stand apart, we know only Germans, and no party differences any more. That is how World War I began; that is how the war-guilt lie was denounced, as well as the dictated Versailles Treaty, and the usurous slavery imposed on the German people by international Jewish finance capital. That was, almost literally, Strauss's slogan when the West German government allegedly sold out the people to the Russians in the treaties with the East.

We grew accustomed to this text long ago. If no one saw the people's existence as threatened any more — by foreigners, by the Reds, the anarchists, a low birth-rate, increased government debt, a swelling flood of refugees — then we would miss something. Except that this time the speaker was not Dr. Strangelove in an interview with the *Nationalzeitung* but Prof. Gollwitzer in a letter to the editor of *Der Spiegel.* And the unconditional subordination with which he reproached the West German government, did not refer, as one might think, to a demobilization of the West German army ordered by the Allies, but the stationing of missiles. Gollwitzer, a man of unquestionable qualifications, is of course not a war monger. His call for a general mobilization for the national war of liberation was aimed not at preparing for war, but at preserving peace. But the road to hell is paved with good intentions if the good intentions are a mortgage on a general absolution for unpardonable errors.

Although elsewhere human reason, human intention, and human will may have been just a ruse of history — in Germany they were all unmitigated, crafty, and wily. Even the "masses' anti-capitalist longing" led here, contrary to all expectation, not to a revolutionary liberation from the rule of capital, but to its crowning, culmination, and supression in concentration camps. The partition did not cut this country in half, as the Allies had intended, but doubled it instead. It perished in the national megalomania, but such perishings were always drastic cures for Germany's economic power. Here we longed for the equality of all, and the result was an equal scantiness. Here the abolution of privileges was understood in the sense that the little man need fear no disadvan-

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tages if he denounces the privileged. Here the petit-bourgeois and the capitalist were denounced with fiery rhetoric, while capital continued to flourish magnificently, but afterwards all the Jews were dead. Here nothing is innocent, not even enthusiasm for peace — especially not if the enthusiasm for peace catalyzes a German-national revival movement.

One could now object that Pershing missiles and neutron bombs are a threat against which one can rightly make a pact even with the devil. And if we sing all the stanzas of the "Deutschland" song three times a day and speak after the little man's own heart ("Foreigners out!") and elect Adolf von Thadden chancellor, if he is still alive — the main thing is to get rid of the nuclear missiles; and if we still listen to the Internationale only in secret and betray all insights, knowledge and principles to the demagogic slogans of a German national peace movement — the main thing is that the nuclear missiles be removed. What is forgotten is that of all things which a German national peace movement attacks — on the one hand, increased armaments, but on the other, for example, the insight that no socialist can wish even more sovereignty to this reactionary country such as it is, and that we have no reason to defend it against any foreign power and even to love it — one thus forgets that of all things which a German national peace movement attacks, the nuclear missiles are most resistant. Certainly, in the end the missiles will still be there, and only our reason, our credibility, our insights and knowledge will be gone. A peace movement that no longer recognizes any parties and classes, but only Germans, can achieve only partial success: the final defeat of the Left.

One could continue in the same vein. One could recall Brecht's dictum that through the many daily little lies we make ourselves guilty also of the great catastrophe. When Gollwitzer and with him the new peace movement transforms this populace into "our people," not just a possessive pronoun was added where a demonstrative would have been called for. *Das Volk* (the people) is not a term that the Nazis had to ruin, but for a hundred years already it had been the lie of the necessarily fated connection of the individual with the coerced collectively of the nation — i.e., the lie that denies the Enlightenment idea of mankind and with it the promise of the socialist revolution, still unredeemed down to this day, the association of free men. One could ask Gollwitzer whether he really seriously believes that the right of disposal over the existence of a population must first fall into foreign hands to become wrong — as if this right of disposal were not itself a scandal. One could ask him for an explanation as to where he gets the strange assurance that a West German government independent of foreign opinion would have more consideration for the populace as a whole and especially for Gollwitzer himself. We recall the people who were not murdered and expelled by foreign powers but by the German police, by the Gestapo and the SS. Some found asylum abroad. We owe the fact that we can continue to live here, to a great extent unmolested, not to any German national sovereignty, but to the Allied victory. And a year ago some wished that in case Strauss won the election, foreign countries, if necessary the CIA, would prevent the worst. If Albertz now publicly hopes that patriotism will never be completely lost, the objection to this is that no one can choose the country in which he is born or the language with which he grew up, but each person is free to make the decision to esteem or curse those accidental conditions to which he owes his existence. Whoever finds reason to esteem this country should name them. Whoever finds none and still loves it should remain silent; what moves in his deepest heart does not concern us. And when the *taz* in connection with the peace movement asks: "Why do we still not have a peace treaty 36 years after World War II?" then, in

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addition to astonishment at the national "We" in the alternative newspaper, the counter question is justified: "Why was Germany not at that time simply divided up among the neighborly countries?" — a comparatively modest and especially unbloody price for Auschwitz and the 50 million dead.

One could thus ask, argue and explain long and patiently — if the matadors of the new peace movement were ignorant beginners instead of experienced veterans. Thus, one could discover and correct errors, one could politely discuss strategy and tactics — if those leftists who are suddenly mouthing German national slogans were at least windy opportunists and sly tacticians and not what they are, namely, upright, thoroughly honest, loyal and pure-hearted people with conviction. Long before anyone spoke of increased armaments, the neutron bomb and the peace movement, they, who in contrast to millions of foreigners driven by hardship into West Germany, never have had to leave the country of their mother tongue and generally for years have been cozily nested in the same town and the same apartment, now weep for their lost homeland. When Piwitt writes in *Konkret*: "This depressed national feeling of the Germans stems from the fact that the revolutionary national traditions were cut off," that is because no one but the Germans themselves have cut off their revolutionary traditions (if there ever were any) and because one must hold a finger out so that another can simply cut it off — a whimpering lie that serves neither peace nor disarmament, but only the emotional needs of its author. When Piwitt, the man with the moral fiber and index finger, continues: "That is how this Americanizing acculturation, that is how this Yankee language, which dominates us with words like 'fighting,' and 'dope,' 'power' and 'message' even when we resist," then he comes up with his proposal to purify the German language of Americanisms, i.e., of foreign words, of course, again too late. The German hit parade has started rolling long ago. When the leftist writer Gerd Fuchs in a conversation with Piwitt published in *Konkret* states: "These people have dishonored us. They have made an entire people into their accomplices. That is a mental and a political poisoning," then we no longer need to know whether "these people" means the American government, the West German government, or the Nazis. This people at least has not done anything evil, it has just been crucified and seduced, and the others were always to blame. When Piwitt, finally, valiantly defends the German cultural heritage against foreign influence, with heart-rending groans at his country's occupation by "Yankee culture," and asks the question which most clearly threatens the main beneficiaries of the real exploitation and repression in the Third World: "So how can I resist colonialism?" then he is doing the right thing, but of course, in the only false place in the whole world. Elsewhere the traditional forms of life of entire nations may have fallen prey to American cultural imperialism. But in Germany it is not barbarism but civilization that began with American cultural imperialism. In this country, every additional branch of the McDonald hamburger chain is a new island of hospitality and a delightful enrichment of culinary culture. To attack the United States because of its armaments policy and its support for just about every torture regime in the whole world is one thing, but the statement that there "is more culture in a single Beethoven symphony than all America has ever produced," comes from Hitler, and jazz was already forbidden once. In the Third Reich, America was considered a crude, multilingual racial mixture, and that is the way it has remained if one is to judge on the basis of the hate-filled epithet "Yankee culture." The great political crimes committed by Germany do not relieve us of the duty to attack America's lesser ones. But every justified protest against U.S. policies is merely reactionary here if one small fact is forgotten: If Germany had ever had the military resources of the United States, no one would

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still be alive on this planet. We always understood the protest against the Vietnam war — how long ago that already was — in connection with German fascism. No German who calls himself by that name has the right to judge America. Whoever lives in Germany and nonetheless does not want to be silent about the crimes being committed everywhere in the world must first of all renounce his nationality. A flaunting of Germanhood and national demagoguery which are allegedly supposed to strengthen the new peace movement against additional armaments and the neutron bomb in truth take away from it any moral and political legitimacy. Thus, one must suspect that not just the neutron bomb — that would be excusable — has robbed the German Leftists of their reason, but that they lost it long ago. Thus, one cannot escape the ugly suspicion that the peace movement is not so very concerned about increased armaments. The Blood and Soil murmurings, the "homeland" whispers, the birth wave, the mother-cult, love for the pale mothers, the rubble women, raw food, nature and the wild health — this explosive mixture of sentimental values, tearfulness and brutality, customary in this country, existed long before the increased armaments, and only the spark was missing. Now the neutron bomb has become the fuse to ignite a German national revival movement. The alternatives are its mass basis, and the fatherland once again firmly has embraced its rejected children. Subterranean forces and semi-ends-of-the-world have always been necessary to unite this country.

What follows from this? Nothing, of course. America is mighty and great, the German Mark is falling, the Germans are skilled in adapting and masters at reaching for the ceiling. In a year,all this will be forgotten again, including, of course, increased armaments and the neutron bomb. Then the anger will be directed against the Turks.

THE PEACE MOVEMENT IN EAST GERMANY — ITS ORIGIN AND FUTURE*

by Klaus Ehring

As a political precaution it must be stated that the theme of this essay uses a terminology which cannot be taken for granted in the country discussed. Representatives of the Protestant Churches in East Germany reject the designation peace-*movement* because they do now know that an independent political movement conflicts with their government's claim to a monopoly of political power. They speak of Christians "witnessing for peace" and this caution even in terminology shows that engagement for peace in East Germany is problematic. Thus, in this context, the participants operate in very different ways. Such linguistic caution at the grassroots level tends to be interpreted as a sign of hesitancy and lack of courage. From this viewpoint, the aim of creating a world without weapons must not be concealed under institutional political calculations. After all, it is shared with all those of like mind in other countries who are now called by what they understand themselves to be: a movement for peace.

* Translated by David J. Parent.

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Unlike the movements in England, Holland or the US, however, a peace movement independent of the state in East Germany is much less possible. It has no journals, no offices, no addresses of contacts by which it can make itself known to the outside world. In the official East German media it is simply non-existent. It is organized, rather, in the only non-state sanctuary in this country: the Church, as especially the Protestant Churches, since the Catholic Church exercises definite restraint on social and political questions.

To give an insight into the thinking of those in East Germany who are working for peace at the grassroots level I quote a letter providing candid information about this work. It was written in March 1982 by a long-time co-worker of a peace circle in East Germany to a friend in West Germany:

"*Dear Hans!*

Our father told us that you are interested in our work for peace. I am therefore sending you some of the scanty information that can be published here on that subject.

There is practically no grassroots-level peace movement. In 1962 the East German Peace Council, which belongs to the World Peace Council (headquartered in Helsinki) abolished the district, county, township and enterprise peace councils, which were carrying on, among other things, an intensive pan-German work, and integrated them into the National Front. Since then it consists only of 300 qualified members and consistently represents the peace policy of the Warsaw Pact states. The Christian Peace Conference (with headquarters in Prague) has a regional conference in East Germany, has only very recently begun conducting occasional grassroot seminars, but they are marked by a critique of Western but not of Eastern armaments.

*The Sign of Repentence Program (*Aktion Sühnezeichen*) in East Germany doing an outstanding job of reconciliation. After it had been received very warmly in Poland and Czechoslovakia for camp-service in the memorial places for former concentration camps, these foreign camps were forbidden by our government so that, for years, Sign of Repentence Camps in East Germany could be set up only in charitable institutions and at Jewish cemetaries where theoretical work was being done on problems of international reconciliations, peace, Jews, the history of international reconciliation, etc., and in which guests from abroad have also occasionally participated. Recently, individual foreign camps, e.g., in the children's hospital in Warsaw, are also permitted. The Signs of Repentence group also issues very good monthly bulletins.*

A small independent peace movement has, through grassroots initiatives (mainly by Christian lay people) taken hold under the sponsorship of the Protestant Churches. We established probably the oldest and the best known peace seminar in East Germany in Königswalde about ten years ago, due mostly to the efforts of Hansjörg Wiegel — a former construction-solder and an automotive electrician by trade. We began with 27 people and now we have reached the absolute maximum that the Königswald village church can hold with 400 members.

Meanwhile, in a few villages, similar groups have been formed or are in the process of being formed. But there are also spontaneous or revolutionary outbreaks which prove to be illusory and unsustainable, which express pent-up dissatisfaction but also exceed what is feasible under our social conditions. Young people then turn out to be no match for state repressions, interrogations or even arrests. So they are broken by them.

Our situation is characterized by an increasing militarization of society, which practically begins in kindergarten with mandatory military toys and the Bummi*-booklets (*Bummi *is the magazine for children of pre-school age) and it continues with the first-grade reader and math-book, the Boy Scout "Snow-Flake" maneuvre, the "Hans Beimler competitions," military-oriented sport instruction, practice handgrenade throwing, participations at public swearings-in counted as "field-trips," the recruiting of individuals in the eighth grade to be future officers, military training starting in the ninth grade with volunteer military camps, acceptance of male high school students as officer candidates,*

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pre-military training as a component of instructional contracts and study-agreements, civil defense including maneuvers that simulate nuclear warfare in populated areas, the assignment of government leaders to factories as reserve officers, "M"-command (mobilizations exercises), etc. Most people just put up with this, afraid to say anything or to refuse to cooperate, and they withdraw behind their Western TV-programs, their gardens, their cars or the soccer field. Predominent at any rate is the imaginary fear of imaginary disadvantages as well as apathy and resignation. Nor is anything published or taught about alternative possibilities. Even quite legal matters such as substitute assignments to unarm construction units instead of military service are unknown to the general public.

So, what could be called a peace movement is very small. The Church tries to promote peace-education, and it indefatigably urges the state in this direction. But it has a lot to lose and so it cannot be as clearly committeed as would perhaps be necessary.

Yet, work for peace is still safest under the Church's wings. Efforts not in conformity with the official peace and defense policy outside the Church are dealt with very harshly and immediately nipped in the bud.

In Königswalde we met twice a year on a Saturday or weekend. Themes of discussion have been, among others: war and peace in the Old and New Testament, possibilities of service for peace in East Germany, the Sign of Repentence program, KSZE/Helsinki, coexistence-proexistence, construction "soldiers" in East Germany, human rights, East German military law, confidence-building, non-violence, education for peace, etc.

My friend Hansjörg Weigel, initiator of the Königswald Seminar, was arrested in 1980, presumably to put an end to the seminar. The pretext was that he had borrowed a book by Reiner Kunze. The Church and many people, however, stood behind him so solidly that the relatively low penalty of 18 months in jail for "anti-governmental agitation" was subsequently reduced to probation and his release followed after three months of investigative arrest shortly after the Church vouched for him. The whole affair make the peace seminar very well known and was of more help than harm . . .

Cordially yours
Christian"

This letter gives a good insight into the current situation of peace initiatives in East Germany. At the same time, it makes it clear that resistance to the (re)militarization of the other German state is not just a momentary phenomenon but has a tradition going back to post-war times when the new rulers themselves were still engaged in an intensive anti-militarist campaign. To trade back the origin of critical commitment to peace is therefore of great signficance in clarifying that it originated in this society, that it was not imported from the outside, but is an immanent East German phenomenon.

After 1945 the new power structure in present-day East Germany was completely anti-fascist and anti-militarist. The slogan "Never again war!" attracted not only many young people but also numerous critical intellectuals who regarded this course as an alternative to the ongoing restoration in West Germany. Even the 1949 East German constitution took this ideology into account in that it did not require military service and guaranteed citizens full freedom of conscience (Article 41).

A change in this attitude first came when East and West Germany gradually developed into independent, sovereign and, moreover, hostile states with their armed forces. The conflict over the remilitarization of that territory from which WWII had been launched, almost necessarily included East Germany. In 1955 the country became a member of the Warsaw Pact and founded — though without introducing universal military conscription — the "National People's Army" (*Nationale Volksarmee*). A change in the constitution now declared military service a "duty of honor." One year later the FDJ (Free German Youth) central committee required its male members to be ready to

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protect "our republic" by service in the National People's Army. Yet, an effort was still made to continue using anti-militaristically colored arguments against West Germany, and this was made easier by the fact that as early as 1956 universal military conscription was introduced and a military chaplaincy contract signed between the Protestant Churches and the West German Army.

Only in 1961, after the wall had been built and there no longer was an open border, did remilitarization take place in East Germany. After a seventeen-year interval without universal military conscription, the FDJ now required its members to sign "declarations of readiness" obliging them to enlist for three years of military service (FDJ-conscriptions), and in January 1962 universal military conscription was finally introduced by law. As opposed to West Germany, the regulation provided for no possibility of refusal, which meant for the post-war generations brought up on anti-militaristic propaganda that they had no other option to avoid coming into conflict with the law. Even ideologically there was no longer any room for conscientious objection. A hard campaign in the form of countless forums on defense policy and newspaper articles on the subject carried on a frenzied attack against pacifism and conscientious objection, which was summed up by the then-chairman of East Germany's defense council Paul Fröhlich: "Where peace and socialism rule, there is no longer room for pacifism." And the (East) *Berliner Zeitung* said: "We support all youths in West Germany who refuse military service, for they weaken the imperialist NATO-Army. In East Germany there can and will be no conscientious objection, since we are protecting peace and socialism."[1]

This line of argument has been maintained uninterruptedly in official ideology down to this day. Thus, the 10th Party Congress of the SED (April 1981) used the newly coined affirmative slogan "Socialism and peace are essentially the same," and the FDJ meetings in March 1982 used the slogan: "Peace must be defended, peace must be armed" (a formulation which, incidentally, was used almost in the same words by the CSU at its peace demonstration in Munich in June 1982). To this day, publicly denounced pacifists are as "utopian dreamers" and war as the "continuation of class politics by violent means."

As for the origin of the current critical engagement for peace in East Germany, its roots can be traced back to the early sixties when there was considerable resistance to the country's remilitarization — especially in Protestant cirles which were still committed to the struggle against fascism, the devasting war and the traditions of the Confessional Church. Over 90% of the population then still had (predominantly Protestant) religious ties. But even outside the Church, people were basically pacifist and anti-militarist. In a 1962 circular letter about the situation of East Germany after the introduction of universal military service providing no legal alternative the Thuringian bishop, Mitzenheim, wrote: "From conversations and letters, I know that there is a great deal of unclarity on the subject of military service. Our youth experienced the condemnation of militarism after the war. In their school years the damnability of war was graphically presented to them and they were taught to condemn the instruments of mass destruction. They were told that war today, with the use of nuclear weapons, would be a campaign of extermination. It is therefore understandable that some of our young people have a critical attitude toward military service."

How great the potential number of young opponents to military service was at that

1. This and all other themes discussed here are extensively documented in Klaus Ehring, Martin Dollwitz, *Schwerter zu Pflugscharen. Friedensbewegung in der DDR.* Rororo-aktuell, 5019 (Reinbeck: 1982).

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time is difficult to estimate. The former East German conscientious objector, Bernd Eisenfeld, places their number at about 3,300 between 1962 and September 1964. Most of the opponents to military service who refused to serve in the National People's Army, even under threat of a long prison sentence, were influenced by Protestant views which, since the end of the war, had been advocating non-violence, reconciliation, and the possibility for a constitutional and legally guaranteed conscientious objection. Their large number, their staunchness, and the great mass of sympathizers for their attitude made the situation seem so sensitive to the East German leadership that they almost always refrained from punishing conscientious objectors, In all, only ten arrests were announced at that time.

Under this pressure, in September 1964 East Germany conceded unarmed service to conscientious objectors — to those who, "for religious or similar reasons rejected armed military service," as it says in the "Order Establishing Construction Units." The background for this step was probably the fear that tacitly tolerated conscientious objection was causing a growing number of young conscripts to drop out of the military recruitment pool and appear to others as models to be imitated.

The newly created "Construction Soldiers Service without Weapons" provided for no verification procedure, but it was and remains to this day a military service in the full sense. The people involved join the National People's Army, wear uniforms, steel helmets, knapsacks, and gas-marks. They are housed in military camps, have to obey military regultions, must take a vow (instead of an oath) obligating them "to give absolute obedience to their superiors" (i.e., generally officers of the National People's Army), and they are used exclusively for military purposes. The only difference is that they do not bear arms. In the 1960s they were used mainly for the construction and reconstruction of military airbases, and today mainly in rear-guard services.

These construction soldiers and those who refused such "military substitute service" (total refusers) have since 1964 become a focus of critique of the populace's military schooling. Practical commitment to peace in East Germany found its first supporters among them. Their support for pacifism and disarmament since then has been at the price of severe personal consequences. The refusal to participate in (pre)military training means in practice that they have no opportunity for a university education, or even to obtain a high-school diploma. Even service as a construction soldier means the sacrifice of a professional career because in East Germany this is considered the expression of an unreliable attitude which does not meet the demands for a "leadership role under socialism." Thus, in the face of the hostility of the social environment, a commitment to peace in East Germany requires a total engagement. Whoever professes pacifism and non-violence is supporting not just an opinion but an attitude.

Unlike in West Germany, there has thus been a commitment to peace since the 1960s, and it was personally embodied in construction soldiers and conscientious objectors. Their work remains to this day one of the most essential factors for the peace-discussion within the East German Church: 1) They have untiringly exerted pressure on Church leaders to support non-violence and disarmament even during the phase of accommodation and harmony between Church and State (since the 1960s). 2) They have taken numerous initiatives which made their views known to and possible convinced a limited public. The origin and practical work of peace workgroups in student parishes, in the Young Parishes movement, and in peace seminars are due mainly to their initiatives. In 1972, construction soldiers founded, for example, the previously mentioned Königswald Peace Seminar, and many were also involved in the Sign of Reconciliation program. 3) Many conscientious objectors later

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entered Church service (for example, the author of the "Berlin Appeal," Pastor Rainer Eppelmann), in order to serve as pastors or to work with youth or for an "education for peace," which was to encompass all members of the Church, young and old. This development changed the climate drastically in the East German Protestant Churches as regards commitment to peace. Yet, the construction soldier's commitment to peace was not easy. All other initiatives and attempts to organize independently of the Church had been nipped in the bud.

Among the main themes of the conscientious objectors' commitment to peace three are prominent: 1) Critique of the military nature of "military-substitute service" in the construction units and demand for a real civilian peace service. Position-papers were repeatedly written on this subject. The most famous effort is the "Initiative the Social Peace Service" which collected about 5000 petitions from the Spring of 1981 to World Peace Day on September 1, 1981. 2) The quest for alternatives to the heavily armed status quo. Beginning with the knowledge that war in the nuclear age would mean the end of human civilization, construction soldiers consider the "balance of terror" to be no guarantee of peace. New ways must be found to ensure peace. Moreover, they fear that the military sphere is becoming increasingly independent and powerful. Yet, conscientious objectors recognize their own lack of political power and, therefore, regard their service and commitment all the more strongly as a *sign* against the prevailing lack of peace. 3) "Education of Peace" instead of "Education for Hatred." Construction soldiers have repeatedly made it clear that society's preparation for war does not make it less but more likely. Instead, they advocate that society be trained for "peacefulness." They organize programs for trading in military toys, support a ban on such toys, and have developed numerous instructional materials for an "Education for Peace."

In this work, in sum, Christian ethics and political critique have — under the pressure of circumstances — combined into a new quality. The commitment to peace is neither a religious mission defused of its political dimension nor a merely short-term political trend. Its particular strength stems from its continuity, its resistance-tested morale, and its peace-concept, which links national and international peace.

As for the present, the recent and considerable upswing in the Christian commitment to peace in East Germany cannot be overlooked. Where does it find its drive? 1978 marks a historical turn for on September 1, military training was introduced as a mandatory subject into the 9th and 10th grades. This showed the government's will to guarantee an uninterrupted military training from kindergarten to adult life, which obviously was an attempt somehow to counteract the process of ideological emanciation and meaninglessness in the 70s and 80s. Society is to be welded together by the constant threat of a possible war. Its "defense readiness" and its constant "alertness" serve, among other things, to guarantee internal cohesion. At the same time, in the amount of relevant materials published to advocate this military training, war appears winnable, if only citizens are sufficiently readied for it by civil defense exercises and military preparedness.

This last aspect seemed absurd and extremely dangerous to peace-loving Christians since it stood in almost diametrical contradiction to the other statements on the government's peace policy which used fear of nuclear war to promote large-scale protests against Western "imperialist armaments policy." When military training, which was regarded as just the tip of the iceberg, became known four months before its inception, a broad protest front arose among Protestant Christians, for the first time encompassing the whole Church and not just those committed to peace. Even Church

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leaders, under pressure from their grassroots, took a stand in "guidelines" and in a pulpit statement against the new subject of instruction and, they even sought to negotiate — in vain — with the government to seek rejection of this program. In September 1978 the synod of the East German Association of Churches therefore adopted an "Education for Peace" program of study and action which was intended as a "contrapunctal undertaking" to military training. Since that time initiatives, partly from "above," partly from "below," have led to a broad and lasting involvement of communities in dealing critically with peace.

Youth work was not especially needed, because the problem of the militarization of young people does not begin merely with conscription, but as early as the ages of twelve or thirteen. The Church here gave assistance and information to those who faced serious personal decisions by providing a group of like-minded people able to provide individuals with a certain amount of support. Still, the number of pupils who refuse to enroll, although rising, remains relatively small.

The program for an "Education for Peace" and its underlying cause, the militarization of social life, is just one source of the rise of the commitment to peace in East Germany. The other has to do with the political conditions for the effectiveness of such a commitment which have changed in the context of the mounting peace movement in the West and its broad coverage in the official media. As in the early 60s, since about 1970 one could refer in East Germany to the "world-wide peace movement" and legitimate one's own *engagement* as a part of this, which made it immensely more difficult for the state to dismiss it as "just a dream."

Against this background of a thoroughly changed legitimation foundation of the independent commitment to peace in East Germany, there also arose those initiatives and demonstrations which first attracted greater attention in the West: 1) Since 1980 every November a Church "Peace Decade" is organized and it generates increasing activities: the presentations in November 1982 were numerous and took place even in rural areas. 2) In Summer 1981 discussion was dominated by the call for a "Socialist Peace Service." This was read aloud, discussed, and signed in countless Church groups. It was also sent to the various *Land*-synods and, via new reports in the West, it also reached the East German public. Originally, the cloth badge represented a practical linking of Christian and state ideas about peace both in its intent — it depicts a Soviet sculpture in front of the U.N. building in New York — and in its content. It was meant to show common objectives rather than opposition. But because the sign — independently of its content — outwardly united for the first time all those who had long since been protesting against militarism only as individuals or behind a Church sanctuary, authorities felt threatened and banned it outright. As the State Secretary for Ecclesiastical Questions, Klaus Gysi, later explained, the reason was partly the fear that the symbol had become the sign of an opposition (one that was not truly organized, but externally recognizable.) This ban and its being reported in the Western media was the real start for the "East German peace movement." If authorities had ignored the sign or even publicized it themselves, it would hardly have become the focal point of independent East German pacifism. 3) A similar identity-forming function also characterized the "Peace Forum" in Dresden (February 1982), attended by about 5000 mostly young people from East Germany. This institution of the Saxon *Land*-Church, which was to organize an announced silent demonstration to the ruins of the *Frauenkirche*, also took on a political significance that made it a symbol for many German youths and caused the government to ban the badges.

In November 1982, the situation changed once again. The two spectacular

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initiatives — the call for a "Social Peace Service" and the "Swords to Plowshares" cloth badge — were not the underlying causes of the movement, because they both ran up against the wall of state rejections. In conversations with representatives of the East German Association of Churches, Klaus Gysi stated that a change of the construction soldier regulation was out of the question. Indeed, there is no sign that any change could be made in the near future, e.g., by assigning the construction soldiers to the health or social sector. By banning the cloth badge and by the partly draconic penalties for violations of the ban, the argumentative "gap" into which the symbol could so effectively penetrate was blocked once and for all because wearing this sign was declared a crime against the state and it thus lost its capacity to link up with governmental position on peace. For this reason, the synod of the East German Association of Churches in September 1982 "for the sake of peace" halted production of this symbol — although it remained the logo for the Peace Decade in November.

What is left in such a situation? One segment, especially in large cities, has become resigned because —as could happen in West Germany after the stationing of the new American medium-range missiles— the political situation is completely frozen. There is a lack of results or even of the smallest changes that peace efforts may have brought about. Hence, other alternatives become more important. Despite all obstacles, the great demonstrations of the Western peace movement can establish a certain identity. This is impossible in East Germany because the state organs make every effort to blunt all public expressions of the will to peace.

In this context the Church's Protestant sanctuary becomes all the more important since it increasingly becomes a kind of substitute for the real East German political public sphere. Here there are ongoing efforts which can counter the moods of resignation and offer the possibility —however slight— of a continued commitment to peace. But precisely after the government's counter-moves peace discussion in East Germany has spread further and infiltrated substuctures not so visible to Western observers. In the free spaces of the Church, a completely new political culture is developing that stands in the most drastic opposition to the emergent military society. "Ready to help instead of ready to fight" (*Hilfsbereit statt Wehrbereit*) reads a new slogan that makes clear that the predominant values here —warmth, candor, trust, solidarity, critique— cannot be found in a society of constant military preparedness.

Such an alternative culture has hitherto existed only in the West, but today it is spreading in East Germany. There are spontaneous peaceful processions, an alternate public sphere, meetings, workshops and vast presentations which indicate that the living cultural and political sector is increasingly being expelled from state institutions and is increasingly spreading within the Church's framework. This has become especially clear during the "Peace Workshop" in East Berlin (June 1982).

At the same time work for peace has been decentralized and is no longer limited to the urban centers. Now it encompasses numerous smaller communities —even in the countryside. Every month the ESG (Protestant Student Community) in Rostolck organizes so-called "Peace Worship Services". In addition, every six months a "Retreat and Meditation Day" on the theme of peace takes place in the *Land*-church of Mecklenberg. In July 1982 the "Peace Forum" met in Greifswald, and in Saxony there are monthly "East-Saxony Peace Discussions." Peace seminars, often attended by hundreds of people, are held not just in Königswalde any more, but also in Karl-Marx-Stadt, Pirna, Meissen, Waldheim, Zittau, Kessin and other cities. Moreover, standing workshops for peace, which meet regularly, have been formed in numerous student communities.

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As for the future, it is important to note the general dynamics. There is no sign of a truce: everything moves in a situation of tension determined by three different entities: 1) *The State*: The state leadership still seeks to counterbalance the signs of erosion of its domestic policy by an ever-expanding and more refined militarization of society. The latitude for domestic policy is not growing but decreasing and, therefore, generates constant conflict with every kind of independent political culture. The state's insistence on clinging to the status quo checkmates the possibilities for an independent East German peace commitment as soon as it reaches beyond the protective walls of the Church. On the other hand, government leaders are not interested in altering relations with the Church and therefore will continue to allow limited inner-church leeway—though without ceasing to exert constant pressure on Church leaders to keep their ranks under control.

2. *The Grass-Roots*. An alternate political culture is gaining strength within the church. When it turns outward it inevitably leads to conflict with state authorities. Peace initiatives try to prevent confrontations with state power, and no one will voluntarily become a "class-enemy" of the system. Yet, conflict becomes more likely where it cannot be concealed—even by well-meaning Church leaders. Thus, the number of those refusing military instruction is increasing and so is the number of conscientious objectors, which in turn leads the state to take counter-measures. Veterans, for whom in reserve-exercises there is no substitute service without weapons are already being given prison sentences when they refuse the call to arms.

3. *The Church*. The peace movement is absolutely unthinkable independently of the Church. But the Church is an institution with its own specific interests. Thus it must retain its credibility with its own grass-roots while also keeping open a dialogue with government leaders. Its ability to act as a buffer in the conflict between state and independent citizens' initiatives for peace while keeping them socially acceptable is not unlimited. But the peace question was not originally an issue that led to conflict with the state, but something concerning which state and Church often agreed. Thus, in the Warsaw Pact states' campaign against the production of the neutron-bomb and the stationing of medium-range missiles in Western Europe, the East German government counted on considerable assistance from the Church's advocacy of peace and disarmament—a fact which Erich Honecker emphasized in his first summit conference with the Association of Churches on March 6, 1978. Church leaders do not necessarily reject such state pressures, but insist on their independence. Thus, Bishop Krusche, the former chair of the Association of Churches, stated that the Churches must not become mere spokesmen for their own state's foreign policy, lest they lose their function as "peace-makers." Accordingly, the Churches are taking a critical stand toward both participants in the East-West conflict, protesting against the neutron-bomb and the medium-range missiles in Western Europe as well as against East German militarization and the stationing of similar medium-range missiles in their own bloc. "Trust," so runs a Church's key principle, "can grow only where differences are not solidified, but there is a readiness for reconciliation."

This two-track approach in the Church's commitment to peace which builds on *independence* as well as on *collaboration* (according to the Association-synod of September 1982 in Halle), will become increasingly difficult to maintain in the future. For the peace discussion is pushing the Church toward a point where a clear profession of faith can no longer be avoided. Individual synods already made it clear at the last Association-synod in Halle that, in dealing with the deadly arsenal of deterrence, the situation for a profession of faith (*status confessionis*) had already arrived, demanding

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from the Church —as it had done under fascism— a clear position: We must no longer cooperate. In the communities of the East German Church the question was asked in a synod-resolution dated September 1982: "May Christians participate in the preparation for defense with nuclear weapons when it is certain that this defense irretrievably destroys what it is supposed to protect? May Christians participate in armed threats which increase the probability for the catastrophe they are supposed to prevent? Can Christians and Churches, in view of the unimaginable horror of a possible war, still justify armed violence as the means of securing peace and protecting one's neighbor? Such questions cannot remain unanswered for long."[2]

Even today East German Churches have formulated a clear rejection of the spirit of the deterrence-system and demanded the building of an alternate system of military security in Europe based on purely defensive non-nuclear weapons-systems that do not fuel an arms race. Secondly, there is agreement on the necessity of education for peace, which prepares people for a non-violent solution of conflicts.

The dynamics of the peace discussion within the Church also presses Christians and Churches to extend verbal nuclear pacifism directly to that sector where their own direct contribution to deterrence is questioned: in military service and Christians' participation in the National People's Army. Until now, Church leaders have been able to rally the synodals (who represent the grass-roots) around the idea that both armed service and its refusal can be an expression of the Christian witnessing for peace. But the consequence of the East German Church's nuclear pacifism would ultimately have to lead to an appeal to their members to refuse to prepare for such a nuclear war by military service. As the Erfurt priar, Heino Falcke, explained in November 1981 at the meeting of the *Land*-Church of the diocese of Saxony, such a position would be considered a "declaration of war" by East German government — leaders especially if it were formulated only in East but not in West Germany. But then the situation for an independent peace commitment in East Germany would be completely changed.

2. All quotations are from Ehring and Dollwitz editors, *op. cit.*

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Pin Yathay, *L'utopie meurtriere.* Paris: Robert Laffont, 1980.

It is unusual that a rank and file survivor of a genocide, an ordinary victim of extraordinary atrocities, is able to provide an exhaustive and all-embracing account of events of frightening dimensions both in terms of casualties and the cruelty involved. Yet, this is the case with Pin Yathay and the chronicle of his sufferings. First, however, let us state the facts. Yathay repeatedly cites the figure of approximately 3 million people who perished both through coercively imposed famine as well as a result of mass executions. This is generally confirmed by newspapers reports and other summaries compiled on the only available basis: interviews with survivors, indirect estimates and the like. In a world which applies the term with infantile irresponsibility to all cruelties, the story of Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge seems to be the first authentic instance of genocide since Hitler and Stalin. Without playing the cynical "game of numbers," and without being excessively scholarly, genocide can be best described as an organized effort to physically destroy a whole *genus* which can be a social class, a "cluster" isolated on the basis of *social* criteria, an ethnic group or a human race. According to Pin Yathay's meticulous report, all these elements were present in the Khmer Rouge's ambitious social experiment.

Secondly, he is the ideal subject for an "inside story." People interested in politics should read other books explaining how all political elites in Cambodia had successively disintegrated into feuding groups of public thieves, how the pro-China faction of Cambodian communism rose to predominance, and what led to a Babuvian egalitarianism transposed into the aspirations of a small intellectual elite gaining power in Cambodia. All this is of no concern to Pin Yathay. He knows enough of to be politically aware of what befalls his fate-stricken nation, and he introduces sufficient background information to make the story understandable even to those who did not follow it in the newspapers. *This much* is necessary for a lucid view. *More* would transform the report from the house of the dead into a dissertation. Pin Yathay, a Canadian-trained engineer, had been politically active prior to the Khmer Rouge takeover: "I was president of the *Bees Club*. In fact, this was a front organization of a movement of national reconciliation which we called the Reassembly of Khmer Patriots....It unified intellectuals of all types. We were all patriots hostile to totalitarianism and tyranny, whether left or right." (p. 26) This sounds like mere *Kaffeehaus*-politicking but it did provide the necessary amount of insight into the underlying intentions of the Khmer Rouge, without which the book could not have been convincingly written.

Thirdly, what the general reader should be interested in is not really the political pandemonium, but the ingenuous machinery of a whole country turned into several small-size Buchenwalds. And who could look at them more closely than the slave of such camps? The term slave is not used loosely. Pin Yathay and the millions with him who were baptized the "new people," and thus isolated from the — unfree but not enslaved — peasantry (the "ancient people") — were *slaves* in the classic Roman sense. Those who have ever been intrigued about how an enslaved free man could have coped with the surrounding nightmarish reality, now possess a unique document. The manuscript of the modern slave provides an understanding of the endless sufferings of millennia: those of the inhabitants of Carthage or Asia Minor torn from their roots and made a "speaking tool" to finally fertilize, along with their wives and children, the Roman *latifundia*, and those of African blacks facing and ultimately finding a similar destiny in the more modern plantations of capitalism. Yet, this very description immediately reveals the inaccuracy of the term. Even the most brutal and primitive

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slavery involved some economic calculation. Even if slaveholders considered the slave an easily replaceable commodity, they had paid for "it" and therefore they wanted to exploit "it" to the extent of their investment. Not so with the collective slaveholder in Cambodia: the "Organization." Yathay's book irrefutably demonstrates that the system of Khmer Rouge slaveholding never aimed at any rational use, and therefore even an elementary protection, of the slave workforce. They simply sought to destroy the "new people" by a lethal combination of undernourishment and overwork. This is the Khmer Rouge's legitimate claim to orginality in the human history of barbarism. Proving this is the major achievement of Yathay's book.

The fundamental feature of the Cambodian experiment is its *absolutist egalitarian* character. Along with tendencies of the "proletarian cultural revolution," this is the only conscious experiment in *Babuvian communism* — a doctrine which, for a number of reasons, had almost disappeared from socialism. Whereas Pin Yathay never seriously confronts the problem of equality, he clearly understands that the Khmer Rouge had solved the constant underlying dilemma of all egalitarian attempts, i.e., the conflict between freedom and equality, by simply eliminating freedom as a value. Khmer Rouge propaganda constantly mentioned the end of exploitation, imperialist domination, social inequality, but never the bourgeois value of freedom. A system of tyrannically imposed equality — first of all, economic equality — had been meticulously organized in Cambodia. The otherwise ignorant and often illiterate peasant Khmer Rouge militants displayed unexpected sophistication into this fundamental principle. One of them explained it to Yathay as follows: "Do you know why *Angkar* (the 'Organization') had withdrawn money from circulation? If we issue money each of you will demand a salary. Naturally, we could give equal salary but how could *Angkar* ensure that you spend the money in an equal manner? There would certainly be people who would economise more than others. In the long run, this would result in new inequalities." (p. 307)

Two consequences follow from this. The first is strictly Babuvian: the reversal of the means-ends relation in mainstream socialism where equality had been, at best, the prime means of promoting freedom or "general happiness" or "de-alienation." With Babeuf, absolute equality, as a guarantee against the vices of an "artificial" civilization, was the end. His theoretical offspring were not reluctant to accept the tyrannical consequences of this position — even in pushing it to monstrous excesses. The second consequence is related to Orwell's famous apercu about certain people who are more equal than others. It points to the inescapable antinomy of equality when used as the supreme category of social organization: absolute equality breeds perforce inequality. This antinomy can be interpreted in a twofold manner, and one of the interpretations is irrelevant to the world in which Yathay had been vegetating for nearly two years. This is the interpretation of absolute equality as inevitable unfreedom (because of the need for supervisors over the "egoistic" inclinations of human majority, with the supervisor being necessarily freer than the supervised.) Strangely enough, it escaped the attention of Khmer Rouge militants that there was a drastic material inequality in their new society: one group of people subsisted, the other was starved to death.

A society of total and unquestionable control had been derived from absolute equality, with the anonymous "Organization" at its summit. Pin Yathay does not correctly understand the symbolic function of the name *Angkar* (the Organization) — a counter-functional name indicating anonymity rather than providing denomination. He believes that the Khmer Rouge leadership had chosen this abstract symbol, instead of simply calling itself the Cambodian Communist Party, because of the general hatred

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for communism in his country. But what can be hated more than the general system of deportation introduced by *Angkar?* More likely, *Angkar* was a this-worldly substitute for Buddha and religion by a system which had wiped out religion — a symbol of compulsory devotion before which individuality, this pernicious vestige of the past, passed to oblivion. The way experienced militants addressed *Angkar* bore witness to its pseudo-religious character: "Wherever you might go, *Angkar* is always master of your destiny. It is essential that you should know that. *Angkar* has many detours....*Angkar* is unpredictable. It can jump over stages without preliminary warning. Do not trust too much all that which has been done by *Angkar. Angkar's* character is unpredictable. *Angkar* proceeds by leaps." (p. 103)

The "classless" society of total control was characterized by such a ruthless separation of social groups that the modern emancipated term "class" cannot be applied to it. There were three such groups in Khmer Rouge Cambodia. The first was the Khmer Rouge caste of "general supervisors" (an aggregate further subdivided into the leading military and the relatively subordinated civilian arm of *Angkar*). The second denoted the "ancient people" — a social group consisting of the regions' peasantry. They were an oppressed and terrorized group, yet enjoying considerable privileges when compared with the third group. The latter is the "new people" consisting mainly of the deported slave population of the cities.

Yathay's summary of the new social organization is concise and lucid: "In November 1976, the Khmer Rouge achieved the final stage of their political organization....The cooperative....was this organization's basic unit. According to its size, a cooperative would comprise three or four camps....A camp was a unit of daily life which assembled fifty to one hundred places of accommodation with a common kitchen. In contrast to this fixed unit, there was a mobile unit as well, the encampment. The cooperatives constituted conjointly....the village. In the village there was also the *Peanich* which had a depot in which the food was stored. This was the locus of amassing and distributing nourishment. It was the *Peanich* that ensured the repartition of products....The population of every camp was attached to the cultivation of rice. The whole village workforce was dedicated to rice production." (p. 281-2)

Such an intricate network of unprecedented life units serving distinct purposes could not spring from improvised moves. Rather, they bear witness to a master plan conceived long before its implementation. Perhaps the strongest proof of this, which was also the direct source of all subsequent horrors, was the *abolition of cities*. Yathay is an honest witness, he does not discuss things he is not familiar with. Therefore, he does not go into whether all Cambodian cities, or just the capital, Phnom Penh, suffered forcible deportation. Yet, since the capital, like Saigon, had been hypertrophically overpopulated during the civil war years to approximately 2-3 million (in a country of 6 million), this forcible evacuation alone would account for everything that happened. But regarding the deportation of the *entire* Phnom Penh population, Yathay is authoritative. His chronicle is beyond doubt. The most striking feature is the unquestionably planned character of the whole operation which had been concealed even from the leading military cadres. But Khmer Rouge functionaries understood full well the doctrinal necessity of deportation. One of them put it bluntly to Pin Yathay: "You know that Vietnam is not fully revolutionary. Vietnam did not order the evacuation of the cities, in contrast to our decision. We know that it is dangerous to leave cities intact, inhabited. They are centers of challenge and group formation. In a city it is difficult to expose counterrevolutionary nuclei. If the urban way of life is not modified, hostile organizations can be reconstituted and align against us. We have evacuated the cities in

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order to crush all resistance, to destroy reactionary and mercantile capitalism in its cradle. Expelling the urban population means the elimination of the germs of an anti-Khmer Rouge resistance." (p. 105) This bit of conversation is a precious item of information. It shows, firstly, that the abolition of cities was, for the average militant, an integral part of the original doctrine distinguishing the Khmer Rouge from "inconsistent" Vietnamese (and even Chinese) communism. Secondly, the abolition of cities as necessary for a society of total control is emphatically accepted by the functionary. But, thirdly, when he mentions the destruction of the "cradles of mercantile capitalism," further socio-economic implications of the experiment begin to surface.

The most important is the *total abolition of the market*. Of course, hostility to the market is typical of all established "socialist" societies. It is also an undeniable part of the original doctrine of most representative socialists who never, in their most nightmarish dreams, would have imagined anything like Cambodia. What is crucial here is the singular character of Cambodian experimentation with marketless society. The first feature is the doctrinaire radicalism of the social engineering which, with the Khmer Rouge, was anything but piecemeal. They were the first to go to the (bitter) end of a social transformation which had been half-heartedly implemented even by Lenin during the period of war communism. All mediations of social life which had anything to do with a market economy were destroyed under the threat of death. Money was abolished, precious stones and gold demonetarized and, to the extent possible, confiscated. Commerce was eliminated, even in the form of rationing. Goods considered necessary by *Angkar* were directly distributed even to those belonging to the non-enslaved group of the population. With the very few exceptions of strictly personal possessions, everything was directly collected from producers, especially foodstuff, and stored in central depots to be later redistributed according to prescribed limits of needs. "Free" peasants could keep half of their produce, the "new" people no part of it — once again under the threat of death.

These draconic measures ruled out the possibility of regenerating a market for there was nothing to exchange — or, at least, so it seemed on the surface. But, secondly, as with absolute equality, the abolition of market also entails a reversal of the means-end relationship. For most socialists (with the possible exception of Babeuf) the elimination of market mechanisms as a means served a further, socially beneficial end, e.g., the guaranteeing of the physical existence of those below the absolute poverty line, when *laissez-faire* worked with absolute ruthlessness. With the Khmer Rouge, marketless society was an end in itself, and a means perhaps only in relation to the system of total social control. At any rate, there was an astonishing ignorance in the average Khmer Rouge militant concerning pecuniary matters. Yathay once watched stupefied an illiterate adolescent Khmer Rouge guard throwing thousands of dollars found on the body of one of the slaves into the river for the simple reason that "imperialist money" meant nothing to him. To such people, a totally marketless society could be at least partly appealing.

But, not astonishingly, below the surface of "marketless" society a gigantic, if confused, network of black market dealings thrived both amongst slaveholders and slave. A society of frugal and absolute egalitarianism normally does not reduce but enhances scarcity — and scarcity certainly reigned supreme in "liberated" Cambodia. Amongst the slaves condemned to slow death by famine, blackmarketing is natural. Despite frequent executions of those caught redhanded, they stole and exchanged cups of rice (except for sugar, the only nourishment available) for gems or foreign currency. The

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black market operated full-scale. Of course, it was a "fragmented" market. As there was no general social recognition of any object (apart from rice, sugar and garments) as use values, the claim to circulate as a "legitimate" commodity had to be established from village to village, from object to object. This was particularly true of precious stones and foreign curencies which, without general social recognition, had to be *personally* introduced into a face-to-face circuit of dealing and trafficking which was a full-fledged, albeit somewhat backward, form of market operation. Yathay describes how he succeeded in establishing the American dollar as exchange value in one of the places of his deportation where earlier only two commodities had been accepted: rice and gold. His arguments were partly political (one could use dollars in case of the regime's collapse or in a successful escape), partly naturalistic. Rice could be measured, he argued, so could the dollar. But gold, without adequate tools, could neither be weighed nor cut to pieces. Needless to say, when Yathay was deported to another village, his "personal" market collapsed.

More importantly, blackmarket operations were in full bloom amongst the partisans of absolute equality: the Khmer Rouge infrastructure. The reason for this daring insubordination was that, whatever the ambitions of a Babuvian communist, need heterogeneity and "artificial needs" cannot be eliminated from any society which had established the slightest contact with the modernized world. Watches and medicines were the main commodities of the "upper market" which used extraeconomic coercion (often Khmer Rouge guards simply robbed their slaves of precious objects in the name of *Angkar*) but which could not function exclusively on coercion. And it was thus that the simple obverse of German camps came about. In the later it was a common (if deadly dangerous) trick of inmates to hide the corpses of their fellow prisoners as long as they could in order to get their portions. In Cambodia, the same trick was regularly pulled by Khmer Rouge guards who collected portions of rice of the dead from the central depots to use it on the black market. It is no accident that "rice" crops up with such frequency in this account.

Under the Khmer Rouge administration Cambodia was *the only modern attempt at agrarian communism, based on monoculture and self-sufficiency as a conscious political objective.* Was this a simple extension, or perhaps a dramatic exposure, of communist regimes, or just a deviation from the usual pattern? As the Khmer Rouge sided with China and against the Soviet Union, Soviet propaganda tended to suggest the latter. Of course for conservatives, Cambodia was the ultimate truth of socialism in general and about Marx's doctrine in particular. From Yathay's exhaustive and accurate analysis, the Khmer Rouge regime appears as a consistent extension of the Soviet model. The Khmer Rouge regime was a dictatorship over needs designed and realized on the basis of a perverted radicalism. It was a political society led by an omnipotent political authority. The "new man" educated by the system and the forms of oppression prevailing in it could more or less be also found in Soviet societies. But there were also substantial differences. Thus, there was the agrarian communist project which was totally missing from the Soviet Union and its East European empire. The latter sought the destruction of the village rather than the reduction of society to the aggregate of self-sufficient villages. Even Asian communism, at its egalitarian peak, the Chinese cultural revolution, was something more and different. It never sought to destroy the cities, even though it certainly intended to increase the village's political and economic might. The Khmer Rouge were totally uninterested in modernization. Their society existed in the stone-age of technology. Therefore, when analyzing the Cambodian genocide, it is legitimate to blame Asian and non-Asian communist power elites for its

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emergence. It is equally legitimate to single out fundamental aspects of communist political regimes which allowed the unrestrained rule of doctrnaire lunatics over a whole society. But it would be illegitimate to regard the Khmer Rouge as a simple extension of Stalin's methods of government.

It was entirely consistent with Cambodian agrarian communism that in their "classless society" the subjection of the whole population to the Khmer Rouge apparatus was not along the lines of a bourgeois-proletarian, or even a rich-poor dichotomy. Instead, the confrontation was between city and countryside. After the seizure of power, millions of city-dwellers were deported to the countryside in a practical act of socio-historical justice. There may have been some selection among the city-dwellers. Perhaps, those who had collaborated with the Khmer Rouge were exempted from deportation. But there is absolutely no such indication in Yathay's meticulous account. People were driven out of their homes in exactly the same way, i.e., in their entirety and without exemptions, as Polish, Ukrainian or Hungarian Jews had been driven into ghettos and then to concentration camps. Yathay's personal acquaintances were intellectuals and members of the monarchic (later republican) state bureaucracy. Yet, it is clear from his chronicle that the "new people" were former Phnom Penh resistents from all social classes. He even points out that, unlike the rich or the well-off who had hidden their jewels, gold and foreign currency, the poor were the first to perish because they had absolutely nothing to exchange on the vital rice blackmarket.

But why not destroy city-dwellers at once, with one stroke? Why the elaborate system of starving city-dwellers to death? And, finally, why not set up modern and efficient annihilation camps? First of all, while streamlined modern death factories could appeal to a barbarian brought up in urban culture, they certainly would not to peasant soldiers. When made sufficiently barbaric, the latter could perhaps have regarded mass starvation of city-dwellers as "just historical punishment." It is, however, questionable how they would have reacted if they had to watch hundreds of thousands of children shovelled into gas chambers. The borderline between humanity and barbarism is fairly easy to overstep, but not under any conditions. Furthermore, there was the self-assured feeling, so common to all varieties of Gulags that time was on the side of the warden, not of the prisoner. Thus, there was no hurry and the physical annihilation of whole social groups could safely proceed in a more or less piecemeal fashion.

The early phases of the new slavery can be outlined on the basis of Yathay's account. In the aftermath of the Khmer Rouge's peaceful and dignified march into Phnom Pehn, orders were given for the whole population to leave forthwith under threat of the "most severe punishment." Reasons were not provided. There were only vague rumors about possible American air-raids. As with the Jews, the evacuation seemed temporary. In fact, the first official requirement for absence from the city was merely three days and this was never revoked. People were simply driven further and further out. Unlike the Germans, however, Cambodians provided no transportation. People, including babies, old folks and the sick and crippled walked as long as they could, and then just died. Unlike the Nazis, they did not execute those remaining behind but simply abandoned them to their inevitable fate. Yathay who watched everything with the viewpoint of the slave and never mentions any more than he saw from such a perspective, could not observe any strict pattern in the evacuation. People simply had to march towards the villages where local peasants (the "ancient people") decided whether to accept the newcomers or just leave them exposed to the adversity of climate and the indifference of nature. One harsh fact became immediately clear: they were not to

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leave the village in which they had been received. Their very movements within the village were increasingly controlled and regulated, just as strictly as those of concentration camp inmates. Later there were two further waves of mass deportation. Yathay could only guess why they had been ordered. Given the increasing cruelty perpetrated during the consecutive waves of deportation and the lack of any economic motivation, he interpreted them as signals of the final victory of the hard line within the Khmer Rouge leadership. Indeed, the new waves were essentially intensified forms of the mass extermination of the "new people."

In the meantime, there were two important public announcements: first, the "new people" were state property (this was a disappointment for the "ancient people" who wanted to use them as their own slave labor); and, second, their transfer was final and irrevocable. This latter announcement seemed to conflict with the constant exhortation to "purify" themselves of the guilt of the past. In this and other matters the Khmer Rouge were not particular about logical consistency. The "new people" were inserted into the everyday life of the village, though in many ways they remained separated from it, and they were increasingly decimated. The process of physical extermination of the "new people," which in Yathay's family alone exacted the lives of his father, mother, two of his own small children, two sisters, one brother, all in laws and their children and finally that of his wife, happened in two ways. The main method was the lethal combination of overwork and undernourishment. Their calorie intake was identical with that of inmates in Nazi camps, with rice being their only nourishment (one cup for six persons working rice fields 15-16 hours daily, seven days a week.) In special camps where people were sent for various violations, the same portion served 40 persons, work was continuous, with only 1-2 hours interruption, and a life expectancy a couple of weeks. In addition, summary executions took place regularly, with two different groups of victims. First, all officers of the Lon Nol army, intellectuals, government bureaucrats who either naively revealed their identity or were later exposed, were taken away by what seemed to Yathay to be a central security organization, and were never seen again. Secondly, those violating any of the endless, locally issued, prohibitions were simply taken to the forest for "re-education" and never returned. Slaves working in the forests often found their bodies, but public executions did not take place.

Their slavery was formal. Thus, they were repeatedly told that, as a result of their "guilt," they had to repent. This methological guilt was never defined, and for very good reasons. Any definition would have identified the subject of guilt. Yet, how could a regime calling itself popular distribute responsibility to both rich and poor simply on the basis of their having lived in cities? What was clear, however, was that their guilt had been collective. Their belonging to *Angkar* meant that they had no rights whatsoever. The amount of food they could consume was prescribed by *Angkar* and acquiring additional portions was a serious crime, in most cases punishable by death — the only punishment ever meted out. Because of chaos in the Khmer Rouge's directives, it had never been clear what objects they could possess (except, of course, precious stones, gold and foreign currency which were strictly prohibited but which, nevertheless, slaves stubbornly hid from the guards.) But even objects which they *de facto* owned were not theirs by virtue of any right. So, whenever a Khmer Rouge soldier "suggested" (they always made suggestions) that they "offer" their watch to *Angkar*, there was absolutely no way they could have protested. They had no say in selecting their place of residence, outside or inside the villages, camps or encampments. The work place, the type of work, the age from which and until which one had to work, their "remunera-

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tion" (old people and the ill had half-portions), were all in the hands of the Khmer Rouge apparatus.

One of the regime's most infernal features was the *formal abolition of the family*. Under the Khmer Rouge, there was no law in Cambodia. This vestige of the feudal-bourgeois past had been eradicated, and the human jungle which emerged in its wake showed the real value of another revolutionary myth. Formal abolition meant, above all, that people had no documents of their family relations or, for that matter, of any kind. Hatred against the formalities of past cultures, or of culture in general, led to the immediate destruction of all printed papers found in the possession of the deported. This, of course, facilitated the concealment of one's own social status from the Khmer Rouge, but, at the same time, it also annihilatd one's identity. Children whose parents had disappeared in this hurricane never knew, if they survived, who they were. But, even if one's family relation was recognized by the Khmer Rouge authorities, it meant nothing. In the endless exhortations of the Khmer Rouge re-education program, this would have been a sign of the preserved vestiges of bourgeois individualism — an inclination to be stamped out of the morally still frail personality structure. In fact, it was a crime for a father to give a part of his own meagre portion to a sick child. And children, who were generally trained to denounce their parents, were persistently interrogated about such parental indulgence.

This tragic farce had no limits. Sometimes husbands were taken to the forest, never to return from "re-education," if they repeatedly infringed the norm of domestic peace and, say, beat up their wives. Free intermarriages between the "new people" and the "ancient people," let alone between members of the first group and the Khmer Rouge, were out of the question. Yet, Yathay mentions instances of young girls from the "new people" having been picked by crippled Khmer Rouge war veterans and forced to "marry" them. Marriages were authorized by the village chief, himself the personification of legislative, judicial and executive power. However, in contradiction to the official abolition of the family, a particularly serious crime by a family member was punished by a collective sanction on the whole family, small children included. As an appropriate answer to constant famine, thefts of rice were not infrequent and, Yathay reports of at least one such event the final outcome of which was the transfer of a woman and her three small children to a special regime camp in a collective sanction against the family.

The institution of compulsory self-criticism is far from being a Cambodian invention. Indeed, it is typical of all societies of dictatorship over needs. In Cambodia, however, this institution was different from its counterparts, still prevailing in Chinese, Korean or Vietnamese re-education camps: Yathay desribes one such confession as follows: "I am not fed particularly well. *Angkar* does not have enough provision. But this allows me to get used to famine and to become more resistant for the revolution. *Angkar* helps me to become tougher and I thank *Angkar* for it. I am always ready to take orders from *Angkar* and I will not say a bad word against the Organization outside the scope of the meeting. I have shed my individualist leanings. If *Angkar* entrusts me with an assignment, I must not think of my wife or my children. *Angkar* already takes care of my family, my children. I will do everything *Angkar* tells me." (p. 256) The difference here is not so much in the liturgical character of the excercise. Reports from all re-education camps (which are typical institutions of *Asian* regimes of dictatorship over needs) confirm the existence of this same ritual invariably aimed at the destruction of personality. What is peculiarly Cambodian is the emphatic rejection of all familial ties by explicitly stating that *Angkar*, not the family, takes care of children.

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For those who have not cast off all vestiges of commiseration, the gravest hour of mourning strikes when it is the children of the "new people" for whom the bell tolls. Yathay's first child to die was the youngest, a three-year-old who succumbed at a very early stage, in one of the typical famine diseases, quickly and without much suffering. The raving mother who optimistically believed that more could not come, fought out the illicit (because religious) privilege of incinerating her dead child and carrying the ashes with her. Much more monstrous was the fate that befell the second child, the five-year-old. He had to be left behind when Yathay and his wife attempted a desperate escape (because Yathay's identity had been found out, and the meant inescapable death). They taught the child to memorize his real name in the unlikely case he survived, as well as how to behave as an obedient slave. They told him that they were going to die (which, for all practical purposes was true as far as the child was concerned) and left him in the "hospital" in the questionable care of a woman who had already lost six children of her own.

As a symbol of all children that perished in that genocide, consider the martyrdom of Yathay's oldest son — a ten-year-old who was languishing in the house because of a big wound of his thigh, a result of systematic undernourishment: "One day, a Khmer Rouge soldier abruptly entered our house. My son, the older one, triggered by a reflex of fear, started to run when he saw the Khmer Rouge soldier. The soldier caught him. He started to interrogate Sudath: 'What are you doing?' I interrupted him: 'He has a bellyache. That's nothing. He was just running to the loo.' The Khmer Rouge soldier was aggressive. He did not seem to be convinced by my explanations. He resumed the interrogation of my son: 'Where do you go to work?' My son seemed to be frightened. I interfered and answered: 'My son has a wound on his thigh....' I saw that the Khmer Rouge soldier wanted to take me to task: 'If he has a wound on his thigh, why does he run so fast? You are still having individualist leanings. You are sick and you would keep your son around you. This is the truth. Stay here alone, if you are sick. Nothing is wrong with your son. Perhaps he has a wound but he can run. Therefore he must work. He has to join the brigade of children. You know that they are well fed there. They work a lot but they are well fed. He must go there....' He looked at the child and insisted: 'You must go there.' I tried to dissuade him and I pointed to the wound of the child: 'You see quite well that he is sick. He needs some more days to rest. Could you grant him just a few days' rest?' The Khmer Rouge soldier refused categorically: 'No! No! You still have individualist leanings. Up until now you have gone through a lot of tests. Nonetheless, you have to purify yourself, to free yourself of your feelings. The child belongs to *Angkar*. You must not want to keep him for yourself. Your son is physically strong. He can work. Don't tell me otherwise: he can run. Anyway, he must go to work....' I was aghast, devastated. My son bowed to the order. 'Father, I go to work. I am obliged to leave. Perhaps I could get a better portion there.' He left us the next day. I felt pity for him. He was thin and had this enormous wound on his thigh....Five days after his departure, one of his mates from work came to me to announce his death." (p. 222)

Men, women and children of the "new people" were apparently inserted into rural life with no external sign, like the star of David worn in ghettos or the striped uniform of the concentration camps, distinguishing them from the "ancient people." The only visible sign of distinction was the emaciated state of their bodies in comparison with the relative physical well-being of a heavily exploited peasantry. Yet, *they were robbed of both normal time and normal space*. As a rule, they had no watches, they calculated time by sheer guesswork: there were no calenders or newspapers. The broadcasts of Radio

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Khmer Rouge were irregular and only the village chief owned a radio. Their space was reduced to whatever they, as camp inmates, were allotted, and not only while they stayed in encampments in the forest, but in the villages as well. All of them were known personally by the Khmer Rouge guards. They could be stopped any time, ordered to do anything the guard deemed fit or be summoned to return to their houses which were barracks or blocks in a camp rather than homes, since supervisors could enter at any time or order them to leave doors open. They had no past except in their recollections; they no longer had any photos, letters or documents of any kind. They had no future, not even in their imagination. What awaited them and their children was, to use one of the constant picturesque allusions of Khmer Rouge activists, serving *Angkar* with their bodies as fertilizer for the rice fields. They had no present for they could pin no name and exact date on the time they were slaving in.

Finally, they did not even have a normally functioning *body*. As with inmates of all camps, Nazi or Bolshevik, the Cambodian deported also suffered from chronic diarrheas and dysenteries, beriberies and other typical diseases of undernourishment. They lacked all facilities for normal hygiene, soap and toothpaste included, as deported people usually are. Corrupted as they had been by the vices of urban life, they suffered from this all the more. Unlike Europeans, they had no knowledge of the effects of concentration camps. Thus, they were stunned to hear that their women, with whom they had had no intercourse for a long time, were no longer menstruating — a most typical, and very dangerous, symptom of female life in concentration camps. They had, of course, hospitals in the best Buchenwald, Mauthausen, Bergen-Belsen tradition. In other words, there were places in the village camps where tyrannical nurses humiliated patients rather than treated them, places where it was more dangerous to stay than in the huts because of circulating contagious diseases, places where there were no doctors (the Khmer Rouge were eliminating the alienation stemming from the division of labor), where there were no medicines except a few "natural products" which, at best, did not kill the patients, places where the sick, again in penitence for the damages caused to *Angkar* by their absence from work, had half portions of a starvation diet. Assaulted from all directions the body became totally desexualized. Apart from the fact that for virtuous Khmer Rouge militants it was a dangerous crime punishable by death if someone was caught having intercourse with someone other than one's mate (once again, when it came in handy, the institution of the family was reinstated), how could a totally exhausted body indulge in sensuous pleasures?

No wonder then that in this dirty, stinking, desexualized world of aching bodies, in this world full of wounds, where people lived literally like vegetables, human dignity collapsed. People were imprisoned in a solipsistic world of incessant yearning for something to eat. Yathay is not only objective and balanced, he is merciless as well (to himself and to those dearest to him) in depicting the human nadir. He describes how he once experimented with the idea of escaping alone and abandoning his wife and two children. He is not afraid of sharing the most intimate moments, those before death, of his beloved mother who begged him to get her some sugar to taste for the last time, and who, when she did receive the sugar, ate herself to death unconcerned with anything else. He watches objectively the terrible dramas of those who could not resist the temptation and committed cannibalism. Yathay is aware that those who committed anthropophagy had irretrievably lost a dimension of their humanity. But, of course, all this happens against the background of Khmer Rouge rule: the moralizing exhortations of all those who had created this very situation. He also depicts with great

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sensitivity episodes of intact human dignity. It is there that his father is presented. His only wish was to see Yathay once more before the night fell forever. He spoke with detachment and lucidity of his impending death, but first of all about how his son could survive, who gave Yathay his last food portion. Yathay's two sisters, mothers of many children, pass rapidly across the screen, young women who volunteered for the pestilential "hospital" to treat their dying mother and who died with her.

If the slaves' fate was so unquestionably horrendous, why not resort to the last weapon: uprising, even if suicidal? Is dignified death not more attractive than slow agony, daily humiliations and, finally, ending as fertilizer on the rice fields? It is all too easy to endorse the first alternative. But it must not be forgotten that such endorsements are usually made after having consumed our more or less copious, more of less exquisite, but nearly always sufficient daily amount of food. This is a physical state that yields perspectives entirely different to those of a constantly undernourished slave. Systematic starvation was, therefore, not only the ultimate means of the physical extermination of the "new people," it was also the main means to tame and discipline them. Those who disguised the system of deportation must have known in advance that minds sheltered by bodies kept on constant starvation diet simply cannot think of anything else but food. This undignified but permanent atmosphere in an otherwise extremely affectionate family was indeed Yathay's main concern and a cause of his constant grief. But there was nothing he could do about it.

The point, however, is perhaps not to pass judgement on the dead, but to understand what happened and why it happened. Of course, there are certain symptoms common to every group exposed to extermination. For instance, rumors were constantly circulating, as in Nazi camps, that very soon the situation would improve, the regime would soften, etc. In Yathay's words: "They only want to test us. They try to test our capacity to work. They will send us back to Phnom Penh when the penitence is over. *Angkar* will need engineers and teachers. A country cannot do without schools and public services." (p. 72) This would have been a sober assessment of any normal situation. But people suddenly exposed to the threat of mass extermination were reluctant to realize that their situation was itself proof of abnormality. The major cause of the extermination of the "new people" was their collective unpreparedness for self-defense. Were the connotations attached to the term "barbarian" not so universally negative, even repulsive, aggressive Khmer Rouge militants who had rejected so many taboos and enjoyed parading with their unparallelled radicalism, would even accept it as an accurate description of their main aspiration. For the two main components of barbarism have rarely surfaced so clearly as they did with the Khmer Rouge. These components are: a radical rejection of civilization and the equally open rejection of the moral tradition.

As to the first component, only the Khmer Rouge's agrarian communism could realize modern barbarism to its full extent: the deliberate physical destruction of mechanical civilization as something *historically negative*. The Khmer Rouge were not nomads camouflaged as communists. Without a genuine theory of agrarian communism they would have remained just an insignificant, if horrendous, relapse into a "backward" stage. But the Khmer Rouge had a *telos* and a historical consciousness They were not "savages," but moralizing murderers who passed historical judgements upon cities, industry, markets, world commerce, and their sins. Industrializing projects of "real socialism" generated their own barbarians (because of the destruction of the whole moral tradition or its replacement by a shabby utilitarianism). But they have to come to terms with industrialization and urban life from which individual

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irresistibly followed. In this respect, an unexpected harmony emerged between Khmer Rouge leaders and their rank-and-file. We do not know how the Khmer Rouge evolved and was theoretically elaborated by its master theorists such as Pol Pot, Sampan and others. Yet, low-level activists immediately grasped the leaders' message: the economic, political and "moral" dimension of destroying individualistic civilization. The first meant self-sufficiency and agrarian production, the second, a total social control unattainable in cities, and the third, collective guilt and collective punishment.

One of the reasons why a slow agony was chosen over a swift destruction of the population could be that the artificially restrained process of their taming and destruction gave rise to the new man. From the new barbarians' perspective, this involved a double inner dynamic: the elimination of commiseration and the generalization of fear. Yathay matter-of-factly and brilliantly sums this up. He tells the story of a family in whose house he found shelter when exhausted, he was wandering alone and unaided in a hospital in the hope of receiving some treatment (rather, of the possibility of finding some Western medicine on the blackmarket). The family, belonging to the "ancient people," and especially a young girl, was exceptionally charitable. When he later recovered and tried to visit them to express his gratitude, he could not find them: "This family had been denounced by an uncle when the young girl went to ask a favor of him. I have been advised about the whole affair in detail. The uncle at that time was in the company of a Khmer Rouge soldier. Imprudently, she started to talk to her uncle openly. The uncle went to the Khmer Rouge guard to make a complaint against her benevolence, her counterrevolutionary feelings. The Khmer Rouge soldiers accused the young girl of having infringed regulations by asking her uncle to give a lift to a stranger to Pursat. In their eyes, this was an unpardonable fault. The young girl and her family were guilty of having expressed humanitarian feeling towards an unknown person, a stranger. This generous attitude was condemnable for the Khmer Rouge militants even with regard to a family member or a neighbour. But displayed towards a stranger, someone from the 'new people,' the gesture implied a real challenge to *Angkar*." (p. 211)

In the new Cambodia, God is dead or, rather, murdered: his temples destroyed, his priests executed. But it was not the Church as an "ideological organ of the oppressors" which was attacked: it was the God of commiseration and charity who was wiped out. Without ever having heard of Nietzsche, the Khmer Rouge coaches of morality had trained the new beasts according to Nietzsche's recipe: they had taught them to live without compassion and fear. Mostly by chance, they had only succeeded in the first, but never in the second. In any society of synthetically produced neobarbarism, where the transcendence of fear and compassion is a general social *telos*, the educators can only achieve a world devoid of commiseration, charity or sympathy (and therefore ultimately inhabitable), albeit, never one lacking in fear. On the contrary: their world is one of generalized terror, and its subject not a Superman but a subhuman.

The new barbarism was a conscious enemy of "high culture" and of literacy. They had several reasons for this rejection. The first had to do with a social inferiority complex. Especially when supported by the authority of agrarian communism, illiterate peasants regard the complicated edifice of high culture as a social gimmick invented to oppress them. This has always been the case in social upheavals involving illiterate masses. Usually, however, modernizing projects inspired a kind of awe concerning high culture. The second reason is more complex. There are some tangible advantages for both leadership and militants in destroying literacy, apart from the technical one that insisting on a written communication between top and bottom would make the

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functioning of this particular power structure nearly impossible. According to Yathay, almost nothing was on paper. For a long time, the country had no constitution and when one was finally declared, it was a rather laconic leading article in a newspaper. There were neither general regulations nor a penal code. The village chiefs were regularly advised about the general policy line but, as far as Yathay could observe, they were neither capable of, nor willing to commit instructions in a written form. Informal verbal directives ensured practically unlimited power to local Khmer Rouge militants. In turn, this provided further grounds for hatred of "superfluous and bourgeois-feudal" high culture.

But perhaps the most important reason is moral in nature. As so often happens with people rejecting morality as dysfunctional and pernicious, Khmer Rouge militants also must have felt morally superior to the people who were denied the benefit and protection of moral treatment. Yathay's noticed that by eliminating tragedy (by upholding generalized fear and simultaneously banning sympathy) they had also eliminated comedy. Khmer Rouge militants never smiled, and even regarded smiling and playfulness as loose and immoral behavior. Promiscuity was equally out of the question. What remained was the cant and the sermonizing earnestness of a passion play in which the "new people" were crucified while, in an inversion peculiar to the long-standing tradition of the inquisition, the Khmer Rouge claimed to carry the whole burden of the moral world.

While preaching communal virtues, collectivity and general interest, Khmer Rouge militants were in the overwhelming majority of cases blackmarketeers, thieves (robbing both slaves and the general interest) and murderers for personal grudges and benefits. This is more than sufficiently documented but not interpreted by Yathay's chronicle. There was a type among them, he observed, who was exempt from the petty crimes generated by greed. But this was all the more dangerous. He mentions a reformed alcoholic who had found his way out through the Khmer Rouge. This former alcoholic was not ashamed of his earlier degradation. Rather, his story was one of the moral parables supporting the Khmer Rouge's claim to superiority. He was not even exposed to greed for he was a man of purely spiritual pleasures. Thus, the collectivist training of the new barbarian came full circle and, through endless hecatombes, returned to the same world of unrestrained individualism against which it had unleashed its crusade.

Ferenc Feher

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Charles Lemert and Garth Gillan, *Michel Foucault: Social Theory as Transgression*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1982, pp. xv and 169. $14.95

Lemert and Gillan convincingly portray Foucault as a social/historian social theorist in relation to critical social theory. In a subtle, nuanced account of his position, they carefully draw connections between Foucault and other intellectual movements without reducing his position to that of any other. Marxism, structuralism, Bachelard, Bataille, Nietzsche, and the *Annales* school each has a role to play in the development of Foucault's thought but none is determining. The reader is led to see the uniqueness of Foucault's position as well as his filiations and debts to other thinkers. All of this is presented in readable English and with a strong command of the literature. The book can serve both as an introduction to Foucault's thought as well as a strong interpretation of it as an advance in critical theory.

As an introduction to Foucault, the book's organization serves as somewhat of a drawback. After an introductory chapter which lays out the interpretive issues, Lemert and Gillan present chapters on Foucault's method, the content of his books and the limitations and strengths of his position. Their attitude toward Foucault is perfect for their task. There is none of that adulation which one finds so often in treatments of contemporary French intellectuals. Nor however is the book marred by a Yahoo, hysterical, defensive anger against French theory that is also prominent in American intellectual life, whether it derives from a traditionalist position or from a Marxist one. Lemert and Gillan are refreshingly evenhanded and mature. They are deeply concerned with the fate of critical social theory and they see Foucault as making a contribution to that field, albeit flawed in certain respects as it necessarily must be. The problem with the book as an introductory text on Foucault stems from their decision to treat Foucault's corpus as a whole.

Unlike Alan Sheridan's commentary, *Foucault: The Will to Truth,* Lemert and Gillan do not present summaries of each of Foucault's books from *Madness and Civilization* to *The History of Sexuality*. One consequence of this organizational strategy is that the reader will have to be familiar with Foucault's texts before opening the pages of *Social Theory as Transgression*. There is another more serious consequence, however. Lemert and Gillan treat Foucault's works as a unity, necessarily minimizing the new directions contained in *Discipline and Punish* and *The History of Sexuality*. They argue that the novelties of the recent work, such as the concepts of power in connection with knowledge and practice in connection with discourse, are prefigured in the earlier works, for example, *Madness and Civilization* and *The Birth of the Clinic*. This argument can be sustained, but it will annoy those who prefer to look at the earlier works on their own terms.

The deeper problem with the strategy of taking Foucault's works as a unity is that it blatantly violates the methodological principles of Foucault's recent works: that is, one must disregard the author as a unifying focus of discourse analysis. Foucault prefers to look for unity at the level of the "statement" because this allows him to displace the subject, constitute a much more objective level of analysis and draw a closer connection between discourse and practice. The strategy of unity at the level of the author, on the contrary, gravitates toward the problem of consistency and contradiction which is anathema to Foucault. It is thus ironic that the sympathetic reading of Foucault by Lemert and Gillan should rely upon an interpretative device which Foucault himself

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finds so repugnant. One recalls vividly Foucault's admonition to let the police compile their own dossier on him as subject and author.

Nevertheless, the treatment of the corpus of Foucault by Lemert and Gillan rings true on every count. The earlier works, even without an explicit theory of power, retrospectively do manifest a consistency of outlook with the later books. *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, as they say, should be read not so much as the methods book of Foucault, but as a step on the way of his work. They see *The Archaeology* rightly as part of the process of working through ideas rather than as a final, frozen position. They write, "It is easy, all too easy, to receive *Archaeology of Knowledge* as Foucault's methodological program. Except for several things. It comes neither at the beginning nor at the end of his work. Neither propädeutic, nor resumé, this book is more a gathering up of what has gone before, and a suggestion of what was to come thereafter" (p. 48).

Lemert and Gillan explain the difficulty Americans have in reading Foucault as the consequence of his unique style which, they think, contains the true key to his method. In a fascinating section, they analyze Foucault's style as composed of three "literary conventions:" the exceptional case, the oppositive structure, and the suppressed footnote. An example of the exceptional case is the treatment of Damiens' torture in *Discipline and Punish*. The exceptional case is by definition not representative nor does it "stand for a larger category." It functions in Foucault's text in its specificity in the context of a discourse that has no privileged instances. Now this is rather disorienting for American readers, whether they be social theorists or social historians. Lemert and Gillan make similar arguments for the other two instances of Foucault's style. Certainly there is much truth in what they say but I wonder if they are not underplaying, in the instance of the exceptional case, the Nietzschean roots of Foucault's method.

What I mean is this: each of Foucault's books begins with a presentation of a phenomenon that is strange to modern sensibilities. The ship of fools in *Madness and Civilization*, the analysis of Las Meninas in *The Order of Things*, the torture of Damiens in *Discipline and Punish* and the denial of repressed sexuality among the Victorians in *The History of Sexuality*. Rhetorically these examples are strikingly dramatic, serving both to put the reader off and to fascinate him or her with the problem. But something else is at stake. I do not think these examples are "exceptional" at all in Lemert and Gillan's sense. The ship of fools and torture, to take two cases, were typical of their respective social formations, the middle ages and the Old Regime. Their power derives not from their exceptionality but from their difference from the present. Like Nietzsche, Foucault investigates a topic by going back from the present until a difference is found, something that shocks the modern sensibility, or disgusts it, or appears ridiculous to it. The next step is to unpack the logic of this apparently absurd phenomenon, to show how it operates as a social practice and how it can be taken, in its own time, as legitimate, meaningful or sensible even though we do not find it so. Through this exercize of genealogy, the present counterpart of the past practice is undermined as an unquestionable, legitimate institution. Thus, the practice of torture relativizes the prison, shows how something else, which at first we find simply bizarre, is in fact a possible alternative to it. Not that torture is somehow superior to the prison as a system of punishment, just that it is strange to us precisely to the degree that we do not see the strangeness of the prison system. To the extent that Foucault can show us the operation of torture as a "technology of power" he can reveal the extent to which we have been unconscious of the prison system as a technology of power. Far from being an exceptional case, the torture of Damiens is the genealogical weapons Foucault uses to assault

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the familiarity with which we regard the prison. We are thereby released from the spell of the prison and can begin the political work of dismantling it.

In the same way, Nietzsche presents the master morality as the antidote to our own slave morality. If we can see the "health" in the masters' brutality, we can see the "sickness" in our own moral system. This is genealogy and it is a most disquieting method of doing history. It is as different from a positivist evolutionary history (the Whig rise of freedom) as it is from a Marxist dialectical history (the class struggle). The Nietzsche-Foucault method differs from positivist-liberal history in that it is full of oppositions and differences. In the end genealogy serves to alienate us in the Brechtian sense from the past, whereas evolutionary history domesticates the past and makes us feel at home in it by demonstrating the continuity of the past and the present. But genealogy also takes its distance from the dialectic. For a Marxist, one social formation derives from another through the mediation of the class struggle. A given social formation attains a synthesis that is progressively beyond the previous social formation. Conflict is a major characteristic of Marxist history, but the conflict is *resolved* through the class struggle. Not so with Foucault: each social formation (actually only a segment of it because Foucault avoids totalizations) stands in antagonistic juxtaposition to the others. Each is simply different from the other, having no relation to it. Hence, the notorious emphasis on discontinuity. And yet, by standing in stark opposition the two social formations do have a relation to each other — a relation of mutual denial. Each excludes the other and from this exclusion derives the possibility of critique. Each social formation makes the other seem ridiculous and impossible, thus justifying itself and its own specificity. If historians can capture the way in which the present social formation attains it familiarity and if they can show how the previous social formation was not ridiculous in itself but only from the perspective of the present, an act of demystification has been accomplished, the first step in a contestatory politics.

Lemert and Gillan do not see things this way. They account for the novel radicalism of Foucault through the notion of transgression. They argue that the central feature of Foucault's position is a strategy of transgression. Genealogy, they argue, "is the transgressive knowledge in which the taboos thrown up around the will to truth are violated" (p. 64). Foucault writes the history of discourses in such a way that their truth value is displaced by their will to power. The implications of this method are again at odds with those of Marxism. The concept of transgression derives from Bataille, particularly in relation to the problem of eroticism. For Bataille to transgress a taboo is not to eliminate it. The taboo stands even in the face of its transgression. Thus, when critical discourse, such as Foucault's, violates the taboo it does not achieve a new or original position of truth. To write, as Foucault does, a history of the production of truth, does not place one in a new position from which a real truth can be attained. By revealing the power at stake in a given discourse, one's own discourse does not avoid the taint of power. The conclusion of Lemert and Gillan is this: "Transgression is the movement that creates, in the absence of an absolute Limit, a limitlessness essential to the transgression of limits" (p. 66).

But the concept of transgression does not solve all the problems of a renewed critical theory of society. In particular, what bothers Lemert and Gillan about Foucault's position is its lack of a concept of rationality: "....there is no conception of a social rationality in which politics would become more than an act of negation" (p. 108). In the end, their defense of the advances of Foucault's position hesitates and comes to a halt before all the old questions. Foucault's is a negative politics of destruction, they admit, without allowing the bugaboo of nihilism to be attributed to him. Is this

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negativity enough, they ask? "Is a *via negativa* sufficient for politics? Can a critical perspective be introduced into political practice solely through the field made available by a history of dispersed events and radical transformations? Does not a critical theory of history demand an analysis of interests operating in history? Is it possible to speak of a politics of freedom without a theory of the subject as constituted in its historical self-formation through freedom? These are hard questions. And to them Foucault gives only ambiguous answers. He has launched the most ambiguous of projects: a theory of politics and of a political reading of history that claims for itself all the prerogatives of freedom while avoiding the necessity of examining its epistemological and practical conditions" (p. 108). Lemert and Gillan hit the theoretical nail on the head. They take Foucault as far as one can and then call attention to his limitations.

Two things need to be said. First, Foucault has done much. It is up to others to work on the remaining issues, which are considerable. The epistemological question in particular remains open and Foucault refuses to face it. Others will have to do so. But a second point draws attention to what I see as the major weakness of Lemert and Gillan's book: they do not draw the connections between the directions taken by Foucault and the current social formation. It should be mentioned that Foucault himself does not do this either. But the issue remains central. Only an analysis of the current social formation reveals the strengths and limits of Foucault's position, while indicating the lines for further work. Foucault's intervention is authorized by the inadequacy of Marxism to account for, 1) the rise of protest movements outside the realm of the traditional working class (feminism, gay liberation, prison protest, ecology movements, black and other minority civil rights movements) and 2) the emergence of a mode of information which alters the social logic based on labor.

The first issue supports Foucault's rejection of totalizing logics and his search for technologies of power that serve to dominate in their specificity particular social groups. The logic of Marxism consistently totalizes the social field under the universal suffering of the proletariat. It can do no other, and, by operating theoretically in this way, it works to reduce the oppressions of women, blacks, etc., to that of the working class. Even though the working class alone can stop the process of production, it cannot serve as a standpoint from which to analyse and combat the danger of nuclear war, the destruction of the ecological balance, racism, sexism and so forth. Critical theory has been made stupid by the extraordinary privilege it grants to the act of working on materials to make commodities in a capitalist factory.

Secondly, the social formation in the advanced societies is changing rapidly. Even within a Marxist perspective of the mode of production, labor is no longer central to the economy. Knowledge has taken its place. In fact, the central feature of twentieth-century capitalism is the rise of new languages and their dissemination throughout the social space, in the realm of production and in the rest of everyday life. Every major institution relies on stored information. Computers monitor the population in a caricature of Foucault's panopticon. Labor is reorganized and displaced by information machines. Commodities are overlaid with codes through advertising that supplant and make a mockery of use value, gearing behavior to fantasies of unfulfilled desire. Communications are dominated by one-way conversations with TVs and radios. The society is connected not by bonds of work solidarity but by telephones and computer terminals. The population is isolated as never before by games and recreational systems that posit social relations as interactions of individuals and elections.

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These new language experiences require analysis. They require the development of concepts that can unpack new modes of domination, not a litany of exploitation and falling rates of profit. Foucault's work, whatever its value, must be assessed in light of the new social horizon. If this is done his strength will be seen particularly in his notion of discourse/practice, an idea that is bold enough to assert the materiality of words and the ideality of practice. Though he has certainly not gone far enough in elaborating a critical theory of discourse, he has just as certainly achieved one of the better attempts at a renewed historical materialism.

Mark Poster

Jeffrey C. Goldfarb, *On Cultural Freedom. An Exploration of Public Life in Poland and America*. Chicago. The University of Chicago Press. 173 pages.

Goldfarb's book has an ambitious aim. He seeks to examine yet another stage in the structural transformation of the public sphere, this time in its limited but "relatively free" existence in the interests of one very particular society of "existing socialism." The analysis is *comparative*, relying throughout on a detailed comparison between economically interpreted mass capitalist societies and politically interpreted "real socialist" ones (typified by the U.S. and Poland respectively). The analysis belongs, furthermore, to the tradition of *critical* sociology in that the Frankfurt School's critique of mass culture is both extended in reference to capitalism and applied to the study of art and mass culture under socialism. In both societies he seeks to define cultural freedom universally as creative resistance to *particular* forms of oppression. Throughout the book he consistently seeks to avoid that kind of critique of either system that could easily become a legitimating ideology for the other. The book's main contribution lies in extending a critical theory of mass culture to Soviet-type societies..

Having defined cultural freedom (p. 50) as subversion, as the critical integration on the level of art and culture of a system of constraint distinctive to a given society, he goes on to argue that existing forms of economic (capitalism) and political (socialism) constraints represent both crucial supports of, and limitations on, cultural life. Cultural freedom in the modern state is possible only in societies in which the institutions of secular cultural life are differentiated from those of economics, politics religion. But this differentiation is only one of the signs of modernity that Goldfarb discusses, the other being the integration of the masses of the population (previous periphery) into the centers of the institutional and symbolic life, i.e., mass society. For the first time there is popular demand for participation in the ruling culture — a demand that neither producers nor the receivers can satisfy as long as that culture is the old high culture. Commercialized mass culture turns out to be the historical way of closing the gap under capitalism, while under socialism politically administered official culture performs the same function. Mass and official culture, however, compromise precisely what the differentiation of the cultural sphere first achieved: cultural freedom.

The result, however, is not as fatal in this analysis as it is in the utilized Adorno Horkheimer critique of mass culture. What Adorno admitted only in the case of the rare authorless work becomes generalized here: the existing forms of cultural control,

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if reflectively integrated into works, surrender some of their power. More precisely, both within and without the ruling mechanisms, art and culture are possible. In capitalist society this *without* is constituted by minor markets and government or university supported non-market spaces while *the within* is provided by those forms of the *avant garde* where reflection on the commodity structure of art stays one step ahead of market integration. In a socialist society like Poland the without is the alternative cultural milieu of the opposition, and the within is represented by forms of critical culture that are either promoted or tolerated (for whatever reason) by the administrators of culture or (more likely) are the uninterested consequences of their efforts to promote their own ideologies: Marxist, nationalist, or traditionalist. In Goldfarb's analysis there seems to be a time sequence between forms within the without — at least for socialist societies. During Stalinism the oppositional form does not exist at all, during the period of consolidation (1956-1975) it does exist but is powerless, and after 1975-6 it tends to reduce the significance of forms of criticism within which have existed at least ever since the death of Stalin.

In Goldfarb's presentation, cultural opposition from without is itself a product of the evolution of the system of existing socialism. The struggles that nourish it, especially by a unified working class (unifiable as a political force as against the West) are possible today only in Poland among the "socialist" countries. The necessary political culture, the institutional supports (especially that of the Church), and the experience with conflict were all primarily developed in the last 35 years. The cultural forms themselves represent a politicization of forms that were developed in the pre-political proto-public sphere *or* relatively free public sphere during the period of consolidation. On the other hand, these forms are not only rooted in the past, they are also anticipations of a possible future. In this analysis, a genuinely free and, in a sense, politicized public sphere represents not only a consequence of the last 25 years of struggles, but the limit of the possible *institutional achievement* by a social movement that cannot conquer state power. Having to renounce politics in the sense of sovereign and legislative powers, the Polish opposition can recover politics, in the ancient sense of the word, on the levels of the intermediary institutions of civil society which are however exclusively identified with a free public sphere. The stabilization, indeed the integration of this form of public life into the existing system, represents to Goldfarb the best possible outcome of the difficult situation. We should recall that the book was written before Jaruzelski's coup on December 13.

Goldfarb's books is excellent, but is open to some serious criticisms. First of all, the Poland/U.S. choice is hardly defendable, aside from reasons of convenience. One society represents, after all, an extremely unusual peripheral unit of an imperial system; the other the center of a system of states. Furthermore, Poland represents an extreme case of cultural freedom for Soviet-type societies; the U.S. on the other hand the most typical instance of the hegemony of mass culture. Therefore, the comparison has the tendency of making Soviet-type societies appear too open and capitalist civil societies too closed. Secondly, in the case of Polish society, Goldfarb has at times a tendency to ascribe to the social system some of the achievements of its bitter enemies. He overestimates the flexibility of the system and thereby diminishes the creative energy needed to rupture it even in relatively undramatic ways. This point is related to a shadow of orthodox Left forms of analysis that sometimes passes through the work: the idea that the abolition of the primacy of economics and the resulting primacy of politics is something "transitional" to democratic socialism.

All of these criticisms can be refocused around a more serious objection: Goldfarb's

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conception of what East European systems are all about is still not sufficiently worked out. In reality, his argument oscillates between conclusions drawn empirically from the Polish experience and a thesis based on a sophisticated — if incomplete — attempt to state "what" Soviet-type societies are. He rightly disclaims any interest in the scholastic exercise of determining whether Soviet-type societies are degenerate workers states, state capitalism, bureaucratic collectivism or centralism and the like (though it is not clear why he has settled for Bahro's concept of "existing socialism.") Unfortunately in bits and pieces, he provides a theoretical conception of the social formation that consists of the following points: 1) modern, i.e., differentiated; 2) mass societies; 3) integrated by the administrative acts of the party's political sphere (system integration) and by an official culture (social integration); 4) whose principle of domination is that of the apparatus of that sphere over experts and other operatives; 5) a principle disguised by the bureaucratic structure of the whole employment system.

All of these points amount to a set of theoretical statements whose scope is often not parallel in at least the sociological literature on the subject. But are the statements and the conclusions based on them defensible? Well, some of them more than others. When we come to the question of the modernity of "existing socialism" we must immediately answer: yes and no. It is in some respects clearly a contemporary and competitor of other forms of social life today. While *differentiation* and *massification* are in any case criteria too narrow to define modernity, in Soviet-type societies the various spheres are not as differentiated from politics as they are from economics under capitalism. Leaving aside historical origins, which in the key instance of the Soviet Union does not involve modern capitalist depoliticization before the system is "repoliticized," the issue of cultural freedom demonstrates the difference. Politics in the East constitutively enters into the works, whereas economics in the West only makes their production and distribution highly *dependent*. In this sense, as Adorno realized, administration kills culture while commodification makes it only antinomic, leading to a split between works that commercialize themselves and autonomous works — a split that enters into the very structure of autonomous works.

The point concerning differentiation relegates system integration (Goldfarb's point) to the administrative acts of the party's political sphere. He is absolutely right in focusing on this, but wrong to the extent he treats this party's political sphere as a differentiated, modern, bureaucratic political order. As many interpreters from Lefort to Staniszkis have pointed out, the party-state is not a legal, rational form of domination. It is not a bureaucracy in Weber's sense. Hence, it also cannot integrate in the formally rational manner that economics integrates the various spheres of capitalist societies, and the theoretical ground for Goldfarb's parallel between East and West becomes somewhat shaky.

While Goldfarb is convincing in demonstrating that the *mass society* problem fully applies to East European societies, he is not equally successful concerning *mass culture*. The reason is the following: the mass cultural mediation of mass society is possible only if the cultural sphere is autonomous. Here, too, the point concerning differentiation has its consequences. But, beyond this, instead of seeking free public spaces merely at the structural breaking points of mass or official culture, we must see the public sphere in the West among the constitutive conditions of mass culture. Mass culture can mediate only because it steps into a pre-existing form of mediation between state and society. Its formal plausibility has to do with its fully public form. Its material

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content has always been indirectly derived from artistic creation. In Soviet-type societies, however, there can be no modern public sphere for reasons Goldfarb mentions, but does not fully unfold: the absense of independent public opinion and individual civil rights. These are in the Habermas analysis (on which Goldfarb ultimately relies even more than on Arendt's) constitutive but not sufficient conditions of a process of communication free of domination. In Soviet-type systems free publicity is possible (either within or without) only under great social pressure and the same may have been once the case for the abolutist forerunners of present Western states. Indeed, the form of *official* public life, especially in the Soviet Union, is more like the type of representative *Öffentlichkeit* described by Habermas for absolutist systems in the West. Official culture and ideology in this sense are not forms of communication at all, but rituals of power whose extremely important function in Soviet societies in the present world context is the *exclusion* and *replacement* of serious communications about politics and society. In Goldfarb's terms, this result must also mean that, as a mass society, the East European form is less mediated, the pull between center and periphery is in fact not bridged at all except by the destruction of high culture (i.e., negatively).

If one defines a system a certain way one sets up limits to its *self*-transformation even under pressure. An overly functionalist account such as Goldfarb's, must of course interpret all changes, including these precipitated by oppositional tendencies, in terms of immanent potentialities of the system as originally defined. Thus, his account of Soviet change is somewhat misleading. If one also takes the viewpoint of the social actors, the institutional core of the system shrinks to one actor among many, and social change must be ascribed to their *interaction*. The result (to bypass a serious discussion about the relation of systems and action theory in sociology) need not be conceived from this viewpoint as the pre-existing potentiality of the system. To speak this way seriously one, of course, needs serious social actors outside the party-state. It is the specificity of Poland that it has had such agents, more continuously and on a wider basis than any other Eastern European society. The different logic of cultural development here is due to this specifity.

Andrew Arato

Morton Schoolman, *The Imaginary Witness: The Critical Theory of Herbert Marcuse*. New York: The Free Press, 1980.
Barry Kätz, *Herbert Marcuse and the Art of Liberation: An Intellectual Biography*. London: Verso Editions, 1982.

The dilemma of Herbert Marcuse is reproduced in and around his critics. Students of his thought are finding out firsthand how difficult it is to preserve the emancipatory thrust of an intellectual tradition in an uncongenial age. Both books under review have comprehensive ambitions. Both books avoid the polemical excesses of the sixties and early seventies Marcuse literature. The Kätz book has much to recommend it; the Schoolman book much less. But the deficiencies of both confirm the suspicion that the move of the Marcuse literature from the nether region between academia and politics to the mainstream of academia was not made without cost. The vanities of pure scholarship replace the vulgarities of political scholarship.

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After a promising statement of objectives, Morton Schoolman's *The Imaginary Witness* is a disappointment. Schoolman's first objective is to provide "the first systematic and comprehensive exposition and interpretation of Marcuse's entire life's work" (pp. xii-xiii). His second objective is a "critical analysis *internal* to Marcuse's social theory" (p. xiii, my emphasis). Even when critical of his errors, Schoolman claims to be sympathetic to Marcuse and asks the reader to receive the criticisms in this spirit. Schoolman expresses a particular sympathy for Marcuse's early writings, the works written between 1928-33 while Marcuse was studying under Heidegger in Freiburg: "perhaps more than anything else the ambitions and humanism of his early writings provided inspiration for this study" (p. xii). It is the ambitions and humanism of Marcuse's early works that provide Schoolman with the standards by which he will assess Marcuse's later efforts. By adopting Marcuse's own early writings as his critical standpoint, Schoolman tries to avoid the externally imposed, obviously hostile standards which characterized so many of the earlier polemical criticisms of Marcuse.

While it is unusual to adopt the first five years of a philosophic career as the means to evaluate the subsequent forty-five years, it is not unprecedented or wrong in principle. Such a procedure has been used to good effect in studies of the young Marx or the young Lukács. The problems with *The Imaginary Witness* lie more in its execution than in its objectives. For example, the problem with Schoolman's systematic and comprehensive exposition and interpretation of Marcuse is that the exposition is so deeply embedded in the interpretation, and vice versa, that they are of little value to anyone who has not read the entirety of Marcuse's corpus. It is very difficult, sometimes impossible, to determine the boundaries between the exposition of Marcuse's thought and Schoolman's interpretation.

The technical problem of distinguishing exposition from interpretation is caused by a deeper problem of method. Schoolman has the writings of Marcuse as his subject, but he transmits little sense of the subjectivity of Herbert Marcuse as a man and a thinker. Without demanding that Schoolman write an intellectual biography that he did not intend, some account of the significant names, dates, places, colleagues, and crises in Marcuse's life could have enlivened Schoolman's prose and provided the reader with some sense of context — if only to help distinguish exposition from interpretation. But for Schooman, it is the texts themselves which provide "the correct approach." Readily available information about Marcuse's life never appears, or is dismissed as "ultimately insignificant biographical detail" (p. 3). The only historical context for Marcuse's works is constituted by reference to a few of the mega-events of the twentieth century: Fascism-Nazism, the Cold War, the New Left; even the German Revolution and its aftermath, the foundation of Marcuse's political consciousness, plays no role in Schoolman's account of his thinking. Finally, Schoolman's Preface excludes references to Marcuse's colleagues and contemporaries as matters lying beyond the scope of his book. In other words, despite Marcuse's lifelong identification with an alternative, critical approach to philosophy and social theory, and despite what we will see to be Schoolman's own advocacy of an individual-focused, subjective, at times existential political theory, *The Imaginary Witness* is an exercise in the same bad old political theory which keeps undergraduates away in droves. Omitting both the personal aspect and the shared efforts of the Institute of Social Research, and including only the broadest image of a historical context, Schoolman is left with Marcuse texts begetting Marcuse texts.

Without doubting the sincerity of his second objective, there is much less involved in the alleged sympathy and internality of Schoolman's criticism of Marcuse than

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might be expected. If this sympathy and internal criticism are understood, as I initially understood them, to mean an acceptance of Marcuse's objectives and a grant of preliminary plausibility to his theoretical means, a surprise is in store. There is no assessment of the specific strengths and weaknesses of Marcuse's works. Rather, Schoolman's particular sympathy for the early writings is used against Marcuse's later work. For Schoolman, the early writings were the crowning achievement of Marcuse's career, and the virtues of these writings are the standard by which the subsequent work is found wanting. Although it is never clearly stated at the outset, it soon becomes apparent that the counterpart of the early writings, i.e., the lamentable defect of Marcuse's subsequent work, is the theory of one-dimensionality. Schoolman's lifeless, literary Marcuse thus has only two major stages in his intellectual development. He had a golden youth which began and ended abruptly between the ages of thirty and thirty-five, and a long period of failure marked by the gradual formulation, classic statement, and embarrassing apologetics for the theory of one-dimensionality.

Schoolman's choice of the early writings as the critical benchmark for the evaluation of Marcuse's *oeuvre* is very peculiar. While a number of claims can be legitimately raised for these works — as criticisms of prevailing approaches to philosophy and social theory; as the first attempt to synthesize Marxism and existential philosophy; as sometimes preserved, sometimes discarded precedents for Marcuse's later work — they do not, as Schoolman himself realizes, constitute a consistent body of social theory. Schoolman calls them "theoretical beginnings" (p. 1), and admits that "Marcuse's project never develops beyond its theoretical outline" (p. 36). While it may make analytic sense to distinguish and to endorse an early Marx from a later Marx, or an early Lukács from a later Lukács, such distinctions are of little value in this case. The early work of Marcuse never attains the comprehensiveness or cohesion of the young Marx or the young Lukács. Moreover, there is the uneven quality of the writings themselves. While some of these works are fine examples of philosophic writing, others, quoting Schoolman, "are saturated with the most complex terminology and appear to be repetitive, confusing, and obscure" (p. 2).

Why does Schoolman view these works, with their limitations, as Marcuse's supreme achievement? The answer is that they possess all that Schoolman demands from a social theory: a stiff upper lip. To Schoolman, the early writings affirm the continued viability of the individual subject in the effort to effect social change: the young Marcuse's adoptions from Heidegger restored the individual subject to Marxist theory; the young Marcuse's adoptions from Hegel and Wilhelm Dilthey assured that this individual subject has an essential, indeed ontological connection to the historical process. I wish that there were more involved in Schoolman's argument than this, but this surprisingly simple set of criteria is reiterated not only in the favorable chapter on the early writings, but also in next five, very unfavorable chapters on one-dimensionality. In all six chapters, Schoolman mistakes the praise of subjectivity and the individual — what Adorno called "the jargon of subjectivity" — with their true defense. Despite all obstacles — despite the capitalist economy and the force of a hostile state, but more frequently, despite ideological obstacles like reification — Schoolman's reading of the early writings contains a theory of the potential efficacy of the individual subject, and that is why he likes them. The later writings, in Schoolman's reading, lose this optimism about the individual subject, until this subject is depicted as swallowed up in an unbreakable one-dimensionality, and that is why Schoolman dislikes them.

Schoolman's praise of the early works and criticism of the later works is not only sim-

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plistic, but also wrong. By omitting both the exaltation and the bitter disappointment of the young Marcuse's experience of the German Revolution, he misses the pessimism and pathos with which Marcuse, in his Freiburg years, sought a transcendent yet concrete, ontological grounding for the possibility of radical action. The opportunity for real radical action had been missed, and it became, in the face of the rising tide of Nazism, a strenuous philosophical task just to demonstrate that practical, radical action remains an existential possibility of human being. Instead of this, Schoolman gives us a cheery reading of the analysis of the master-slave relation in Marcuse's book on *Hegels Ontologie und die Theorie der Geschichtlichkeit.* He sees this as an assurance that a theoretical and practical opposition can arise out of the most dire of circumstances. He also likes Marcuse's references to Socrates, Plato, and Kierkegaard as philosophers who understood the practical significance of philosophy to the conduct of daily life and who acted, as individuals and as philosophers, on the basis of this understanding. Schoolman completely misses the pathos with which Marcuse extols these figures as the products of bygone ages when the practically oriented individual philosopher might have had some expectation of changing the course of life in his society. In opposition to Schoolman's misreading, Marcuse clearly stated that "the individual is no longer the point of departure, but rather the *goal* of philosophy."[1] Philosophy may have important practical tasks in the present, but the philosophical-practical subject for the young Marcuse, contra Schoolman, was the working class. Schoolman's world of practical effective individuals is long gone, and must once again be created through collective, radical action.

For Schoolman, the decline from the promising beginning of the early writings was caused by the horrors of the Nazi accession to power in 1933. "In a way that never became apparent to Marcuse, their memory was seared deeply, grotesquely, into the structure of his thought" (p. 43). From this point on, *The Imaginary Witness* is a continuous account of grotesqueries, but none of them are Marcuse's. Schoolman's depiction of Marcuse's fall into one-dimensionality begins in his works completed in association with the Institute for Social Research, underlies even the apparently optimistic *Eros and Civilization*, and reaches its apotheosis in *Soviet Marxism* and *One-Dimensional Man*. A few remarks about the analysis of the latter work will illustrate Schoolman's characteristic method.

One-Dimensional Man opens with a statement of "two contradictory hypotheses: 1) that advanced industrial society is capable of containing qualitative change for the foreseeable future; 2) that forces and tendencies exist which may break this containment and explode the society."[2] Marcuse goes on to admit the prevailing dominance of the first hypothesis, without withdrawing the second. On the other hand, Schoolman's analysis of *One-Dimensional Man* is centered around "a single question: what is the nature of an individual who can be so completely dominated by technical reason?" (p. 179) In a stroke, Schoolman once again reduces the collective subject of Marcuse's theory, here society, to the individual. But even this is a relatively minor concern compared to his reduction of the theses of *One-Dimensional Man* to a single proposition. What Schoolman has done here — the same thing that he did with regard to the tension between the authoritarian state-society and reason, to the tension between industrial society's increased need to repress the instincts and the possibility of

1. Herbert Marcuse, *Schriften, Band I: Der deutsche Küstlerroman, Frühe Aufsätze* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1978), p. 405.

2. Herbert Marcuse, *One-Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1964), p. xv.

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unprecedented happiness and gratification, and the same thing that he will do again in his analyses of Marcuse's later works — is to dissolve Marcuse's dialectic. Marcuse's philosophy lives in the tension between historically possible alternatives. It dies, as it does here, when obtuse and undialectical interpretations of his work dissolve that tension.

For Schoolman, dialectics is a topic in Marcuse's philosophy. He may write about Marcuse's views on dialectical materialism or on the state of dialectical theory in the Soviet Union, but he betrays not the slightest inkling that Marcuse's thought itself may be dialectical. Instead, when confronted by a situation with multiple alternatives, Schoolman at times treats this as an unintended ambiguity on Marcuse's part, and promptly sets out to resolve it for him. But his characteristic method is the one which he uses on *One-Dimensional Man*: divide and conquer. Divorced from the second contradictory hypothesis, *One-Dimensional Man* becomes an essay in cultural pessimism. So one-sided as to be a caricature of itself, the book is merely a foil, a series of gloomy errors which elicit Schoolman's needed corrections.

The corrections come in two forms. If the discussion concerns one of Marcuse's favored sources, then Schoolman demonstrates how Marcuse diverges from and thus misinterprets the master in question. If the discussion concerns a theory which Marcuse opposes, then Schoolman demonstrates how Marcuse misconstrues the theory in question. In both cases, the masters and rivals prove themselves to be advocates of the individual and subjectivity, and thus in direct opposition to Marcuse's grotesque, Nazi-induced pessimism about these matters.

Having completed the necessary surgery, the remainder of *One-Dimensional Man*, with the untidy second contradictory hypothesis excised, is ready for Schoolman's treatment. Since the book is now an essay in cultural pessimism, it can be compared to its intellectual sources. Horkheimer and Adorno's *Dialectic of Enlightenment* might be considered a likely candidate, but Schoolman has already ruled out any comparison of Marcuse's work to that of his colleagues. That leaves Max Weber, who is never cited in *One-Dimensional Man* but whose notion of the "iron cage" of technical rationality is sufficiently akin to Marcuse to bear comparison. To no reader's surprise who has followed this book so far, Marcuse is found to have departed from Weber, and thus fallen into error. The Weber of the iron cage, never the favorite of American social science, conceals another, more optimistic Weber. According to Schoolman's Weber, "technical reason is habituating, but politics, values and their subjective basis are not dissolved. Rather they continue to exist beside the apparatus and often in conflict with it" (p. 181). Thus Marcuse's departure from and erroneous interpretation of an intellectual source leaves him in a one-sided, unduly pessimistic misinterpretation.

Marcuse's departure-error-misinterpretation in the Weber case is not without precedent. In the chapter on the early writings, we are told that "Hegel's subject is freer" (p. 21) than Marcuse's Heidegger-derived subject, but here Marcuse makes the necessary corrections. Things are not so sanguine when Schoolman considers the other pillars of Marcuse's thought, Freud and Marx. Among numerous departures, errors, misinterpretations, and distortions, Schoolman finds Marcuse's emphasis of Freud's instinct theory, the foundation of his most radical demands for human emancipation, as still another example of Marcuse's "theoretical erosion of the subject": "but Freud's instinct theory and metapsychology,..., are interpreted in such a way as to lose the singular element of subjectivity, the ego, that must exist if there is to be any critical autonomy" (p. 114). Schoolman's true Freud never ceases to be an ego psychologist. Earlier Schoolman claimed that Marcuse had been seared into a

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hyperrationalistic position by Nazism; now Schoolman criticizes Marcuse for his turn to instinct, nature, and biology in *Eros and Civilization*. Schoolman is hard to please.

My favorite example of this tactic is Schoolman's rescue of Marx from Marcuse. Schoolman calls this philosophical *coup de théâtre* "Marx against Marcuse." According to Schoolman, "the reciprocal relationship of base and superstructure as conceived by Marx is altered by Marcuse decisively in favor of all-pervasive and all-determining material basis encroaching upon, manipulating, and coordinating ideology until there ceases to be any difference between base and superstructure, ideology and reality, subject and object" (p. 187). Schoolman's humanist, praxis-oriented, multidimensional Marx saves Marcuse from his tendency toward rigid determinism and materialist reductionism. Schoolman's invidious comparison belies the important historical fact that it was the efforts of Marcuse and his neo-Marxist contemporaries which enabled us to understand Marx as a humanistic, praxis-oriented, and multidimensional thinker in the first place. Have we already forgotten?

Any philosopher who plays so fast and loose with his sources can hardly be trusted to give fair treatment to his opponents. The core of Schoolman's criticism of *One-Dimensional Man* is his rehabilitation of every theoretical tendency which Marcuse opposed. Marcuse, of course, completely misconstrued operationalism, ordinary language analysis, linguistic analysis, and mainstream political science, and Schoolman sets the record straight. Schoolman's bibliography includes the most extensive list of secondary works on Marcuse that I have seen, and he mines these sources thoroughly for refutations of Marcuse. The nadir of this effort is Schoolman's treatment of industrial psychology and sociology. Marcuse was cynical about the application of psychology and sociology to the industrial setting. Schoolman finds Marcuse's analysis obsolete and overly pessimistic. Marcuse concentrated on the Hawthorne study from the late 1920s, an example which he believed to be applicable still. But for Schoolman, "newer techniques — 'job rotation,' 'job enlargement,' 'participative management,' 'work teams,' 'human relations training,' 'sensitivity training,' 'job enrichment,' 'encounter groups,' and even the philosophies of the East (Taoism, Buddhism), just to name a few — were developed and underwent variation in organizational theories that multiplied at an exponential rate to take into account not only the complexities of the worker's rational abilities but his emotional needs, as well" (pp. 209-10). In other words, Schoolman invokes the gamut of current industrial psychology and sociology to testify to the sensitivity of contemporary management. It is enlightened management, not the grotesquely pessimistic Marcuse, who has the true concern for the well-being and the personal fulfillment of the worker. Working men of all countries, relax!

With their emphasis on the new sensibility and the New Left, the later writings of Marcuse would seem to be immune from the charge of one-dimensionality and excessive pessimism. Schoolman admits this much, then uses his last two substantive chapters on *An Essay on Liberation* and later works to inflict one final indignity on Marcuse. For Schoolman, it was Marcuse, not mainstream social theory, who was embarrassed by the eruption of dissent in the sixties and early seventies; and it was Marcuse, not mainstream social theory, who had to undertake an extensive series of theoretical revisions in order to account for the unanticipated emergence of the New Left. Thus the "sympathetic" analysis contained in *The Imaginary Witness* closes with an account of the pathetic old philosopher, blinded by his pessimism, trying to comprehend a world which has passed him by.

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But nothing could be farther from the truth. Schoolman's truncated, undialectical account of the theory of one-dimensionality is exploded by the New Left, but not Marcuse's dialectical theory of one-dimensionality. Unlike the harmonious fantasies of pluralist democracy, system maintenance, and worker fulfillment characteristic of mainstream social theory, it was Marcuse's theory of one-dimensionality which anticipated the possible explosion of even the most affluent of societies. With the emergence of the New Left, Marcuse merely shifted the weight of his analysis from the first to the second of his contradictory hypotheses in *One-Dimensional Man*. It was mainstream social theory that had to do some catching up. But having eliminated the second contradictory hypothesis from his analysis, Schoolman could only depict *An Essay on Liberation* and later works as discontinuous attempts to compensate for the errors of *One-Dimensional Man*.

The brief conclusion to *The Imaginary Witness* offers no new offense to Marcuse. The early writings are once again praised; the theory of one-dimensionality once again condemned. Schoolman saves his final insult for his reader, not for Marcuse. In the conclusion, we are told that the progressive aspects of Marcuse's early writings are present in a contemporary study by William Connolly entitled *Appearance and Reality in Politics*. I have not read this book. From the brief description provided, it appears to have all the emphasis on the individual subject and all the confidence in the efficacy of this subject which Schoolman requires. We are not, however, provided with a reason why forty-five years of Marcuse's published work had to be belabored in order to reach such a paltry conclusion. *The Imaginary Witness* should have been an essay on the virtues of the young Marcuse and William Connolly rather than the lengthy, undialectical, thoroughly unsympathetic, and ultimately insignificant book that it turned out to be.

Nostalgia is held in disfavor on the left. But I must say that *The Imaginary Witness* left me longing for one more chorus of "Marcuse is the corrupter of youth" or "Marcuse has abandoned the working class." Hostile and primitive as the old polemics were, they at least accorded Marcuse the respect shown to a dangerous political adversary. Despite protestations to the contrary, *The Imaginary Witness* only demeans its subject. If believed, Schoolman's book would leave the reader wondering why anyone ever took Herbert Marcuse seriously.

Marcuse appeared to be a most unwilling subject for an intellectual biography. In his last years, he did relax his characteristic silence about his life and the development of his thought. Never garrulous about these matters on any single occasion, the bits of information scattered throughout the interviews and reminiscences from the years of his celebrity nevertheless provide invaluable clues to the development and meaning of his thought. Yet, in the enormous Marcuse literature, no one has dared to elevate these fragments into the foundation for an intellectual biography. Lacking sufficient biographical information, as well as access to correspondence or unpublished manuscripts, intellectual biography seemed destined to be the literary form that would remain beyond the grasp of Marcuse scholars.

Barry Kätz's *Herbert Marcuse and the Art of Liberation* claims to change this situation. Thorough in his use of previously published material, Kätz was able to supplement these fragments through "intensive discussions with Herbert Marcuse on biographical and theoretical aspects of this work" conducted between 1976 to 1979. Still lacking access to Marcuse's correspondence, Kätz breached this deficiency through "interviews, correspondence, or informal discussion" with an impressive array of Marcuse's friends and relatives (p. 9). Finally, despite the widely held belief that there were no such creatures, Kätz was granted access to Marcuse's unpublished writings. Since Mar-

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cuse died before reading the final version of the manuscript, the only thing that prevents this book from being considered an authorized biography is the approval of its subject. While I have some serious reservations about Kätz's tightfisted use of his privileged material, there can be little doubt that *Herbert Marcuse and the Art of Liberation* is both the most finely constructed portrait of Marcuse as a man and thinker presently available, and one whose central thesis will provoke considerable controversy.

Kätz's Introduction warns the reader not to expect too much of a personal biography. Sounding like his subject at his most elusive, Kätz invokes "the erosion of the private sphere" and the primacy of the published works as the reasons for minimizing the personal and maximizing the theoretical and political aspects of Marcuse's career (p. 12). Fortunately, Kätz's bark is worse than his bite. While it is true that Kätz foregoes the retelling of every piece of Marcuseana currently in circulation, there is enough here to depict something of the philosopher as a human being: from his climbing onto the base of a Freiburg statue to crow " 'Now I'm somebody!' " at the time of the publication of his first book on *Hegels Ontologie*; through justifying his first class accommodations on his frequent trips to Europe because of his long legs; to his anxiety about seeing Venice once more, in his last summer, lest he die there like Thomas Mann's von Aschenbach (pp. 84, 213, 214). The fear of the erosion of the private sphere does not prevent Kätz from considering Marcuse's three wives as important intellectual influences, particularly with regard to feminism. Even when Kätz is retelling some already known situation or event, his privileged sources enable him to bring it to life. Nothing in this book denies the familiar facts that Marcuse's childhood was typical of the upper middle class, assimilated Jewish, cultured Berlin bourgeoisie, but how refreshing it is to have these sterile sociological categories animated by the names of real people and places. Gone also are the makeshift bridges with which previous authors have had to span the nonpublic, unpublished periods of Marcuse's career. With these difficult concatenations removed, Kätz achieves a smooth narrative flow, which, at its best, is both elegant and eloquent.

Kätz's access to privileged sources affects the substance of his book as well as its form. Kätz argues that it is the aesthetic dimension which is the "transcendent, Archimedean standpoint" of Marcuse's intellectual career (p. 200). This concern for aesthetics is manifest at the beginning of Marcuse's life and education, latent during his middle years, and manifest once again in his works from *Eros and Civilization* onwards. Kätz's privileged sources are indispensible to this notion of a continuous aesthetic thread linking Marcuse's career. I have listed below the evidence for Marcuse's persistent aestheticism. Readily available materials stand alone; material from Kätz's privileged sources is in parentheses; some relevant material from my own research on Marcuse is in brackets.

(1898-1917: early interest in modern architecture and literary modernism).

1917-22: doctoral studies in German literature, philosophy, and political economy, culminating in a dissertation on "der deutsche Künstlerroman"

(1922-28: immersion in the culture of Weimar Berlin, including the pseudonymous editorship of an Expressionist journal, *Das Dreieck*)

1925: editorship of *Schiller-Bibliographie unter Benutzung der Trömelschen Schiller-Bibliothek*

1937: "The Affirmative Character of Culture"

(some years before 1945: an unfinished, unpublished, and apparently unseen manuscript on Proust)

(1945: unpublished essay entitled "Some Remarks on Aragon: Art and Politics in the

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Totalitarian Era")

1955-58: "Eros and Culture," *Eros and Civilization, Soviet Marxism*

1964-67: *One-Dimensional Man*, "Remarks on a Redefinition of Culture," "Art in the One-Dimensional Society," "Die Gesellschaft als Kunstwerk"

1969: *An Essay on Liberation*, "Art as Form of Reality"

[1970: unpublished lectures on "The New Sensibility" and "Art as a Revolutionary Weapon" delivered at The New School for Social Research]

(1972: unpublished essay entitled "Letters on Surrealism")

(1977: unpublished lecture delivered at the Center of the Study of Epic Theatre)

1978-79: *The Aesthetic Dimension*

Including the privileged material, Marcuse's aesthetic works and activities constitute only a small portion of his public career. The value of this material to Kätz's aesthetic thesis is partly a matter of strategic placement and partly a matter of adding some bulk. On the one hand, the interviews and unpublished materials fill the gaps in the earlier accounts of Marcuse's career — i.e., 1898-1917, 1922-28, 1942-51 — with an aesthetic content. On the other hand, the additions to Kätz's account of Marcuse's later works raise aesthetics to the status of the paramount concern of his last years. This point is crucial. As Kätz admits, Marcuse's later works on aesthetics, including *The Aesthetic Dimension*, are not systematic or comprehensive statements in the manner of the later Lukács or Adorno. In this context, the increase in the sheer number of later aesthetic works lends credence to the thesis of a persistent aesthetic concern.

In his concluding chapter, Kätz expresses the hope that his book and its supporting material will contribute to the analysis of contemporary Marxism and Marcuse's relationship to contemporary Marxism. But it is Kätz's parsimonious use of his privileged material that will be the most significant factor in limiting the usefulness of his book for these questions.

Kätz makes a veiled reference about honoring "the agreements" that he had with Marcuse about their intensive discussions on biographical and theoretical aspects of this book (p. 11). Apparently, it is the agreements which shroud the number, nature, and results of these discussions. No overview of the discussions or the manner of their use in the book is furnished. We are provided with an anecdote about Kätz quoting Marcuse to Marcuse at the beginning of the book and an allusion to a meeting with Kätz before Marcuse's last trip to Europe at the end. In addition, there are eight footnoted references to "conversation with HM." Seven of these provide more details about previously known aspects of Marcuse's life and thought: his experience on the Berlin *Soldatenrat* (p. 29), his misgivings about the German Communist Party (p. 53), his political activities during the Weimar Republic (p. 57), his postwar contacts with Heidegger (p. 130), the death of his first wife (p. 134), the meaning of surplus-repression in *Eros and Civilization* (p. 150), and the right wing attacks in San Diego (p. 176). The eighth reference, concerning Marcuse's admiration of Kurt Eisner and the Barvarian Socialist Republic (pp. 30-1), is unique to Kätz's work. But is this all the Kätz derived from his series of intensive discussions? Were these discussion confined by the agreements to previously known situations?

A couple of examples of Kätz's curious use of his interview possibilities must suffice. Kätz elicited additional details about Marcuse's relationship to Heidegger. Although interesting, these details do not alter our biographical or theoretical understanding of this relationship. But Marcuse's relationship and nonrelationship to Lukács is allowed to remain "a matter for speculation" (p. 63). Kätz realizes the importance of the Lukács-Marcuse connection: Marcuse and Lukács "have come to represent alternative

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paradigms of leftist politics in the twentieth century" (pp. 53-4). Kätz's opportunity to elucidate the foundations of these alternative paradigms was dissipated. Kätz's treatment of Marcuse's wartime stint with the State Department is also very curious. The "Interregnum" on "Art and Politics in the Totalitarian Era (1942-1951)" both fills an important gap in previous accounts of Marcuse's career, and represents the definitive refutation of the ultraleft fantasies about Marcuse as a CIA agent. But no "conversation with HM" illuminates Kätz's path. Kätz's makes a yeoman effort to reconstruct these years from the recollections of coworkers and State Department documents, but it must have been the agreements which prevented him from questioning Marcuse about this period in his life. Lacking any general guidelines about their nature and use, and including only a handful of explicit references, the information that Kätz generated from Marcuse's family and friends is as problematic as the products of his interviews with Marcuse.

The situation is not much better when we consider Kätz's access to previously unknown works. The involvement of the young Marcuse in an Expressionist journal like *Das Dreieck* is intriguing, if only as a biographical precedent for his later receptivity to the cultural politics of the New Left. But why was his editorship pseudonymous? More importantly, why is it still necessary, fifty years after the demise of *Das Dreieck*, to keep Marcuse's pseudonym a secret? The unpublished writings present still more problems. Kätz apparently did not see the unfinished 1940s essay on Proust; like Marcuse's projected history of heretical thought, the *Corpus Hereticorum*, it can only be mentioned and accounted for in terms of its biographical and theoretical plausibility. But the unpublished essays on "Art and Politics in the Totalitarian Era" and "Letters on Surrealism" are another matter. Kätz did read these. Yet he provides no general overview of their length and scope. Worse, there is no indication of the reason why Marcuse did not publish these pieces, or why they cannot be published now. Instead, these essays are situated in Marcuse's biography in such a way so that they support Kätz's thesis of a persistent aesthetic concern. Only short quotations are then taken from these works, the same procedure which Kätz uses for readily available published works. I guess that I wanted to see more. No doubt this desire runs afoul of the agreements.

I cannot overcome my ambivalence about this book. Its merits are undeniable. Although Kätz's aesthetic thesis shifts the dialectical tension between idealism and materialism in Marcuse's thought toward the idealist pole, there can be no doubt that Kätz has captured the rhythm of Marcuse's intellectual development. *Herbert Marcuse and the Art of Liberation* depicts a disciplined and imaginative thinker whose abiding characteristic is an unswerving commitment to the emancipation of human life. Kätz's artful prose is worthy of this subject. And, despite my reservations, every word of this book may be true, including its aesthetic thesis.

But I cannot surmount a sense of distance from the materials of this book, a sense which may be the result of Kätz's agreements with Marcuse. Every revelation is accompanied by an exclusion.

Far from providing a foundation for further research on Marcuse or on Marxism, the present form of the book will create a perpetual dependence on "Kätz's Marcuse"; Kätz's presentation of the interview materials and the unpublished manuscripts will preclude other scholars from using this information in an independent manner. Finally, *Herbert Marcuse and the Art of Liberation* culminates a most unusual scenario. Long secretive about his person, Marcuse gradually relaxed his guardedness in his later years, only to bequeath a hoard of biographical information to Kätz. It appears that

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Kätz's task was to reveal what he was authorized to reveal, then to shut the door to further inquiry.

None of this is irremediable. Surely some way can be found to remove the reservations which prevent this book from assuming a place of eminence in the Marcuse literature. Trusting his readers to understand the agreements under which the biographer was granted access to privileged materials would be an important first step. But until the nature and use of the privileged materials is clarified, any attempt to evaluate critically Kätz's aesthetic thesis would be like boxing with a phantom.

John Bokina

Barry Kätz, *Herbert Marcuse and the Art of Liberation.* London: New Left Books, 1982. 234 pages.

The battle over Herbert Marcuse's legacy is now underway. Conflicting interpretations and evaluations are appearing regularly. Morton Schoolman's *The Imaginary Witness* presents Marcuse as a one-dimensional pessimist who good liberals, empiricists and persons of sound common sense should avoid like the plague.[1] Schoolman concentrates his focus on explicating Marcuse's theory of one-dimensional society and one-dimensional man; in so doing, he constructs a model of Marcuse's thought more one-dimensional and pessimistic than Marcuse's own work. For Barry Kätz, on the contrary, Marcuse underwent a period of "Years of Cheerful Pessimism" (162-192) in the midst of a series of searches for a transcendental ontology. Whereas for Schoolman, Marcuse is seen as a one-dimensional social theorist and speculative philosopher, for Kätz he is an aesthetic transcendental ontologist. Of course, Marcuse was all these things and more but the disturbing trend in the two most recent books that claim to cover the entirety of Marcuse's life and work is a tendency to reduce Marcuse's thought to a single problematic, or, in Kätz's case, to a "standard" or "consistent theoretical principle."

The most useful aspects of Barry Kätz's *Herbert Marcuse and the Art of Liberation* are his sketches of the contours of the historical, political and intellectual world in which Herbert Marcuse's life and thought unfolded. Kätz competently describes the historical context of Marcuse's work and the intellectual currents which he assimilated or combatted. He presents his study primarily as intellectual history and provides some hitherto unknown biographical data on Marcuse's life which he claims to have gathered from interviews with Marcuse's relatives, friends and Marcuse himself. However, it is not clear that Kätz's tidbits of biographical information provide historical understanding of Marcuse the man and thinker and some of the stories that Kätz presents as "facts," especially material on Marcuse's early life which is generally not documented or even attributed to clear sources, are extremely dubious.

Although much of Kätz's information about Marcuse's wartime activity in Washington is well-documented, as is his discussion of Marcuse's adventures with the New Left, his information on the early Marcuse is unreliable. Two stories in particular seem more as products of the author's fantasy than as significant new material about

1. Morton Schoolman, *The Imaginary Witness* (New York: Free Press, 1980). I have reviewed this book in *New German Critique*, 26 (Spring/Summer 1982): 185-201.

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Marcuse's youth. Kätz claims that during his study in Humboldt University in Berlin during 1919-1920, Marcuse continued the humanistic education begun before WW I in a German Gymnasium and that "this decision clearly anticipates his later theoretical position that the intellectual and aesthetic ideals of bourgeois culture can themselves serve simultaneously as a point of retreat and resistance in the face of bourgeois society" (32). We find a tendency here — that permeates Kätz's reading of the early Marcuse— to infuse the later Marcuse back into the life and thought of young Herbert. Not satisfied with his anticipatory reading of Marcuse's "decision" to continue a humanistic education, Kätz then claims: "His studies were not confined to the deeply traditional and hierarchical university setting in the post-revolutionary period, for he also met frequently in those months with a dozen friends in a Left-radical literary-group. His regular comrades included Walter Benjamin, the expressionist playwright Walter Hasenclaver, and the poet Adrian Turel —all to become major figures of the literary avant-garde themselves— and they were joined on his occasional visits to Berlin by Georg Lukács, who had recently become a Communist, and had by that time already embarked on the writing of *History and Class Consciousness.* Marcuse evidently came into contact with Lukács's thought at this point, but it must be recalled that he was still barely twenty, and only beginning to explore the dimensions of cultural and political radicalism that were opening up to him. He declared himself an 'existentialist' in those days, one for whom the experiences of life in Berlin could be appropriated not merely as events, but as comprehensive world-views: poetry '*als Weltanschauung*', drunkenness '*als Weltanschauung*,' sex '*als Weltanschauung*'. He and his literary accomplices met through 1919, when this little-known stage in the prehistory of the Frankfurt School ended abruptly with the unexpected return of his father in the midst of one of their 'existential evenings' in the Marcuse living-room" (32-33).

Everything here is questionable and casts doubt on Kätz's reliability as a historian. Walter Hasenclaver was about thirty at the time, a leading expressionist playwright whose work *The Son* was performed in 1914; Walter Benjamin would have been in his late 20s and was in Bern, Switzerland in 1919 working on his dissertation *Der Begriff der Kunstkritik in der deutschen Romantik* —thus it is unlikely that they were "friends" or "regular comrades" of "barely twenty" year old Herbert. Lukács was in Vienna in 1919-1920 as an exiled member of the recently defeated Hungarian communist government; although he travelled periodically to Berlin, it is unlikely that he met with Marcuse. According to Leo Lowenthal, to the best of his knowledge Marcuse never met Lukács and only met Benjamin later. Lowenthal claims that Marcuse's and Benjamin's circles did not overlap and, incidentally, that Benjamin had no influence on any of the Institute members (except Adorno) during the 1920s and 1930s.

Moreover, it is unlikely that Marcuse called himself an "existentialist" in 1919 since the term was not in circulation. The term "*Existenz-philosophie*" began to circulate after the publication of Heidegger's *Being and Time* (1927) and F.H. Heinemann claims that he coined the term in 1929.[2] The term "existentialist" did not appear until WW II in France.

Another of Kätz's stories is equally suspicious. He claims that after Marcuse completed his doctoral dissertation on *Der deutsche Kunstlerroman* in 1922, he returned to Berlin where he "pursued the aesthetic dimension" in the theater and "the now-legendary opera houses and concert halls of the city" (53). Kätz then claims: "Marcuse was not entirely relegated to the audience of the Berlin avant-garde, however, for he

2. See F.H. Heinemann, *Existentialism and the Modern Predicament* (New York: Harper and Row, 1958).

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even collaborated in a memorable, if short-lived, publishing venture: *Das Dreieck*, a Berlin monthly with an expressionist slant which he edited with his friend Walter Gutkelch. Its first issue provocatively appearing in a triangular format (yet printed in the Gothic *Altschrift* as if to heighten the tension between the avant-garde and the old culture)...Marcuse's (pseudonymous) editorial involvement brought him into contact with the work and also the persons of its many well-known contributors . . . Doblin . . . Zuckmayer . . . Toller . . . Kurt Pinthus" (55), etc.

During an interview with Marcuse while working on German Expressionism, I asked Marcuse what his own involvement with Expressionism had been;[3] he answered that he had read the literature, seen plays and paintings but denied active participation in expressionist circles and never mentioned *Das Dreieck*. None of his colleagues in San Diego, or Leo Lowenthal, or his son Peter, ever heard of Marcuse's expressionist undertakings and I wrote scholars working in the Schiller-National museum in Marbach where *Das Dreieck* is collected and none of them, or any other expressionist scholar, ever hear of Marcuse's involvement in this venture.

This raises questions about Kätz's methods of inquiry; in a note on p. 16, Kätz states: "Much of the material presented in part 1 is drawn from interviews and correspondence with Herbert Marcuse and members of his family over the years 1976-1979." This vague indication does not really help in ascertaining Kätz's sources for various stories.

The first textual problem is in Kätz's interpretation of Marcuse's doctoral dissertation on *Der deutsche Kunstlerroman*. Here Kätz reads the problematic of the later Marcuse into his doctoral dissertation. Kätz's reading is signalled by the title of the Chapter, "The Aesthetic Dimension" (37-57). Kätz claims that; "*Der deutsche Kunstlerroman,* contains embryonic formulations of so many of the themes of his later intellectual projects that it is necessary to examine it —his first piece of sustained writing— in some depth" (40). Kätz concludes: "At this juncture, it can only be noted that he has programmatically outlined a principle of life —*Kunstlertum*, the artistic-aesthetic mode of existence— that is in its essence irreconcilably opposed to the prevailing society. He has implicitly put forward the notion that an abstract concept and its embodiment in a concrete social type can express a persistent critical standard, immune to the integrative forces of the status quo —of *any* status quo" (52-53).

In fact, at this point in his intellectual career, Marcuse had not yet developed his theory of the aesthetic dimension; did not programmatically outline the aesthetic dimension as "irreconcilably opposed to the prevailing society" in his doctoral dissertation; did not implicitly claim that the aesthetic dimension provided a critical standard to condemn the status quo; and in fact was drawn to a quite different normative ideal of art and the relation between art and life in his doctoral dissertation than Kätz posits. A more careful reading of Marcuse's *The German Artist-Novel* reveals that he was more attracted by novels that showed the integration of art and life, that celebrated joy in reality, and that attained a unity between the artist, nature and society, than in those more romantic works that posited artistic alienation.

Marcuse's favorite artist-novel was Gottfried Keller's *Der grüne Heinrich* —a work influenced by Feuerback, that celebrated joy in nature, love and community, and Kätz misinterprets Marcuse's reading of this and other German artist-novels that were central to Marcuse's study.[4] In a later aside (p. 64), Kätz claims that "Keller's Heinrich, and

3. See Stephen Eric Bronner and Douglas Kellner, editors, *Passion and Rebellion: The Expressionist Heritage* (co-published by Bergin Press, Universe Books and Croom Helm, 1983).

4. Interview with Herbert Marcuse, San Francisco, March 1978. In *The German Artist-Novel*, Marcuse writes: "The brightest affirmation of life, the restoration and recovery of reality, the rooting

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Gustav von Aschenbach" inhabit the domain of the aesthetic dimension that is inexorably opposed to bourgeois society, whereas in Marcuse's presentation Keller's Heinrich and von Aschenbach in Thomas Mann's *Death in Venice* are exemplars of writers who seek accommodation with bourgeois society, either through attaining a unity between art and life (Heinrich) or contentment in bourgeois professionalism (von Aschenbach). Kätz thus creates an ideal-type of the aesthetic dimension, which he claims contains a "persistent critical standard" (53) that runs throughout Marcuse's work and is used to criticize the "status quo." Surely this is *part* of Marcuse's *later position* but is not present in his 1922 doctoral dissertation.

Curiously enough, Kätz's longest chapter is a study of "Heidegger and Concrete Philosophy" (58-86) where he sets forth the rudiments of Heidegger's *Being and Time* and the "facts" of Marcuse's study with Heidegger.[5] It is no accident that Heidegger, rather than Marx, Freud, or his critical theory colleagues, is given the most hermeneutical and biographical space in Kätz's study because Kätz basically reads Marcuse's project as an attempt to "derive a transcendent standard of truth based on an existential ontology" (74), which is transcendental and essentialist.[6] In the most revealing expression of his overall interpretation of Marcuse, Kätz writes: "Marcuse attempted to press beyond even the radical standpoint of (Marx's) *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts*, however, departing once and for all from the terrain of any possible Marxist orthodoxy, he extended the conception of the ontological centrality of labor into a standard against which *all* 'factical,' historical configurations might be judged and condemned...The perpetual need for labor, and thus its ontological centrality, is based upon the conception of an 'essential excess of Being over existence,' of an essential dimension of human being which can *never* attain fulfillment in the historical world. As such, it provides the ontological foundations for a transcendent political critique, for a 'permanent revolution' in a sense much nearer to Goethe's Faust than to the European proletariat:

Werd ich zum Augenblick sagen:
Verweile doch! Du bist so schön!
Dann magst du mir in Fesseln schlagen,
Dann will ich gern Zugrunde.

---

of the artist in an immediate and present this-sideness (*Diesseitigkeit*) . . . find its fulfillment in Gottfried Keller . . . *Der grüne Heinrich* emerges as the genuine antipode to the subjective and romantic artist-novel: in opposition to the great symbol of romanticism he posits a new realism . . . closely connected with the philosophy of Feuerbach who opposes romanticism and German idealism . . . A clear sunshine and the brilliance of a warm summer day radiates over the people." In *Schriften* 1 (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1978), p. 210. This passage and many others contain an implicit critique of romanticism and the theory of the "aesthetic dimension" that Kätz repeatedly and illicitly reads into the early Marcuse.

5. Kätz writes: "Heidegger, at this time, appears to have revealed nothing of his political sensibilities: no anti-semitism or pro-Nazi sympathies have been reported in his personal life or in the execution of his academic duties, and his conduct remained entirely unpolitical" (85). Consequently, his entry into the Nazi party "came as a complete shock" to Marcuse (85). When I questioned Henry Pachter about this, who was studying in Freiberg at the time, he said this is questionable because: 1) Nazi students frequented Heidegger's classes and socialized with Heidegger; 2) Heidegger's wife was a well-known Nazi enthusiast; and 3) Heidegger's life-style and many of his ideas were compatible with Nazism. Thus, if Pachter is right, either Marcuse was short-sighted not to see Heidegger's Nazi proclivities, or Kätz's account is inaccurate.

6. In fact, neither Heidegger's subjectivistic theory of truth as disclosure, his individualistic concept of authenticity, nor his increasingly relativistic, even nihilistic, philosophical perspectives that he developed in *Being and Time* support transcendental ontology. Kätz seems to be following Alfred Schmidt's reading of the early Marcuse which he projects onto Marcuse's theory

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Like Faust, Marcuse's philosophical standpoint builds in a fundamental irreconcilability with the prevailing reality principle, with the established society (as two of his later formulations would have it); he has laid the ontological foundations for a truly "great refusal." (78)

In fact, the Goethe passage cited was consistently interpreted by Marcuse as an expression of finitude, of the impossibility of lasting happiness, and as a yearning for joy and contentment in reality (see, for example, *The Aesthetic Dimension*, 59); it is difficult to see how the quote provides "the ontological foundation for a truly great refusal" (of what? "truly great?"). This passage reveals Kätz's desire to make Marcuse more of a transcendental ontologist than a Marxist social critic. However, Kätz never really develops this interpretation beyond scattered references to a "frankly transcendent standard" (11) or a "transcendent standard of truth" (79) interpreted as a "persistent critical standard" (53) or an "essential standard of criticism" (64).

Moreover, despite constant allusion to this magical standard or "principle," Kätz never describes and defends it, thus we fail to learn what kind of transcendental philosophy Marcuse allegedly has. Underneath Kätz's "reading" is a tendency to reduce Marcuse's thought to a single principle. Symptomatically, Kätz writes that after studying Marx's *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts*, the impact of Heidegger on Marcuse weakened and "from this point on his philosophical function was supplanted by the insight of the young Marx" (77). Note that "*the* insight" of the young Marx is decisive in supposedly liberating Marcuse from Heidegger's ontology and that from "this *point* on" Marcuse was a new ontologist.[7] However, Kätz never specifies what ontology Marcuse derived from Heidegger, what ontology inspired by the early Marx replaced it, and how, if at all, Macuse's ontology developed over the years. Nor does he really describe, in any detail, Marcuse's assimilation of the rationalism of critical theory in the 1930s, his appropriation of Freud, his development of the theory of one-dimensional society and one-dimensional man, or how his sustained work on aesthetics might have deepened or enriched Marcuse's ontology.

Part of the problem is that Kätz, who does not seem particularly adept in philosophy, reduces Marcuse's philosophical work to search for principle rather than seeing Marcuse's work as developing. In effect, Kätz reduces Marcuse's thought to an easily reproducible commodity that can be assimilated without much difficulty into traditional idealist philosophy and cultural history. He simplifies Marcuse and thus makes him too accessible, too easy, too smooth. In this sense, Kätz's interpretation of Marcuse's thought is similar to the quite simplistic early works on Marcuse, sharply criticized for their tendencies toward commodification and reduction of Marcuse's multi-dimensional thought.[8] Kätz adds to this commodification of Marcuse's thought

as a whole. Compare Alfred Schmidt, "Existential-Ontologie und historischer Materialismus bei Herbert Marcuse," in Jürgen Habermas, editor, *Antworten auf Herbert Marcuse* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1968).

7. In another revealing passage Kätz writes: "In the late phase of his career, that of the thesis of 'one-dimensionality' . . . in this period of unsolicited international attention, Marcuse added almost nothing to the theoretical framework he already constructed . . . if the achievement of *Eros and Civilization* had been to anticipate the libertarian impusles of the 1960s, the achievement of *One-Dimensional Man* was to resonate perfectly with them" (162). Note how in this passage Kätz reduces Marcuse's thought to "*the* thesis," (my italics), *the* "theoretical framework," "achievement," etc. Furthermore, to say that *One-Dimensional Man* resonates "perfectly" with the 1960s is highly problematic since 1960's revolts and movements put in question many of Marcuse's theses in *One-Dimensional Man* and forced Marcuse himself to revise many of his positions.

8. Marcuse also thought that there was little in his private life that was relevant to understanding his ideas and did not want biographers prying into his personal affairs. He pointedly distanced

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found in earlier books the commodification of Marcuse's life as an interesting artifact to be consumed and enjoyed. For these and other reasons, Marcuse was thoroughly opposed to the sort of biographical project which Kätz undertook.[9]

As one reads through his book, one discovers that at every stage Kätz's readings of Marcuse's thought contain decisive errors or omissions. As noted, he misinterprets Marcuse's doctoral dissertation. Further, he inaccurately characterizes Marcuse's first published essays[10]; misinterprets the thrust of Marcuse's *Habilitationsschrift* on Hegel's ontology[11]; reads the later Marcuse into his 1930's work with the Institute for Social Research and fails to specify the differences between Marcuse's work with the Institute and his earlier or later writings[12]; provides a sketchy and superficial reading of Marcuse's appropriation of Freud; and omits most of what is interesting and provocative about Marcuse's various theories of contemporary society and social change.

The problem is Kätz's tendency to reduce Marcuse's thought to a philosophical problematic and to neglect his contributions to social or political theory. Not wishing to complicate his endeavor of selling Marcuse as a pleasant figure to academia, Kätz neglects discussing Marcuse's defense of revolutionary violence in "Repressive Tolerance," *An Essay on Liberation*, and many of his other articles, interviews and speeches. It was precisely this issue that gained Marcuse much of his notoriety and so threatened the establishment.

himself from Kätz's sort of enterprise in his last book *The Aesthetic Dimension* where he writes: "What is true of the classics of socialism is true also of great artists. They break through the class limitations of their family background, environment. Marxist theory is not family research" (Boston: Beacon Press, 1977), p. 19. In view of Kätz's work, one can see how his dislike of biographies is justified. In addition to the unattributed fables that litter Kätz's "intellectual biography," we learn that his sister referred to Marcuse as "our Salonkommunist" (178) and that "when his family visited Freiburg to celebrate the publication of *Hegel's Ontology*, he climbed onto the base of a statue and announced to his incredulous visitors, *'ICH BIN BEDEUTEND'* — 'Now I'm somebody!' " (84). Is this true? Did we need to know this? What is the purpose and form of "intellectual biography"?

9. Many of the points made in the following reviews of early books on Marcuse could be applied to Kätz: see the reviews by Paul Piccone, *Telos* 3 (Spring 1969): pp.150-158; Russell Jacoby, *Telos* 5 (Spring 1970): pp. 188-190; and Robin Blackburn, *Telos* 6 (Fall 1970): pp. 348-351.

10. Kätz writes: "Marcuse's attempts to penetrate beyond the abstractness of the existential framework constructed by Heidegger were sketched out in a series of about a dozen essays and reviews written during this period. These pieces covered a range of contemporary theoretical issues, and, viewing them together, it is possible to identify two thematic concerns. The first entailed the dialectical 'mapping' of the ontological terrain first surveyed by Heidegger, and upon which Marxism would be reconstructed . . . systematic reflection upon his own political obligations as a Marxist philosopher comprised a second theme which ran through Marcuse's writings of the late twenties and early thirties" (66, 79). The first citation shows Kätz's propensity to present Marcuse as an ontologist and suggests that Marcuse sought to reconstruct Marxism on "the ontological terrain first surveyed by Heidegger." What is a "dialectical 'mapping' of an ontological terrain" and what "map" did Marcuse draw? The second citation constructs an imaginary "systematic" political reflection on obligations as a Marxist philosopher — in fact, Marcuse's essays are highly theoretical during this period and contain no such systematic political reflections.

11. Kätz claims that *Hegel's Ontology*, although "cast in the expository form mandated by the academic conventions of the *Habilitationsschrift*, in fact contains virtually all the concepts that powered the "revolutionary Concrete Philosophy" (81-82). In fact, the book is highly academic and contains no "revolutionary Concrete Philosophy," although, as usual, Kätz says little of interest about this "Concrete Philosophy" and why it is revolutionary.

12. Kätz's chapter on critical theory (87-107) is particularly weak. He fails to see how Marcuse's turn to the critical rationalism of the Institute's inner circle, especially Horkheimer's, led to a break with his alleged "transcendentalism" and does not really indicate what Marcuse's concept of "critical theory" is.

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It is only in his conclusion, revealingly titled "The Philosophical Dimension," that Kätz confronts Marcuse's Marxism, almost as an afterthought (217-221). Unfortunately, his discussion is extremely sketchy and does not characterize the specificity of Marcuse's Marxism or how it relates to the transcendental philosophy that Kätz finds paradigmatic of Marcuse's thought. In fact, he also says nothing of interest, in his conclusion, about the philosophical dimension in Marcuse's thought or his distinctive brand of philosophy and contributions to contemporary philosophy.

Curiously, although Kätz omits material pertaining to the one-dimensional pessimist that is the subject of Schoolman's work on Marcuse, and although Kätz is as completely uncritical of Marcuse as Schoolman is "critical," there is a similar way of reading Marcuse present in both books. Both Kätz and Schoolman reduce Marcuse's thought to a simple philosophical problematic which they then either implicitly promote (Kätz) or attack (Schoolman). The result in both cases is a one-dimensional Marcuse, stripped of what made him so attractive and such an important figure in the late sixties, eliciting such passionate and contradictory responses. Consequently, neither Kätz nor Schoolman can explain why Marcuse was such a potent figure, or why he was so beloved by some and hated by others. Thus, an adequate appraisal of Marcuse's thought and legacy remains to be done.

Douglas Kellner

Theodor W. Adorno, *Against Epistemology: A Metacritque*, translated by Willis Domingo, The MIT Press (Cambridge 1983), 248 plus vii pp., $27.50.

Why was Adorno against epistemology? Because it deals with foundations. The very posing of the question of foundations from a traditional critical theory perspective is a problematic undertaking. Adorno was deeply distrustful of *any* kind of philosophical or extra-philosophical foundations. According to him, all discussions of foundations, origins, or *prima philosophia* precipitate thought into reification and identity logic or, better yet, into an idealism that freezes existing relations of domination into an unwarranted ontological dimension. Thus, Adorno was adamantly opposed to Heidegger, to scholastic philosophy and even to what he understood Husserl to mean, in addition to most empirical work and survey research in social science.

The same arguments deployed against philosophies of origins were equally effective against the social sciences whenever they pretended to flow out of an allegedly apodictic source. Thus, facts themselves are always suspect when considered in isolation or independently of the theoretical context or totality that constituted them. Although the totality does not exist above and beyond the facts, the facts themselves are not identical with the totality.[1] Similarly, the facts themselves, in their immediacy, are the philosophical equivalents of "appearances" and only through considerable mediation can they result in knowledge of social reality. At any rate, "the objectivity of social research is an objectivity of the methods, not what is investigated." On the contrary, "empirical methods...favor the subjective...(they abstract) at most...from statistical data of the census type...the behavorial modes of human subjects."[2] These methods

1. See Theodor W. Adorno et. al., *The Positivist Dispute in German Sociology*, trans. by Glyn Adey and David Frisby (Harper & Rev: New York, 1976), pp. 32-33.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 71.

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capture, at best, only one side of their object so that the dialectical concept of objectivity Adorno works with has nothing to do with pregivenness or epistemological primacy, but emphasizes throughout the function of *mediation*. To the extent that the particular already mirrors the totality of which it is an integral part, its adequate apprehension is possible only through *micrology,* i.e., apprehending the particular *as such* free of extraneous distorting encrustations.

But the concept of totality in Adorno is by no means an unproblematic one.[3] It is neither immediately given nor ever capable of being apprehended exhaustively: in fact, when it is presented as such, it becomes a totalitarian reification deployed by "really existing socialist societies" as the ideology of the ruling bureaucratic apparatus. The famous claim that "the whole is the untrue" expresses this difficulty in a nutshell. Far from seeking to impose any forced reconciliation of the whole with the part, Adorno always stressed that the totality itself was hopelessly "lacerated," "split" and in internal conflict with itself so that, at best, the concept was always *heuristic* rather than affirmative —or to use his words, the concept was thoroughly *critical.*

This situation is complicated by the fact that the Adornian critique, in *The Dialectic of the Enlightenment*, expands to invest all of instrumental rationality to the point of challenging the entire Enlightenment tradition. This leads Adorno into the paradox of postulating "the self-destruction of the critical faculty" by means of an analysis —but an analysis which, as Habermas put it, "must make use of the same critique which it has declared false."[4] This kind of objection, however, would not have daunted Adorno who had already rejected systematic coherence as inadequate and even mystifying in the effort to apprehend its object. For all such efforts are bound to be futile when the object is internally torn by the irreconcilable social contradictions generated by the fraudulent "principle of exchange" in capitalist society. In such a situation, critique must forfeit its claims to systematic coherence and remain fragmentary and untotalized. Among other things, this also explains why Adorno insisted on an esoteric language impossible to integrate within the mundane discourse of the logic of domination and privileged art over science as the potential repository of truth.

Clearly, this paradoxical approach can be employed only at the tactical and not the strategic level. It can win many battles, but it can never hope to settle any wars. Its refusal even to begin to provide concrete alternatives for fear of reinforcing precisely the state of affairs that it is meant to challenge relegated it to an unrelenting critical stance that parasitically fed on the degenerate situation it attacked. Such a consciously one-sided negative dialectic could never translate into a critical theory able to sustain itself over any length of time at any level other than the aesthetic and the literary ones. Thus, it is not surprising that the next generation of critical theorists had to change course for the sake of the same theoretical coherence and systematic approach that Adorno had so readily forsaken. In Habermas, the linguistic turn and the shift to a Kantian proceduralism provided the type of foundation that did result in a coherent critical theory, but at a price Adorno would never have paid.

By splitting off instrumental rationality — ascribed to interaction — Habermas sidesteps the pessimistic trajectory Adorno had outlined for the domination of the con-

3. For Adorno's position, see Theodor W. Adorno, "The Actuality of Philosophy," in *Telos*, n. 31 (Spring 1977), pp. 120-133. See also Benjamin Snow, "Introduction to Adorno's 'The Actuality of Philosophy," in *Telos*, n. 31 (Spring 1977), pp. 113-119; and Martin Jay "The Concept of Totality in Lukács and Adorno," in *Telos*, n. 32 (Summer, 1977), pp. 117-138, where Jay, however mistakenly, associates Adorno's and Althusser's two very different concepts of totality.

4. Jürgen Habermas, "The Entwinement of Myth and Enlightenment," in *New German Critique*, n. 26 (Spring-Summer 1982), pp. 22.

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cept: from Adam and Eve to Auschwitz, Hiroshima and Siberia. Since for Habermas, emancipation is no longer the conscious political task of a social class (according to various modifications of the classical Marxist scheme) but, rather, is built in the very logic of communicative interaction, the question of a conscious revolutionary social agency gives way to the functionally equivalent necessary requirements of advanced industrial societies. The old discredited notion that technological progress automatically would bring human emancipation is displaced by a dubious collective learning process, which allegedly cannot be reversed. Even historical materialism is redefined in terms of this cultural dimension.[5] The result is that all of Adorno's forebodings about the intensification of alienation and the increased sophistication of the means of domination are rendered superfluous. Alienation itself—the key notion for a whole generation of Western Marxists — becomes redefined operationally in terms of communicative competence and loses its overwhelming normative import.

Habermas' critical theory consequently gains a linguistic foundation and successfully grounds critique in a seemingly unchallengeable formal dimension. The problem, though, is that this dimension seems to have no bearing on any concrete social situation and remains thereby abstract. Habermas' approach cannot effectively deal with nature and ecology—now safely relegated to labor and instrumental rationality—and trivializes the dialectic to a politically and socially impotent linguistic dimension. But the only link this has to "traditional" critical theory is reduced to biographical accidents. Habermas' systematically elaborated theoretical coherence has thus brought the new version of critical theory the kind of academic respectability Adorno's and Horkheimer's could never have achieved, but at the price of practically repudiating its main objectives. In learning to speak the language of the academy and becoming accommodated to conformist discourse, critical theory forgot what it originally sought to say or, at any rate, is now incapable of saying. As a specialized subdiscipline, it thrives in the intricacies of its new scholasticism, away from that socio-political fray that Adorno and Horkheimer never lost sight of.

Of course, Habermas' critical theory can still effectively defend democratic values against, e.g., Luhmann's technocratic challenges. It can also successfully insert a minimal critical dimension in an otherwise sterile social-scientific context. But its edges have been blunted and its normative import diluted. It has simply become another voice in the academic crowd. Is this the only possible outcome for the Adornian tradition? Was this reconciliation necessary? Is an alternative critical theory possible?

If the distinction between labor and interaction is erased on the grounds, pointed out by many critics, that labor is as social as any other type of interaction,[6] and that the objectivistic distinction is replaced by its subjectivistic opposite, i.e., what determines the character of praxis is not the object but the activity itself, then all the answers provided by the linguistic turn become vacuous while reification, the dialectic, and the precategorical material dimension so central for Adorno and the whole Marxist tradition before him, regain their theoretical primacy. At the same time, however, all of the old problems reappear as they existed prior to the ill-fated linguistic turn. Thus, the

5. Jürgen Habermas, *Communication and the Evolution of Society*, trans. by Thomas McCarthy (Beacon Press: Boston, 1979), ch. 3, "Historical Materialism and the Development of Normative Structures," pp. 95-129.

6. For an excellent summary of these criticisms, see David Held, *Introduction to Critical Theory: Horkheimer to Habermas* (University of California Press: Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1980).

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question arises: do foundations necessarily entail the reification or the trivializing of theoretical discourse? At this point, Husserl's phenomenology — especially as developed in his last work *The Crisis of European Sciences*— may become relevant. In this context, the translation into English of Adorno's *Metakritik der Erkenntnisstheorie* may be a welcome contribution, despite the peculiar title *Against Epistemology,* to the still largely unresolved question of possible relations between traditional critical theory and Husserlian phenomenology.

In spite of its book-format, *Against Epistemology* is essentially a long essay which has already been available in English for a few years[7] embellished with a number of relatively irrelevant appendices written years before and having a dubious bearing on the much more clearly formulated arguments of the introductory pieces. And the main theme is captured by the opening epigram from Epicharmus to the effect that "A mortal must think mortal and not immortal thoughts." In other words, the problem with phenomenology is that it seeks to collapse the infinite, the precategorical, the living into the finite, the categorical and the conceptual. In so doing, Adorno suggests it only feeds into the logic of the totally administered society by extending into the most remote areas of philosophical discourse that principle of identity and exchange that has already been identified as the hallmark of capitalist domination. It is the old problem of reification shifting from the commodity form to the industrialization of thought.

While always opposed to "philosophies of life" which in his own lifetime —and at a crucial political juncture— had leaned towards the barbarism of fascism and Nazism, Adorno always vindicated the primacy of "the living" over "the thought," of the process over the product, of the doing over "the deed." This, for him, is why truth is not a purely conceptual matter but transcends such a restrictive domain. In fact, it becomes accessible only through art inasmuch as only art can operate freely at the level of the preconceptual and can succeed in communicating that which, mummified in concepts, loses its infinity and collapses into finitude, mundanity and ultimately reification. Unlike the nomological truths of science, which obtain within the a homogenized, mathematized reality (identity thought), the truth conveyed by art is irreducible to a logical deduction or a well-documented argument. It obtains instead at a transcendental, almost theological domain — that concerning which one cannot merely speak of. As he wrote in *Aesthetische Theorie* : "Works of art speak like fairies in tales: you want the truth; as a form of knowledge, art possesses truth but only as something that proves incommensurable to art."[8]

Phenomenology's efforts to scientifically spell out the constitutive operations whereby these very basic experiences become what they are appear to Adorno as unwarranted intrusions of the administrative logic into that which cannot be penetrated without at the same time destroying it. As Vico had roughly put it centuries earlier, science can seek to study life but what it ends up dissecting is the cadaver and not the living being. In eliminating the tension between the finite and the infinite, the living and the thought, the part and the whole, phenomenology allegedly destroys the possibility of apprehending truth and degenerates into but another garden variety of positivism. As with the opening epigram, the closing sentence also is revealing: "Should philosophy as scientific semantics desire to translate speech into logic, then it

7. Theodor W. Adorno, "Metacritique of Epistemology," in *Telos*, no. 38 (Winter 1978-79), pp. 77-103. The best systematic critique of this remains Guido G. Neri, *Prassi e Conoscenza* (Feltrinelli: Milan, 1966).

8. Theodore W. Adorno, *Aesthetische Theorie* (Suhrkamp: Frankfurt, 1974), p. 191

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is left to it as speculative philosophy to bring logic to speech. It is time not for first philosophy, but last philosophy" (p. 40). As such, phenomenology collapses into positivism and speculative philosophy fades into art.

But Adorno's analysis may have been affected too much by a reading of Husserl through a Heideggerianism that at the time was flirting with Nazism and by an excessive emphasis on Husserl's early works at the expense of later, more historically and socio-politically relevant ones —such as the *Crisis*. For it is in this last, unfinished work that Husserl himself confronts the problem of reification and attempts to explain phenomenology as living praxis meant precisely to demystify reification by investigating how it is constituted, how it is reproduced, and, most important of all, how the very recreation of reified social relations presupposes that same creative activity it subsequently destroys. Contrary to Adorno's pronouncements, Husserlian phenomenology turns out to vindicate that very same aesthetic dimension that he considers the only remaining path to truth as the foundation of a non-reified science grounded in a teleological project of human emancipation and no longer reduced to its administrative and scientific travesty successfully marketed by postivist ideologues.

Adorno's critique of Husserl unfolds along a number of familiar tracks, but all of them miss the mark: the incompatibility of Husserl's phenomenology with Hegel's; the illusion of first beginnings; the destruction of particularity from the viewpoint of the all-encompassing reified totality; the separation of being and method; the positing of philosophy as true being; the reduction of the new to the old; the unwarranted hypostatization of pseudo-concreteness; etc. In all of these issues, not only is Husserl much closer to Adorno than Adorno suspects, but in providing a phenomenological elaboration of these themes, the later Husserl was able at the same time to begin outlining the kind of philosophical foundations without which critical theory floats into nothingness, or is forced into conformist compromises such as Habermas' linguistic turn.

Consider the question of the "dialectical contradiction" to which Adorno ascribes so much negative power and rightly so. What gives the contradiction its strength is that it obtains between form and content where this content is not already formed and thus prepared for standard conceptual processing. Rather, this content is that particular embodying the totality and irreducible to any of its possible conceptual renditions *without* leaving behind a substantial residue which eventually reappears as negativity and drives the dialectic forward by exploding what turns out to be an arbitrarily imposed structuration. Adorno refers to this multi-sided particularity but cannot elaborate on it other than by resorting to micrology, which ultimately is a kind of artistic hermeneutic disclosing its relation to the totality in problematic metaphors, which tend to collapse either in esoteric allusions or crude sociologisms. One need only consult *Minima Moralia* or the essays in the Popper debate to realize this. In Husserl, the phenomenological reduction does the same thing, but in a much more satisfactory way. The particular is "deconstructed" —to use a less than felicitous but increasingly fashionable expression— back to the living context out of which it was experienced. What this does is to allow the retrieval of the by now forgotten *principium differentiationis*, which selected out of the original polymorphous content what eventually was conceptually processed as *formed* content. But it is precisely this principle of selection —long since occluded in the mundanity of automatic perception— that embodies the axiological dimension as a translation of that teleological project constituting Western civilization (or, to use Husserl's phrase, "European Science").

The great advantage of the phenomenological reduction is that, in carefully spelling

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out the steps involved in even the reproduction of mundanity, it provides a dialectical analysis grounded in the creative foundation of life, but not forever imprisoned in philosophical metaphors accessible only to the initiated. Thus, reification as forgetting, a phrase dear to all the members of the first generation of critical theorists, also gains an analytical meaning. What has been forgotten, and therefore generates reification, is the principle of selection employed in the structuring of living content into experienced being. The conscious reappropriation of this all-important feature restores the dimension of freedom to a most basic level and thus eliminates reification from our very mode of experiencing. Far from being impoverished, the dialectic now attains a clarity it had never had in the Hegelian tradition and instead of reducing the new to the old —as Adorno claims— it rejuvenates the old by bringing it to life once again as a decisive active, and consequently changing discussion of the new.

Given this, it is clear that Husserlian phenomenology does not strait-jacket particularity within the pre-given categories of a reified totality but does precisely the opposite: it provides access to particularity independently of mundane modes of perceiving, and thus frees it from the grips of automatic thinking, or reification. Since this process does not occlude or forget about the residues remaindered in the process of constituting formed content, it is able to avoid identity thinking, and thus can escape the homogenizing functions of the predominant logic of domination. Here Adorno's identity principle receives the kind of philosophical elaboration that he himself never bothered to provide.

One could go on to systematically show how Adorno's criticisms of Husserl not only miss the mark by a country mile but also fail to see how phenomenology provides Adorno's own critical theory with the kind of foundation that it so desperately needs and without which it must be condemned to philosophical impotence. As Dallmayr and others have repeatedly pointed out,[9] Adorno's *Negative Dialectic* can be seen as an extended attack on the notion of constitutive subjectivity on the ground that it tends to evaporate materiality into consciousness and thus fall into old-fashioned idealism. But this charge simply extends the original misunderstanding of the function of Husserlian phenomenology which is not to dissolve materiality, but to concretely grasp it beyond the sedimentations of meanings built upon it in the totally administered society. In a nutshell, phenomenology for Husserl performs precisely the task that Adorno relegated to art, but in a less esoteric and thus immensely more accessible way.

Clearly, providing traditional critical theory with a phenomenological foundation —or, to use a more palatable phrase, to have critical theory undertake a phenomenological rather than a linguistic turn— generates an entirely new series of problems while opening also new horizons within which to reconstitute the problems of emancipation, alienation, reconciliation with nature, etc. Unfortunately, Husserlian phenomenology has either been Heideggerianized or otherwise trivialized by the armies of academic pedants parading as "phenomenolgists," "ethnomethodologists" or other equally esoteric denominations. Like mustard, phenomenology goes with almost everything with the consequence that it degenerates into but another rhetorical mode —a private language practically incomprehensible and when deciphered, either trivial or utterly nonsensical.[10] To the extent that, largely because of Adorno's mis-

9. Fred R. Dallmayr, *Twilight of Subjectivity: Contributions to a Post-Individualist Theory of Politics* (The University of Massachusetts Press: Amherst, 1981), p. 133ff.

10. For one of the worst examples of this, see Roslyn Wallach Bologh, *Dialectical Phemenology:*

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understanding, a potentially fruitful rapprochement between critical theory and phenomenology was missed,[11] the task remains. Given the theoretical predilections of the new generations of both phenomenologists and critical theorists, however, this task is likely to remain unfulfilled in the foreseeable future.

Paul Piccone

Marx's Method (Rutledge & Kegan Paul: Boston and London, 1979), which, despite the title, has nothing to do either with phenomenology, dialectics, Marx's method or French Fries.

11. The older Marcuse was beginning to shift in that direction. See his "On Science and Phenomenology," in Robert Cohen and Marx W. Wartofsky, eds., *Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science,* vol. II (The Humanities Press: New York, 1965), pp. 279-291. Given Marcuse's never fully relinquished Heideggarian proclivities and his concern with aesthetics and political issues in the late 1960s-1970s, the issue was never taken up again other than by Kosik in Czechoslovakia, Merleau-Ponty and Sartre in France, Paci in Italy, and the *Praxis* philosophers in Yugoslavia whose political and theoretical fate is well known.

Helen Swick Perry, *The Psychiatrist of America: The Life of Harry Stack Sullivan*, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press (Cambridge, Mass., 1982).

In her biography, *Psychiatrist of America,* Helen Swick Perry details quite vividly the nexus of interpersonal relations which provided the basis for Sullivan's development. She stresses the degree to which Sullivan's "interpersonal theory is an American product," rooted in "the rural life of Chenanto County" in New York where he grew up at the end of the nineteenth century (p. 7). Acknowledging that Sullivan's interpersonal theory was, in part, an attempt to account for his own fragility, Perry emphasizes the impoverishment of personal life in his early environment. His grandparents had come to this country because they were violently uprooted by the potato famine in Ireland which occured between 1845 and 1849. Choosing to settle in upstate New York in a thinly populated and geographically isolated farming area in which the winters were long and bitterly cold, they had to struggle to survive, particularly through the depression that occurred at the end of the last century. In this context, speaking of the unusually high number of suicides in the community, Perry suggests that Sullivan's mother went through a severe emotional crisis when her son was two and a half. Cared for by his grandmother who preserved her Irish ways and even spoke Gaelic, Sullivan seemed almost destined to be "the outsider, the loner who lived mainly on the edge of things" (p. 94).

Yet from early youth he was urged by his mother and her relatives to engage in that most typical American endeavor — to rise in the manner of Horatio Alger to a position of eminence and therefore acceptance. For Perry, the arduousness of this quest, especially its desperation which undermined the possibility for happiness, became one of the most salient features of Sullivan's life. Referring to his mother's attitude toward him, Sullivan stated that "her son was so different from me that I felt she had no use for me except as a clotheshorse on which to hang an elaborate pattern of illusion" (p. 13). His mother's aspirations to rekindle the myth of her family's splendor, which was rooted in the status of the old landed gentry in Ireland, was channeled in part

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through her son. Her husband was primarily a farm laborer who was unsympathetic to his wife's aristocratic pretensions or to his son's intellectual interests. Sullivan, then, was caught quite early in the conflicting currents of his home which pointed outward to an essentially "incoherent culture." Trapped by rural life with its emphasis upon physical labor, unable to become assimilated because of the virulent nativism of the period, shunned as a Catholic in a predominantly Protestant environment that was extremely repressive, Sullivan experienced in his late teens severe emotional difficulty which led to hospitalization and provided the impetus for his search "for the relation between outworn value systems and the sickness that infected gifted adolescents in the delicate transition from the early environment to the larger world" (p. 66).

Perry is extremely concerned with Sullivan's capacity to respond sympathetically to those like himself who were in certain respects deprived of an environment which might foster a sense of security and the possibility for personal growth. In 1911, he went to medical school in Chicago where his observations of the immigrant population, which was burdened by the negative effects of the industrial revolution, helped him to understand the schizophrenic states. He found his own "terrible loneliness and despair" echoed in the slums of the city where the sense of being uprooted permeated the lives of the Irish whose desire for farmland was generally undermined by "financial and physical exhaustion" (p. 164). Like his fellow countrymen, "he drifted around from one dreary job to another, living with no consistent or traceable housing . . . " (p. 164).

His life became more focused when he went to Washington in 1920 and later began work at St. Elizabeth's Hospital under the direction of William Alanson White. Here he found, perhaps for the first time, an ambience in which "he was accepted by people who shared his interests and where his curiosity about life was not only tolerated — it was encouraged" (p. 179). His experience here as well as at Shephard and Enoch Pratt Hospital in Maryland were his most formative institutional experiences as a psychiatrist who would later make an important contribution to the understanding of the schizophrenic process.

He was encouraged by staff members to follow his belief that " 'interpersonal factors seem to be the effective elements in the psychiatry of schizophrenia' " (p. 180)[1] Influenced by psychoanalytic theory, especially the modifications introduced by Ferenczi, Sullivan attempted to create a therapeutic milieu for psychotic patients. His work foreshadowed some of the communitarian experiments of the late sixties and early seventies since he envisaged "socio-psychiatric" enclaves in which an empathic environment cut off from the harshness of everyday life in America might provide a haven for severely disturbed patients. Sensitive to the social deprivation caused by the industrial revolution as well as to the forms of hierarchy which pervaded institutional life in America, Sullivan tried to create an atmosphere of reciprocal trust in which doctors, nurses, attendants, and patients might be on a more equal footing than in the past.

These interests were furthered as he came under the influence of the Chicago School of Sociology, which emphasized the use of empirical studies in the interdisciplinary setting to further democratic and humane ends. Increasingly, Sullivan saw himself as a social scientist and spent considerable time seeking a place for psychiatric research and education in the larger community. At the same time, he began to become interested

1. Here Perry quotes Sullivan from "The Onset of Schizophrenia," in *Schizophrenia as a Human Process* (New York: Norton, 1962), p. 104.

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in developing a "psychiatry of peoples" which might help to prevent emotional distress and even alleviate the tensions that cause war.

When he left Sheppard to come to New York City in 1930, he was already a socialist, although one "who admired extravagantly the better things of life" (p. 304). Perry speaks of the periodic bankruptcies which made his work more difficult. But he survived through his private practice which brought him for the first time into contact with the rich whose obsessional devices were often "useful in maintaining a financially safe existence" (p. 350). He was distressed by their narrow, uninvolved lives and believed strongly in the idea that people had a duty to society, often moving his patients in this direction. Thus it is not surprising that his friendships were often based upon a mutual sympathy for the exploited and the oppressed as is evident in his ties to John Vassos, Erich Fromm, Karen Horney, Edward Sapir, and Harold Lasswell.

Under the influence of Sapir and Lasswell, he helped to establish the Washington School of Psychiatry as a major force in the United States and promoted his journal *Psychiatry* as an organ for research. In these endeavors, he was often concerned with the larger social totality as well as with individual mental health. In 1939, he visited the South to explore the situation of Blacks. Utilizing his experience during World War I when he ministered to soldiers scarred psychologically by the trauma of battle, in World War II he helped the Selective Service set up a screening system for recruits. When the war ended, Sullivan turned most of his attention to the possibility of creating an enduring peace. Shocked by the destruction of Hiroshima, he made frequent trips to various parts of the world, including Russia, to gain a better understanding of social and political problems and the ways in which psychiatry might be useful to prevent further conflict. Despite the fact that he was scorned by many of his colleagues for being "politically naive," he continued in these efforts until he died in Paris in 1949 where he was consulting on some plans for a project on "Tensions That Cause Wars."

Sullivan's hope that a dynamic interpersonal psychiatry might alleviate emotional problems as well as provide the basis for the prevention of serious mental illness did not blind him to the severity of social conditions, particularly the political, racial, and economic issues which contribute to personal distress in the first place. At one point he remarked that "With one out of four citizens either significantly deficient in intelligence or so distorted from an optimum development of personality that the vicissitudes of life are a considerable risk for him, the social system comes very near being impeached . . . "[2]

And yet, despite the fact that he criticized the larger social reality, he could at times underestimate its power. Thus he stated that "We may have been and still continue to be the most guardedly superficial in interpersonal relations of all the peoples of the earth, but we stem from traditions which emphasize the worth and dignity of human beings, and our inadequacies are matters of deficiency in the understanding and technique of interpersonal intimacy, rather than matters of fundamental cleavage between master and man, between an hierarchy of traditional ruling classes and their vassals and slaves."[3] If in this passage Sullivan demonstrated a limited understanding about the nature of power, particularly the opacity of class rule in twentieth-century America, he was even more shortsighted in his failure to elaborate significantly on the manner in which our economic system, rooted in the nature of commodity exchange,

2. "Completing Our Mobilization," *Psychiatry*, 5 (1942), 281. This statement appeared in an unsigned editorial which Perry acknowledges was mainly written by Sullivan.

3. "The Soldier's Return," *Psychiatry*, 8 (1945), 112.

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affects the quality of interpersonal experience. In addition, however liberating Sullivan's views might have been in the context of his criticism of the old repressive morality and his desire to expand the range of psychological awareness, they have come to serve current forms of domination which utilize the obsession with introspection and personal fulfillment in an interpersonal context to deflect attention away from the prevailing structure of institutional power.

Sullivan focused upon the nuances of perception and feeling that came to be incorporated in the self-dynamism throughout development, which itself was construed as primarily an interpersonal process. He was very concerned with the way that the individual was thwarted emotionally through the distortions of communication that took place with others, especially with family members. If he did acknowledge that the family was embedded in the larger social totality, he devoted himself primarily to an exploration of the quality of inner experience which in its immediacy tends to obscure the importance of society whose effects appear to be relatively remote.

Given his perception of the importance of the home environment, he increasingly turned his attention to child rearing practice which, he believed, could be improved if parents were properly educated. In this context, Christopher Lasch suggests that Sullivan can be viewed as an important link to a critical legacy of progressive thought: the idea that began to be articulated in a widespread manner at the end of the nineteenth century in the positive benefits to be derived from the "appropriation of parental functions" by the "helping professions."[4] Lasch believes that Sullivan must be included among those who helped foster the "psychiatric imperialism" which permeates contemporary American society and induces people to believe in their fundamental inadequacy when dealing with issues pertaining to inner life.[5]

Perry's inability to perceive the possibility that Sullivan's views might come to serve the prevalent ideology of our age is perhaps ironic, given the fact that she worked closely with him for three years before his death during which time he was deeply committed to the (then) radical idea of creating a "cultural revolution to end war."[6] His desire to see an end to economic inequity, racism, and nationalism suggested his belief in a socialist future at a time when America was settling into the "cold war" with Russia.

Perry applauds these efforts. Nevertheless, as the managing editor of *Psychiatry* and his posthumous papers, she came to admire Sullivan in ways that interfere with her ability to look critically at his life and work. Perhaps her most serious error is her attempt to explain Sullivan's life by utilizing his theoretical framework, especially his conception of the stages of human development from infancy through adolescence. To compound the problem, Sullivan often draws indirectly upon his own life to illustrate and support his contentions, a fact which Perry recognizes but does not acknowledge as a possible limitation of his attempt to construct a systematic theory. If she criticizes Freud for being essentially unconscious of the manner in which aspects of his perspective are applicable mainly to people from a certain kind of milieu in *fin de siècle* Vienna, she is unable to extend this critique to her evaluation of Sullivan. Though she does acknowledge that the "size" of the continent as well as the "diversity" of the American people helped shape Sullivan's views regarding the self as the embodiment of " 'the reflected appraisals of others' " (p. 226), she never suggests that his attempt to create a universally applicable theory might be skewed by his particular background.

4. *Haven in a Heartless World: The Family Besieged* (New York: Basic Books, 1977), p. 15.
5. *Ibid*, p. 98.
6. "The Cultural Revolution to End War," *Psychiatry*, 9 (1946), 81-87.

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For example, Sullivan's early friendship with Clarence Bellinger is described as a necessary part of the preadolescent period when, according to interpersonal psychiatry, every child usually develops an intense friendship with a member of the same sex. Perry labors at great lengths to indicate the importance of this relationship without ever discussing the possibility that Sullivan's theory might be limited in terms of its relevance to two intelligent boys (or girls) growing up in a highly isolated rural environment.

Despite these problems in her biography, Perry presents a wealth of important detail to indicate the ways in which the trajectory of Sullivan's life either paralleled or differed from the experience of others who exercised considerable influence upon him. Brief vignettes of Ruth Benedict, William Alanson White, Clara Thompson, Edward Sapir, Harold Lasswell, and G. Brock Chisholm punctuate this book, as well as a very rich set of allusions that draw upon the work and lives of other significant figures from a variety of fields who touched Sullivan's world.

Perry's use of these vignettes serves to illustrate her belief, which echoed Sullivan's view, that people can be understood almost exclusively in the context of their experiences with others. In an essay, Sullivan himself suggested that individuality was an illusion, since we are thoroughly embedded in a social matrix. Several times Perry quotes Sullivan who said that "every human being has as many personalities as he has interpersonal relations."[7] He went even further to state that personality is revealed "in interpersonal situations only. The phenomenal presence of personality *in or about* a discrete living being is not demonstrable and need not be assumed. Personality phenomena are conditional on the relevant personal situation, which always includes a least one other person — who need not be contemporarily real or immediately present as an embodied human organism. Persons (personalities) are the entities which we infer in order to explain interpersonal events and relations."[8]

Although she describes the differences within the psychoanalytic community between the orthodox followers of Freud who were more skeptical about the singular importance of interpersonal relations than the Neo-Freudian group that came to be identified with Sullivan, Horney and Fromm, she never discusses the schism fully. Failing to indicate that traditional Freudians, especially members of the object-relations school and the ego psychologists, believe that psychological life is overdetermined by a web of constitutional, environmental, and intrapsychic factors, she stresses the "economic," "dynamic," and "structural" aspects of psychoanalytic theory and contrasts this with the greater emphasis placed upon cultural and interpresonal issues by some of Freud's successor/critics. Moreover, she does not address the issue of the irreconcilable conflict between culture and instinct that is so central to orthodox psychoanalytic theory which scorns the belief, advanced by Sullivan, in the possibility of developing an integrated and harmonious personality in an empathic interpersonal environment.

Even if she takes Sullivan's side in his battle with the orthodox Freudian school without elaborating sufficiently on the complexity of the issues involved in the controversy, her book is an extremely lucid and generally thorough presentation of the signficiance of Sullivan's life and work. In her discussion, she intimates correctly that Sullivan's importance has often been underestimated both in and outside the psychoanalytic community. She might have indicated that his interpersonal psychiatry

7. "The Illusion of Individuality," in *The Fusion of Psychiatry and Social Science* (New York: Norton, 1964), p. 221.

8. "Intuition, Reason, and Faith," in *The Fusion of Psychiatry and Social Science, op. cit.* p. 64.

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dovetails in many respects with the work of object-relations theorists; and that Sullivan's understanding of the importance of the nuances of personal interaction is central to much of the therapy that takes place today, particularly in the context of work done with families. Perry's book should awaken a sense of Sullivan's significance, since she meticulously details his development in the context of the relevant social and intellectual currents operating in America since the latter part of the nineteenth century.

Robert Ehrlich

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